

# **State Funding and Intra-Party Dynamics:**

Exploring the Impact of State Funding on  
Staffing, Centralisation, and Electoral Participation in New Minor  
Parties in Norway and Italy

*Volume I of II*

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## Abstract

State funding is currently provided to parties in most first and second wave democracies. For European political parties, state funding has come to constitute a majority of their income. Existing studies have found that state funding is linked with staffing, shifting structures of intra-party power (centralisation), and continued pursuit of constitutive function, i.e. electoral participation (survival). However, the results are far from unequivocal. In consequence, we have only a limited understanding of the ways in which state funds shape contemporary parties, and in particular, the extent to which state funding fosters or hinders the performance of political parties' crucial linkage function between citizens and the state.

This thesis addresses this limitation, by analysing the impact of state funding in parties where this impact is most likely to manifest itself, namely in newly established (post-1980) and electorally minor parties (with less than 10 percent of the vote). The central research question is: *How does state funding influence processes of staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function (electoral participation) in newly established, electorally minor parties?* State funding is defined as state benefits, comprising direct (e.g. annual grants), and indirect (e.g. party tax) state funds, and state constraints, comprising criteria related to access to and maintenance of state benefits. Staffing is defined as shifts to a party's number of staff, while centralisation refers to the process in which elites increase their share of seats in the (national) executive council at the expense of members. Pursuit of constitutive function (electoral participation) is defined as surpassing Pedersen's (1982) threshold of authorisation, i.e. exceeding ballot access requirements and presenting an electoral list.

The thesis develops three hypotheses to guide the empirical analysis. Firstly, I argue that an increase in state funding sparks hiring processes (H1). Secondly, I argue that state funds *and* staff strengthen party elites, in turn enabling them to initiate and execute centralising reforms (H2). Finally, H3 contends that state funding and staff contribute to new minor parties' pursuit of constitutive function by facilitating their compliance with ballot access requirements and their presentation of an electoral list.

A comparative case design is adopted to empirically explore H1, H2, and H3. The comparison takes place both across the 14 selected new minor parties in Norway and Italy, and within these parties, as the exploration of staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function take place by means of analyses of individual party life cycles. A range of primary documents, 61 interviews, and secondary sources are used to analyse the research question. The main conclusion from the in-depth, exploratory analysis is that state funds do indeed shape new minor parties' staffing patterns, supporting H1. In a similar vein, state funds and staff strengthen elites, in turn enabling them to initiate centralising reforms, and – in some instances – state funds and staff contribute to execute centralising reforms, thus supporting H2. Finally, state funds and staff broadly contribute to new minor parties' ability to exceed ballot access requirements and present an electoral list in both Norwegian and Italian new minor parties, in line with H3.

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## *Table of contents*

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>13</b>
1.1	Puzzle and research question .....	13
1.2	State funding from a normative perspective.....	19
1.3	Closing gaps in the existing literature: A literature review .....	22
1.4	Outline of thesis.....	30
<b>2</b>	<b>Analytical framework .....</b>	<b>35</b>
2.0	Introduction.....	35
2.1	Defining state funding, staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function .....	36
2.2	The impact of state funding on staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function: A theoretical framework .....	44
2.3	Summary .....	59
<b>3</b>	<b>Research design .....</b>	<b>62</b>
3.0	Introduction.....	62
3.1	Research Design: The comparative approach, contexts, and time-frame.....	63
3.2	Case selection: Parties, reforms, and electoral contests .....	68
3.3	Data and method .....	78
3.4	Operationalisations.....	85
3.5	Additional factors to be considered in the analysis .....	91
3.6	Summary .....	93
<b>4</b>	<b>State funding regulations in Italy and Norway .....</b>	<b>95</b>
4.0	Introduction.....	95
4.1	State benefits and constraints in Italian party finance 1974-2016 .....	96
4.2	State benefits and constraints in Norwegian party finance 1970-2016.....	113
4.3	State funding regulations in Norway and Italy – Parallels and differences .....	122
4.4	Summary .....	125

<b>5</b>	<b>New minor parties' income structures under shifting state funding regulations .....</b>	<b>126</b>
5.0	Introduction .....	126
5.1	Italian new minor parties' income structure .....	126
5.2	Norwegian new minor parties' income structure .....	140
5.3	Comparative discussion: New minor parties' income structure across Italy and Norway ...	152
5.4	Summary .....	157
<b>6</b>	<b>State funding and staffing .....</b>	<b>158</b>
6.0	Introduction .....	158
6.1	State funding and staffing: An analysis of Italian new minor parties .....	158
6.2	State funding and staffing: An analysis of Norwegian new minor parties .....	184
6.3	Comparative overview and discussion .....	203
6.4	Summary .....	209
<b>7</b>	<b>State funding and centralisation .....</b>	<b>211</b>
7.0	Introduction .....	211
7.1	The implications of state funding access and staff for centralisation in Italy .....	212
7.2	The implications of state funding access and staff for centralisation in Norway .....	236
7.3	Comparative overview and discussion .....	256
7.4	Summary .....	262
<b>8</b>	<b>State funding and pursuit of constitutive function .....</b>	<b>263</b>
8.0	Introduction .....	263
8.1	Pursuit of constitutive function in Italian new minor parties .....	264
8.2	Pursuit of constitutive function in Norwegian new minor parties .....	290
8.3	Comparative overview and discussion .....	309
8.4	Summary .....	314
<b>9</b>	<b>Conclusion .....</b>	<b>316</b>
9.0	Introduction .....	316
9.1	Empirical results and contribution to literature .....	317

9.2 Normative implications of empirical findings .....	333
9.3 Avenues for future research .....	337
9.4 Closing remarks .....	342
<b>Appendices .....</b>	<b>345</b>
Appendix A: Overview of Italian and Norwegian new minor parties .....	345
Appendix B: Overview of primary sources used in thesis .....	346
Appendix C: Overview of interviewees.....	365
Appendix D: Ethics approval .....	370
Appendix E: Italian and Norwegian interview guides and consent forms .....	371
Appendix F: Composition of executive councils in Norwegian and Italian new minor parties over time.....	384
Appendix G: Ballot access criteria, Norway and Italy.....	390
<b>Bibliography.....</b>	<b>404</b>



## *List of tables*

Table 2.1 Overview of core concepts and their definitions .....	43
Table 2.2 Overview of theoretical argument and hypotheses.....	61
Table 3.1 Operationalisation of party, newness, and minor party status .....	71
Table 3.2 The party landscape, Norway and Italy .....	72
Table 3.3 New minor parties selected for analysis – Norway and Italy.....	74
Table 3.4 Overview of selection criteria for centralising/consolidating reforms and electoral contests .....	77
Table 3.5 Interviews in Italy and Norway .....	84
Table 3.6 Data sources – Italian and Norwegian new minor parties.....	85
Table 3.7 Operationalised indicators of staffing, centralisation/consolidation, and pursuit of constitutive function .....	90
Table 4.1 Overview of regulatory phase 1 (1974-1992): Italy .....	100
Table 4.2 Overview of regulatory phase 2 (1993-2011): Italy .....	107
Table 4.3 Overview of regulatory phase 3 (2012-2016): Italy .....	112
Table 4.4 State funding allocations to Norwegian political parties, Regulatory phase 1. NOK.....	115
Table 4.5 Overview of regulatory phase 1 (1970-2005): Norway .....	117
Table 4.6 Overview of regulatory phase 2 (2006-2016): Norway .....	121
Table 5.1 Access criteria and generosity, regulatory phase 1 (1974-1992), and expectations for new minor parties' income structure: Italy .....	127
Table 5.2 Access criteria and generosity, regulatory phase 2 (1993-2011), and expectations for new minor parties' income structure: Italy .....	130
Table 5.3 Access criteria and generosity, regulatory phase 3 (2012-2016), and expectations for new minor parties' income structure: Italy .....	138
Table 5.4 Access criteria and generosity, regulatory phase 1 (1970-2005), and expectations for new minor parties' income structure: Norway.....	140
Table 5.5 Access criteria and generosity, regulatory phase 2 (2006-2016), and expectations for new minor parties' income structure: Norway.....	148
Table 5.6 State-dependency, range and mean (percentage) in Italian and Norwegian new minor parties – across regulatory phases .....	155
Table 6.1 Regulatory phase 1 (1974-1992). Overview of state benefits and constraints, and expectations for new minor party staffing: Italy .....	159
Table 6.2 Overview of support for H1 from regulatory phase 1: Italy.....	164
Table 6.3 Regulatory phase 2 (1993-2011). Overview of state benefits and constraints, and expectations for new minor party staffing: Italy .....	166
Table 6.4 Overview of results on staffing from regulatory phase 2: Italy .....	178
Table 6.5 Regulatory phase 3 (2012-2016). Overview of state benefits and constraints, and expectations for new minor party staffing: Italy .....	179
Table 6.6 Overview of results on staffing from regulatory phase 3: Italy .....	183
Table 6.7 Regulatory phase 1 (1970-2005). Overview of state benefits and constraints, and expectations for new minor party staffing: Norway .....	185
Table 6.8 Overview of results on staffing from regulatory phase 1: Norway...	191
Table 6.9 Regulatory phase 2 (2006-2016).Overview of state benefits and constraints, and expectations for new minor party staffing: Norway.....	192

Table 6.10 Overview of results on staffing from regulatory phase 2: Norway .	202
Table 7.1 Overview of Italian parties, their room to centralise, and reform process to be analysed .....	220
Table 7.2 Empirical overview, the impact of state funding and/or staff on centralisation and consolidation: Italy .....	236
Table 7.3 Overview of Norwegian parties, their room to centralise, and reform process to be analysed .....	243
Table 7.4 Empirical overview, the impact of state funding and/or staff on centralisation and consolidation: Norway .....	256
Table 8.1 Selection of electoral contests for in-depth scrutiny of H3: Italy .....	271
Table 8.2 Summary of analysis: The impact of state funds and staff on electoral participation: Italy .....	289
Table 8.3 Selection of electoral contests for in-depth scrutiny of H3: Norway	294
Table 8.4 Summary of analysis: The impact of state funds and staff on electoral participation: Norway .....	308

## List of figures

Figure 5.1 Share of income from state funding. The Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party. Regulatory phase 1 .....	128
Figure 5.2 Income from state funding (euros) and share of income from state funding. The Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party. Regulatory phase 2 .....	131
Figure 5.3 Income from state funding (euros). Tricolour Flame, the Segni Pact, and the Pensioner Party. Regulatory phase 2 .....	134
Figure 5.4 Share of income from state funding. Tricolour Flame, the Segni Pact, and the Pensioner Party. Regulatory phase 2 .....	135
Figure 5.5 Income from state funding (euros) and share of income from state funding. The Communist Refoundation Party and the Greens. Regulatory phase 3. ....	138
Figure 5.6 Share of income from state funding. The Greens, the Pensioner Party, and the Fatherland's Party. Regulatory phase 1 .....	143
Figure 5.7 Share of income from state funding. The Greens, the Pensioner Party, the Coastal Party, and the Fatherland's Party. Regulatory phase 2.....	149
Figure 5.8 Income from membership fees and state funds (NOK). The Greens, 2006-2016 .....	151
Figure 6.1 Income from the state (euros) and number of staff in the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party. Regulatory phase 1 .....	161
Figure 6.2 Income from the state (euros) and staff figures (full time, permanent and temporary). The Greens, 2003-2011 .....	168
Figure 6.3 Income from the state (euros) and number of staff. The Communist Refoundation Party. Regulatory phase 2.....	173
Figure 6.4 Income from the state (euros). Tricolour Flame, 2007-2012 .....	180
Figure 6.5 Income from state funding (NOK), overall income and staff expenses. The Green Party, 1994-1997 .....	186
Figure 6.6 Income from state funding, income from members, and overall income (NOK). The Pensioner Party, 1995-1998 .....	188
Figure 6.7 Income from state funding, members, and overall income (NOK). The Greens, 1994-2016 .....	193
Figure 6.8 Development in income from the state and members (NOK). The Coastal Party, 2006-2016.....	197
Figure 6.9 Income from state funding, overall income, and staff expenses (NOK). The Christian Conservative Party. Regulatory phase 2.....	198
Figure 6.10 Income from state funding (NOK). The Pensioner Party. Regulatory phase 1 and 2.....	200
Figure 7.1 Development of membership and number of local branches in the Green Party, 2007-2016.....	246
Figure 8.1 Share of constituencies in which parties fielded candidates (percentage). Elections to the Chamber of Deputies, the European parliament and Regional councils: Italy, 1987-2016.....	267
Figure 8.2 Income from state funding and membership fees (euros): The Greens, 2007-2011 .....	278

Figure 8.3 Income from state funding (euros) and number of staff: The Communist Refoundation Party, 2007-2010.....	281
Figure 8.4 Share of constituencies in which the parties fielded candidates (percentage). Regional and parliamentary elections: Norway, 1987-2016 .....	291
Figure 8.5 Development of membership and number of local branches in the Green Party, 2007-2010 .....	298
Figure 8.6 Membership development, the Christian Conservative Party, 2013-2015 .....	301
Figure 8.7 Income from membership fees (NOK): The Coastal Party, 2009-2016 .....	303
Figure 8.8 Income from membership fees (NOK): The Fatherland's Party, 1993-1999 .....	305

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Puzzle and research question

Most first and second wave democracies currently provide state funding in some form to their political parties and/or electoral candidates (Biezen & Kopecký, 2007, 2014; Nassmacher, 2009). For political parties across Europe, state funding has come to constitute a majority of their income (Poguntke et al., 2016). Parallel to the introduction or increase of state funding to parties, laws to regulate parties' access to state funds, the size and distribution of state funding, and monitoring and oversight of their receipt and use, have been introduced (see e.g. Biezen, 2008). No other regulatory instrument is so widely diffused across countries in the world as state funding with attached regulation (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 4). Given the prominence of state funds, an important question is if and how these funds impact political parties. This question is the topic of this thesis.

Proponents of state funding contend that it provides parties with sufficient resources to engage in important democratic activities and to operate effectively (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006, pp. 4-5; Nassmacher, 2009, pp. 290-294), which, arguably, makes it important to the functioning of contemporary democracies, given the vital role of political parties in them (Schattschneider, 1942, p. 1). Empirically, this claim is substantiated by studies documenting a correlation between the availability of state funds and staff presence in political parties (Mair, 1994; Mendilow, 1992; Sundberg, 1994; Svåsand, 1994a), staff who can aid parties in executing day-to-day tasks. Studies have also found that state funds help to secure parties' continued electoral participation (i.e. their survival) (Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017; Casal Bértoa & Taleski, 2016; Casal Bértoa & Walecki, 2014), often perceived as the core task – or 'constitutive function' – of parties

(see e.g. Pedersen, 1982; Sartori, 1976). Opponents of state funding conversely contend that it has turned political parties away from their members and supporters (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006, pp. 4-5; Nassmacher, 2009, pp. 290-294), intensified parties' relationship with the state, and turned them into public utilities (Biezen, 2004; Epstein, 1986). It is arguable that such a development threatens the ability of parties to function as a means of linkage between citizens and the state (see e.g. Katz & Mair, 1995). On this point, literature has found that state funding contributes to changed party power structures, benefitting the top, national echelons rather than the members (i.e. contributing to centralisation) (see e.g. Ebbighausen, 1996; Hagevi, 2018; Katz & Mair, 2002; Mendilow, 1992).

The empirical results concerning the impact of state funds on intra-organisational party dynamics, whether concerning staffing, centralisation, or survival, are, however, far from unequivocal (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 50; Koss, 2011, p. 4; Pierre et al., 2000; Scarrow, 2007, pp. 204-205). Consequently, we have only a limited understanding of whether, when, and how exactly state funds impact these intra-organisational dynamics. In turn, we also have only a limited understanding of whether and how state funds threaten to undermine parties' citizen-state linkage function. The present thesis addresses this empirical ambiguity and goes beyond the drawing of correlations to explore in-depth how state funding *specifically* contributes to staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function (i.e. electoral participation) in parties.

To do so, the study investigates the impact of state funds on intra-organisational dynamics in parties where this influence is more likely to manifest itself (for a similar argument, see Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017, p. 2), namely in newly established (post-1980) minor parties (winning less than 10 percent of the vote). The existing literature contends that both newness and minority status (in

electoral terms) make parties particularly vulnerable to the design of, and changes in, state funding regulations. Stinchcombe (1965), for instance, argues that younger organisations are generally shaped more by external pressures (such as state funds) than older ones are. When it comes to minority status, Casal Bértoa and Spirova (2017, p. 2) state: ‘(...) *the availability of state financing is of major consequence for small political parties, but might have less significant impact on the bigger parties (...)*’. Thus, new minor parties are particularly insightful objects of study when the goal is to explore the impact of state funds. Given these considerations, the central research question is: **How does state funding influence processes of staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function in newly established, electorally minor parties?**

In the following, state funds are understood as direct and indirect state benefits and state constraints (related to access to and maintenance of state funds). The study’s in-depth focus on the impact of state funds on intra-organisational processes attempts to fill different gaps in the literature. Specifically, the analysis of staffing sheds light on how state funds – as compared to other income sources – shape staffing patterns (i.e. shifts in the number of permanent and temporary staff), and also explores whether the timing of staffing is related to state funds. In this way, the results fill a gap in the literature, which has mainly been concerned simply with correlations between state funds and staffing (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006; Mair, 1994; Mendilow, 1992; Sundberg, 1994; Svåsand, 1994a).

The analysis of centralisation, defined as the process in which party elites increase their control of the party’s executive council (at the expense of members), first sheds light on whether and how *both* state funds *and* staff contribute to strengthening party elites in new minor parties. The analysis thus

adds more detail to the literature's finding that state funds strengthen specific party faces (e.g. party in public office) (Bardi et al., 2017; Hagevi, 2018; Katz & Mair, 2002), by analysing specifically which party elites are strengthened by state funds and staff, and the mechanisms through which it happens. Secondly, the analysis contributes to the literature by investigating whether and how elites use their strengthened position to initiate changes in the composition of the executive, and whether or not state funds and staff contribute to executing such changes, both of which are unexplored to date. The focus on the executive council in a centralisation analysis is a novelty in a literature that has mainly focused its attention on which party actors control specific decision-making procedures, such as candidate and leadership selection and policy development (see e.g. Gauja, 2013; Lisi et al., 2015; Rahat & Hazan, 2001). This analysis thus broadens our knowledge regarding which actors are in charge of party affairs on a daily basis (i.e. the executive) (Poguntke, 1998).

Pursuit of constitutive function is defined as a party's ability to comply with ballot access requirements and file an electoral list (i.e. to exceed Pedersen's (1982) threshold of authorisation). This thesis goes beyond previous studies that have found that state funds contribute to parties' continued ability to run in elections (see e.g. Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017; Casal Bértoa & Walecki, 2014; Spirova, 2007) by exploring specifically how state funds and staff contribute to new minor parties' ability to exceed the threshold of authorisation.

One final, and crucial, contribution of the study is to provide empirical data on the organisational development of new minor parties generally, and new minor parties in Italy and Norway specifically. While electorally minor parties barely have been covered in the existing literature (Fisher, 1980; Muller-Rommel, 1991; Pedersen, 1982; Pridham, 1991; but see e.g. Spoon, 2011), the literature on new



parties is larger. However, literature on new parties mainly comprises parties of specific party families (e.g. green and far right parties), and not new parties as such (e.g. Art, 2011; van Haute, 2016; but see Bolleyer, 2013;). In Norway and Italy only individual case studies on (mainly green and communist) new minor parties have been conducted (see e.g. Bertolino, 2004; Biorcio, 2016; Calossi, 2007; Siem Knudsen, 2016; Vannucci, 2007). Therefore this study's analysis of new minor parties (belonging to different party families) fills a glaring empirical gap, which is crucial for our broader understanding of how a large diversity of interests are represented in Norway and Italy specifically, and contemporary democracies more generally.

The rest of this introductory chapter proceeds as follows. Firstly, I justify the decision to analyse new minor parties, elaborating on the argument briefly outlined above. Then, I discuss the normative debate on state funding, laying the groundwork for discussing the normative implications of the empirical findings in the concluding chapter of the thesis. Thirdly, I outline in more depth the gaps that this thesis seeks to fill, and review the state of the art on state funding and staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function. I conclude with an outline of the thesis by chapter.

### *1.1.1 Why new minor parties?*

The choice to study new minor parties has analytical and methodological advantages in a study that seeks to understand in-depth how state funding shapes intra-organisational patterns. As mentioned above, *new* parties are more easily shaped by external pressures, such as state funding regulations, than established parties are (Stinchcombe, 1965). This reflects new parties' more malleable and less institutionalised party structures (see e.g. Gauja, 2016, p. 115). Additionally, the impact of state funding regulations will differ according to

the electoral support a party has (Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017; Lanza-Laco, 1985, cited in Pridham, 1991). Specifically, whereas electorally larger parties will rarely encounter difficulty in surpassing access criteria for state funds, this may present a real hurdle for electorally minor parties (for a similar argument, see Rashkova & Spirova, 2014). Moreover, new *and* minor parties have vulnerable income structures as they have yet to develop mass memberships and are an unattractive prospect for donations (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006; Ikstens et al., 2002; Mair & Biezen, 2001). Thus, state funds have been found to be particularly important for largely state-dependent new minor parties (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 43), as they rely on these funds more than other parties in order to operate (for a similar argument, see Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017).<sup>1</sup>

New minor parties' state dependency first allows the study to pin-point precisely how state funds impact intra-organisational processes, such as staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function. Secondly, I can explore in-depth how specific shifts in state funding regulations, for example with regards to access criteria for funds, possibly impact directly on the internal workings of new minor parties. The selection of state-dependent new minor parties thus reflects the study's focus on understanding the exact impact of state funds, and is an initial attempt to bring more clarity to the existing bulk of research, which is characterised by contradictory results regarding the link between state funding and party organisational development (Casas-Zamora, 2006).

The selection of state dependent new minor parties, arguably constituting so-called most likely cases (see e.g. Gerring, 2007; Levy, 2008), i.e. cases where I most expect to find that state funding does indeed matter for intra-organisational

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<sup>1</sup> This finding thus counters the claim that new minor parties are disadvantaged by high access thresholds to state funds set by the established (and governing) parties (Katz & Mair, 1995, 2009).

development, could limit the study's scope for generalisation. However, the selection of a diverse group (e.g. on ideology) of new minor parties in two regulatory contexts that have differed over time, gives a suitable starting point for extending the relevance of the study's findings to a broader group of new minor parties. Furthermore, the in-depth exploratory analysis allows me to investigate the extent to which findings are related to parties' newness and minority status respectively. This opens up for a final discussion of whether the study's empirical results also are of relevance to electorally larger or established parties – or both. Consequently, the empirical results of the analysis of most-likely cases will be of relevance both beyond the Italian and Norwegian new minor parties studied here, but also – potentially – to large and established parties.

## 1.2 State funding from a normative perspective

The strong opinions that exist both for and against state funds is what Pierre et al. (2000, p. 2) label the 'public subsidy debate'. The debate is rooted in normative conceptions of the role of political parties as core linkage structures between citizens and the state in contemporary democracies. In fact, Van Biezen (2004, p. 707) contends that only '*a conception of democracy which views parties as the principal protagonists and as an indispensable public good*' could let the state gain the momentum in party finance that it (by now) has. Consequently, whether the debate leans in favour of state funding or against it, the underlying factor in the arguments is the crucial role parties play in democracies today (see also Schattschneider, 1942, p. 1).

There are three core arguments for/against state funding in the literature. One concerns the role of state funding in the income structure of parties (state-dependency), and another its role in shaping electoral participation. Both of these

are discussed below as they are relevant to the theoretical and empirical approach of this study. The final argument concerns the role of state funding in curbing illicit financing practices and fighting corruption. As this issue is neither theoretically nor empirically under scrutiny here, this argument is not to be further discussed (but see Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 5).

Proponents of state funding first emphasise that it is crucial for enabling political parties to perform their core functions, such as running in increasingly cost-intensive electoral campaigns, and enabling day-to-day operation of branches (for an overview of this argument, see Biezen, 2004; Casas-Zamora, 2006; Pierre et al., 2000). The implicit argument is that a democracy dependent on parties would not function if its constituent parts (parties) do not have the means to operate effectively. To that point, Nassmacher (2009, p. 292) argues that state funds represent the only income source that parties can use to close the gap between their rising expenses and their self-generated income. Arguably, state funds are also important for levelling the playing field between parties and other societal actors (e.g. interest groups), as the financial resources of parties, by definition exercising a monopoly on candidate selection for elections, are financially weak in comparison to other actors, who also exert crucial political influence (Pierre et al., 2000, p. 4).

Proponents of state funding secondly argue that it contributes to levelling the playing field in electoral competition. State funding helps to ensure that parties can compete in the electoral game on equal grounds, as it can take away the advantage held by incumbents and *'offer fairness to opposition parties'* (Nassmacher, 2009, p. 291). This argument is based on the fact that parties operate with different pools of resources:

State funding is expected to facilitate a more equal level playing field by enabling new, small and less resourceful parties to compete on a more equitable basis with the dominant and financially more privileged ones (Biezen, 2004, p. 707).

Conversely, critics argue that state funds reduce political parties' incentive to reach out to members and supporters for funds. However, this depends on the type of state funding system in place. If parties receive state funds with 'no strings attached', i.e. without an obligation to match state funds with self-generated income (e.g. membership fees), parties will arguably lose the incentive to recruit and maintain members for financial reasons (for an overview of these arguments, see Casas-Zamora, 2006; Nassmacher, 2009, p. 295; Pierre et al., 2000). According to critics, therefore, state funding can contribute to parties' alienation from members specifically, and society more generally, if mechanisms such as matching funds are not used. This resonates with the cartel party thesis, which argues that cartel parties are immersed in the state and not in civil society (as would be a mass party), so that they resemble public utilities (Biezen, 2004; Epstein, 1986) that are more interested in promoting their own ends than those of the citizens (Nassmacher, 2009, p. 293).

Additionally, critics argue that state funding contributes to freezing the existing party system, as those parties benefitting from state funding regulations would generally be the parties already established in power. Consequently, state funds would contribute to excluding some political formations, while keeping others on life-support (Pierre et al., 2000, p. 3). This argument is based on the fact that political parties themselves are in charge of introducing public policy, which means that the parties already in power are likely to enact a system of state funding that benefits themselves (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 5), which is also a core component of the cartel party thesis (see Katz & Mair, 1995).

In normative terms, therefore, proponents of state funds first emphasise their importance for parties' ability to perform the functions that make them important linkage structures between citizens and the state. Secondly, state funds are allegedly crucial for levelling the playing field in elections, and ensuring that the widest possible variety of citizens are linked to the state through the broadest possible selection of parties. The opponents, however, fear that state funds have the inverse effect, namely harming parties' role as linkage structures by (potentially) reducing their incentive to recruit and maintain members (Pierre et al., 2000, p. 3). Moreover, critics argue that state funds contribute to freezing the party system, thus hindering the effective linkage between the state and the broadest possible group of citizens by excluding certain political parties.

The next section of the chapter provides an overview of the literature on how state funding shapes staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function, and identifies the gaps which this study seeks to fill. As such, it represents the empirical side of the normative debate just discussed.

### 1.3 Closing gaps in the existing literature: A literature review

Some have argued that the introduction of state funding to political parties is '*one of the most significant developments in the relationship between political parties, the state and the citizenry in the advanced Western democracies*' (Pierre et al., 2000, p. 1). Despite the interest in state funding as one factor in studies of party organisational change (see e.g. Janda, 1980; Katz & Mair, 1994), or party organisational strength (see e.g. Webb, 2002; Webb & Keith, 2017), a limited number of studies analyse in depth the effects of state funding, especially in comparative terms (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 5; Hopkin, 2004; but see

Nassmacher, 2009). The following literature review – which also outlines the gaps in the literature that this thesis seeks to fill – evidences this.

### *1.3.1 State funding and staffing*

Theoretically speaking, the party literature has linked the provision of state funding to an increased presence of employed staff in political parties. The catch-all (Kirchheimer, 1966), electoral professional (Panebianco, 1988), and cartel party models (Katz & Mair, 1995) mainly link an increase in professional staff to parties' increased tendency to engage in capital intensive campaigns,<sup>2</sup> but also to the existence of state funds (Katz & Mair, 1995, p. 20; see also Kirchheimer, 1966; Panebianco, 1988). Empirically, the literature does present empirical evidence for a correlation between an increase in state funding and an increase in staff (whether professionals or party bureaucrats)<sup>3</sup>, for instance in Norway (Svåsand, 1994a, p. 325), Sweden (Gidlund, 1991, p. 48), Finland (Sundberg, 1994, p. 173), Ireland (Farrell, 1994, p. 223), and Israel (Mendilow, 1992). Mair (1994, p. 9) states that the large increase in staff, particularly with regards to parliamentary party staff, in the 1970s and 1980s, was paid for with the help of state funds.

Despite these findings, there are ambiguities as to the exact influence of state funding on staffing, as systems with little or no state funding, such as Ireland, Denmark, and the Netherlands, had a higher growth in party staff (1975-1989) than parties operating in more generous state funding systems, e.g. Norway, Sweden, and Finland (Casas-Zamora, 2006, pp. 50-51). Concretely, not only is there a gap with regards to our understanding of the actual role of state

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<sup>2</sup> For an account of the increasing demands related to electioneering, for example due to technological innovations in campaigns, see for instance Farrell (1996).

<sup>3</sup> For a more elaborate discussion on the distinction between professionals and party bureaucrats, see Panebianco (1988, chapter 12).

funding (as compared to other income sources) in processes of staffing, but also with respect to when parties take on staff (particularly the timing of this in relation to state funding access) (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 50). This study seeks to fill this gap. The staffing analysis explores how a party's increase of, and decrease or loss of state funding influences patterns of staffing over time. As new minor parties are highly state-dependent, the analysis will be able to say something specific about how state funding (as opposed to other sources of funding) contribute to staffing patterns. Moreover, the life cycle analysis will shed light on the exact timing of party staffing patterns, addressing Casas-Zamora's (2006, p. 50) claim that the role of state funding with regards to timing of staffing is ambiguous.

In addition, the analysis of staffing helps to shed light on an empirical puzzle in the literature concerning new minor party membership. Recent studies have found that members are more important for newer parties than they are for older, due to the electoral support that such members can provide (Köln, 2014, p. 465). One would thus expect a push in new minor parties to recruit and maintain members. However, above it was argued that new parties have poorly developed membership structures (Casas-Zamora, 2006; Mair & Biezen, 2001): *'it is striking to note how relatively few members there are among many of the new and alternative parties that have emerged to gain electoral support in recent years'* (Mair & Biezen, 2001, p. 14; see also Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 43;). This is arguably one of the reasons why new minor parties are particularly reliant on state funding. As the analysis of staffing in this thesis also discusses what types of tasks the hired staff do, it sheds empirical light on the contrast between new minor parties' need for members, and their low memberships. It does so by outlining whether or not new minor parties prioritise having their hired staff (if they



have staff) perform tasks related to membership recruitment and management. In this way, the results also feed into the normative debate on state funding, where critics claim that access to state funds eliminates the incentive to recruit members (if no obligation to collect self-generated funds exists).

### *1.3.2 State funding and centralisation*

The theoretical literature argues that state funding empowers the actors who receive and manage them (Mendilow, 1992; Nassmacher, 1989, 2009). Empirically, the literature has addressed this argument in two ways; First by investigating how state funding allocations have benefitted either the party in public office or the party in central office.<sup>4</sup> Katz and Mair (2002, pp. 123-124; see also Katz & Mair, 2009, p. 756) found that the provision of state funding to the party in public office, combined with these representatives' control over the level and type of funding available (through their presence in parliament), advantaged this party face (see also Bardi et al., 2017). Correspondingly, the party in public office in Sweden (Hagevi, 2018, p. 9), and the party in central office in Italy (Ciaurro, 1989, p. 168) both strengthened their positions at the expense of other party faces due to their receipt of state funding. Secondly, the empirical literature has investigated how state funds empower party representatives on different party levels, i.e. on national, regional, or local level respectively. This empirical strand of the literature reflects the fact that many countries provide state funding to parties on different institutional tiers (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 50). Concretely, empirical results show that the distribution of state funds to other party branches beyond the national branch has strengthened such subnational branches, as illustrated by evidence from Anglo-Saxon-democracies

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<sup>4</sup> Political parties allegedly have three different *faces*; the party on the ground, the party in public office and the party in central office (Katz & Mair, 1993). These faces refer to the party members, the governing/parliamentary branch of the party and the national party headquarters respectively.

(Nassmacher, 2009), Sweden (Hagevi, 2018)<sup>5</sup>, Canada (Coletto et al., 2011), and Spain (Casal Bértoa et al., 2014).

In addition to the importance of state funds in empowering either party faces or party branches (beyond the national branch), the literature has also focused on how staff can have the same impact. The importance of staff as an organisational resource (Webb & Keith, 2017) was one of the reasons why Katz and Mair (2002) argued that increased staff for the party in public office has advantaged this party 'face' at the expense of the party in central office (for similar arguments, see Bardi et al., 2017; Biezen, 2003b). The literature has thus outlined how both state funds and staff can empower the party face or party branch that receive them, which has thus far been taken to mean centralisation.

The centralisation analysis in this thesis goes further than the literature discussed above, thereby contributing to fill three gaps in the literature. First, I analyse exactly which party actors (in the party's central, national office)<sup>6</sup> empower their positions following access to state funds and staff, and the mechanisms through which this happens. This adds another layer of detail to the existing literature which mainly has focused on how party faces or branches are strengthened by state funds and staff. Secondly, I analyse whether and how the strengthened elites use their empowered position to initiate reforms that shift the control of the executive council towards themselves, and the extent to which state funds and staff are used to execute such reforms. This contributes to filling a gap in the literature with regards to whether state funds (and staff) actually contribute to centralising *reform*. In other words, it goes further than the literature discussed

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<sup>5</sup> Hagevi not only refers to the distribution of state funds to subnational branches, but also to regional and municipal parties' possibility to '*secure access to separate public funding that it decides on locally*' (Hagevi, 2018, p. 9).

<sup>6</sup> Reflecting the analysis of *national* financial accounts and staffing on national level. See chapter 3 for details.

above, which has focused on how state funds (and staff) strengthen party faces and branches. The centralisation analysis in this thesis thus gives a broader overview of how state funds and staff potentially contribute to shaping reforms that affect the daily running of contemporary new minor parties, adding more detail to those studies that equate state funding access (to the national branch) with party centralisation, but without exploring this in-depth (see e.g. Ebbighausen, 1996, cited in Koss, 2011; Mendilow, 1992; Nassmacher, 1989).

Moreover, the centralisation analysis addresses a lacuna in the literature by analysing the composition (i.e. control) of a party's executive council. So far, the literature has focused more on analysing which party actors are in charge of which decision-making procedures, such as candidate (Bille, 2001; Hazan & Rahat, 2010) and leadership (Cross & Pilet, 2015; Kenig, 2008; Lisi et al., 2015; Wauters, 2014) selection, and policy development (Gauja, 2009, 2013; but see studies on party congresses, Heidar & Saglie, 2002; Pettitt, 2007). The analysis of centralisation thus provides new empirical insight concerning which actors (elites or members) control the executive councils of new minor parties over time, i.e. run the party on a daily basis. As such, the study empirically addresses Mair's (1994, p. 12) observation that central office organs are increasingly made up of elected representatives (i.e. party elites), rather than the party on the ground (members).

### *1.3.3 State funding and pursuit of constitutive function*

State funding has been found to be an important factor for understanding party survival. As survival is most often defined as participation in elections, these studies constitute the background for this study's analysis of how state funding (possibly) contributes to new minor parties' pursuit of their constitutive function, i.e. electoral participation. Compared with the literature on staffing and

centralisation the literature on survival has to a larger extent addressed the survival of new and/or minor party formations specifically. Bolleyer (2013, p. 85), for instance, finds that the permissiveness of access criteria for state funding significantly influences the survival of new parties. Concretely, more constraining access thresholds significantly increase the chances that a new party dies, i.e. stops running in elections (Bolleyer, 2013, p. 14). The link between state funds and parties' continued electoral participation has been found for minor parties in Hungary (Spirova, 2007, p. 145), and for new but electorally major parties in Macedonia (Casal Bértoa & Taleski, 2016, p. 14) and Poland (Casal Bértoa & Walecki, 2014). Interestingly, Casal Bértoa and Spirova (2017) find, in a study encompassing parties in post-communist Europe, that parties that are not represented in parliament (i.e. most often minor parties) have a higher chance of continuing to persist in the electoral contest when they have access to state funding.

This evidence links state funding to the persistence of all kinds of parties (old and new, minor and major) in the party system, i.e. their ability to continue fighting elections. Still, few studies have gone into depth and studied how state funding specifically contributes to keeping parties in the party system, and analysed the impact of staff in this equation (but for the importance of staff in electoral campaigns, see e.g. Farrell, 1996; Farrell, 2000; Karlsen, 2010). This study addresses these limitations, and looks more specifically at whether and how state funding and/or staff *directly* contribute to electoral participation, for example by assisting with signature campaigns (by paying for costs, or organising rallies), or filing the electoral list (recruiting candidates). Moreover, it analyses how state funds and staff facilitate electoral participation *indirectly*, by contributing to building branches and recruiting members.

#### *1.3.4 New minor parties (in Norway and Italy)*

Electoral *minor* parties are often omitted from studies of political parties (Fisher, 1980; Muller-Rommel, 1991; Pedersen, 1982; Pridham, 1991) either because of limited data, to make studies of party politics more manageable, to avoid entities that allegedly have no impact on the political system, or because minor parties are considered dysfunctional entities in the system (Fisher, 1980, pp. 609-610, cited in Pedersen, 1982). The consequence is that we know little of minor parties generally, but about their organisations specifically (but see case studies, such as Bertolino, 2004; Vannucci, 2007). This is especially so since electorally minor parties largely have been omitted from the comparative efforts to collect organisational data on parties (Katz & Mair, 1992; Poguntke et al., 2016). *New* parties (which are sometimes also minor parties) belonging to specific party families, such as the green (see e.g. Spoon, 2011; van Haute, 2016) or far-right family (see e.g. Art, 2011; Enyedi & Linek, 2008), have been covered in the literature. However, the literature analysing new parties more broadly (irrespective of party family) – especially in organisational terms – is modest (but see Bolleyer, 2013). This lack of coverage of new minor parties in the literature is curious when we consider that new and/or minor parties often are the most numerous parties in party systems.

In the two national contexts under scrutiny here, excellent case studies have enhanced our organisational knowledge of two of the Italian new minor parties selected for analysis, namely the Greens (see e.g. Biorcio, 2002; Biorcio, 2016; Rhodes, 1992; Vannucci, 2007) and the Communist Refoundation Party (see e.g. Albertazzi et al., 2011; Bertolino, 2004; Calossi, 2007). However, the remaining five parties selected for analysis are barely mentioned in the literature (but see Pridham, 1991 for an older study of small Italian parties). In Norway, the

literature is even more limited, although a few studies of the Norwegian greens exist (Heglum, 2015; Jupskås, 2013; Siem Knudsen, 2016).

The empirical analysis of intra-organisational development in new minor parties in Norway and Italy in this thesis, covering the income structure of parties, their patterns with regards to staffing, their centralisation, and their pursuit of constitutive function, thus contributes in a significant manner to fill (parts of) a large lacuna; Both by contributing to the general literature on new and electorally minor parties, and more specifically by filling a gap concerning organisational development of new minor parties in Norway and Italy. This is important, as only by studying a broader segment of political parties can we extend our understanding of how different interests in contemporary democracies are represented. In turn, this also gives us a better comprehension of the aforementioned linkage function between citizens and the state.

## 1.4 Outline of thesis

This introductory chapter has given an overview of the core puzzle that this thesis seeks to address, the research question, and the normative debate regarding the utility (or not) of state funds. Finally, the state of the art with regards to how state funding shapes intra-organisational patterns in parties was discussed, outlining the gaps that this thesis seeks to fill. The remaining chapters in this thesis are structured as follows:

**Chapter 2** outlines the thesis' analytical framework. The first part defines state funding, staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function. I then briefly present rational choice institutionalism as the guiding principle for the theoretical framework, before I develop three hypotheses that are heuristic tools to guide the empirical analysis. First, I argue that an increase of state funding

contributes to staffing in new minor parties, and that a decrease sparks downsizing (H1). In H2, I argue that both state funds and staff contribute to strengthening the position of party elites (e.g. party leader, treasurer). In turn, this strengthened position enables party elites to initiate and execute reforms that *either* increase their control of the executive council (centralisation) *or* decrease the importance of other national party organs besides the executive, in order to consolidate elite power (consolidation). Centralising reforms arguably take place in parties where the elites do not have full control of the executive council, i.e. where the executive is not solely composed of party elites. Consolidating reforms take place in parties that already have completely elite-dominated executive councils. The third hypothesis, H3, argues that state funding and staff contribute to enabling pursuit of constitutive function, understood as compliance with ballot access criteria and presentation of electoral list.

**Chapter 3** discusses the study's research design. First, I briefly outline the comparative case design deployed in the thesis, before I proceed to argue that Italy and Norway are feasible regulatory contexts from which to draw new minor parties, given their rich variety in state funding regulations (over time). Then I discuss case selection; seven new minor parties are selected in each context based on a) party newness, b) minority status, c) variation with regards to state funding access, and d) variation in ideology/age/status (alive/dead). The case selection also outlines the criteria for selecting centralising reforms and electoral contests, both of which will be analysed in depth in the analysis of centralisation (H2) and pursuit of constitutive function (H3) respectively. Subsequently, I present and discuss the benefits and limitations of the primary documents, semi-structured interviews, and secondary sources upon which the analysis rests. In the final part of the chapter I operationalise state funding, staffing, centralisation

(and consolidation), and pursuit of constitutive function, and discuss indicators that will be used in the empirical analysis. In the end, I outline the additional factors that will be accounted for in the empirical analysis.

**Chapters 4 to 8** are empirical chapters. **Chapters 4 and 5** analyse state funding regulations and income structure respectively, and thereby lay the groundwork for the later analysis of staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function. Specifically, **chapter 4** presents an analysis of state funding regulations in Italy and Norway respectively, each divided into so-called regulatory phases, to demarcate important shifts in state funding regulations. The analysis outlines which types of state benefits (direct and indirect) have been available over time, their size (generosity) and allocation mechanism (e.g. flat grants), and the access criteria and regulation related to maintaining them (state constraints). The chapter concludes with a comparative discussion, outlining the similarities and differences between the two contexts. **Chapter 5** analyses the income structure of all the selected new minor parties throughout their life cycles, in light of the regulatory phases developed in chapter 4. The chapter gives a comprehensive overview of how shifting state regulations shape the income structure of the selected parties, and concludes with a systematic comparative overview bringing together the findings from the Italian and Norwegian parties respectively.

**Chapter 6** analyses staffing patterns (H1) in the selected new minor parties within the aforementioned regulatory phases, thereby enabling a systematic investigation of how state benefits and constraints foster and hinder patterns of staffing over time. The chapter first analyses staffing in the Italian parties, and then in the Norwegian, before a comparative overview and discussion is provided. The chapter finds that an increase of state funding (and



decrease/loss of state funds) broadly shape staffing in new minor parties in both Norway and Italy, thus supporting H1. A party's overall budget, membership fluctuations, and leadership change are some of the additional factors that contribute to shaping staffing. Interestingly, the findings show that new minor parties most often invest in staff to work on organisational maintenance, for instance to recruit and maintain members.

**Chapter 7** analyses the extent to which state funding and staff contribute to centralisation of the executive council (H2). The chapter starts with a life cycle analysis of the composition and tasks of the executive council – both statutory and de-facto – to establish whether or not the parties had room to centralise their executive councils. The analysis also sheds light on whether centralising/consolidating reforms took place. To capture the dynamics of how state funding and staff shape centralising/consolidating reforms, the first reform process of the executive council that took place in each of the parties following state funding access and/or staffing was selected for in-depth analysis. If there was no room to centralise the executive, I selected the first consolidating reform that took place after state funding access and/or staffing. A total of six centralising and three consolidating reforms were analysed across the Norwegian and Italian parties. The results support H2; state funding and staff strengthen the position of party elites, who in some parties use this position to initiate centralising/consolidating reforms. There is also some evidence that state funding and staff contribute to executing centralising and consolidating reforms. Other factors, such as leadership change, organisational vulnerability, and membership fluctuations also contributed to shaping the centralising and consolidating reform processes.

**Chapter 8** analyses how state funding and staff contribute to new minor parties' pursuit of constitutive function, i.e. surpassing Pedersen's (1982) threshold of authorisation. The first part of the chapter analyses new minor parties' pursuit of constitutive function in a life cycle perspective, outlining the share of constituencies in which the parties fielded candidates in each election on national, regional, and EU levels over time. To analyse how state funding and staff contribute to pursuit of constitutive function, I select one electoral contest in each party for in-depth scrutiny. The first electoral contest following a shift in income from the state and/or a change in staffing was selected in a majority of the parties. However, in order to ensure variation with regards to the institutional tier of the election (e.g. national vs. regional), and in ballot access criteria, the second electoral contest following changes to state funds and/or staff was selected in a minority of cases. The in-depth analysis of electoral contests supports H3; state funding and staff both contribute to enabling compliance with signature requirements for ballot access and to the process of presenting an electoral list. In Italy, state funds and staff are most important to electoral participation through their role in aiding parties to overcome signature requirements, while in Norway they are more crucial in the building of branches and maintenance of membership. Other factors that contributed to new minor parties' electoral participation were parties' overall budget, and their participation in electoral coalitions.

**Chapter 9** summarises the empirical results, explores their generalisability, and their normative implications. The chapter concludes with an overview of avenues for future research.

## 2 Analytical framework

### 2.0 Introduction

This chapter firstly presents the study's conceptual framework, before going on to develop a theoretical framework that pinpoints how state funding contributes to staffing, and how state funding and staffing contribute to centralisation and pursuit of constitutive function in new minor parties. Thus, it is the contribution of state funding (H1) and state funding and staff (H2 and H3) that is of prime interest. The centrality of the role of state funding in organisational processes in new minor parties is the reason why the conceptual framework starts with the definition of state funding, and only subsequently goes on to define the three other core concepts of the study: staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function. The second part of the chapter firstly outlines rational choice institutionalism as the broader theoretical framework within which the three hypotheses of the thesis are embedded, and secondly outlines the rationale behind them.

The theoretical argument is composed of three parts. Firstly I argue that an increase of state funding contributes to staffing in new minor parties, and inversely, that decreasing state funding contributes to a process of letting staff go (H1). Secondly, state funding access and staff are theorised to contribute to strengthening party elites, such as party leaders, treasurers, and party secretaries, enabling them to initiate and execute centralising reforms of the executive council that increase their own control of this organ (H2). Such centralising reforms are theorised to take place only in parties where the executive is not already composed exclusively of party elites. In parties where there is no 'room' to centralise the executive further (i.e. where it already comprises only elites), state funding and staff are theorised to contribute to consolidate the position of the already strong elites. Thirdly, I argue that state

funding and staff help new minor parties to pursue their constitutive function, i.e. to overcome ballot access requirements and present lists in elections, and conversely, that the loss or significant decrease of such resources hinders pursuit of constitutive function (H3).

## 2.1 Defining state funding, staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function

### 2.1.1 *State funding*

With the help of rational choice theory, this study conceptualises state funding in terms of *benefits* and *constraints*, incorporating both state funding in various forms (benefits), and reporting requirements related to the receipt of state funding (constraints). State benefits more specifically comprises direct and indirect sources of state funding (for a similar approach, see Pizzimenti, 2017). *Direct state funding* is cash grants paid out by the state to parties, both on national, supra-national (EU), and subnational levels (regional and local). Such cash grants can, for example, be annual state grants or electoral reimbursements. *Indirect state funding* comprises party tax, and tax benefits that materialise in cash transfers. An example of the latter tax benefit is funds that spring from ordinary citizens' decision to assign a share of their tax return to a political party, which is then distributed (by the state) to the relevant parties as a form of cash benefit. Party tax refers to parliamentarians' transfer of a share of their income (paid by the state) to their party (Biezen, 2003a; Bolleyer & Gauja, 2013; Casas-Zamora, 2006; Ewing, 2007; Koss, 2011; Nassmacher, 2009). In the following, 'state funding' thus refers to both direct and indirect forms of state funding. Consequently, financial transfers rather than in-kind resources, such as secretarial help in parliament or government, are under scrutiny here. Such in-kind resources can certainly bring positive spill-over effects for a new minor party,

for example in developing party policy, and are therefore factors that will be accounted for in the empirical analysis (see chapter 3)

*State constraints* comprise the different (reporting) requirements that political parties need to comply with in order to *either* be eligible for funding *or* to maintain direct/indirect state funds. Examples of the former are access criteria for funding and registration requirements, while examples of the latter are reporting requirements ranging from auditing of accounts to disclosure of financial accounts (Casas-Zamora, 2006; Ewing, 2007; Nassmacher & Nassmacher, 2001). New minor parties may also be exposed to a broader range of state regulations, for example related to ballot access, whose relevance for pursuit of constitutive function will be discussed in greater detail in the theoretical argument below. Existing studies have also shown how other regulations, such as those regarding donations or election expenses, have increasingly become part of the legislative framework for political parties (see e.g. Biezen, 2008; Doublet, 2011). However, such regulations are excluded from this thesis, whose focus is strictly on direct and indirect state benefits, and constraints related to their receipt and maintenance. Also, regulations related to expense ceilings and donations will to a lesser extent be relevant for new minor parties given their restricted funds, their poorly developed income structures, and their status as less attractive prospects for potential donors.(see Casas-Zamora, 2006; Ikstens et al., 2002; Mair & Biezen, 2001). In the following, permissive regulation means regulation that is beneficial for new minor parties, for example low access criteria for funding or light or no reporting requirements related to such funds. Constraining regulations refer to the opposite.

### 2.1.2 Staffing

Staffing is in this thesis defined as the process in which a party hires staff either on permanent (full-time or part-time) or temporary basis (e.g. external consultants). Patterns of staffing thus describe shifts in the existence of staff and the number of staff, resonating with definitions adopted in existing studies (see e.g. Farrell & Webb, 2000; Poguntke et al., 2016; Webb & Keith, 2017). This numerical definition of staffing also reflects existing studies which seek to link development in staffing patterns to state funding access (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 51), and allows the study to develop a precise theoretical link between state funding access and staffing. This thesis thus takes a step back from studies that focus on the skills of staff (see e.g. Negrine & Lilleker, 2002; Romzek & Utter, 1997; Webb & Fisher, 2003; Webb & Kolodny, 2006), which generally reflect the concept professionalisation.<sup>7</sup> Rather than professionalism, the interest here lies in capturing shifts in a party's *number* of staff, as that can shed light on resource-vulnerable new minor parties' (see e.g. Bolleyer, 2013; Casas-Zamora, 2006; Wilson, 1973, see also below) organisational strength (see also Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002, p. 269; Webb, 2002, p. 9). This is particularly pertinent in a study that is not just concerned with analysing how state benefits and constraints contribute to staffing, but also how staffing contributes to centralisation and pursuit of constitutive function.

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<sup>7</sup> Semantically, the use of the concept 'professionalisation' implies taking into account either the professional skills of individual staff or the overall professionalism of a party (or both), even though several scholars have also referred to a party's shifting number of staff when referring to professionalisation (see e.g. Farrell & Webb, 2000; Kölln, 2015). The notoriously ambiguous nature of this concept (Eliassen & Pedersen, 1978; Negrine & Lilleker, 2002; Webb & Kolodny, 2006), and this study's focus on the number of staff, explains why it is avoided.

### 2.1.3 Centralisation

This study defines centralisation as the process in which party elites, at the expense of party members, increasingly control the national executive council, i.e. increase their share of seats in the executive. As such, the study seeks to understand of whom the circle of decision-makers is composed, reflecting the concept of inclusiveness used in the intra-party democracy literature (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Scarrow, 2005; Von dem Berge & Poguntke, 2017). Centralisation, broadly taken to concern the locus of '*effective decision-making authority within the party*' (Janda, 1980, p. 108; see also Duverger, 1959), can meaningfully be defined as the process in which elites – at the expense of members – increase their control of the executive, due to this organ's central role in party decision-making.

Concretely, the executive, which usually comprises between 15 and 20 members, is vested with the important power to run a party on a daily basis (Katz, 2002, pp. 98-99; Michels, 1962 [1911], p. 58; Poguntke, 1998, p. 161; Von dem Berge et al., 2013, p. 25).<sup>8</sup> Consequently, it has powers related to making various types of decisions (for example related to urgent policy matters, or finances) between party congresses, which only convene intermittently (Katz, 2002, p. 96). The centrality of the executive in daily party management arguably implies leadership power (Lukes, 2005, cited in Loxbo, 2013, p. 540), and changes to its composition constitute what Panebianco denominates 'real changes', i.e. changes that alter the distribution of control in a party (Panebianco, 1988, p. 243).

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<sup>8</sup> It is worth noting that in the party's central office, the executive is often accompanied by a larger executive (hereby called the national executive), which is involved in more fundamental debates on strategy and ideology (Katz & Mair, 2002, pp. 98-99; Michels, 1962 [1911], p. 58; Von dem Berge et al., 2013, p. 25). This organ is in some cases a reflection of the territorial branches of the party (see Bolleyer, 2012 for a discussion of the leadership structure in federations). Potential changes to the composition of the national executive will be accounted for in the empirical analysis, as changes to one organ can be met with changes in the other.

This definition of centralisation thus broadly captures whether elites or members control decision-making by analysing an organ that makes a range of decisions, thereby taking a step back from the intra-party democracy literature, which largely focuses on describing and analysing which actors within a party have decision-making power in specific (yet crucial) decision-making procedures, such as candidate selection (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Rahat, 2013; Rahat & Hazan, 2001), leadership selection (Aylott & Bolin, 2017; Kenig, Rahat, & Hazan, 2015; Kenig, Rahat, & Tuttnauer, 2015), and policy development (Gauja, 2013; Loxbo, 2013; Pettitt, 2007).

This definition of centralisation acknowledges that members of an executive council do not have to be elites, even though the executive council – as an aspect of the party in ‘central office’ – is generally perceived as an elite organ (Katz & Mair, 2009, p. 756). The argument here is rather that a person’s tasks and/or position within the council is what determines elite-status (ex officio members versus members elected by the congress, for example). This means that I go beyond the mere status of this organ as an aspect of the party’s central office, avoiding the circularity that such an argument would entail, namely studying centralisation in what would already be perceived as a centralised aspect of the party (the party in central office). Elites are in the following defined as the party’s core representatives on regional, national, and over-national level, i.e. the leader, deputy leader, party secretary, and treasurer, and the elected representatives (party in public office), thereby acknowledging that elites are not necessarily exclusively found on the national level (see e.g. Bolleyer, 2012). That said, local party leaders, treasurers etc., are not perceived as elites here, given their proximity to, and need for support from, the members. This arguably makes them part of the membership (see Katz & Mair, 1993, p. 598). This proximity can



be argued to be even more prominent in new minor parties due to their smaller memberships (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 43). A party member is understood here in the formal sense, characterised by the existence of a clear recognition of the membership (e.g. payment of a regular and annual membership fee) (Gauja, 2015).

The definition of centralisation above implies that parties' executives have room to co-opt more elites, i.e. that they are composed of both elites and members, and not necessarily exclusively of elites. However, some parties may have executives that do only contain elites. Elites may still (even in such centralised executives) increase their control of the party. To account for that, the concept of consolidation is introduced. Consolidation refers to the process in which party elites operating in parties that already have a completely centralised executive, reinforce their strong position (i.e. consolidate it), for example by enlarging the scope or responsibility of the centralised executive. In brief, therefore, centralisation and consolidation of the executive both refer to processes in which elites increase their own power in the party. Centralisation occurs if the share of elites in the executive organ increases, while consolidation takes place if elites consolidate their position, for instance by reducing the importance of other core organs (besides the centralised executive), or by banning them.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> In the analysis I will refer to centralising and consolidating changes as *reforms*. The concept reform is used irrespective of whether the change in centralising or consolidating direction implied a statutory change or not, and whether information concerning the (centralising/consolidating) change was publicised or not. The core criterion for using the concept reform is to highlight that the studied processes of centralising and consolidating changes are *intentional* (for a similar argument, see Gauja, 2016, p. 20)

#### 2.1.4 Pursuit of constitutive function

The core characteristic of any political party is its participation in elections (Pedersen, 1982; Sartori, 1976), and electoral participation can thus be described as a party's constitutive function (Bolleyer, 2018), and *raison d'être*. Participating in elections is a precondition of pursuing any of a party's three goals – office, votes, or policy (Strøm & Muller, 1999) – and of its more overarching goal of survival (Lowery, 2007). In fact, several scholars have defined party survival in terms of whether it continues to present candidates in elections or not (Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017; Cyr, 2016; Dinas et al., 2015). In the following, pursuit of constitutive function is thus defined as a party's continued electoral participation on national, regional, or supra-national levels. Two matters must be disentangled with regards to this definition: What electoral participation means, and what *continued* electoral participation means.

Firstly, drawing on Pedersen's seminal work on the life cycle of parties, electoral participation is in the following defined as surpassing Pedersen's (1982, p. 7) 'threshold of authorisation'. If a party manages to comply with legal regulations for ballot access, and in turn present an electoral list, it has exceeded the threshold (ibid). This definition acknowledges that the constitutive function of a party is not to *be* represented in the national legislature (i.e. the threshold of *representation*), but to *seek* to be represented, for which surpassing the threshold of authorisation is the first step. Defining electoral participation in terms of a party's ability to exceed the threshold of authorisation also eliminates endogeneity issues that potentially arise when pursuit of constitutive function is to be understood in light of Pedersen's threshold of representation. The reason is that representation in the national legislature is often a precondition of

accessing state funding, which could obfuscate an analysis that seeks to explore the impact of state funds on a party's pursuit of constitutive function.

Secondly, the definition of pursuit of constitutive function adopted here underlines a party's *continued* participation in elections. Existing literature has argued that a party may, for various reasons, find itself temporarily outside the electoral race (Kjær, 2012; Spirova, 2007). To account for this, only when a party fails to run in two consecutive elections will I count it as failing to pursue its constitutive function, building on already existing studies on party survival which adopt the same time-frame (Tavits, 2008). As the thesis captures electoral participation on national, supra-national, and regional levels, a new minor party must fail to surpass the threshold of authorisation in two consecutive elections on any of these three levels in order to fail in pursuing its constitutive function. Thus, a party can count as pursuing its constitutive function even if it fails to present lists on national level, as long as it does so on a subnational (or supra-national) level.

### 2.1.5 Summary

The table below summarises the core concepts of the study:

Table 2.1 Overview of core concepts and their definitions

Concepts	Definition
<i>State funding</i>	a) Direct and indirect state benefits b) Constraints: Access requirements for benefits, and reporting related to maintaining benefits
<i>Staffing</i>	The process of hiring staff either on temporary or permanent basis (full-time or part time)
<i>Centralisation</i>	The process in which elites increase their control of the executive council
<i>Pursuit of constitutive function</i>	Electoral participation, i.e. the process of exceeding the threshold of authorisation (overcoming ballot access requirements and presenting an electoral list)

## 2.2 The impact of state funding on staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function: A theoretical framework

This study is built on the assumption that party actors operate rationally and seek utility maximisation within their own party, but that their actions are significantly shaped by the institutions – in this case state benefits and constraints – that surround them. As such, the study takes up the perspective of rational choice institutionalism, which outlines how ‘*institutions are (...) systems of rules and inducements to behaviour in which individuals attempt to maximize their own utilities*’ (Peters, 1999, p. 19; see also Weingast, 1996; Weingast, 2002). In this thesis state benefits and constraints constitute a formal institution, given that they are embedded in national law (for a distinction between formal and informal institutions, see Peters, 1999, p. 18). More specifically, where some institutions are related to values and symbols, rational choice institutionalism is more concerned with institutions as rules and sets of incentives (Peters, 1999, p. 50). In practice, therefore, the thesis tries to shed light on how one specific form of institution shapes political parties through their actors, following Detterbeck:

Political processes will depend on the choices of individual and corporate actors which have some freedom of manoeuvre yet are shaped and constrained by the institutional rules of the game (Detterbeck, 2012, p. 46).

The assumption that most individuals will respond in similar ways to the incentives they are confronted with is a common view in rational choice institutionalism (Peters, 1999, p. 50). Thus, rational choice institutionalism is core to the development of the three hypotheses in the study.

The first hypothesis presumes that party actors will respond similarly to an increase or decrease of state funding, by taking on or downsizing staff respectively (H1). Correspondingly, H2 presumes that party actors will use state

funds and staff to centralise the executive council, and to pursue the party's constitutive function (H3). In other words, staffing is in H1 the factor to be analysed, while staffing *and* state funding constitute the indicators whose influence will be analysed in H2 and H3. The theoretical framework focuses on exploring state funding's (H1) and state funding and staff's (H2 and H3) role in shaping party organisational patterns, and not on developing a testable framework of staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function per se. The hypotheses are thus heuristic devices to guide the subsequent in-depth exploratory analysis.

### *2.2.1 How does state funding contribute to patterns of staffing (H1)?*

New minor parties tend to be fundamentally challenged by scarce resources. The literature outlines how new parties generally start out with few financial resources and few material incentives to distribute to members, activists, or followers (Bolleyer, 2013; Wilson, 1973). Additionally, new parties tend to have small memberships (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 43), partially because incentives to become a party member are greatly diminished (see e.g. Scarrow, 2015, p. 74; see also Mair & Biezen, 2001).<sup>10</sup> This also means that these parties have fewer organisational branches, and weak or non-existent youth organisations. Finally, minor parties have little access to donations (Ikstens et al., 2002; Scarrow, 2007), simply because they are less attractive prospects for potential donors (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 43).<sup>11</sup> In sum, new minor parties have poorly developed income structures. The existing literature has found that the answer to this is state

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<sup>10</sup> Interestingly, other authors (Bolleyer, 2013) find that some new radical right parties have been surprisingly proactive in building a strong party organisation, examples being National Front and Forza Italia, but these are electorally larger parties (and not minor parties).

<sup>11</sup> That said, donations (if new minor parties access them) naturally contribute to the overall budget which in turn can contribute to staffing. In order to account for this, the empirical analysis accounts for parties' overall budget size in the staffing analysis (see chapter 3).

funding. Despite the dreary prediction of Katz and Mair's cartel party thesis (Katz & Mair, 1995; see also Palitel, 1981), which contends that established (cartel) parties will exclusively strive to ensure their continued receipt of state funding, and exclude other parties (such as new minor parties) by raising the bar for access to state funds, empirical evidence suggests the opposite. Namely that electorally minor parties are in fact often over-subsidised by the state. This is in some cases facilitated through the use of flat grants, benefitting electorally smaller contestants over larger ones (Bille, 1997; Casas-Zamora, 2006; Nassmacher, 1989; Sundberg, 2002).

State funds (if accessed) thus represent a crucial source of income for new minor parties, forming the basis for understanding why fluctuations in income from state funding shape staffing patterns in such parties. Concretely, new minor parties have to cope with the same organisational tasks as any other (established, more affluent) party, namely recruiting political leadership, training political elites, recruiting and maintaining members, keeping membership registers, organising meetings, rallies, and workshops, writing letters and answering the telephone, and articulating and aggregating political interests (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002; Key, 1964). Additionally, new minor parties operate in an era characterised by increasing demands related to participation in elections and electoral campaigns (Farrell, 1996; Farrell & Webb, 2000; Panebianco, 1988), which adds additional pressure. Therefore, once new minor parties increase their income from state funding, either by accessing state funds (for the first time) or increasing the sum received, I expect them to hire staff to deal with some of these organisational tasks, in turn increasing their organisational strength (see also Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002, p. 269; Webb, 2002, p. 9). The

reason for this is that having staff, as opposed to just volunteers, is useful as it provides continuity and stability for the party.

The hiring of staff following an increase in state funds can also be sparked by state constraints (e.g. reporting and transparency requirements) related to the maintenance of state funding, constraints which have increasingly been introduced across many countries (see e.g. Biezen & Kopecký, 2007; Biezen & Kopecký, 2014). Compliance with such reporting may require professional knowledge, echoing Panebianco's argument (1988, p. 222) that political decisions have become much more technical than in the past.

Similarly, decreasing levels of income from the state, or the complete loss of state funding, which can represent what Panebianco (1988, p. 243) calls an environmental shock, is expected to lead to downsizing.<sup>12</sup> In the management and organisational literature (see e.g. McKinley et al., 2014; Staw et al., 1981), a decline in organisational resources, in this case income from the state, is theorised to limit the possibilities for manoeuvre in the organisation, making *'organisations less innovative and more restricted'* (Kölln, 2015, p. 709). Gidlund (1991, p. 51), for example, argues that the first expenses to be cut back in times of financial crisis are expenses to staff and offices, which is corroborated by the empirical literature (Albinsson, 1986). A loss of state funding will also relieve a party of regulatory requirements related to state funding. Consequently, parties will downsize, as the need to balance the financial account will trump the party's responsibility and loyalty towards their employees.

The restricted income structure of new minor parties combined with the pressures these parties face to execute organisational tasks, is theorised to give

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<sup>12</sup> Even though environmental shocks are generally described as the dramatic loss of votes from one election to the next, they can also be understood as the loss of a significant portion of the party's income, constraining a party in performing its core functions.

state funding a crucial role in shaping staffing patterns in these parties, leading to the hypothesis below. In light of the above, I expect that new minor parties that do not have any income from state funding will not be able to take on staff.

**H1:** An increase in income from state funding will contribute to staffing in new minor parties.

### *2.2.2 How do state funding and staffing contribute to centralisation (H2)?*

Pfeffer and Salancik's (1990, p. 148) contention that '*organisations are (...) resources*' is the starting point for arguing that state funding and staff contribute to centralisation of executive councils or consolidation in new minor parties. Thus, different groups within a party organisation will compete over and be protective of the resources available (Tan, 1997). Given the resource shortage in new minor parties, competition over state funds and staff – as two core resources (see Webb & Keith, 2017) – will be particularly fierce. The reason for this competition is that those actors that have access to their own resources, will become stronger and more independent from others in the party (Nassmacher, 2009, p. 379), and particularly so in parties that are short of resources:

To the extent participants furnish resources that are more critical and scarce, they obtain more control over the organisation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1990, p. 148).

Concretely, those vested with the power to receive, allocate, audit, and monitor the use of state funds in the party will arguably have an elevated position due to the responsibilities that this entails (Janda, 1980, p. 111; Nassmacher, 2009, p. 305). In a similar vein, elites controlling hiring processes and employees' tasks will equally reinforce their position, reflecting Panebianco's (1988, p. 227) contention that the control of staff (even though he refers to a strong, bureaucratic apparatus) advantages those who control it, over those who do not (see also



Nassmacher, 2009, p. 379). Empowerment of elites will also occur if elites themselves take on a paid position, as they then have both the advantage of their position, and of having time to dedicate themselves fully to party tasks. So, state funding and staff will both increase party elites' symbolic power as they enhance their responsibilities in comparison with other party actors (see Kefford, 2016, p. 513 for party leaders' power), and their material power as they are put in command of larger budgets with greater financial leeway, and in command of staff.<sup>13</sup> Subnational elites, for instance regional leaders and treasurers that themselves manage state funding and control staff, will be equally as reinforced as elites on the national level (see e.g. Hagevi, 2018; Nassmacher, 2009). Consequently, exactly *which* party elites (i.e. national or subnational) are reinforced due to state funding access and staff is an empirical question to be analysed in each relevant case (and is dependent on the regulatory framework in place).

Whereas Tan (1997) argues that competition over internal resources may lead to a situation where rent-seeking organisational actors prevent or slow down reforms within a party, the argument here is that the opposite may just as well be true. More specifically, *'the battle for organisational control would also constitute an important motivator for party reform'* (Gauja, 2016, p. 42), echoing Ware's (1999) argument that resources in a party are more available to the party leadership than to rank-and-file members, so that *'in any party, policy and strategy initiatives are far more likely to develop among officials and leaders than with members'* (Ware, 1999, p. 110; see also Gauja, 2016; Nassmacher, 1989). Taking as a starting point the assumption that party actors pursue their own

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<sup>13</sup> Such a financial leeway may in practice be limited, due to statutory regulations that, for example, grant the party congress power over the budget. However, this is a question that must be examined empirically.

rational self-interest, Barnea and Rahat (2007, p. 378) argue that politicians will try to either protect or increase their status in the intra-party hierarchy by maintaining the status quo or changing the rules of the game.<sup>14</sup> An effective way to do so is to work for reforms that secure them enhanced control over the executive council, given the executive's important role in day-to-day decision-making. The argument here is thus that new minor party elites, reinforced (either in material or symbolic terms) by state funding access and/or staff, will use their enhanced positions and these resources to work for such reforms, or to see them through. This echoes the description of party leaders as core promoters of organisational change in parties given (among other things) their position (Gauja, 2016, p. 147; see also Harmel et al., 1995). Whether reinforced party elites choose to work to centralise or consolidate the executive is dependent on how the new minor party within which they operate is structured, which is the topic of the next paragraph.

The organisational structure of a party will provide party actors – reinforced by state funding access and/or staff – with institutional possibilities and restrictions for centralising reforms, reflecting Duverger's assertion that '*modern parties are characterised primarily by their anatomy*' (Duverger, 1959, p. xv). Thus, elites' leeway to use their empowered position will be different depending on the new minor party's organisational set-up. Bolleyer (2012, p. 319; see also Carty, 2004; Carty & Cross, 2006; Mair, 1994) outlines three different party models: party hierarchies, stratarchies, and federations, to be deployed as heuristic devices here. In the first, the locus of power is on the national level, in stratarchies it is divided across different territorial levels, and in federations it is

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<sup>14</sup> Even though this assumption has been developed for elites in larger, established parties, there is no reason why elites in new minor parties should be any different, as they presumably entered politics for the same reasons, namely pursuing either office, policy, or votes (Strøm & Muller, 1999).

situated at the regional level. Consequently, federations will have national executive organs in which the territorial division will be reflected (Bolleyer, 2012, p. 321), a way of organisation often found in Green parties (Poguntke, 1987; van Haute, 2016). In contrast, party hierarchies will have a strong concentration of elites in the national leadership, which is a type of organisation frequently found in radical right parties (Art, 2011, p. 58; de Lange & Art, 2011, p. 1232; Taggart, 1995, p. 40) and successor parties to communist parties (Chiru et al., 2015; for a similar argument, see also Cross & Pilet, 2015). In the broader party literature, the cadre, mass, and catch-all party models are characterised by hierarchical power structures, where either elected representatives (cadre and catch all) or elites in the national party office (mass) dominate over party members in core decision-making (Duverger, 1959; Katz & Mair, 1995; Kirchheimer, 1966). Stratarchies, with dispersed power structures (see cartel party thesis, Katz & Mair, 1995), have more member-based national executive councils (Bolleyer, 2012, p. 320).

Thus, in parties organised as stratarchies, elites that are empowered by state funds and staff will have room to centralise the executive, i.e. increase the share of elites in the organ. Conversely, this is not possible in hierarchical parties, as the executives in such parties will already be composed exclusively of elites, leaving them open only for processes of consolidation (i.e. consolidation of elite power). Parties organised as federations can offer opportunities both for centralisation and consolidation, depending on the type of elites in the executive. As federal parties emphasise regional representation in the executive, this may in practice mean that the executive is already composed exclusively of elites (i.e. regional elites), leaving it open only for consolidating reforms. However, such

parties may also invite local leaders (who are not perceived as elites in this thesis) to participate, in which case centralising reforms can take place.

State funds and/or staff help elites both to initiate centralising or consolidating reforms, and to see them through. Concretely, elites' increased symbolic position due to state funding access and/or staff control can then give them the leverage and authority to initiate (possibly controversial) proposals of centralising or consolidating reforms without suffering repercussions, and aid them in the process of convincing party representatives and members of their proposal. In a material way, state funding can help party elites to execute centralising and consolidating reforms by facilitating the organisation of workshops, meetings, and congresses where changes can be discussed and developed. Moreover, state funds can secure the payment of expenses for travel and accommodation to various party representatives who participate in such meetings, and see to the printing and distribution of proposals to other affected party representatives/members.

Elite control over staff, or hired elites themselves, can also contribute to the execution of centralising or consolidating reforms, resting on the argument (and findings) that staff can have a role in processes of party reform (Gauja, 2016, pp. 157-159). First, staff can liberate party elites from administrative tasks, giving them more time to focus on preferred issues, for example centralising/consolidating reform, resonating with Panebianco's (1988, p. 232) argument that staff can '*increase the leaders' freedom of movement*' (see also Moe, 1980, p. 98). Secondly, staff can aid elites in developing an argument for centralising/consolidating reform, and gather the relevant and necessary data to back up such a proposal (for example membership figures, or data on local branches). Such preparatory work can also effectively be done by party elites

who themselves are hired. Thirdly, Moe (1980, p. 99) argues that elites can use their staff's expertise and control over information to shift the perceptions of actors who are part of internal politics. Similarly, elites hired as staff can do the same. Concretely, staff can thus be used to lobby for party reform among congress participants (whether members or delegates or both).

Now, as most parties change their statutes in party congresses, where either delegates (of members) or members themselves directly participate, centralising or consolidating reforms prepared by strong party elites are far from automatically accepted by a party congress. In cases where members or delegates do support such reforms, this can be understood in light of resource-dependency relationships between members and elites. For example, Coletto (2011, p. 112; see also Gidlund, 1991, p. 49) argues that a party branch has to be financially independent if it is to be autonomous (see characteristics of a stratarchical party in Bolleyer, 2012). Consequently, in new minor parties where resources are scarce, those branches not receiving state funding will most likely be dependent on the branch which receives it, whether this is at the national, supra-national, or regional level. Empirically, there are examples of parties where subnational branches transfer state funds upwards to the national branch, and parties where the national branch transfers shares of state funding to subnational branches (for a Swedish example, see Hagevi, 2018. See also the Norwegian and Italian case in this thesis). Consequently, in new minor parties where the national and/or regional branches are strongest financially, centralising reforms of the executive can be more likely to happen because, either explicitly or implicitly, party elites (on these levels) can threaten unruly members with the withdrawal of funds from (local) party branches (party on the ground) if they do not vote in favour of a reform proposal (see also Coletto et al., 2011). The financial

situation, and the internal distribution of funds in a party, can thus put party elites in a position to 'discipline' members into agreeing to reforms that possibly diminish the latter's power.

In brief, therefore, state funding *and* staff can contribute to centralising or consolidating reforms, depending on the organisational structure of the party in question, by giving elites the symbolic and material leeway necessary to initiate, prepare, win support for, and eventually execute reforms. Resource-dependency relationships between party branches can arguably ensure that party members and/or delegates in congresses accept such reforms, even if they ultimately decrease these representatives' own power. This leads to the following hypothesis:

**H2:** Access to state funding and control over staff will empower party elites and in turn, depending on organisational structure, either contribute to consolidation or centralisation.

### *2.2.3 How do state funding and staffing contribute to pursuit of constitutive function (H3)?*

In resource-vulnerable parties, such as new minor parties, state funding and staff can help the party to surpass the threshold of authorisation, i.e. to comply with ballot access requirements and present an electoral list, here labelled electoral participation. State funding and staff can arguably do so both directly and indirectly.

In a direct manner, state funding can firstly help parties to comply with various ballot access requirements that require funds, such as payment of fees, preparation and printing of statutes/bylaws, and having an external auditor (see Tavits, 2008; Pedersen, 1982; for examples from the US case, see Stratmann, 2005; Burden, 2007), echoing the argument that state funds are the money that

keep parties alive from one election to the next (Nassmacher, 2009, p. 292). State funds are especially important for potential signature requirements for ballot access. Concretely, signature collection often demands that party representatives travel and rally for their party. State funds can cover the costs of such travel, and enable party representatives to collect signatures in more areas than would otherwise be possible. Moreover, party pamphlets and other materials that can be used in the signature campaign itself can be prepared and printed with the help of state funds. Additionally, possible fees related to approval of signatures are naturally more easily covered when a party has state funds. Surely, other income sources also aid a party in these processes. However, as mentioned previously, new minor parties tend to have few alternative income sources upon which they can rely.

Staff can also contribute directly to the task of complying with ballot access requirements, and signature requirements specifically: Staff have knowledge and updated information regarding the specificities of the ballot access requirements. This task is particularly pertinent for parties that operate in contexts where ballot access requirements often change, or where snap-elections are held, meaning that the time-frame within which new minor parties have to exceed the threshold of authorisation, is short. Additionally, staff can coordinate and participate in signature campaigns.

In addition to helping to surpass ballot access requirements, state funding and staff facilitate the process of constructing the electoral list(s) itself. Depending on the electoral system, a party has to either present one electoral list per constituency, or two in the case of mixed electoral systems (one party list and one with individual district candidates). The process is in itself crucial, as a party is defined by its candidates demographically, geographically, and ideologically

(Hazan & Voerman, 2006, p. 148). Previously in the chapter it was argued that new minor parties have a limited recruitment ground as they often have few organisational branches and lack a strong youth organisation. This is also related to an often low membership number (Casas-Zamora, 2006; Mair & Biezen, 2001). All these characteristics complicate the process of developing an electoral list, as *'one thing that parties absolutely cannot do without (...), is candidates'* (Art, 2011, p. 35; see also Lucardie, 2000; Scarrow, 2015). State funding can help new minor parties to exploit their (limited) membership base to the fullest when it comes to constructing and presenting an electoral list. Concretely, state funding ensures that new minor parties have the funds available to reach out to their members and find out which of them are interested in standing as candidates on the list, for example by distributing letters to all members, launching a campaign searching for electoral candidates, or organising meetings where candidacies can be discussed. Moreover, coordination between constituencies or between party representatives with regards to candidacies can be facilitated when the party has money to cover travel costs, meeting facilities, and telephone and internet bills. Also external campaigns, where a party seeks electoral candidates outside its membership ranks, can more easily be conducted and paid for with the help of state funding. Similarly, staff presence can contribute to the processes described above: staff can help in the process of identifying candidates, contacting them, and interviewing them (if the parties choose to do that), and dealing with the administrative requirements related to presenting a list (for example formatting requirements).

In an indirect manner, state funds and staff can enable electoral participation by contributing to building branches and increasing the membership. More specifically, Kölln (2015, p. 707) argues that party organisations,



understood as the extra-parliamentary units of parties, '*prepare the party for the next electoral event*'. In works on party members, their importance as potential candidates for public office and as a means of voluntary support are frequently mentioned (see e.g. Scarrow, 2000; Scarrow, 2015). Consequently, I argue that members represent a crucial resource which is necessary to facilitate electoral participation per se. Members can for example aid compliance with ballot access criteria by being mobilised to organise signature campaigns, and collect signatures. They provide a party with candidates for elections, and can also themselves contribute with proposals for candidacies, which helps in the process of developing the electoral list. This indicates that state funding and staff may be well utilised in the task of increasing the party membership. State funding can contribute to membership growth by facilitating membership campaigns and travels by party leaders to new areas where recruitment campaigns can take place. Furthermore, transfers to subnational branches can be used for recruitment purposes. Staff can similarly work on such campaigns, identify new members, and provide a stable point of reference in the party office with whom new members can be in touch. State funding and staff can thus, by contributing to membership growth, indirectly make it easier for new minor parties to exceed the threshold of authorisation.

State funding and staff can also contribute indirectly to electoral participation by contributing to either establishing or strengthening subnational party branches.<sup>15</sup> Having functioning subnational branches is particularly important for electoral participation as parties in many European countries

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<sup>15</sup> While some argue that an increase in membership necessitates more subnational leaders and branches (Blondel, 1978, p. 149, cited in Kölln 2015; see also Michels, 1962 [1911], p. 34), membership increase and the establishment and strengthening of subnational branches are different organisational processes with different dynamics, which is why they are treated separately in this argument.

(including Norway and Italy) grant their subnational levels a crucial role in identifying and selecting candidates for election (Bille, 2001; Hazan & Voerman, 2006; for Norwegian examples, see Svåsand, 1994a; Svåsand et al., 1997), not just in regional, but also in national elections. Although the studies referred to above offer little insight into new minor parties specifically, given that '*parties tend to imitate one another*' (Hazan & Voerman, 2006, p. 154), it is reasonable to expect the new minor parties in this study to have a similar way of organising their candidate selection processes. Consequently, functioning subnational branches to which members adhere, and that the party can rely on for proposals and decisions regarding candidacies, are crucial for a party's ability to complete the work on setting up electoral lists in different types of elections. A subnational branch can also aid in processes of signature collection, for instance by mobilising members.

Staff can facilitate the establishment of new branches, for instance by travelling to areas where there is no branch (but only members) in order to set up basic structures (local executive, for instance). Staff can also work to strengthen those branches that already exist (but function poorly), by following up on their activities, urging them to hold annual meetings, and performing training to ensure that branches know how to deal effectively with internal matters (e.g. candidate selection, regular meetings), and external matters (how to engage in public debate, write letters to the editor, etc.). This can in turn significantly improve a new minor party's potential to field candidates in more electoral districts, and hence pursue its constitutive function.<sup>16</sup> State funding can also contribute (not

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<sup>16</sup> I take countries that do *not* have an electoral system with one single nation-wide district as a starting point, as neither Norway nor Italy have had this. For a discussion of the link between electoral district and candidate selection method, see Hazan and Voerman (2006).

just by paying for staff) to the establishment and strengthening of branches, by financing meetings, office space, and basic facilities (computers etc.).

In brief, therefore, state funding and staff can directly contribute to facilitating the processes of overcoming ballot access requirements and presenting an electoral list, and can indirectly contribute to an increase in membership and to the establishment and/or strengthening of subnational branches. This argument similarly implies that new minor parties that lose or face a significant decrease in their income from state funding, and/or decrease or downsize their staff, will have a harder time in surpassing the threshold of authorisation. This is because new minor parties will then have less money and fewer staff to help with demands related to ballot access requirements and the preparation of the electoral list, but also because efforts to increase the membership and establish and/or strengthen subnational branches will suffer. This leads to the following hypothesis:

**H3:** State funding access and staff help new minor parties to exceed the threshold of authorisation.

## 2.3 Summary

This chapter has defined the study's core concepts, and outlined how they are theoretically related to one another, developing a total of three hypotheses that are heuristic devices to guide the empirical analysis. Concretely, state funding was defined as state benefits, comprising both direct and indirect benefits, and state constraints, comprising requirements related to the access and maintenance of state funds. Staffing was defined as changes to the number of either temporary or permanent staff, while centralisation is understood as the process in which elites, such as party leaders and elected representatives,

increase their power over the executive council in new minor parties. Consolidation was defined as the process in which party elites (that operate in parties that already have a completely centralised executive), reinforce their strong position, as such consolidating it. Finally, pursuit of constitutive function is understood as the process of exceeding Pedersen's (1982) threshold of authorisation, i.e. complying with ballot access criteria and presenting an electoral list.

There are three core arguments in this study, each reflected in a hypothesis. The hypotheses have been developed based on rational choice institutionalism, and are outlined in the table below. H1 argues that an increase of state funding will contribute to staffing in new minor parties. The argument conversely implies that a decrease or loss of state funds contributes to downsizing. In H2 staffing shifts status, and becomes – in addition to state funding – the factor theorised to contribute to centralisation. In the table below, I mark this shift with a double line between H1 and H2. The argument in H2 is that state funding and staff will contribute to strengthening party elites, in consequence leading to either a centralisation of the executive council, or to the consolidation of an already centralised structure. The argument thus takes into account that different parties will exhibit different levels of centralisation prior to a reform, which will affect a party's *room* to centralise. Finally, the argument in H3 contends that state funding and staff facilitate electoral participation, by directly contributing to overcoming ballot access criteria such as signature campaigns and candidate recruitment. Also, these resources contribute indirectly to electoral participation, by aiding in the establishment and strengthening of party branches and in increasing the membership. Conversely, H3 implies that a decrease or loss of state funding and staff will make it more difficult for new minor parties to

participate in elections, as they will then lack two core resources that directly and indirectly enable electoral participation.

Table 2.2 Overview of theoretical argument and hypotheses

Hypotheses	State funding access/increase	Staffing	Centralisation	Pursuit of constitutive function
H1	+	+		
H2	+	+	+	
H3	+	+		+

**Note:** The impact of state funding *on* staffing is analysed in H1, while the impact of state funding *and* staff on centralisation and pursuit of constitutive function is analysed in H2 and H3.

The next chapter outlines the research design of the thesis, specifying how it empirically addresses the theoretical framework outlined in this chapter. Concretely, I discuss why a comparative design, relying on in-depth qualitative data from 14 new minor parties from Norway and Italy, provides a fruitful way to analyse the theoretical propositions discussed in this chapter.

## 3 Research design

### 3.0 Introduction

This chapter outlines the study's comparative design, case selection, the data on which the analysis relies, and operationalisations. Firstly, I discuss the thesis' comparative case design, and why it is feasible to select Italy and Norway as contexts from which to draw new minor parties. These two advanced, established democracies offer rich variation concerning state benefits and constraints, crucial for both within-case and across-case comparisons. Secondly, I present the study's case selection, which has two parts. The first discusses the criteria for and selection of new minor parties. As emphasised in chapter 1, the impact of state funds will be most readily visible in new minor parties, making them particularly pertinent to the aims of this thesis. Four analytical criteria are employed to select new minor parties: a) party newness; b) minority status; c) variation with regards to state funding access; and d) variation in ideology/age/status (alive/dead). Seven new minor parties in each context are selected. The second part of the case selection outlines the criteria for selecting centralising/consolidating reforms and electoral contests, both of which constitute units of analysis that will be analysed in-depth in order to explore how state funds shape centralisation (H2) and pursuit of constitutive function (H3) respectively. The core criterion for selecting centralising/consolidating reforms is that prior to the reform the party had access to either state funds and/or staff, while the main criterion for selecting electoral contests is that prior to the relevant contest the party experienced an increase or decrease of state funds and/or staff.

The following part of the chapter describes the data upon which the analysis relies, namely primary documents, semi-structured interviews, and

secondary sources. I discuss how the data is used and triangulated, both across different sources and within the same type of source, how it has been collected, and its challenges regarding validity and reliability. In the final section of the chapter I operationalise the concepts of the study (state benefits/constraints, staffing, centralisation/consolidation, and pursuit of constitutive function), and outline the indicators for the analysis. Then I discuss which additional factors will be considered throughout the analysis.

### 3.1 Research Design: The comparative approach, contexts, and time-frame

This study's aim, to systematically explore how state benefits and constraints shape staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function, implies that the core focus is on '*the importance of an independent variable*' (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 80). The complexity involved in analysing the ways in which institutions<sup>17</sup> – for this thesis, state benefits and constraints – influence political actors has led some to argue that in-depth examinations of individual cases are necessary (Detterbeck, 2012). In recognition of this, the present work is a comparative case study. Case studies better enable us to specify whether and how a factor matters, rather than how much it matters (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 25), making this method appropriate to the aim of this study – to analyse how state funding contributes to shaping intra-organisational processes in new minor parties. The comparative approach employed first seeks to ensure a comparison *across* contexts, i.e. by analysing how state funding in Norway and Italy impact staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function in the respective new minor parties of these two contexts. However, the analyses of H1, H2, and H3 are also

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<sup>17</sup> See rational choice institutionalist approach in chapter 2.

life cycle analyses, meaning that shifts in staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function will also be analysed over time within each of the new minor parties under scrutiny, thereby allowing for *within-case* comparison as well (Paterson, 2012).

Chapter 1 outlined how the choice to study new minor parties in this thesis is appropriate for analytical and methodological reasons. In particular, these parties tend to have poorly developed income structures, few material resources, and small memberships (Bolleyer, 2013; Casas-Zamora, 2006; Ikstens et al., 2002; Mair & Biezen, 2001; Wilson, 1973). As a result, state funds are particularly important for these largely state-dependent parties (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 43). Thus, new minor parties constitute most-likely cases, i.e. cases where one expects to see that state funding (in this case the crucial factor to be studied) indeed has an impact on the outcome of interest (staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function) (see e.g. George & Bennett, 2005, p. 253; Gerring, 2007, p. 89; Levy, 2008). Such state-dependent new minor parties (most likely cases) are arguably particularly useful for a study that seeks to bring clarity to a literature that has found contradictory results concerning the impact of state funds on intra-organisational development in parties (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006). More specifically, their state-dependency makes it possible to pin-point the impact of state funds (as opposed to other income sources) on staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function, and explore how regulatory shifts to state benefits and constraints potentially impact intra-organisational processes.

The crucial role of state benefits and constraints in the analysis means that regulatory context is the core entity that needs to be selected first in order to ensure variation (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 83). By selecting Italy and Norway



this study contributes to redressing the fact that political finance issues have *'received far less systematic treatment in Western Europe [than in the US]'* (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 3; but see Nassmacher, 2009; Poguntke et al., 2016). These two contexts from Western Europe ensure homogeneity on some core, overarching factors. First, both Italy and Norway are parliamentary democracies in which parties (not candidates) are at the centre of political finance, contrary to, for example, the systems in place in the US and Canada (Nassmacher, 2009, p. 32). Secondly, both countries have, since 1970 and 1974 (Norway and Italy respectively) offered state funds to political parties, which is crucial given the thesis' focus on exploring the impact of state funds on intra-organisational processes. Moreover, selecting two countries where state funding was introduced before the parties under scrutiny were established (i.e. prior to 1980) eliminates the introduction moment per se as an additional factor in the analysis. Thirdly, these two countries' political parties (irrespective of size) have over time been highly state-dependent (see e.g. Biezen & Kopecký, 2014, 2017). Finally, Norway and Italy are similar with regards to the timing of the introduction of a party law (2006 in Norway and 2012 in Italy) and party constitutionalisation – two matters that generally differ across new and old democracies (Biezen & Kopecký, 2014).

These overarching similarities aside, the two contexts have exposed their parties to considerably varying state benefits and constraints over time, which enables the analysis to investigate how a broad range of (different) state funding regulations influences staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function. More specifically, both contexts have changed the nature of state benefits (type of benefit, amounts available) and constraints (related to accessing and maintaining benefits) considerably since state funding was introduced (see also Pizzimenti, 2017; Pizzimenti & Ignazi, 2011; Saglie & Sivesind, 2018). Now, the

extent to which the new minor parties studied notice these changes and adapt to them is an empirical question. The crucial matter is that each of the contexts allows for variation over time within the core indicator of the study (see operationalisation below), namely access to/increase of state funding (or decrease or loss), and therefore facilitates the comparisons outlined above: both across contexts and within cases.

Italy and Norway also differ (and have differed over time) concerning some (party) system-level variables. First, despite both Italy and Norway being established democracies, the Italian party system has been more fluid, and has been characterised as '*fertile soil*' for new party emergence, while Norway is used as an example of the opposite (Krouwel & Lucardie, 2008, p. 280). This fluidity is particularly related to the collapse of the party system following corruption scandals in the early 1990s (see e.g. Bull & Rhodes, 1997). The changed external pressures and opportunities that all political parties were faced with in the wake of this – such as a rejection of the political class by the people, and the disappearance of a range of the established parties (see e.g. Bull & Rhodes, 1997) – could potentially affect the analysis of the ways in which state funds impact intra-organisational development, particularly so with regards to staffing (H1). This difference between Norway and Italy enables the analysis to explore whether state funds still shape organisational patterns in new minor parties operating in two different party systems similarly.

Secondly, the electoral system in Italy has changed more frequently and undergone more substantial changes than in Norway. The shift from a highly proportional to a mixed electoral system in 1993 is a case in point (see e.g. Katz, 2003; Regalia, 2018). This has provided (new minor) parties with different opportunities, e.g. concerning coalition participation in elections. I can thus

explore whether state funding (and staff) similarly contribute to pursuit of constitutive function in new minor parties that operate under contrasting electoral systems. Thirdly, Italy is a member of the EU, which Norway is not. In terms of state funding provision, this should not significantly skew the analysis, as both contexts have provided direct state funding on *three* levels. While Norway has done so on national, regional, and local level, the Italian state has provided benefits related to regional, national, and European elections. Now, that does not mean that the benefits provided on these three different levels across the two contexts are alike, but that the number of institutional tiers on which state benefits are available are identical in the two countries, eliminating this as a source of variation.

As mentioned above, state funding was introduced to Norwegian parties in 1970, and to Italian ones in 1974. However, even though the regulatory analysis goes back to the 1970s, the time-frame for the analysis of how state funds shape staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function is from 1980 until 2016. 1980 is selected as a cut-off point given that 1980 is selected as a definitional criterion for *newness* in this thesis. Studying parties that were formed post 1980 allows for the coverage of *complete* life cycles of new parties, while simultaneously assuring that all the parties face the challenge of consolidating support in increasingly individualised contexts and in times of considerable regulatory change (see e.g. Biezen & Kopecký, 2014, p. 173). 2016 is the final year covered in the analysis, as this was the year the fieldwork for the thesis began.

## 3.2 Case selection: Parties, reforms, and electoral contests

The first part of this section on case selection reflects the above section on selection of regulatory contexts, by outlining the criteria for and selection of seven new minor parties in each context, whose patterns concerning staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function will be analysed in this thesis. The second part outlines the criteria for selecting centralising/consolidating reforms and electoral contests with regards to the in-depth analysis of H2 and H3 respectively.<sup>18</sup> Concretely, the analyses of centralisation (H2) and pursuit of constitutive function (H3) both comprise a life cycle and an in-depth analysis. The life cycle analysis of H2 outlines shifts to the composition of the new minor parties' executive councils and the de-facto leadership structure over time, in order to establish whether or not centralisation and/or consolidation took place. Similarly, the life cycle analysis of H3 explores the new minor parties' electoral participation (i.e. ability to exceed the threshold of authorisation) over time. The in-depth analyses of H2 and H3 explore the ways in which state funds and staff impact centralisation/consolidation (H2) and pursuit of constitutive function (H3), by analysing selected centralising/consolidating reforms and electoral contests respectively. The criteria for selecting these centralising/consolidating reforms and electoral contests are thus outlined in the second part of this section on case selection.

### 3.2.1 *Selecting new minor parties in Norway and Italy*

Analytically speaking, there were four steps to constructing a sample of new minor parties for the analysis of H1-H3. Firstly, *new* parties in Norway and Italy, i.e. parties formed post-1980, had to be identified. Secondly, it had to be

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<sup>18</sup> There is no need to select specific staffing processes for in-depth scrutiny of H1, as the analysis of H1 includes *all* staffing processes throughout the new minor parties' life cycle.

established which of these were electorally *minor* parties, i.e. winning less than 10 percent of the vote. This also implied eliminating possible major (new) parties. Thirdly, the focus on how new minor parties' access to/increase of, and decrease/loss of, state funding impacts intra-organisational processes meant that the sample had to be selected from new minor parties exhibiting variation on this indicator. Finally, it was important to achieve variation with regards to the parties' ideology, formation date, and current status (dead/alive), given these indicators' relevance in the analysis. The following paragraphs outline the details of these four steps, but first, I operationalise the concepts *party*, *new*, and *minor*, as these form the basis for the subsequent case selection.

Chapter 1 defined a new party as one established after 1980, and a minor party as one that has never achieved more than 10 percent of the vote. To operationalise 'new', I rely on Hug (2001), who states that a new party either results from a split or is a genuinely new foundation that has no basis in an older party/different party. This contrasts with the view adopted by Harmel and Robertson (1985), who included mergers, splits, and natural formations in their category 'circumstances of formation' for new parties, and with Bartolini and Mair (1990), who excluded both mergers and splits from a sample of new parties.

Hug's starting point is appropriate for studying organisational development over time since the parties selected will have to build a new organisation (if they chose to do so) from scratch, and not the least maintain it. Moreover, new parties - irrespective of whether they originate as a split or as a completely newly born party - will share the trait of having malleable and (at least initially) poorly institutionalised party structures due to their age, and of having vulnerable income structures (see section 1.1.1 in this thesis). So, even though some parties may start out with (more or less) resources, such as members and/or elected

representatives, these features are still present. In theory, therefore, state funds' impact on these parties' patterns of staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function, will be similar. To empirically explore this notion, however, the final sample of parties (see below) studied in this thesis, includes both splits from powerful mother parties (e.g. the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy) and completely newly born parties (such as the Greens in both Norway and Italy). Thus, the thesis can investigate if state funds actually impact new parties that start out with different pools of resources similarly - or not.

To operationalise minor party status, I rely on a party's electoral results (see e.g. Duverger, 1959; Mair, 1991), and not on institutional criteria, e.g. membership in the national parliament (Pridham, 1991), or the party's relevance or position in the party system (Copus et al., 2009; Herzog, 1987; Smith, 1991). Electoral results are a feasible indicator for minor party status because they often determine a party's access to state funding. Operationally, a minor party needs to be distinguished from a major party, and hence an upper electoral limit must be set. Casal Bértoa and Spirova (2017) argue that small (minor) parties are those that linger between the thresholds for parliamentary representation and access to state funds, while Rashkova and Spirova (2014) argue that small parties (in Bulgaria) are those receiving less than 10 percent of the national electoral vote. I adopt the latter threshold for two main reasons. First, it creates a sample of minor parties that is relatively homogeneous in terms of electoral turnout, but still captures both electorally minor parties that have no problem accessing state funds (winning 5-10 percent of the vote), and parties that never or only sometimes qualify (winning 0-5 percent of the vote). Secondly, since this study investigates party features over time, a 10 percent threshold allows minor

parties to grow through the period of study, without being excluded from the study because of their doing so.

Only national and regional new minor parties are included in order to exclude strictly local formations that will never – because they either lack the potential or lack the desire – become relevant on a national level. To avoid selecting minor party formations that never came close to accessing state funds, and that, due to their size, most likely lack structures that can be analysed, a lower 0.5 percent limit for inclusion in the sample is adopted. Concretely, national/regional parties that never won more than 0.5 percent of the vote on national level are not selected. However, if a party that never achieved more than 0.5 percent of the vote on the national level still managed to have a parliamentarian elected, the party *is* included. The reason is that parliamentary representation most likely implies the presence of (at least some organisational) structure in a party (that can be analysed in this thesis). The selection criteria are summarised in the table below:

Table 3.1 Operationalisation of party, newness, and minor party status

	<b>Party</b>	<b>New</b>	<b>Minor</b>
<i>Operationalisations</i>	a) Be a national or regional party	a) Be formed as a split or completely newly born	Never achieve more than 10 percent of the vote
	b) Achieve more than 0.5 percent in national elections or have one parliamentarian elected	b) Founded post-1980	

In order to select new minor parties, I first identified all parties that ran in elections in Italy and Norway between 1980 and 2016 by analysing official statistics from the Italian Ministry of Interior, and reports and electoral lists provided by Statistics Norway (SSB) and the Norwegian Social Science

Database (NSD). The table below shows that 252 parties ran in the nine parliamentary elections held between 1980 and 2016 in Italy, while the figure was 65 in Norway (same number of elections).

Table 3.2 The party landscape, Norway and Italy

Overview	Italy <sup>1</sup>	Norway
Total number of parties running	252	65
Number of <i>new</i> parties	28 <sup>2</sup>	8
Number of new minor parties	26	8
% of new minor parties of total number of parties running	10	12
Number of new minor parties (achieving between 0.5-5% in elections)	21	8
Number of new minor parties (achieving between 5-10% in elections)	5 <sup>3</sup>	0
<b>Formative features of the new minor parties</b>		
Splits	23	6
Newly born	3	2

**Notes:** All elections in the period 1980-2016 are included. Both Italy and Norway had 9 parliamentary elections in this time period.

<sup>1</sup> Only Chamber of Deputies elections (not Senate) are included. In 1994, 1996, and 2001 Italian parties could run lists in a proportional and a majoritarian component. The table only includes parties running in the proportional part of the election for these three years.

<sup>2</sup> Three parties have not been registered, as they do not have individual (just coalition) election results.

<sup>3</sup> The Christian Democratic Centre (CCD) and United Christian Democratic Centre ran together, and their total election result is above 5 percent. The two parties are counted as two in this figure, even though their election result was joint.

**Sources:** Norway: Statistics Norway (Undated (a)), and Norwegian Social Science Database (Undated). Italy: Ministry of the Interior.

After having identified all parties that ran in elections between 1980 and 2016, I coded newness, i.e. whether a party was established after 1980 as either a split or a newly born. Party webpages, other webpages (of them Wikipedia)<sup>19</sup>, secondary sources, and newspaper sources were used in this analysis. Then I noted which parties had either achieved more than 0.5 percent of the vote or had one parliamentarian elected. Afterwards, I singled out those that had achieved more than 10 percent of the vote. Two such (new, major) parties existed in Italy, namely Forza Italia and The 5 Star Movement, but none in Norway. In Italy, a total of 26 parties were both *new* and *minor*, while the number was eight in Norway. While all the new minor Norwegian parties are located in the electoral

<sup>19</sup> For some of the very minor formations, Wikipedia is nearly the only source for information, and, although not ideal, the author has decided to rely on information from this source in a few cases where no other source is available.



range between 0.5 percent and 5 percent of the vote, the Italian context also produced new minor parties that won between 5 and 10 percent in national elections. Appendix A lists all of the new minor parties in each of the two contexts.

Given the overall lower number of new minor parties in the Norwegian case (only eight parties), all of them except one is included in the final sample.<sup>20</sup> Seven parties were selected among the new minor parties in the Italian case. Both of the samples contain parties that increased and decreased their income from state funding, ensuring variation on the study's crucial indicator. Two parties – in each context – that did not access state funding are included. This is useful in the analysis of staffing, as it enables me to explore whether a complete lack of state funds really does (as theorised) mean a complete lack of staff. As outlined above, the selected parties are founded at different time points between 1980 and 2016, enabling a broad analysis of how different state funding regulations have affected them at different time points. Moreover, two dead parties are included in each context to enable an analysis of the extent to which state funding contributes to a decrease (and eventual ceasing) of ability to pursue constitutive function. As ideology is one of the factors that will be accounted for throughout the analysis (see section 3.5), it is valuable that both the selected Norwegian and Italian new minor parties exhibit a diverse range of ideological dispositions, from single-issue parties, to regional/agrarian, to environmental. The table below outlines the core traits of the seven selected parties in each context.

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<sup>20</sup> I exclude The Political Party from the analysis, given that it was a party created by two comedians, widely perceived as a joke by the mainstream media and commentators (see e.g. Dagbladet, 2000; Kvilesjø, 2000).

Table 3.3 New minor parties selected for analysis – Norway and Italy

	Formation date	Dead/alive	Accessed state funding in life span	Decreased/lost state funding in life span	Ideology
<b>NORWAY</b>					
The Pensioners' Party	1985	Alive	Yes	Yes	Single-issue/pensioner
The Greens	1988	Alive	Yes	Yes	Environment
Future for Finnmark	1989	Dead (1993)	No	No	Single-issue/regional
The Fatherland's Party	1990	Dead (2008)	Yes	Yes	Far-right/immigration
Cross-Partisan MPs	1992	Alive	No	No	Non-applicable <sup>1</sup>
The Coastal Party	1999	Alive	Yes	Yes	Regional/coastal interests/agrarian
The Christian Conservative Party	2011	Alive	Yes	Yes	Christian conservative
<b>ITALY</b>					
The Greens	1986	Alive	Yes	Yes	Environmental
The Pensioners' Party	1987	Alive	Yes	Yes	Pensioner/single-issue
Communist Refoundation Party	1991	Alive	Yes	Yes	Communist
The Segni Pact	1993	Dead (2002)	Yes	Yes	Single-issue (change electoral law)
Tricolour Flame	1995	Alive	Yes	Yes	Far-right
The Communist Party of Workers	2006	Alive	No	No	Communist
Work to Stop the Decline	2012	Dead (2014)	No	No	Liberal

**Notes:** <sup>1</sup>Non applicable is coded because Cross Partisan MPs allowed their representatives to choose their own program/issues.

### 3.2.2 Selecting centralising/consolidating reforms and electoral contests

To select reform processes for the in-depth study of centralisation/consolidation, I first relied on the life cycle analysis of centralisation. This analysis (see chapter 7) outlines whether or not the selected new minor parties centralised the

composition of their executive councils – if there was room to do so – throughout their life cycles. If there was no room to centralise the executive (i.e. it was already completely elite-controlled), the analysis investigates whether the party underwent a consolidating reform. If a new minor party never introduced either a centralising or consolidating reform, the party was excluded from the second (in-depth) part of the centralisation analysis. Then, if a party implemented several reforms, the core criterion for selecting one reform process was that prior to its introduction the party had access to state funding and/or staff, i.e. one or both of the resources which constitute the main interest of the analysis. To establish whether parties had state funds and/or staff, I relied on the life cycle analysis of the parties' income structure (see chapter 5) and staffing patterns (chapter 6). The adoption of this selection criterion implies that those parties that introduced a reform, but did not have state funding and/or staff prior to its introduction, were omitted from the in-depth analysis (i.e. their reforms are not analysed).

I selected the *first reform*<sup>21</sup> (centralising or consolidating) following access to state funds and/or staff. Three centralising and two consolidating reform fulfilled the selection criteria in the Italian case, whilst three centralising and one consolidating reform were selected in the Norwegian case.<sup>22</sup> As it happens, the selected reforms comprise both major and minor reform processes, which ensures that the analysis does not present a skewed picture of the role of state funds and staff, as larger reforms would arguably require more resources (for example in the form of preparatory work) than smaller reforms. The empirical details of the selection process (in light of the criteria developed above) are found in chapter 7 on centralisation.

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<sup>21</sup> I.e. the first reform that I have been able to document via my sources.

<sup>22</sup> This means that no party in my sample introduced a de-centralising reform as its first reform following access to state funds and/or staff.

To select one electoral contest for each of the parties, for in-depth analysis regarding pursuit of constitutive function (H3), I relied on the life cycle analysis of the new minor parties' income structure (see chapter 5), and staffing patterns (chapter 6). The first criterion for selecting an electoral contest is that prior to it the party experienced either an *increase* or a *decrease* of state funding and/or staff, i.e. a significant shift in one or both of the resources which constitute the main interest of the analysis. New minor parties in both contexts which experienced an increase or decrease of such resources were thus identified in a first step, to ensure variation. The adoption of this selection criterion automatically implies that those parties which throughout their life cycles had neither state funds nor staff are excluded from the in-depth analysis, since I would not be able to explore the impact of the two core indicators of interest (state funds and staff) in these cases.

Two additional selection criteria were adopted, to ensure the broadest possible sample of electoral contests and give the analysis a wider basis for exploring how state funding and staff contribute to electoral participation. First, electoral contests exposing new minor parties to varying ballot access criteria, which are a crucial part of the threshold of authorisation, were selected. A detailed overview of the ballot access criteria in place in Norway and Italy over time can be found in Appendix G. Ensuring variation within this indicator is important in order to avoid presenting an analysis which, due to homogeneity (either ballot access criteria are permissive or constraining), is biased with respect to the impact of staff and state funding on electoral participation. In a related vein: electoral contests taking place on different institutional levels (national, regional, EU) were selected. This criterion helps to fulfil the previous one (i.e. variation concerning ballot access criteria), but also ensures that the impact of state

funding and staff is analysed in electoral contests where parties' need for members and local branches might vary. For example, the number of candidacies required to present a list may differ in different types of elections (see Appendix G), in turn exposing new minor parties to different pressures with regards to recruitment of candidates. Overall, the *first* electoral contest following a new minor parties' increase or decrease of state funding was selected. However, to ensure variation in ballot access criteria and institutional tier of the election, the *second* electoral contest after an increase or decrease of state funding and/or staff was selected for in-depth analysis in some of the parties. In the Italian case, six electoral contests were selected – one at the European level, three at the regional level, and two at the national level. In Norway, three regional electoral contests and two national were selected. The empirical details of the selection process are outlined in chapter 8 on pursuit of constitutive function.

The table below summarises the selection criteria for centralising/consolidating reforms and electoral contests:

Table 3.4 Overview of selection criteria for centralising/consolidating reforms and electoral contests

Unit of analysis	Selection criteria
<i>Centralising/consolidating reform</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Presence of state funds and/or staff prior to introduction of reform</li> <li>2. First reform following access to state funds and/or staff selected</li> </ol>
<i>Electoral contest</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Significant increase/decrease in income from the state and/or in staff number</li> <li>2. First electoral contest following such a shift in resources selected in a majority of the parties, but in minority of parties the second electoral contest following this shift was selected to ensure variation in:</li> <li>3. Ballot access requirements</li> <li>4. Institutional tier of the election</li> </ol>

### 3.3 Data and method

The main sources of data used in the analysis were: primary documents such as party documents and newspaper sources; semi-structured interviews; and secondary sources such as legal texts. The party documents, newspaper articles/radio recordings, and interviews were all analysed using simple qualitative content analysis.<sup>23</sup> To address the three hypotheses, I first analysed the written material, i.e. party documents, newspaper articles, radio interviews, and secondary sources. Then, those sources were analysed in conjunction with interview material, in order to '*confirm information that has already been collected from other sources*' (Tansey, 2007, p. 766). The diversity of data sources, and this way of analysing it, facilitated data triangulation (Bryman, 2003) throughout the analysis, both across sources (interviews vs. documents, and primary vs. secondary sources), across interviewees (party leader vs. party staff), and across party documents (financial account vs. annual account). Triangulation enhances the validity of the study's findings, and simultaneously reveals weaknesses in other sources (Patton, 2002; Tansey, 2007).<sup>24</sup> The ability to triangulate across interviewees facilitated validity in cases where other data sources (e.g. documents) were scarce. The next section outlines the different data sources upon which the analysis rests, and discusses their challenges and limitations.

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<sup>23</sup> The direct quotes from documents and interviews in Norwegian/Italian have been translated by me, and semantically adopted to appear fluent in English. That means that not all translations are completely literal, as this would hamper the understanding in English.

<sup>24</sup> As will become evident in the analysis, triangulation is not possible in *all* cases and for *all* information. Sometimes this is caused by the fact that some information has been particularly difficult to get hold of. The lack of triangulation in some instances is a weakness, but difficult to operate without, given that new minor parties are generally poorly covered (with a few exceptions) in the secondary literature, and that new minor parties have to a lesser degree developed archives offering consistent and broad information. Having said that, care has been taken to highlight where this is the case in the analysis, and to modify the nature of the conclusions accordingly.

### 3.3.1 Primary documents

Financial accounts and annual accounts are two core primary documents in this thesis. The former gives crucial information concerning state funding access and staffing, and the latter (often) provides information on various matters including staffing, electoral participation, organisational change, and finances. More specifically, the attachments to the Italian parties' financial accounts (*nota integrativa*) (usually) detail the exact number of staff in the parties. In some instances, staffing figures are discussed in the Italian parties' annual accounts as well (or instead of in the attachments). In Norway, staffing figures and changes to these are reported in the parties' annual accounts. The annual accounts also give (in some cases substantial) information about the staff's tasks.

The annual accounts in the Italian case usually originate from the treasurer, and are called *Relazione del tesoriere/Relazione sulla gestione del bilancio*, while they are often written by the executive council or the leadership in the Norwegian parties (*årsrapport*). Financial and annual accounts for Italian parties that accessed state funding from the late 1980s onwards are publicly available online.<sup>25</sup> Consequently, I lack financial accounts for the two parties that never accessed state funding: Act to Stop the Decline and the Communist Party of Workers.<sup>26</sup> There are also gaps in the accounts of Tricolour Flame and the Pensioner Party in Italy, as they only occasionally accessed state funding. In these instances, information about finances and party activities was collected through interviews (see below) and other party documents. In the Norwegian

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<sup>25</sup> See <http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/> (last accessed 30.08.2018). The legal requirement to also submit the annual account to the state was introduced in 1997 (see regulatory chapter). However, prior to this, parties also tended to attach the annual account to the submitted financial account (see e.g. Financial Account, the Greens, 1994).

<sup>26</sup> The Communist Party of Workers does not disclose such documents, as they are perceived as internal documents, according to party representatives. In Act to Stop the Decline, nobody with whom I spoke had access to financial/annual accounts, and I was not able to retrieve them online either.

case, full financial accounts (comprising income and expenses) are only publicly available covering 2014 onwards.<sup>27</sup> Financial and annual accounts in Norway have thus been collected in party archives (the Greens and the Pensioner Party), via party representatives (Coastal Party and the Fatherland's Party), and from the Norwegian State Archive (the Coastal Party).<sup>28</sup> For the Cross Partisan MPs and the Future for Finnmark there are no financial or annual accounts, which means that, for information concerning finances and party operation, I rely on interview material and other primary sources (see below).

Some authors have called into question the reliability of the financial accounts submitted to the authorities in Italy in the 1980s and 1990s (see e.g. Ciaurro, 1989; Rhodes, 1997; see also Pierre et al., 2000). Even though this suspicion has good ground, as indicated by the massive corruption scandals that hit the established political parties in the early 1990s, the problem of hidden finances and corrupt practices is generally much larger for the financial accounts of the affluent, established parties than for those of new minor parties. The reason is that new minor parties, as they rarely hold governmental power, nor have stable and strong parliamentary representation, are less prone to bribes and corrupt practices, as they would have little to offer in return. As we know from the literature, new minor parties are also less inviting prospects for donations, which reduces the chance that they have large donors supporting them (without it appearing in the financial account). Moreover, new minor parties generally have

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<sup>27</sup> Norwegian parties were also obliged to file income accounts from 1998, but these have been impossible to track down. The author has been in touch with the Storting and its archive, the Ministry of Local Government and Administration, and the Norwegian State Archive, none of which has been able to find these reports in their records. According to the archive in the Storting, there is a possibility that the income reports were not seen as '*worthy to be archived*', which may explain why they are nowhere to be found. Income accounts between 2006 and 2014 are available at [www.partifinansiering.no](http://www.partifinansiering.no) (last accessed 30.08.2018).

<sup>28</sup> Granted access to file in State Archive: RA/PA-1484 Steinar Bastesen, serie F – Arkiv, eske nr.1.



few *other* sources of income besides state funding (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006; Ikstens et al., 2002; Mair & Biezen, 2001), which to a large extent eliminates the risk of hidden funds in these parties' accounts. I thus align with Ciaurro (1989, p. 158) who argues that the financial accounts provide interesting and essential information for the study of public financing in Italy, even though they must be treated with caution. This also applies to the Norwegian financial accounts.

Where available, the analysis here relies on meeting documents (e.g. meeting minutes), congress documents, letters, party newsletters, and news reports from the parties' own webpages. The availability varies from party to party, but overall, my access to party archives, party representatives' willingness to share documents, and their publication on both present and past webpages, has provided me with a range of different documents for each party. These documents – as with the financial and annual accounts – are read with a critical eye, as they are often developed for public consumption, and as such (often) constitute the party leadership's presentation of the party. They thus present a form of 'official' version of events (Tansey, 2007, p. 767). That said, since this thesis focuses primarily on how party elites respond to state funding access (for instance with regards to staffing and centralisation), the leadership's own account of what goes on in a party is of particular interest. Moreover, such challenges are less relevant for some documents, such as internal meeting documents and letters, since they tend to be developed for a restricted group of party representatives.

This thesis also relies on statutes, i.e. the formal rulebooks of parties, in order to establish governance structures in general, and the composition of executive councils more specifically. The statutes have mainly been accessed

from current and old webpages.<sup>29</sup> Statutes of the Pensioner Party, the Greens, and the Fatherland's Party in Norway, as well as the Communist Refoundation Party and the Greens in Italy have been accessed through party archives and party representatives. Even though party statutes are useful when analysing party change, as statutory changes normally result from long deliberations and real conflict within a party (Katz & Mair, 1992), statutes also have their limitations. Concretely, they are – just as with other documents – not necessarily valid indicators of actual behaviour (see also Allern, 2006). Panebianco (1988), for example, states that statutes, at best, can only serve as a point of departure for the analysis of party organisation. Following the recommendation of Smith and Gauja (2010, p. 756), who state that party statutes must be '*treated with caution in describing the actual operation of parties*', statutes are triangulated with interview data and other party documents in the analysis presented here.

Finally, the analysis relies on news outlets. In the Norwegian case, I have mostly used newspaper articles, retrieved from the newspaper archive *Atekst (Retriever)*.<sup>30</sup> In the Italian case, a combination of newspaper articles, mainly from the archives of *La Repubblica*, *Corriere della sera*, and *La Stampa*<sup>31</sup>, and recordings and interviews by the radio station *Radio Radicale* are used.<sup>32</sup> This radio archive has been highly valuable for the analysis of for example the Greens, Tricolour Flame, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the Segni Pact. The

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<sup>29</sup> Old versions of webpages are saved at the web-portal *Wayback machine*, accessible here (last accessed 30.08.2018): <https://archive.org/web/>.

<sup>30</sup> This archive brings together issues (current and old) for a range of national/regional/local newspapers in Norway. Accessible here (login required) (last accessed 30.08.2018): <https://www.retriever.no/product/mediarkiv/>.

<sup>31</sup> Accessible here: <http://ricerca.repubblica.it/>, <http://archivio.corriere.it/Archivio/interface/landing.html> (login required), <http://www.lastampa.it/archivio-storico/index.jsp>. Last accessed 02.09.2018.

<sup>32</sup> *Radio Radicale* has a large digital archive available online, and has (for example) recorded the sound of a range of the selected new minor parties' congresses from the 1980s onwards.

complete list of all primary documents explicitly used in the thesis is given in Appendix B.

### 3.3.2 *Semi-structured interviews*

Interview data generally makes it easier to grasp values, attitudes, informal interactions, tactics, strategies, and processes (Beyers et al., 2014; Bryman, 2004; Tansey, 2007). This study has mainly interviewed party elites or representatives that have positions in some of the core organs of the parties, such as the executive council (for elite interviews, see e.g. Odendahl & Shaw, 2001). This is because decisions on staffing are mainly taken in a party's head office, which means that detailed information about such processes is best sought among party elites (H1). The same rings true when it comes to party representatives' endeavours to centralise the executive council (H2), or a party's strategy with regards electoral participation, i.e. pursuit of constitutive function (H3).

Elite/expert interviews specifically, and interviews about concrete events more generally, pose some particular challenges concerning validity. First of all, party elites may try to either modify the details of a specific process, and/or inflate or minimise their own role in an event, depending on whether there is something at stake (see e.g. Beyers et al., 2014; Tansey, 2007). For these reasons, elites may provide an erroneous or misguided account of a process. Secondly, time lags between the interview and the topic upon which the interview focuses can threaten reliability (Beyers et al., 2014, p. 178). To address these challenges, I interviewed several people with different roles in each party, and people who at *various time points* were active in the party, facilitating triangulation. Hence, I identified party representatives who had held core positions in the party throughout its life cycle, such as party leaders, deputy leaders, staff, treasurers,

and regional leaders. To a limited extent, snowball sampling (see e.g. Tansey, 2007) was used, as it enabled me to reach out and eventually speak to a broader group of party elites exercising different roles, which in turn facilitated triangulation across different interviewees, enhancing validity.

To assure comparability, the interviews were semi-structured, and an interview guide was developed. The interview guides (Norwegian/Italian) are attached in Appendix E. The questions mainly revolved around the impact of state regulations generally, and state funds specifically, on the party's operation, and changes to this over time. It also asked questions about the parties' income structure, and decision-making procedures. The Italian fieldwork was conducted first (November 2016), while the Norwegian fieldwork was done in two parts, the first in spring/summer of 2017, and the rest in winter 2017/2018. A total of 32 and 29 interviews were conducted in Italy and Norway respectively. The table below gives an overview of the interviews, while Appendix C gives details concerning the interviewees, their position in the party, the form of the interview, and interview date(s). Appendix D also provides the project's ethics approval.

Table 3.5 Interviews in Italy and Norway

	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Norway</b>
Total number of interviews, comprising semi-structured and follow-up interviews	32	29
<i>Of the total interviews:</i>		
a) Semi-structured interviews	a) 25	a) 22
b) Follow-up interviews	b) 7	b) 7
Average length of semi-structured interviews (i.e. not follow-up interviews or written interviews)	Ca 45 min	Ca 50 min <sup>1</sup>
Range of interviews in each party	2-5	2-5

**Note:** <sup>1</sup> In the Norwegian case, four interviews were not recorded, and are thus not part of this table.

### 3.3.3 Secondary sources

A range of legal texts and some secondary sources have been consulted and analysed to provide an overview of how state funding regulations and ballot

access criteria have developed over time in Italy and Norway. The legal texts were accessed via the Italian and Norwegian law portals.<sup>33</sup> Electoral statistics provided by the Ministry of Interior in the Italian case, and reports and electoral lists provided by Statistics Norway (SSB) and Norwegian Social Science Database (NSD) were crucial for the analysis of the new minor parties' pursuit of constitutive function. Finally, the study relies on some secondary literature, especially some excellent case studies of two of the Italian parties – The Greens (Vannucci, 2007) and the Communist Refoundation Party (Bertolino, 2004; Calossi, 2007) – and of the Italian regulatory framework (Pacini & Piccio, 2012; Pacini, 2009; Pizzimenti, 2017; Pizzimenti & Ignazi, 2011). One case study of the Norwegian Greens (Siem Knudsen, 2016) was also highly useful for the analysis.

### 3.3.4 Summary of sources

The summary below outlines the different sources that the thesis relies on in the analysis:

Table 3.6 Data sources – Italian and Norwegian new minor parties

<b>Data</b>	<b>Used to analyse which hypothesis?</b>
<i>Primary documents:</i> Financial and annual accounts, letters, newsletters, congress documents, meeting minutes, newspaper articles, radio recordings, and party statutes.	H1, H2, H3, and analysis of parties' income structure
Semi-structured interviews	H1, H2, H3, and analysis of parties' income structure
Legal texts	Regulatory analysis, and H3
Electoral statistics	H3

## 3.4 Operationalisations

State funding (i.e. state benefits and constraints) is operationalised as access to and/or increase of state funds (and decrease/loss of state funds). This core

<sup>33</sup> [www.lovdata.no](http://www.lovdata.no) and <http://www.normattiva.it/> (last accessed 30.08.2018).

indicator in the study captures both parties' access to and increase of indirect and direct state funds, and state constraints attached to these benefits (access criteria/reporting). Even though the definition of state benefits comprises state funds obtained from different party levels (EU, national, regional, local), only state funds registered in the national party branch's financial account are captured by the operationalised indicator. Understanding the national branch's financial situation is most central when the goal is to systematically analyse new minor parties, as their subnational branches are often either non-existent or weak, and the national branch is thus the central locus of the party.<sup>34</sup> This also implies that the data availability on the subnational level – especially over time – is weak,<sup>35</sup> and an analysis of national accounts thus ensures comparability across new minor parties. Capturing state funds in national accounts gives a broad overview of the total state funds received as state funds can originate from the parties' local, regional, and European levels if internal transfers take place, which happens in a few (but not all) the Italian and Norwegian new minor parties studied here. Moreover, in Italy, state funds are allocated directly to the national branch, even when the funds are won in relation to, for example, regional elections. Thus, all state funds (won on all levels) are captured by analysing the national accounts. In Norway, state funds are allocated to the branch responsible for winning them.

Staffing as an indicator has different roles throughout the empirical analysis; the influence of state funds on staffing is analysed in H1, while the influence of state funding *and* staff is analysed in H2 and H3. Staff is operationalised as either permanent or temporary staff (full-time or part-time). In the analysis of H1, staffing thus refers to changes in number of either permanent

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<sup>34</sup> This is especially so since none of the selected new minor parties (except the Italian Greens) have adopted a federal party structure.

<sup>35</sup> For example, the Greens' and Pensioner Party's archives in Norway had very few documents pertaining to the operation of subnational branches.

or temporary staff, while in the analysis of H2 and H3, staffing refers to the presence of staff. The analysis of staffing in H1 will also include data on what tasks the staff perform, even though this is not part of the staff-indicator per se. This is done in order to shed light on the contrast between new minor parties' low memberships (Casas-Zamora, 2006; Mair & Biezen, 2001) and their alleged need for members (Kölln, 2014; see also chapter 1), and to enable a more detailed analysis of how staff (possibly) shape centralisation (H2) and pursuit of constitutive function (H3). Staffing is captured at the national level only, as new minor parties have few resources available for the employment of subnational party staff.<sup>36</sup> This decision also reflects the above decision to only capture state funds registered in national financial accounts. Parliamentary party staff is also excluded, as the study is interested in understanding the impact of party organisational state funds (i.e. not parliamentary party grants). That said, parliamentary staff can certainly contribute positively (for instance by developing motions) to new minor party organisations, which is why parliamentary representation is accounted for in the analysis of staffing.

Centralisation is operationalised as changes to the executive council in which elites increase their share of seats, while consolidation is operationalised as a process whereby national organs (besides the executive), a) convene more rarely, and/or b) are removed altogether. Both these indicators imply a strengthened position of the executive and party elites. In the life cycle analysis of centralisation/consolidation, these are the indicators to be analysed. Party elites comprise party leader(s) and deputy leader(s), treasurer, party secretary, and elected representatives situated on either on regional, national, or supra-

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<sup>36</sup> Only the Greens in Norway (post-2013) (Gaupset, 15.05.2017), the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy (Bertolino, 2004), and the Italian Greens (at certain time points and in a few regions) (Lion, 17.11.2017) have had regionally employed staff among the parties in the analysis.

national levels (EU). Locally elected representatives and other party representatives (leaders, deputy leader) on the local level are not defined as elites because of their proximity to the rank-and-file (see Katz & Mair, 1993).

To facilitate the second, in-depth part of the centralisation/consolidation analysis, where I systematically explore how state funds and/or staff impact centralisation/consolidation in carefully selected reform processes, a set of indicators is developed. The two first indicators capture whether state funds and staff strengthen party elites, in turn enabling them to *initiate* reform. Specifically, and reflecting the theoretical argument of chapter 2, I analyse a) elites' management of state funds and b) elites' control over staff, elites' ability to hire staff, and/or whether elites' themselves are hired in their parties. The two last indicators are c) whether state funds, and d) staff, are used to execute the centralising or consolidating reform process. A full overview of the indicators are given in the table below.

To capture a party's pursuit of constitutive function (electoral participation), the operationalised indicator is the share of constituencies in which a party manages to pass the threshold of authorisation, i.e. comply with ballot access requirements and present an electoral list, in each election. This is thus the indicator that will be analysed in the life cycle analysis of new minor parties' pursuit of constitutive function. In order to get a full understanding of a party's ability to pursue its constitutive function, electoral participation is captured on three levels, i.e. national, regional, and supra-national (EU), in line with existing literature on party survival (Copus et al., 2009; Cyr, 2016; Obert & Müller, 2017). Following recent studies investigating political parties in a multi-level setting (Detterbeck, 2012; Swenden & Maddens, 2009), only the regional level (and not provincial/local) level is included in the definition of 'subnational' here. This still



secures the inclusion of one institutional tier which has traditionally been more welcoming towards new minor parties (Hough & Jeffery, 2006; Swenden & Maddens, 2009, p. 7). While Italian parties participate in European elections, Norwegian parties do not, which gives Italian parties an additional avenue for electoral participation. This is of little importance to the analysis here, as the goal is to explore how state funding and staff contribute to electoral participation by empirically focusing on one electoral contest. The comparison across cases (Norway and Italy) thus refers to the different mechanisms linking state funds and staff to electoral participation, and not the institutional tier of the election per se.

Four indicators are developed to capture how state funding and staff contribute to electoral participation in selected electoral contests in the second, in-depth part of the analysis of pursuit of constitutive function. I analyse whether a) state funding and b) staff are used to overcome the signature requirements for ballot access and to present an electoral list, and whether c) state funding and d) staff are used to recruit members (increase membership) and establish and/or strengthen subnational branches. The two former indicators (a and b) refer to the direct impact of state funds and staff on electoral participation, and the two latter (c and d) to their indirect impact.

Table 3.7 Operationalised indicators of staffing, centralisation/consolidation, and pursuit of constitutive function

Concept	Definition	Indicators	Party level
<i>State funding</i>	<i>Benefits:</i> Direct state funds (cash grants) and indirect state funds (tax benefits and party tax). <i>State constraints:</i> Access criteria and reporting related to the maintenance of state funds.	Access to/increase (loss/decrease) of state funding.	National
<i>Staffing</i>	The number of staff – either temporary or permanent staff.	In analysis of H1: Shifts in number of staff (either permanent or temporary). In analysis of H2 and H3: Staff presence (permanent or temporary).	National
<i>Centralisation and consolidation</i>	<i>Centralisation:</i> Elites' (at the expense of party members) get increased control over the executive council.  <i>Consolidation:</i> The process whereby party elites operating within an already centralised executive reinforce their position (for example by enlarging the scope or responsibility of the centralised executive).	<i>Indicator for life cycle analysis of centralisation:</i> Increased share of party elites in executive council.  <i>Indicator for life cycle analysis of consolidation:</i> When national organs (besides the executive) a) convene more rarely or b) are removed altogether.  <i>Four Indicators for in-depth analysis of state funding and staff's impact on centralisation/consolidation:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- State funding and staff's impact on strengthening party elites, in turn enabling them to initiate reforms, as measured by: (1) Elites' management of state funds and (2) elites' control over staff, ability to hire staff, and/or whether staff themselves are hired in their party.</li> <li>- (3) State funding and (4) staff are used to execute the centralising or consolidating reform process.</li> </ul>	National
<i>Pursuit of constitutive function</i>	Surpassing the threshold of authorisation, i.e. exceed ballot access criteria and present electoral list.	<i>Indicator for life cycle analysis of pursuit of constitutive function:</i> Share of constituencies in which the party is able to comply with ballot access criteria and present an electoral list.  <i>Four indicators for in-depth analysis of state funding and staff's impact on pursuit of constitutive function:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- (1) State funding and (2) staff used to overcome the signature requirement for ballot access criteria and present electoral list.</li> <li>- (3) State funding and (4) staff used to recruit members and/or establish/strengthen subnational branches.</li> </ul>	National/ Regional/ European

### 3.5 Additional factors to be considered in the analysis

The main aim throughout the empirical analysis is to explore how state funds (and staff) impact intra-organisational processes. That said, other factors – outlined as important in the current literature – will also be considered in the analysis in order to shed a broader light on staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function.

In the analysis of staffing, the parties' *overall budget* will be accounted for, i.e. whether the party experiences large shifts in income sources (besides state funds). Money is one of a party's crucial resources, and '*can be turned into many uses*', of which one is staff (see e.g. Webb & Keith, 2017), highlighting this factor's importance for an analysis of staffing. In a related vein, the staffing analysis accounts for changes to the *membership*, whether increasing or decreasing. As one income source for parties (see e.g. Nassmacher, 2009; Scarrow, 2015; Webb & Keith, 2017), fluctuations in membership (and hence in income from members) can affect the overall budget of the party, in turn influencing a party's staffing patterns. Some also equate increasing memberships with increasing number of staff (see e.g. Webb & Keith, 2017, p. 44). *Leadership change* is discussed in the staffing analysis, as a new leader's priorities may impact on staffing patterns, reflecting the argument that leaders '*may advocate and succeed in bringing about some change*' in parties (Harmel & Janda, 1994, p. 266). Furthermore, the existing literature has showed that staff are increasingly taken on to deal with *electoral campaigns* (see e.g. Farrell, 1996, 2006; Farrell & Webb, 2000), which is why the electoral cycle is considered in the staffing analysis. Finally, reflecting the decision not to define parliamentary staff as (organisational) staff, I consider *parliamentary representation* in the analysis of staffing. This is done to explore

whether the presence of staff in parliament in any way shifts staffing patterns in the party's central organisation.

In the analysis of centralisation, some of the same factors are accounted for as in the staffing analysis. Specifically, *leadership change* has in existing studies been found to be important for understanding party reform, which centralisation/consolidation is an expression of (see e.g. Albinsson, 1986; Gauja, 2016; Kefford, 2016; Müller, 1997; Wilson, 1980), while changes to the *membership*, mainly in a decreasing direction, has similarly been found to be a factor in explaining party reforms (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Kenig, Rahat, & Hazan, 2015). Another indicator which has broadly been argued to spark internal party reforms is *electoral decline* (Albinsson, 1986; Harmel & Janda, 1994; Panebianco, 1988), to which a loss of parliamentary representation is related. Furthermore, existing studies have found that party reform (regarding leadership selection procedures) is more common in new and small parties (see e.g. Chiru et al., 2015, p. 46; Cross & Blais, 2012, p. 39). As newly established parties have more malleable and less institutionalised organisational structures (see e.g. Gauja, 2016, p. 115), one can expect that centralising reforms are also initiated by a need to address poorly functioning party organs. As all the parties investigated in this thesis are new (and also minor), I thus account for such *organisational vulnerabilities* in the centralisation analysis.

I take into consideration two factors that arguably are interlinked when it comes to understanding new minor parties' pursuit of constitutive function. The first factor is parties' *overall budget*, as existing studies have found that parties' financial considerations can shape particular electoral choices, for instance whether parties choose to field lists in an electoral coalition or not (Kostadinova, 2005; Rashkova & Spirova, 2014; Spirova, 2007, p. 146). In turn, parties'

*participation in electoral coalitions* may (for instance) shift new minor parties' exposure to signature requirements for ballot access, which it is important to consider when seeking to understand how state funds and/or staff contribute to shaping a party's ability to comply with such requirements. Moreover, it is worth reminding the reader that in the analysis of pursuit of constitutive function, two core factors that can arguably have an impact on a new minor party's pursuit of constitutive function, i.e. *membership shifts* and *signature requirements for ballot access*, are implicitly part of the theoretical argument. Concretely, in H3 I argue that state funds and staff can contribute to increasing the membership, which in turn can facilitate compliance with ballot access requirements and assist with the process of setting up the electoral list. Thus, these two factors will – due to their centrality for the core argument – also be discussed and considered throughout the analysis.

### 3.6 Summary

This chapter has presented the comparative approach of the thesis, and outlined how the impact of state funding on staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function will be compared *across* parties from Norway and Italy, but also how the life cycle approach facilitates within-case analysis in each of the selected parties. Norway and Italy have been selected as regulatory contexts from which to draw new minor parties primarily because of the variation in state benefits and constraints that has characterised the two contexts since state funding was introduced, which facilitates such comparisons. Based on four analytical criteria, i.e. parties' newness and minor status, their variation with regards to state funding access, and ideology/formation date, seven new minor parties were selected in each country. Moreover, centralising/consolidating

reforms and electoral contests were selected for the in-depth analyses of centralisation and pursuit of constitutive function respectively. The core selection criterion for centralising/consolidating reforms was that a party had to have access to either state funds or staff (or both) prior to its introduction. To select electoral contests, the main criterion was that a significant increase or decrease in state funds and/or staff preceded the contest.

A broad range of sources comprising primary documents such as financial and annual accounts, 61 interviews, and secondary sources are used in the analysis. The broad range of data allows for triangulation both between different sources (documents and interviews) and within the group of sources (congress documents vs. letters, across interviewees), enhancing the validity of the study's findings. The chapter's final section operationalised the core indicators of the study, paving the way for the chapters on empirical analysis that follow. The empirical section now starts out with an analysis of the regulatory development of state benefits and constraints in Italy and Norway respectively.

## **4 State funding regulations in Italy and Norway**

### **4.0 Introduction**

This chapter outlines and compares state funding regulations, i.e. regulations concerning state benefits and constraints, in Norway and Italy from the year in which they introduced state funding (in 1970 and 1974 respectively) until 2016. As such, it provides the foundation for the later analysis of how the thesis' core indicator, namely access to/increase of state funds, impacts intra-organisational dynamics in new minor parties. As defined previously, state benefits comprise both direct benefits such as annual direct state funding and electoral reimbursements, while indirect funds are tax benefits that materialise as cash transfers and party tax. State constraints are regulations concerning the access to or receipt (maintenance) of state benefits. The previous chapter outlined how two established, Western European countries, i.e. Italy and Norway, are suitable contexts from which to draw new minor parties for analysis because both have (since the 1970s) provided state funds to parties (rather than candidates), and exposed their (new minor) parties to changing state benefits and constraints. Whilst the types of state benefit available (e.g. annual grants, electoral reimbursements, tax benefits) have differed greatly between the two contexts, both systems increasingly made more money available in state benefits throughout the 1990s and 2000s until Italy started to cut back in 2008. In terms of constraints, both countries lowered the access criteria for state funds overall throughout the 1990s and 2000s, until the Italian system made them more constraining from 2009 onwards. In a similar vein, both Norway and Italy increasingly made reporting tied to the maintenance of state funds more constraining, starting in the late 1990s and continuing in the 2000s. For example,

Norway introduced expense reporting in 2013/2014 (previously it had only had income reporting), while Italy introduced an obligation for parties to undergo external auditing in 2012.

This chapter is divided into three parts, one Italian, one Norwegian, and a concluding comparative discussion. Each country-specific analysis is divided into what I refer to as regulatory phases. A transition between one phase and another is constituted by a significant shift in state benefits and/or constraints. The Italian regulatory analysis has three regulatory phases, and the Norwegian two.

## 4.1 State benefits and constraints in Italian party finance 1974-2016

### 4.1.1 *Regulatory phase 1: 1974-1992*

Two different forms of state funding to political parties, annual grants and electoral reimbursements, were for the first time introduced in Italy in 1974.<sup>37</sup> *Annual* state funds were paid out to the parliamentary party groups in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies in Italy, and to access them a party thus had to be represented in the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies respectively (Law 195/1974). As the Italian electoral system for both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies was, prior to 1993, almost perfectly proportional (see among others Katz, 2003; Renwick et al., 2009),<sup>38</sup> the access criteria for annual state funds were permissive for new minor parties. This proportional system also made collection of party tax (for those parties deciding to do so) easier. The law

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<sup>37</sup> Parliamentary party grants are not part of the definition of state funds in this thesis. It is however worth mentioning that such grants have existed in Italy in the period studied here. The parliamentary regulations have always stated that such grants are in place to ensure the operation of the parliamentary party groups, but only from 2012 onwards did the regulations explicitly state that the funds are to be used for parliamentary purposes *only* (Camera dei deputati, undated).

<sup>38</sup> Both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, although the regulations were slightly different, had in practice the same proportional system in the post-war period (Grofman & Giannetti, 2011, p. 3).



demanded that no less than 95 percent of the annual funds paid out to the parliamentary party group was to be transferred to the central party organisation. In 1981 this was changed to 90 percent (Law 659/1981). Hence, the national branch of eligible parties was the ultimate recipient of annual state grants, which in total amounted to circa 23 million euros annually<sup>39</sup> (Art. 3, L195/1974). The law did not outline any constraints on the use of these funds (L195/1974, L659/1981). The allocation mechanism of the annual grants disadvantaged new minor parties, as only 2 percent were allocated as flat grants, while the rest were allocated proportionally to parties (Art 3. L195/1974; see also Pizzimenti & Ignazi, 2011).

To qualify for electoral reimbursements related to elections to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, a party had to win at least 2 percent of the votes and present lists in at least two thirds of the electoral constituencies (Art. 1, L195/1974). Even though this threshold has been described as low (Pizzimenti & Ignazi, 2011), it could still represent a barrier for new minor parties, which often achieved an electoral result below 2 percent. These access criteria were thus less permissive than those for annual state funds. The total sum available in electoral reimbursements amounted to circa 7.7 million euros in 1974,<sup>40</sup> which was generous as the reimbursements by far exceeded the different parties' reported electoral expenditures (Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 74). The allocation of electoral reimbursements was more favourable to new minor parties than the allocation of annual grants, as 15 percent was distributed equally to all parties (who fulfilled the eligibility criteria), while the rest was distributed proportionally to all parties according to election results (Rhodes, 1997, pp. 60-61).

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<sup>39</sup> The sum was 45 thousand million lire, which has been converted into euro by using conversion rates issued by the European Central bank (1998): 1 euro = 1936.27 lire.

<sup>40</sup> 15 thousand million lire (see conversion rate above).

In sum, the Italian context's first state benefits were permissive towards new minor parties, as the access criteria (especially for annual state grants) were low, the sums allocated were generous, and finally, a share of the funds (albeit relatively low) was allocated equally across different parties, irrespective of size. The generosity towards parties increased in 1980 when electoral reimbursements related to regional and European elections were introduced (Law 422/1980). All parties that had at least one member of the European Parliament (EP) or one regional councillor elected, had access. The electoral system for EP and regional elections was completely proportional (Law 18/1979, Law 108/1968), and the access criteria were thus highly permissive for new minor parties. 20 percent of the electoral reimbursements related to EP and regional elections was allocated equally to the eligible parties, benefitting new minor parties, while the rest was allocated on a proportional basis. The total fund for these two elections amounted to circa 15 million euros, and the funds were paid out at the national party level.

Thus, state funds related to both national, regional, and EU elections were channelled into the national branch, indicating a highly centralised system (Nassmacher, 1989, p. 250), which, it was expected, would end the '*endemic fractionalization of Italian parties*' (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 50). In 1981 (Law 659/1981) the total of state funds to be allocated to political parties (see also Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 75) was nearly doubled (Pizzimenti & Ignazi, 2011, p. 205), thus increasing the generosity in the system. This tendency of increasing generosity continued until 1992 (Pizzimenti & Ignazi, 2011).

There was limited reporting tied to the maintenance of state funds in this phase. Parties receiving state funding had to set up their financial accounts in a specific way, disclose them in the official party paper or in a newspaper with national distribution, and file them with the president in the Chamber of Deputies

(Law 195/1974). In 1981 this requirement was made somewhat more comprehensive, as the financial account had to comprise information about (for example) the party's real estate, its participation in commercial societies, and ownership of companies (Art. 4, Law 659/1981). Additionally, an internal audit organ in the parties had to approve the financial account. Administrative sanctions, such as a shortening of state funding, were introduced in 1974. However, as enforcement rested with the parliament,<sup>41</sup> i.e. the parties themselves, and the control was mostly formal (controllers lacked investigative powers) (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 23; Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 74), both the reporting and enforcement were permissive, not only towards new minor parties, but towards parties generally (see also Rhodes, 1997).

The period from 1974, when state funding was first introduced, until 1992, represents the first regulatory phase in Italy. The main characteristics of this phase are summarised in the table below. Overall, the state benefits and constraints were permissive towards new minor parties in this phase due to overall low access criteria, generous funds, and permissive reporting.

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<sup>41</sup> The law stated that the presidents of the two chambers (the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) were to control the financial accounts, relying on help from a specifically appointed group of auditors. However, as the controls rested with the presidents, it was party-controlled, and not independent.

Table 4.1 Overview of regulatory phase 1 (1974-1992): Italy

Type of state benefits	Tied to which level/institution	Recipient	Introduction year	Access criteria	Reporting related to the receipt of state funding	Enforcement
<i>Annual state funds</i>	Chamber of Deputies and Senate	National branch	1974	Representation in Chamber of Deputies and/or Senate	1974: Disclose financial account in party newspaper or other newspaper. File financial account with the president in the Chamber of Deputies	1974: Permissive: Administrative sanctions existed, but the (formal) control rested with the parties themselves.
<i>Electoral reimbursements</i>	Chamber of Deputies and Senate	National branch	1974	Present lists in more than 2/3 of constituencies, and achieve more than 2 percent of the vote	1981: Same as above, but somewhat more comprehensive reporting. Requirement to have an internal audit organ introduced.	
<i>Electoral reimbursements</i>	European parliament and regional councils	National branch	1980	One candidate elected		

#### 4.1.2 Regulatory phase 2: 1993-2011

The transition from the first to the second republic in Italy, following the corruption scandals *Tangentopoli*, sparked a referendum which led to the abolition of state funding to political parties in Italy in 1993, representing the start of regulatory phase 2. Concretely, annual state funding was abolished in 1993, while electoral reimbursements were kept (or rather re-instated with a new law) (Law 515/1993). Electoral reimbursements were intended to cover expenses to a broad range of party activities, such as the production and distribution of campaign material and staff working on the campaigns (Art. 11, Law 515/1993). This change represented a constraining turn, both for new minor parties and other parties, in two ways: First of all, the abolition of annual grants meant that state funds (i.e. electoral reimbursements) were now 'only' provided in election years, and not annually. Secondly, the abolition of annual state funds meant that less money was available. Nevertheless, the electoral reimbursements paid out still exceeded the expenses incurred by parties during the electoral campaigns (Pacini & Piccio, 2012; Pacini, 2009, p. 187; Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 76), which modifies this picture.<sup>42</sup> In fact, the state allocated much more money to electoral reimbursements after 1993 than before, aiming to compensate for the loss of annual state funding (see Pacini, 2009, p. 187).

In 1993 a new mixed electoral system was introduced. It elected 75 percent of the MPs to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate on a plurality basis, and the remaining 25 percent on a proportional basis (Katz, 2003; Parlamento Italiano, undated (a); Newell & Bull, 1993). This shift from a nearly pure proportional system to a mixed one made the access criteria for electoral

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<sup>42</sup> It is also worth noting that the new law passed in 1993 also introduced some indirect (non-financial) benefits for parties, such as free use of public halls and reduced rates on postal delivery (see Art. 17 and 19, L515/1993).

reimbursements more constraining. Concretely, to access state funds related to Senate elections, political parties now had to either have one candidate elected in a region or achieve at least 5 percent of the regional votes. Funds related to Chamber of Deputies elections could be accessed by winning at least three percent of the national vote and having one candidate elected in one of the majoritarian districts, or by winning more than 4 percent in the proportional component of the election (Law 515/1993).<sup>43</sup> The shift away from a purely proportional system also made it harder for parties to collect party tax, as it was more difficult to become represented. Similar shifts took place on regional level. From 1995 (Law 43/1995) onwards, parties that wished to win representation (and therefore access state funds on regional level) had to achieve at least 3 percent of the vote, or be aligned with a coalition that won at least 5 percent of the vote,<sup>44</sup> which per definition represented a constraining turn. Still, the secondary literature has found that the broadest group of beneficiaries of state funds in Italy are found on regional level (Pacini, 2009, p. 197). There was no change to the access criteria related to European elections, and they were thus just as permissive as before.

The allocation mechanism also became somewhat more constraining for new minor parties at the start of regulatory phase 2, as all electoral reimbursements related to European, Senate, and Chamber of Deputies elections were to be allocated (in full) in a proportional fashion based on the number of votes obtained. Before, a component of the reimbursements was distributed equally (flat grant) to all parties eligible (Art. 9 and 16, Law 515/1993).

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<sup>43</sup> In the 1987 elections, for instance, three parties received less than 0.5 percent of the vote, but still won representation in the Chamber of Deputies, meaning that they were entitled to state funding.

<sup>44</sup> The electoral system on the regional level changed slightly in 1995. From then on, one fifth of the regional councillors were to be elected on the basis of a majoritarian model, and the rest on a proportional basis.

No change was made to the centralised allocation mechanism – state funds won on all levels were still paid out to the national party branches.

The first part of regulatory phase 2 was thus more constraining for new minor parties with regards to the state funds available and access criteria (than regulatory phase 1). Nevertheless, the generosity in the system quickly changed to the advantage of parties. In 1997 the Italian parliament introduced a new form of state funding, called Four for the Thousand (Pacini, 2009, p. 185), which allowed citizens to earmark 0,004 percent of their personal income tax for the funding of the party system. Parties with one MP were eligible to participate in the subsequent allocation of these funds (Pacini, 2009, p. 185; Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 77; see also Law 2/1997). A whopping 82 million fresh euros were made available for parties through Four for the Thousand in 1997 (Art. 4, Law 2/1997).

Interestingly, the 1997 law also introduced somewhat more constraining reporting requirements related to the receipt of state funds. From now on, the financial account had to be followed by an annual report from the treasurer/legal representative and had to be set up in a different way. Financial accounts of companies aligned to the party also had to be filed (Art. 8, Law 2/1997). The financial accounts were to be controlled by a Board of Auditors (i.e. not the presidents of the two chambers in parliament), making the enforcement slightly more independent. Nevertheless, right to impose sanctions still rested with politicians (the president of the Chamber of Deputies). The secondary literature states that the reporting and sanctions system remained inefficient throughout the 1990s and early 2000s (GRECO, 2010, p. 23; Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 76), which indicates that the constraining turn in 1997 had little effect in practice.

In 1999 the availability of state funds and the access criteria were changed again. In one way, the new law (Law 157/1999) made the system (much) more

generous as the sums to be allocated to parties in electoral reimbursements were heightened again (see also Pacini, 2009; Pizzimenti, 2017). At the same time, however, the tax benefit introduced in 1997 (Four for the Thousand) was abolished. Moreover, the new law obliged parties to spend 5 percent of the allocated funds in electoral reimbursements to activities aimed to increase women's participation in politics (Art. 3, Law 157/1999). The introduction of a lower access threshold for electoral reimbursements related to Chamber of Deputies elections benefitted new minor parties. Whereas the threshold before was to win 3 percent of the vote and have a candidate elected in a majoritarian district, the percentage threshold was now lowered to 1 percent,<sup>45</sup> which represented the start of a '*progressive lowering of the payoff thresholds*' (Pacini & Piccio, 2012, p. 8). The law from 1999 also made state funding allocations annual (Art. 1, comma 6, Law 157/1999),<sup>46</sup> which was particularly beneficial for new minor parties with vulnerable income structures. Thus, the annual funds that had been abolished in 1993, were now in practise re-instated (in the form of annual electoral reimbursements).

This increasing permissiveness continued with Law 156/2002. First and foremost, the access threshold for electoral reimbursements related to the Chamber of Deputies was lowered to a general 1 percent of the vote in 2002. Secondly, the electoral reimbursements were '*multiplied each year of the legislature*' (Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 77). Concretely, instead of having one sum available in electoral reimbursements for a whole legislature, this same sum was now made available for *each year* of the legislature (see Art. 2, Law 156/2002), massively increasing the funds allocated to political parties, also benefitting new

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<sup>45</sup> In the proportional component of the election the threshold was still 4 percent of the vote (Art. 2, L157/1999).

<sup>46</sup> The first instalment comprised 40 percent of the total funds.



minor parties. In 2006, a new permissive change took place, when it was decided to continue payments of the (by now) annual electoral reimbursements for full legislatures, even in the event that they would terminate early (which indeed happened in 2008) (Pacini, 2009; Pizzimenti, 2017).

In the mid-2000s, changes to electoral laws on both national and regional levels shifted the access criteria for funds. First, in 2005 the Italian electoral system was turned into a more proportional system with a majority bonus (from a mixed electoral system) (see e.g. Giannetti & De Giorgi, 2006; Pappalardo, 2006). This did not change the access criteria for state funds related to the Chamber of Deputies, which was set to 1 percent of the vote anyway. For the Senate, the inclusiveness of electoral coalitions now determined how permissive the access criteria for state funds were (i.e. the criteria to win one representative).<sup>47</sup> While coalitions were highly inclusive in 2006, they were less so in 2008, which impacted on which new minor parties managed to win representation. The changed electoral system for the Senate was thus permissive towards new minor parties when coalitions were inclusive, less so if not. The same argument applies to the collection of party tax. In terms of winning representation (and thereby being able to claim party tax), the inclusiveness of the large coalitions (centre-left and centre-right) was crucial.

Similarly, starting in 2005, Italian regions started to introduce their own regional electoral laws, which prescribed different thresholds for winning representation from the national laws. In turn, this affected the access thresholds for state funds, as that was linked to regional representation. By 2010, 10 regions had introduced a regional law, but only four of them changed the threshold for

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<sup>47</sup> Another access criterion for state funds related to the Senate was to win at least 5 percent of the vote, which naturally was the same (irrespective of electoral system).

representation. These were Calabria, Le Marche, Puglia, and Toscana, and they all heightened the threshold for representation (Camera dei Deputati, 2010), in turn representing a constraining turn for new minor parties' access to regional funds there. In a similar, constraining vein, a 4 percent threshold for representation in the European parliament was introduced in 2009. This also represented a constraining turn for access criteria for state funds, as access was tied to having one member of the European parliament elected (before representation was based on a purely proportional system). In addition to making access criteria more constraining at the end of regulatory phase 2, the financial crisis in 2008 led to the reduction of state funds to parties (by 20 million euros annually) from 2008 and onwards (Parlamento Italiano, Undated (b)), decreasing the system's generosity.

In brief, therefore, the shift from regulatory phase 1 to 2 initially represented a constraining turn with regards to access criteria and generosity of state funds. However, from the late 1990s until 2008, the state funding system in Italy was characterised by increasingly permissive access criteria and increasingly generous allocations. In 2008 the generosity in the system decreased, while the access criteria for European and regional state funds became more constraining in 2009 and 2010 respectively. Reporting related to the receipt of state funds stayed permissive throughout the phase (despite some changes in 1997). The table below summarises the developments in phase 2.

Table 4.2 Overview of regulatory phase 2 (1993-2011): Italy

State benefit	Tied to which institution	Recipient	Introduction year	Access criteria	Reporting related to the receipt of state funding	Enforcement
<i>Electoral reimbursements</i>	Chamber of Deputies, Senate, European Parliament, regional councils	National branch	1974 (re-instated in 1993)	<p>-<i>Chamber of Deputies</i> (1993-1999): One candidate in a majoritarian constituency elected and 3 percent of the votes, or 4 percent in the proportional part of the election.</p> <p>-<i>Chamber of Deputies</i> (1999-2001): One candidate elected in a majoritarian constituency and 1 percent of the votes, or 4 percent in the proportional part of the election.</p> <p>-<i>Chamber of Deputies</i> (2002→): 1 percent of the vote</p> <p>-<i>Senate</i> (1993→): One candidate elected or 5 percent of the votes in the region.</p> <p>-<i>Regional elections</i> (1993→): One candidate elected.</p> <p>-<i>EP-elections</i> (1993-2009): One candidate elected (no threshold).</p> <p>-<i>EP-elections</i> (2009→): One candidate elected (4 percent threshold).</p>	<p>(Some requirements from regulatory phase 1 were still valid, and are thus repeated here)</p> <p>1974: Disclose financial account in party newspaper or other newspaper. File financial account with the president in the Chamber of Deputies.</p> <p>1981: Same as above, but somewhat more comprehensive reporting. Requirement to have an internal audit organ introduced.</p> <p>1997: Somewhat more comprehensive reporting: the financial account had to be followed by an annual report from the treasurer/legal representative, and financial accounts of companies aligned to the party had to be filed as well. A new template for the financial account was introduced. Financial accounts were to be published in the Italian state's official journal (<i>Gazzetta Ufficiale</i>).</p>	<p>1974: Permissive: Administrative sanctions existed, but the (formal) control rested with the parties themselves</p> <p>1997: Control of financial accounts by a group of auditors (not politicians as before). However, politicians in parliament kept the authority to impose sanctions. The system was thus still permissive.</p>
<i>Four for the Thousand</i>	National level	National branch	1997 (abolished in 1999)	Have one MP		

#### *4.1.3 Regulatory phase 3: 2012-2016*

In line with the regulatory trend in Western Europe (Biezen & Kopecký, 2014; Piccio, 2014), Italy introduced a party law in 2012, marking the entrance into regulatory phase 3. The 2012 law continued the provision of electoral reimbursements, but simultaneously introduced a so-called co-funding scheme. From 2012 and onwards, electoral reimbursements constituted 70 percent of the state funds available and co-funding 30 percent. The overall sum available in these two schemes together was 91 million euros, 50 percent less than what was provided in electoral reimbursements in 2011 (Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 80), which indicates decreasing generosity. The co-funding mechanism allocated 50 cent from the state for each euro that the eligible parties managed to raise through membership fees/donations etc. A party had to have at least one candidate elected in elections to either the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, regional councils, or European parliament, or receive 2 percent of the vote to qualify for the co-funding mechanism (Art. 2, Law 96/2012).

To access electoral reimbursements related to elections to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, parties now had to have one candidate elected (Art. 6, Law 96/2012), which changed the access criteria for electoral reimbursements related to Chamber of Deputies elections.<sup>48</sup> The inclusiveness of electoral coalitions determined whether this represented a permissive or constraining turn for new minor parties. The new access criteria could in theory be more permissive towards new minor parties than the old 1 percent rule, as inclusive electoral coalitions could grant parties receiving less than 1 percent representation.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> To have one candidate elected had previously been a requirement to access state funds related to the Senate.

<sup>49</sup> For example, in 2013 two of the parties who won seats in parliament (part of the winning centre-left coalition) achieved only 0.43 and 0.49 percent of the vote, and would not previously have been eligible for funding, but were eligible after the 2012 shift.

However, less inclusive coalitions would make it harder to become elected, meaning that the new threshold would be more difficult to reach for new minor parties. The access criteria for European and regional elections remained unchanged (i.e. one candidate elected). The national branch was still the branch receiving state funds, and they were still allocated on the basis of number of votes achieved.

The most constraining change in 2012 was the introduction of comprehensive reporting requirements related to the receipt of state funding. The core reporting requirements were still the ones introduced in Law 2/1997 (see Table 4.2 above), but from 2012 onwards, parties' meeting the access thresholds for state funding had to have their financial account audited by an external auditing company (Art. 9, Law 96/2012). In addition, a new enforcement body was created, composed of five members (magistrates), with the mandate to control parties' financial accounts. It was to work full-time with the control of financial accounts, and was also assigned staff. Still, as this body's task was still 'only' to control the regularity of the financial accounts, and lacked investigative powers, it was relatively similar to the one in place from 1997 (GRECO, 2014, pp. 15-16). The difference was that it had power to apply sanctions to those parties not complying with the reporting requirements (see Art. 9, Law 96/2012).

The entry into regulatory phase three thus represents a constraining turn due to increased reporting requirements and severely decreased availability of state funds. In 2013, however, the system became even more constraining as Law 159/2013 abolished all forms of direct public funding, and also drastically reduced the amounts that parties were due to receive for prior electoral competitions (Art. 14, Law 159/2013; see also Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 80). In place of electoral reimbursements, the Italian state introduced a tax-benefit called Two

for the Thousand, which gave citizens the opportunity to allocate 0.002 percent of their income tax to parties (Art. 12, Law 159/2013; see also Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 80). To be eligible, registration in a new party register, in addition to having at least one representative in either chamber in parliament, in the European parliament, or in a regional council, was required (Art. 10, Law 159/2013). In this way, the access criteria were the strictest to ever have been in place in Italy. In order to get registered, a party had to submit and get its statute approved.<sup>50</sup> Additionally, the parties were from 2013 onwards obliged to spend 10 percent (up from the previous 5 percent) of the allocated state funds on activities intended to increase women's participation in politics (Art. 9, Law 159/2013). The reporting requirements related to the receipt of state funding (i.e. the Two for the Thousand) were the same as in the 2012 legislation. Interestingly, the new 2013 law tied the requirement to undergo external auditing to registration (and not to the receipt of state funding), representing a constraining turn for those new minor parties *attempting* to access the tax-benefit (but not succeeding), as they would then have no state funds, but still have to undergo external auditing to be eligible for such funds (at a later stage).

Regulatory phase 3 in Italy thus represents an increasingly constraining environment both for new minor parties and other parties. State funds became less generous, and the access criteria and reporting requirements related to their receipt turned more constraining. An especially constraining turn for new minor parties was that allocations from the Two for the Thousand depended on parties' ability to recruit people to be their donors, by having them donate a share of their income tax (later to be distributed as indirect state funds) to the party. This is

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<sup>50</sup> The statute has to contain some mandatory information, such as for example the rights and obligations of members, and the procedures in case of party dissolution (Art. 3, Law 159/2013).

surely harder for new minor parties with less visibility and lower memberships.

The core mechanisms in regulatory phase 3 are outlined below.

Table 4.3 Overview of regulatory phase 3 (2012-2016): Italy

Type of state benefit	Tied to which institution	Recipient	Introduction year	Access criteria	Reporting related to the receipt of state funding	Enforcement
<i>Electoral reimbursements</i>	Chamber of Deputies, Senate, European Parliament, regional councils	National branch	1974 (re-instated in 1993).  Abolished in 2013 <sup>1</sup>	One candidate elected (the same for Chamber of Deputies, Senate, European Parliament and regional elections).	2012: 1997-rules continued, i.e. the financial account had to be followed by an annual report from the treasurer/legal representative, and financial accounts of companies aligned to the party had to be filed as well. Financial accounts were to be published in the Italian state's official journal ( <i>Gazzetta Ufficiale</i> ). Plus, external auditing was introduced.	2012: A new enforcement group was set up with power to impose sanctions (but no investigative powers).
<i>Co-funding</i>	See above.	National branch	2012.  Abolished in 2013	One candidate elected (either in the Chamber of Deputies, Senate, European Parliament or regional council), or win 2 percent of the vote.	2013: Former rules still applied, but registration (in the party register) required approval of parties' statutes. External auditing was tied to registration (and not receipt of state funding).	
<i>Two for the Thousand</i>	National level	National branch	2013	Registration in the party register and have at least one representative in the Senate, Chamber of Deputies, regional council, or in the European Parliament.		

**Notes:** <sup>1</sup> Decreased payments would continue for three more years after 2013.



## 4.2 State benefits and constraints in Norwegian party finance 1970-2016

### 4.2.1 Regulatory phase 1: 1970-2005

State funding was introduced for national party organisations in 1970, and was allocated (to the national branch) based on the number of votes that the parties achieved in the election (Kommunal og Moderniseringsdepartementet, 1993).<sup>51</sup> The absence of flat grants made the system per definition constraining for new minor parties. To access state funds between 1970 and 1975 (i.e. before the parties in this thesis were founded), parties simply had to present lists (their own or together with other parties) in at least half the electoral districts in the previous parliamentary (Storting) election, which was highly permissive. In 1975 a 2.5 vote threshold to access state funding was introduced, which was added to the requirement to present lists in at least half the electoral districts (NOU, 2004, p. 38; Svåsand, 1994b). So, when the parties studied in this thesis were founded, the access criteria for national state funds and the allocation mechanism were relatively constraining towards new minor parties. That is supported by the fact that the threshold for entry into parliament *could* be much lower. Concretely, the electoral system in Norway (both then and now) mainly<sup>52</sup> allocates seats on the basis of regional constituencies. If a new minor party manages to concentrate its electoral support to one region, the chance of winning representation is larger than if the support is scattered out in the whole country. To illustrate, Future for

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<sup>51</sup> Parliamentary party grants are not part of the definition of state funds in this thesis. It is however worth mentioning that such grants have existed in Norway in the period studied here. However, they have been exclusively for the use of the groups in parliament, and have thus not been available for Norwegian party *organisations* (see e.g. Stortinget, 1995, and Innstilling 421 S, 2012-2013).

<sup>52</sup> Compensatory seats were introduced with an alteration of the Constitution in 1988 (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 1988) and from 1989 to 2001 there were eight compensatory seats. From 2002 and onwards there are 19 compensatory seats. To participate in the distribution of these seats, a party needs to achieve more than 4 percent of the vote.

Finnmark won one seat in parliament in the 1989 elections. It only won 0.3 percent of the national vote, but 21.5 percent of the votes in the region of Finnmark.

State funding on regional and municipal levels was introduced in 1975. The access criteria were permissive for new minor parties as a party simply had to be registered in accordance with the Electoral Act,<sup>53</sup> have a branch in the relevant region or municipality, and win at least one vote. The funds were allocated on a proportional basis (Kommunal og Moderniseringsdepartementet, 1993), which by definition disadvantaged new minor parties. State funds on national, regional, and local levels were allocated directly to the branch responsible for winning them, meaning that the state funding system in Norway was (contrary to the Italian) de-centralised.

The sums available for subnational state funds were lower than those available for national state funds (Svåsand, 1994b), and throughout the 1980s the distribution of state funds was further skewed towards the *national* state funds. In 1976, the state funds to the *national* party organisations constituted 39 percent of the overall state funds paid out, while the percentage had risen to 47 in 1988 (Svåsand, 1994a, pp. 321-322). It is worth noting that the tendency to set aside more state funds for the national party branches was constraining for new minor parties due to the high threshold for access to such national funds. That said, the sums available in state funds (overall) increased in regulatory phase 1, as the table shows:

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<sup>53</sup> The application for registration with Notarius Publicus had to be signed by two members of the party's executive, and be followed by 5000 signatures (Art. 17, Electoral Act, 1985).

Table 4.4 State funding allocations to Norwegian political parties, Regulatory phase 1. NOK.

<b>Year</b>	<b>Support in 1000</b>	<b>Support per vote</b>
1970	55,704	25.8
1975	58,925	27.4
1980	58,925	25.5
1985	71,146	28.4
1990	79,410	29.8
1995	115,015	46.5
2000	140,420	56.2
2004	148,287	58.8

**Note:** The sums are fixed 2004 Norwegian kroner. The reader can transfer the sums into euros by removing the last digit, so 148,287 NOK is ca. 14,828 euros.

**Source:** (NOU, 2004, p. 39)

Neither in this regulatory phase nor in regulatory phase two did the Norwegian state impose constraints on the use of state funds to party organisations (see e.g. Kommunal og moderniseringsdepartementet, 1993; Party Political Act, 2006).

There were no reporting requirements tied to the receipt of state funds (Svåsand, 1994a, p. 321) until 1998 when mandatory reporting of income for parties' *national* branches was introduced, representing a constraining turn for both new minor parties and other parties. Parties that had presented lists in the previous parliamentary election and were registered in accordance with the Electoral Law (and from 2002 in the party register), had to file an income report for their national branch, that had to be approved by an auditor. The latter particularly represented a constraining turn, due to the expenses it would incur. While the reporting was not related to the receipt of state funding, the only sanction for non-compliance with the reporting was a decrease in state funding. Compliance was thus crucial for those parties that were registered and received state funding (Law 22.05.1998).<sup>54</sup>

In brief, therefore, regulatory phase 1 in Norway was constraining in terms of national state funds, both due to the high access criteria, the allocation method,

<sup>54</sup> All the Norwegian new minor parties analysed in this thesis were registered.

and due to the obligation to report from 1998 and onwards. The skewed distribution of funds towards the national level strengthens this picture. Still, the access criteria for funds on regional and local levels were permissive, and so was the lack of reporting in the initial part of this phase. A summary of the regulation in phase 1 is outlined below:

Table 4.5 Overview of regulatory phase 1 (1970-2005): Norway

Type of state benefit	Tied to which institution	Recipient	Year	Access criteria	Reporting related to the receipt of state funding	Enforcement
<i>Annual state funds</i>	Storting (the parliament)	National branch	1970	1970-1975: Present lists in at least half the constituencies.  1975→ Same as above, and win 2.5 percent of the vote.	1970-1998: No reporting.  1998-2005: Reporting of income. Audit required.	1998: Administrative sanction: Shortened state support. No enforcement organ.
<i>Annual state funds</i>	Regional and local councils	Regional and local branches	1975	Be registered, have a party branch in the relevant region/municipality, and win at least one vote.		

#### *4.2.2 Regulatory phase 2: 2006-2016*

The introduction of the Political Party Act (PPA) in 2006 marks the entry into regulatory phase 2 in Norway. The PPA mainly altered the access and allocation criteria for state funds, and made reporting somewhat more comprehensive. Annual state funds to the national, regional, and/or local branches of party organisations were now split into two: one vote support allocated proportionally to eligible parties based on the number of votes achieved; and one basic support, allocated to those parties winning more than 2.5 percent of the vote on the national level. On regional and local levels the criteria for access to the basic support was to win more than 4 percent of the vote or have one representative elected. 9/10 of the funds were allocated as vote support, and the remaining 1/10 as basic support (Art. 11 and 12, PPA). The access criteria were thus made remarkably more permissive towards new minor party organisations on the national level in 2006. Moreover, the existence of flat grants (the basic support) was also a move in the permissive direction for new minor parties, even though the threshold of 2.5 percent to access it to some extent undermined this benefit. The state funds were still to be paid out to and be managed by the relevant party branch, keeping the de-centralised component of the system.

The PPA made the reporting more comprehensive and constraining for new minor parties. The reporting requirements were still tied to registration (and not to the receipt of state funding). Still, the sanction for non-compliance was, as before, a shortening/loss of state funds (Moderniseringsdepartementet, 2004-2005). Parties were still 'only' obliged to file an income account, but from 2006 onwards also the parties' organisational branches had to report their income account annually – a constraining requirement for organisationally vulnerable new minor parties. The types of income that had to be reported were extended

(including information on donations) in the PPA, and a declaration stating that the party did not have any other income sources than those reported also had to be presented. The audit requirement from 1998 was still valid (Moderniseringsdepartementet, 2004-2005). For the first time, a specific committee (the Political Party Act Committee) charged with the responsibility of interpreting the Party Political Act and deciding on sanctions (withholding state support) was introduced. The committee was to be independent, but its leeway was limited, as it neither had investigative rights nor the right to control the accuracy of the financial reports. The sanction of withholding state support was thus made on the basis of whether or not the parties had reported their financial income on time (Moderniseringsdepartementet, 2004-2005; see also GRECO, 2009).

Thus, the PPA introduced more permissive access criteria for state funding, but simultaneously made reporting somewhat more constraining. The funds available in state funds increased throughout this phase, indicating increased generosity. Where Table 4.4 above outlined that 148 million NOK (ca. 14.8 million euros) was allocated to Norwegian political parties in 2004 (i.e. end of regulatory phase 2), the sum increased to 220 million NOK (ca. 22 million euros) in 2009, and further to 282 million NOK (ca. 28 million euros) in 2014, confirming the claim made elsewhere that the Norwegian system of state funding is generous (GRECO, 2009, p. 17). This benefitted not just new minor parties, but all eligible Norwegian parties. The share of the total state funds paid out at the *national* level was 70 percent between 2009 and 2014 (Finansdepartementet, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2014). This was not particularly negative for the new minor parties in regulatory phase 2, given that the access criteria for state funding on the national level were now so permissive.

The end of regulatory phase 2 (2013/2014) saw the introduction of more constraining requirements related to documentation and bookkeeping. For the first time party expenses also had to be reported, and the independence of auditors was highlighted in the law. The enforcement organ, the Political Party Act committee, was assigned wider powers to control the parties' reporting (Stortinget, 2012-2013). Moreover, criminal sanctions for non-compliance with reporting requirements were also specified in the PPA (see Art. 28-30, Party Political Act). So, in parallel with increasingly permissive access and allocation criteria for state funding, and increasing generosity, increasing demands related to reporting were also introduced in regulatory phase 2. A summary of the regulation in this phase is summarised in the table below:



Table 4.6 Overview of regulatory phase 2 (2006-2016): Norway

Type of state benefit	Tied to which institution	Recipient	Introduction year	Access criteria	Reporting related to the receipt of state funding	Enforcement
<i>Annual state funds</i>	Storting	National branch	1970	<i>Vote support:</i> No threshold. <i>Basic support:</i> 2.5 percent of the vote. Vote support accounts for 9/10 of the total support.	2006: All organisational branches subject to income reporting. Audit required. Income declaration had to be filed.  2013/2014: Audit requirements specified. Reporting of expenses. Increased demands concerning bookkeeping and documentation.	2006: The Political Party Act Committee could impose administrative sanctions, but had no investigative rights.  2013/2014: Criminal sanctions for non-compliance introduced in the PPA. The Political Party Act Committee could control parties' reporting.
<i>Annual state funds</i>	Regional and municipal councils	Regional and local branch	1975	<i>Vote support:</i> No threshold. <i>Basic support:</i> 4 percent of the vote or have one candidate elected.		

## 4.3 State funding regulations in Norway and Italy – Parallels and differences

The first difference between the two countries is the frequency of change to state funding regulations in Italy compared to Norway. New minor parties in Italy have operated in a much more unstable context with regards to state funding regulations, increasing the possible adaptation costs of new minor parties, and making the funding system more difficult to navigate. The fact that Italian electoral laws have changed several times between 1980 and today adds another layer of instability to the Italian context. The life cycle analysis of parties' income structures and staffing later on will outline whether and how these frequent changes impacted on the new minor parties under scrutiny.

Whereas one of the central features of the Italian state funding system is its centralised structure, a core characteristic of the Norwegian system is its de-centralised design. State funds in Italy, irrespective of whether they have been won in relation to regional, European, or national elections, have been paid out to the national party branch. No state regulation has demanded that the central branch transfer funds to other branches, which means that both the receipt and also the management of funds (and reporting related to them) has been managed on the central level. Conversely, the Norwegian state has practiced a de-centralised system, where national, regional, and municipal party branches each gain access to, receive, and manage state funding. Thus, this study's analysis of national branches' financial accounts will most likely show that the Italian new minor parties' financial accounts are larger than those of their Norwegian counterparts. This difference is particularly interesting as one of the goals of the thesis is to understand whether state funding contributes to centralisation of executive councils. Having one centralised and one de-centralised state funding

system means that there are parties that operate in a most-likely (Italy) and a least-likely (Norway) context for centralisation. This is based on the argument that state funds contribute to centralising reforms by strengthening party elites and contributing to executing reforms. I can thus explore whether Norwegian and Italian party elites are strengthened in different ways due to the (potentially much) larger income from state funds in the Italian new minor parties. Moreover, whether (potentially) larger income from the state in Italian new minor parties shapes the execution of reform can also be explored.

Another difference between the two contexts over time has been the diverging access criteria to state funds and shifts in the generosity of state funds. Whereas Italian new minor parties were overall exposed to permissive access criteria (until 2009/2010) and to increasingly generous (exception in early 1990s, and after 2008) state funds related to both regional, national, and European elections, the access criteria for national state funds (but not subnational) in Norway were constraining until 2006. Consequently, prior to 2006, Norwegian new minor parties were to a large extent excluded from benefitting from the provision of (increasingly generous) national state funding allocations, as the majority of state funds in Norway went to national state funds, and not subnational state funds which had a lower access threshold. The picture reverses after 2006, when Norwegian new minor parties were exposed to very permissive access criteria for national state funds that became (increasingly) generous, while Italian new minor parties operated in a context where the access criteria for state funds became increasingly constraining, first concerning state funds related to the European level (2009), then the regional (2010), and finally the national level (2012/2013). This development in Italy coincided with decreasing generosity, culminating with the abolition of all forms of direct state funds in 2013. These

developmental traits allow the thesis to analyse how the income structures and staffing patterns of new minor parties that start out in a permissive and generous state funding context (Italy) (possibly) change with the transition to an increasingly constraining and less generous context. Similarly, I can analyse how such dynamics play out in new minor parties that start out in a constraining and less generous context (Norway) and enter into a permissive and generous environment.

Alongside these differences concerning access criteria and generosity, the regulatory frameworks share an increasing tendency to introduce more and more constraining reporting related to the receipt of state funds.<sup>55</sup> Both countries had non-existent (Norway) or very lenient reporting requirements (with poorly functioning enforcement mechanisms) in the 1980s and early 1990s. Both countries introduced somewhat more constraining reporting in the late 1990s, Italy in 1997 and Norway, introducing reporting for the first time, in 1998. In the 2000s, both countries increasingly introduced constraining reporting: In Italy this happened in 2012 and 2013, and in Norway in 2006 and 2013/2014. By now, the reporting tied to the receipt of state funds is similarly constraining in the two contexts: Full financial accounts (including income and expenses) must be submitted in both contexts, and they must be audited by an external auditor. Parties in both contexts are subject to sanctions that can be imposed by an independent commission. The analysis can thus investigate whether increasingly

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<sup>55</sup> In a comparative perspective, this development is far from surprising, as transparency obligations related to state funding have arisen from the international anti-corruption agenda (see e.g. Biezen & Kopecký, 2007; Koss, 2011). On that point, both Norway and Italy have been reviewed and received recommendations concerning party finance transparency from the Council of Europe (through the GRECO), and Smirnova (2018) has recently found that countries tend to comply with such GRECO recommendations.

constraining reporting requirements in Norway and Italy have similar impacts on patterns of staffing in new minor parties in both contexts.

## 4.4 Summary

The above analysis outlined the rich variety of state benefits and constraints that have been in place in Norway and Italy since the 1970s until today. As such, the overview has demonstrated the potential for variation in the study's core factor of interest, namely access to/increase of state funding and decrease and/or loss of state funding. The variation within and across the contexts is important for the thesis' comparative case design, as it allows for both within- and across-case comparisons regarding how parties' intra-organisational dynamics evolve under different state funding regulations. On that point, the next chapter explores how the shifting state funding regulations in Norway and Italy have shaped new minor parties' income structure.

## **5 New minor parties' income structures under shifting state funding regulations**

### **5.0 Introduction**

Earlier works claim that electorally smaller parties are highly state-dependent; some even argue that small parties are 'over-subsidised' by the state (Bille, 2001; Casas-Zamora, 2006; Nassmacher & Nassmacher, 2001; Nassmacher, 1989; Sundberg, 1994). This chapter empirically analyses whether this contention is true for new minor parties in Norway and Italy, and thus explores the role of state funding over new minor parties' life cycles in these two contexts. This chapter (like the regulatory chapter) provides a crucial foundation for the later analyses of how state funds impact staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function. Building on the regulatory analysis conducted in the previous chapter, this chapter is structured according to the regulatory phases outlined there, in order to analyse how the parties' income structures are affected by shifting state benefits and constraints, especially access criteria and generosity of funds. The Italian and Norwegian parties are (in that order) discussed separately, before a concluding discussion engages in a comparative assessment.

### **5.1 Italian new minor parties' income structure**

#### *5.1.1 Regulatory phase 1: 1974-1992*

The table below summarises the permissive access criteria and high generosity in regulatory phase 1 in Italy. This permissive situation is likely to make it easy for new minor parties to draw on state funds for their operation.

Table 5.1 Access criteria and generosity, regulatory phase 1 (1974-1992), and expectations for new minor parties' income structure: Italy

<b>Phase 1: 1974-1992</b>	
<i>Access criteria</i>	Access tied to institutional representation. Permissive due to proportional electoral system on all levels (EU, national, regional).
<i>Expectation for new minor parties' access</i>	+
<i>State funds available (generosity)</i>	Generous: Both annual grants and electoral reimbursements.
<i>Expected effect of state funding access on new minor parties' budgets</i>	+


The Greens, the Pensioner Party, and the Communist Refoundation Party are the only three Italian parties studied here that were operating during this phase. Due to the permissive access criteria, the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party accessed electoral reimbursements and annual state funding following their first national elections in 1987 and 1992 respectively.<sup>56</sup> The Communist Refoundation Party also accessed regional state funding in its foundation year, 1991. The Pensioner Party ran in regional elections in 1990 and accessed state funds as a result. However, it failed to win representation in the 1992 parliamentary elections with its modest 0.63 percent of the votes, and thus also failed to access state funds, despite the low threshold for entry.

Figure 5.1 outlines that the Greens was nearly 100 percent state-dependent in 1987. The Communist Refoundation Party was already relatively state-dependent in its foundation year in 1991, despite not participating in any elections (generating direct state funding). The state-dependency was due to party tax: The party was formed as a split from the electorally and organisationally powerful Italian Communist Party, and several founding members and others who

<sup>56</sup> Ten Green regional lists that in 1986 went on to form the Green party, accessed regional state funding in the regional elections in 1985 (Annual account, 1986).

aligned with the new party were parliamentarians (Bertolino, 2004).<sup>57</sup> Also the Green Party relied on party tax.<sup>58</sup> The share of income from the state was 67 percent for the Communist Refoundation Party in 1991, which emphasises the importance of party tax for the party's budget. Once the party accessed electoral reimbursements related to the 1991 regional elections, the party's state-dependency rose to nearly 100 percent.

Figure 5.1 Share of income from state funding. The Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party. Regulatory phase 1



**Sources:** Financial accounts

Membership fees mainly benefitted the subnational branches in the Green Party in this phase. Its federated structure meant that membership fees were collected on the local level, and only a share was subsequently transferred to the national branch (Lion, 17.11.2016; Vannucci, 2007; Financial account, 1990). In the Communist Refoundation Party most of the membership fees have, throughout the party's life cycle, stayed on the local level (see e.g. Financial

<sup>57</sup> Founding members who were also MPs were for example Armando Cossutta, Lucio Libertini, and Sergio Garavini. The minor party Proletarian Democracy (Democrazia Proletaria) with institutional representation was also incorporated into the new party in the spring of 1991.

<sup>58</sup> The Green statutes from 1986 (founding statute) and 1990 do not mention the obligation of elected representatives to pay party tax, neither does the founding statutes of the Communist Refoundation Party (1991). Nevertheless, the financial accounts document this practice from 1988 for the Green Party (Financial account, 1988; see also Vannucci, 2007) and from 1991 in the Communist Refoundation party (Financial account, 1991).



accounts, 1997, 2002). This sheds light on the two parties' high state-dependency in this phase.

Unfortunately, no financial records are available for the Pensioner Party in this phase, but the state's allocation plans for state funds<sup>59</sup> demonstrate that the party received a total of 90,955 euros related to the regional elections in 1990. According to interviewees, the party has relied to a large degree upon personal funds from party representatives (Party representative, 10.11.2016), which supports the idea that the party never has practised party tax (see also Statutes, 2002).<sup>60</sup> Given that personal funds (and possibly some membership fees) were the party's only other income sources, the state-dependency was probably high in this phase. This contention is strengthened by the fact that the party was highly dependent upon state funds in later regulatory phases.

In brief, therefore, the permissive access criteria and generous state funding allocations in place in regulatory phase 1 largely benefited the three new minor parties established in this phase. The low income from membership fees on the national level sheds light on why the state-dependency of the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party was so high.

### *5.1.2 Regulatory phase 2: 1993-2011*

With the advent of regulatory phase 2, Italian legislators temporarily (between 1993 and 1999) made the access criteria more constraining for new minor parties and also decreased the generosity by abolishing (annual) state funds (1993-1997). However, from the late 1990s onwards, the generosity in the system increased, and the access criteria were made more permissive. Towards the end of the phase, in 2009 and 2010, the access criteria were again made more

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<sup>59</sup> These were issued after each election and outlined the sums that each party was to receive in electoral reimbursements.

<sup>60</sup> No older statutes have been accessed.

constraining. The parties' financial leeway is thus likely to reflect this shifting permissiveness concerning access criteria and generosity in phase 2.

Table 5.2 Access criteria and generosity, regulatory phase 2 (1993-2011), and expectations for new minor parties' income structure: Italy


<b>Phase 2: 1993-2011</b>	
<i>Access criteria</i>	Somewhat more constraining due to abolition of proportional electoral system. From 1999 and 2002 onwards increasingly permissive for funds related to Chamber of Deputies. More constraining after 2009 (EP-elections), and after 2010 (regional elections).
<i>Expectation for new minor parties' access</i>	+ - (EP-elections/regional elections post 2009/2010)
<i>State funds available (generosity )</i>	Only electoral reimbursements, i.e. less generous. Brief period with tax benefits from 1997-1999, i.e. more generous. Much more money allocated to state funding between 1997 and 2008, and the introduction of annual electoral reimbursements (2001) increased the generosity. Decreasing generosity after 2008.
<i>Expected effect of state funding access on new minor parties' budgets</i>	- (1993-1997) + (1998-2008)

I address the income structures of the Greens and the Communist Party in conjunction first, then Tricolour Flame, the Segni Pact, and the Pensioner Party, as the parties in these two groups have similar life cycles with regards to state funding access. Finally I discuss the Communist Party of Workers, the only party which did not access state funding in this regulatory phase.

The Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party were highly state-dependent throughout regulatory phase 2, with a clear dip towards the end of the period, which can be observed in the figure below. The parties' income from the state reflects the regulatory framework nearly linearly, as illustrated by the dip in income from the state in the early 1990s following the abolition of *annual* state funds (see figure below). The introduction of the tax benefit Four for the Thousand in 1997 meant a stark increase in the income from the state in both parties that year. The increasing generosity in the system in the early 2000s meant that both parties experienced a nearly continuous increase in state funds from 2001

onwards. It is worth noting that the Communist Refoundation Party is the party with (by far) the highest income from the state in this phase. Increasingly constraining access criteria for state funds in 2009 (European elections) meant that neither party managed to access, with decreased income from the state as a result. Both parties also lost representation on national level in 2008, leading to a drop in income from the state.

Figure 5.2 Income from state funding (euros) and share of income from state funding. The Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party. Regulatory phase 2



**Sources:** Financial accounts

**Notes:** The figures from before 2004 have been converted into euros by using conversion rates issued by the European Central bank (1998): 1 euro = 1936.27 lire. The Segni Pact dissolved in 2002.

Despite the two parties' stable and high state-dependency, they are less state-dependent in some years, for example in 1996, 1999, and after 2008/2009. In 1996, both parties drastically increased their income from their members. For the Green Party this was because it launched a *national* membership campaign for the first time (Vannucci, 2007, p. 202),<sup>61</sup> and for the Communist Refoundation

<sup>61</sup> From then on, the national branch transferred a share of membership fees to subnational levels (Vannucci, 2007, p. 209).


Party because it was a congress year, which generated more income from members (Bertolino, 2004, p. 320). In 1998 and 1999 the share of income from membership fees rose to 15 and 27 percent respectively in the Greens, which can be related to a membership campaign that was launched when the work to restructure the party started in 1999 (Vannucci, 2007, pp. 177-178). Everyone interested in “*creating the New Greens*” (Federazione dei Verdi, 1999a) was urged to join, which also guaranteed participation in the party’s constitutive congress in 2000 (Federazione dei Verdi, 1999b). There was also lower state-dependency in the Greens between 2001 and 2003 due to an increase in membership fees, and a parallel decrease in income from the state due to disappointing electoral results in 2001. In 2006 the party’s state-dependency increased when it doubled its representation in the Chamber of Deputies compared to 2001, and got more than 11 million euros in electoral reimbursements (Financial account, 2006). In 2008, a massive dip in income from membership fees sheds light on increased state-dependency. Finally, the party’s loss of representation following the 2008 national elections and the 2009 European elections led to a stark decrease in state funding. Since 2008/2009, the party has increasingly relied on membership fees and other self-generated funds, according to interviewees (Bonelli, 16.11.2016; Ripamonti, 23.11.2016; see also financial accounts), even though the party regained some income from party tax (i.e. state funding) in 2011, after winning 15 seats in the 2010 regional elections.

The Communist Refoundation Party kept a stable income share from the state until 2011, with the aforementioned dip in 1996, and another slight decrease in 2005, which was due to an increase in the income from donations, mainly from the party’s own elected representatives (Financial account, 2005). In 2011 the

share of income from the state plummeted due to loss of party tax. According to the treasurer, this was expected as the party failed to win representation in both the 2008 general elections and the 2009 European elections (Annual account, 2011), which also affected the income from the state in real terms.

The figure below shows that Tricolour Flame, the Pensioner Party, and the Segni Pact managed to access state funding early in this regulatory phase, despite the presence of slightly more constraining access criteria compared to regulatory phase 1. These parties' income from the state has been much smaller (due to an electorally more minor position) than that of the Communist Refoundation Party, and also somewhat lower overall than that of the Greens. Only in 1994 did the Segni Pact, with an income of more than 3 million euros from the state, nearly reach the same levels in income from the state as the Communist Refoundation Party. As mentioned above, the Pensioner Party (Statutes, 2002) did not collect party tax, neither did the Segni Pact (Masi, 13.03.2018; Segni, 29.01.2018). According to their 1999 statutes, Tricolour Flame obliged elected representatives to pay party tax, but since none of the interviewees mentions party tax as a source of income (Bevilacqua, 14.11.2016; Romagnoli, 16.11.2016; Condorelli Caff, 28.11.2016; Francescon, 25.11.2016) it is unlikely that this rule was ever enforced.

Figure 5.3 Income from state funding (euros). Tricolour Flame, the Segni Pact, and the Pensioner Party. Regulatory phase 2



**Sources:** Financial accounts

**Notes:** The figures from before 2004 have been converted into euros by using conversion rates issued by the European Central bank (1998): 1 euro = 1936.27 lire. The Segni Pact dissolved in 2002.


Overall, the figure shows that these three parties were generally most successful in accessing state funds related to European elections (i.e. in 1994, 1999, and 2004) in this phase. This is hardly surprising, given the very low access criteria for such funds. Both Tricolour Flame and the Segni Pact significantly increased their income from the state in 1999 and 2004 respectively. The Pensioner Party also accessed state funding related to the European parliament in both 1999 and 2004 (as the party elected a representative), but no financial account from 1999 is available (and these state funds do thus not show in the figure). In turn, when the access criteria for state funds related to European elections were made more constraining in 2009, neither Tricolour Flame nor the Pensioner Party managed to access (the Segni Pact had dissolved by 2009).

The fact that state funds were paid out in annual instalments after 2001, meant that both the Pensioner Party and Tricolour Flame (as the table outlines) had continuous state funding access for the first time after 2004. The tax benefit Four for the Thousand introduced in 1997, which significantly altered the income from the state for the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party, generated

less income for the Pensioner Party (135,000 euros), and the Segni Pact (297,000 euros), reflecting the proportional allocation mechanism, disadvantaging electorally (very) minor parties, such as these two. Tricolour Flame did not access this tax benefit.

The Pensioner Party, Segni Pact, and Tricolour Flame were state-dependent in the years they accessed state funding, as the figure below shows:

Figure 5.4 Share of income from state funding. Tricolour Flame, the Segni Pact, and the Pensioner Party. Regulatory phase 2



**Sources:** Financial accounts

The Segni Pact and the Pensioner Party were particularly state-dependent, which coincides with interview material highlighting the importance of state funds for the Segni Pact's (Masi, 13.03.2018; Segni, 29.01.2018) and the Pensioner Party's budgets (Party representative, 10.11.2016). Echoing the findings in the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party, big changes in income from membership fees in the Pensioner Party, sheds light on shifts to the party's state-dependency. In 2010, for example, the income from membership fees suddenly soared in the Pensioner Party, which may reflect the party's efforts to raise funds to compensate for the loss of state funding. Also, donations from party representatives in the Pensioner Party, such as in 2009 and 2010, shed light on why the share of income from the state decreased (Financial account, 2009,

2010).<sup>62</sup> Such donations also occurred in Tricolour Flame. The financial accounts from 2006 and 2007 outline that the party secretary donated ca. 32,000 euros and 41,000 euros to the party respectively, reflecting information from party representatives who state that membership fees and personal funds have been crucial in periods when the party has not had state funding access (Romagnoli, 16.11.2016; Bevilacqua, 14.11.2016; Francescon, 25.11.2016; Condorelli Caff, 28.11.2016). A steep increase in income from donations in 2008 (election year) also shed light on why Tricolour Flame's state dependency decreased in 2008. Interestingly, the financial accounts from the Pensioner Party, the Segni Pact, and the Tricolour Flame indicate that all income from membership fees was kept at national level, which means that these parties had more leeway to use this income source than the Communist Refoundation Party and the Greens.

The Communist Party of Workers was created in 2006, and never accessed state funding, despite permissive access criteria. The party only collects party tax from regionally or nationally elected representatives (Party representative, 11.11.2016; Statutes, 2008, 2011, 2014), which the party has failed to achieve. According to party representatives, the main sources of income for the party are membership fees, and income from fundraising activities or other self-generated income (Terra, 29.11.2016; Party representative, 11.11.2016, 21.11.2016). A fixed sum of the collected membership fees is always transferred to the national branch of the party (Statutes, 2008, 2011, 2014).

In brief, this analysis shows that five out of six parties operating in this phase were very state-dependent (when they had state funding access), and shifts in state benefits and constraints are largely reflected in the parties' income

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<sup>62</sup> In 2009 and 2010 regional councillors Luigi Ferone and Elisabetta Fatuzzo contributed with private donations to the party (Financial account, 2009, 2010). In light of their position, these contributions are portrayed as donations in the financial records, rather than as contributions (i.e. not party tax).



structures. The Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party experienced decreased income from the state due to a decreasingly generous state funding system in the early 1990s. In a similar vein, the increasingly generous system in place from 1997 and onwards, as illustrated by the introduction of the tax benefit Four for the Thousand and the provision of electoral reimbursements on an annual basis, gave all the studied parties increased financial leeway. The fact that the Tricolour Flame, the Segni Pact, and the Pensioner Party mainly accessed state funds related to European elections (1999 and 2004) demonstrates how highly permissive access criteria concerning these funds benefitted them. Similarly, more constraining access criteria (4 percent of the vote) for state funding related to the European parliament led to a loss of such funds for all the parties in 2009.

### *5.1.3 Regulatory phase 3: 2012-2016*


The third regulatory phase encompasses great changes. First of all, common access criteria for electoral reimbursements on all levels (one candidate elected) were introduced in 2012. From 2013, the access criteria became more constraining as registration in a newly established party register was required. In addition, the state provided less and less money for direct state funding, continuing the development started in 2008. From 2013 all direct state funding was abolished. In its place, a tax benefit called Two for the Thousand was introduced. This decreasing generosity and increasingly constraining access criteria is likely to be reflected in decreased income from the state for the new minor parties.

Table 5.3 Access criteria and generosity, regulatory phase 3 (2012-2016), and expectations for new minor parties' income structure: Italy

<b>Phase 3: 2012-2016</b>	
<i>Access criteria</i>	Institutional representation was required for access to funds on all levels. Registration was required from 2013.
<i>Expectation for new minor parties' access</i>	-
<i>State funds available (generosity)</i>	A decrease in amount set aside for state funding (2012). Abolition of state funds from 2013, just tax benefits left.
<i>Expected effect of state funding access on new minor parties' budgets</i>	-

Echoing the Italian state's provision of less money to state funds, the figure below shows that the Greens' and the Communist Refoundation Party's income from the state was significantly lower in this third regulatory phase (compared to previous phases). That said, the introduction of the tax benefit Two for the Thousand in 2013 led to a significant increase in state income for the Communist Refoundation party in 2015 and the Greens in 2016.

Figure 5.5 Income from state funding (euros) and share of income from state funding. The Communist Refoundation Party and the Greens. Regulatory phase 3.



**Sources:** Financial accounts.

The figure shows that the Greens' state-dependency decreased until accessing Two for the Thousand in 2016, due to a decrease in income from state funds, combined with a relatively stable income from membership fees between 2013 and 2015, amounting to between 40,000 and 50,000 euros. The Communist Refoundation Party was increasingly state-dependent in the period. In 2014 this was because of a massive drop in membership fees (from 94,281 euros in 2013 to 6115 euros in 2014), and in 2015 it was due to a significant increase in income from Two for the Thousand (see also Annual account, 2015).<sup>63</sup>

The Pensioner Party, Tricolour Flame, and the Communist Party of Workers were not able to access any state funds in this regulatory phase, reflecting increasingly constraining access criteria. Tricolour Flame continued to enjoy access to a small share of state funds that it won in relation to the 2008 parliamentary election, but from 2013 onwards the party relied on membership fees and personal funds only (Romagnoli, 16.11.2016; Bevilacqua, 14.11.2016; Francescon, 25.11.2016; Condorelli Caff, 28.11.2016). Act to Stop the Decline which was founded in 2012, did not manage to access state funds following participation in the parliamentary elections in 2013, and thus relied on small donations and self-generated income in its short life span (it died in 2014) (Boldrin, 27.11.2016; Brusco, 28.11.2016).

This regulatory phase has thus demonstrated how the access criteria were constraining for the new minor parties in this sample, even though the previous chapter demonstrated how, depending on the inclusiveness of electoral coalitions, the new access criteria could also be more permissive than before. The decrease in generosity (i.e. by abolishing state funding and leaving only a

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<sup>63</sup> I have not accessed the Communist Refoundation Party's 2016 financial account, which is why 2016 figures are not reported here.

tax benefit in place) severely affected the income structures of parties that throughout their life cycles have been highly state-dependent. It is worth noting that failure to attract electoral support by the Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party, Tricolour Flame, and the Pensioner Party is also responsible for these parties' stark decrease in income from the state prior to the abolition of direct state funds in 2013.

## 5.2 Norwegian new minor parties' income structure

### 5.2.1 Regulatory phase 1: 1970-2005

The table below demonstrates that access criteria for national state funding were constraining in this phase (2.5 percent), but permissive on regional and local levels, as the only requirement was to be registered, have an operative branch in the relevant constituency, and win at least one vote. The state increased the funds available in state funds throughout the phase, but a majority of the total state funds went to the national state funds. Reflecting this, new minor parties operating in this phase would to a greater extent qualify for (the less generous) subnational funds.

Table 5.4 Access criteria and generosity, regulatory phase 1 (1970-2005), and expectations for new minor parties' income structure: Norway

<b>Phase 1: 1970-2005</b>	
Access criteria	<i>National level:</i> Win more than 2.5 percent of the votes and present lists in at least half the electoral districts. <i>Subnational level:</i> Vote support (no threshold).
<i>Expectation for new minor parties' access</i>	+ (subnational level) - (national level)
Generosity	Less generous than in Italy, as only annual grants (and not also electoral reimbursements) were available. The provision of funds on three levels compensates for this. Increasingly generous.
<i>Expected effect of state funding access on new minor parties' budgets</i>	+ (but relatively modest, as I only expect the new minor parties to access subnational funds)

Echoing the constraining access criteria for state funds on the national level, the Pensioner Party, the Greens, the Coastal Party, and the Fatherland's Party only accessed state funding on the subnational level in this phase. The Pensioner Party's congress first introduced a rule where subnational branches had to transfer 10 percent of their state funds to the national level (Pensjonistpartiet, 1991a), which was increased to 20 percent from 1992 onwards (Pensjonistpartiet, 1992b; Pensjonistpartiet, 1993a), while the Fatherland's Party obliged their subnational branches to transfer 1/3 of the subnational state funds to the executive council (Statutes, 1990). In practice, however, nearly all of the state funds were transferred to national level (Fedrelandspartiet, 1992, 2002). The Greens required 10 percent from 1993 (Statutes, 1993) and 15 percent from 1997 (Statutes, 1997) to be transferred. There was no further change to this in regulatory phase 1 (Green party statutes, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2004; and Pensioner party statutes, 1996, 2004). These internal regulations explain why the national accounts of these parties have income from the state in this phase. There was not a similar practice in the Coastal Party. As will be discussed last, neither the Cross Partisan MPs nor Future for Finnmark accessed state funding.

The Pensioner Party received between 60 and 92 percent of its income from transfers of state funding from subnational branches between 1992 and 2001. The Greens' state-dependency ranged between 20 and 50 percent in this phase, while the Fatherland's Party's state-dependency was around 70 percent in 1992, before it decreased (see figure below).<sup>64</sup> All three parties divided the

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<sup>64</sup> Regarding the Fatherland's Party I have not been able to access *full* financial accounts, which means that there might be other sources of income that have not been registered. That said, both membership fees – which according to party representatives (Moseng, 26.02.2018; Party representative, 16.04.2018a) have been the party's most important source of income – and state funds are included in the calculations on which the figure is based.


income from membership fees between the national and subnational level. In the Greens 1/3 of membership fees went to the national branch (Statutes, 1997), while half was reserved for the national branch in the Fatherland's Party (Statutes, 1990). In the Pensioner Party the share was calculated by the Congress and the regional annual meeting (see e.g. Statutes, 1992, 1996). As the only party in the Norwegian sample to do so, the Greens collected (modest) party tax from its elected representatives, and the party's income from the state thus originated from both party tax and transferred subnational state funds (see e.g. Financial account, 1994).<sup>65</sup>

The difference in overall state-dependency between the Greens, the Pensioner Party, and the Fatherland's Party is first of all due to the different shares of subnational state funds transferred from the subnational branches (see above). Secondly, the Pensioner party was electorally larger than the Greens and the Fatherland's Party in this phase, and thus received more state funds than the other two parties due to the proportional allocation mechanism. This sheds light on why the share of income from membership fees and other income sources (besides state funds) was lower in the Pensioner Party than in the other two parties. For example, the Pensioner Party received between 270,000 NOK (ca. 27,000 euros) and 530,000 NOK (ca. 53,000 euros) in state funds between 1995 and 2001 (Financial accounts, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001) while the sums ranged between 25,000 and 40,000 NOK for the Greens between 1994 to 1997 (Financial accounts, 1994-1997), and between 4800 NOK and 152,000 NOK for the Fatherland's Party (Fedrelandspartiet, 2002a).

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<sup>65</sup> The Greens' income from party tax was significantly lower than that of Italian new minor parties. For example, the Greens received 3000 NOK (ca. 300 euros) in party tax in 1995 (Financial account, 1995).

Figure 5.6 Share of income from state funding. The Greens, the Pensioner Party, and the Fatherland's Party. Regulatory phase 1



**Sources:** *The Greens*: Financial accounts. The 1994 figures are just the budget figures (Miljøpartiet de grønne, 1994a), as no financial account is available. *The Pensioner Party*: Budget (1992) (Pensjonistpartiet, 1992b), otherwise financial accounts. The 2005 figure for state funding has been calculated by the author on the basis of the party's receipt of subnational state funds that year. *The Fatherland's Party*: Fedrelandspartiet, 1993, 2002.

**Note:** There should have been subnational state funds transferred to the national level in the Fatherland Party in 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 as well. The reason why such transfers are not noted in the figure is simply that the transfers never took place (Fedrelandspartiet, 2002a).

The state-dependency of the Pensioner Party decreased significantly in 1999 and 2001. In 1999 the party received a transfer from one of its regional branches (not the mandatory state funds), amounting to nearly 100,000 NOK,<sup>66</sup> while the financial account from 2001 demonstrates an increased income from sales, amounting to nearly 150,000 NOK, echoing the parliamentary elections that year. Interestingly, the party's share of income from members declined throughout the period, from 8.6 percent in 1995 to 2.9 in 2003. Not until 2005 was there a small increase in income from this source. The decline in the late 1990s is probably related to the serious conflicts that riddled the party in 1998 concerning the sitting party leader Jørgen Øydvin (see e.g. NTB, 16.09.1998; Aftenposten, 17.09.1998). Still, the increase from other sources compensated for this loss of income.

<sup>66</sup> Rather it was noted as 'returned money from Aust Agder' (the region). In addition, the financial account that year included the sum that the party had in its account going into 1999 as *income* (which was ca. 80,000 NOK).

For the Greens and the Fatherland's Party the shifting state-dependency reflects shifts in income from members, echoing findings from the Italian analysis. Specifically, the Greens' increased income from members between 1994 and 1997 meant that its state-dependency went down (Financial accounts, 1994-1997). The increased membership in this period was also mentioned in the party's newsletter in 1995, '*Growth in the Greens: In August already 20 percent more members than in 1994 together*' (Grønn Kontakt nr. 4, 1995). The membership fee is also highlighted as a very important source of income for the party in regulatory phase 1 by interviewees (Party representative, 28.06.2017; Simonsen, 16.06.2017). Another reason for the Green's decreased state-dependency in 1996 and 1997 was an increased income from gifts and donations (Financial accounts, 1996, 1997).

The importance of state funding decreased in the Fatherland's Party in 1993, due to a surge in income from membership fees. In fact, the party increased its income from members from ca. 64,000 NOK (6400 euros) in 1992, to ca. 280,000 NOK (28,000 euros) in 1993 (Fedrelandspartiet, 2002a). The lack of income from state funding in the years between 1994 and 1998 is simply due to the fact that the branches never transferred the sums they were required to (Fedrelandspartiet, 2002a). After 1999, the party did not access state funds anymore. This shows how vulnerable a national party branch is in a situation where it cannot itself access state funding, and where subnational branches fail to fulfil their financial duties. Generally, in the period after 1994 until the party died (2008), the party's main sources of income were membership fees, which was decreasing steadily from its highest point in 1993 (Fedrelandspartiet, 2002a), and private funds (Moseng, 26.02.2018; Party representative, 16.04.2018a).



The figure above has a large gap in the Greens' life cycle concerning state-dependency. This mirrors the lack of specific data about the financial situation in the Greens between 1998 and 2005. That said, electoral statistics show that the party continued to access state funding on the subnational level in this period due to its stable (albeit low) electoral support.<sup>67</sup> Consequently, the national branch of the Greens also continued to get a share of state funding from subnational branches in the period which is marked as blank in the figure above, as the rule to transfer subnational state funds to the national level was valid in the whole period.

The Coastal Party did not oblige its local and regional branches to transfer state funding to the national branch (Falch Pedersen, 18.12.2017; Stabrun Johansen, 26.01.2017).<sup>68</sup> The party (the national branch) thus relied on membership fees, some sales, and donations in this phase (Party representative, 21.02.2018; Stabrun Johansen, 26.01.2018; Falch Pedersen, 18.12.2017), which is also supported by meeting documents that refer to the party's only income sources being membership fees and donations (Kystpartiet, 2004). The lack of funds in the national branch was also due to the national branch's transfer of a share of membership fees to subnational branches, which happened both in regulatory phase 1 (Kystpartiet, 2004) and 2 (Financial accounts, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012).

Cross Partisan MPs<sup>69</sup> and the Popular Movement for the Future for Finnmark never accessed state funding, and the lack of financial accounts for

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<sup>67</sup> The party achieved between 0.2 and 0.3 percent of the vote on the local level in the regional and local elections in 1995, 1999, and 2003 (Statistics Norway, Undated (b)).

<sup>68</sup> The party elected several representatives on the subnational level in 1999 (25 local councillors and three regional councillors) and 2005, for example, which means that the party's subnational branches had access to state funding (Kystpartiet, undated).

<sup>69</sup> The party was registered under different names from the 1970s onwards, but was taken over by Harald B. Haram and supporters in 1992, and this is thus registered as the formative year of the party (even though it was first registered as Cross Partisan MPs in 1997) (Nordstrand, 2005).

both parties explains why they are not part of the figure above. Both parties were organisationally vulnerable, and neither of them had established membership registers (Leirvik, 26.01.2018; Moe, 05.02.2018; Party representative, 21.02.2018). In consequence, Cross Partisan MPs has mainly relied on personal funds during its life cycle (Nordstrand, 2005; Tverrpolitisk folkevalgte, 1997a, 1997b; Party representative, 15.02.2018), creating a very restricted financial situation (Tverrpolitisk folkevalgte, 1997b). The regional branches and local branches have been financially independent (Tverrpolitisk folkevalgte, 1997b). Consequently, in 1997, when a branch of the party in the region of Nordland started to enrol members (Party representative, 21.02.2018), the income from this activity stayed in the region.<sup>70</sup> Future for Finnmark relied on membership fees, loans, and some donations to finance the electoral campaign in 1989 (Aune, 1996; Leirvik, 26.01.2018; Framtid for Finnmark, 1990; Framtid for Finnmark, 1991). However, after 1990 the membership register was not maintained (Leirvik, 26.01.2018). Even though the party elected one candidate to the Storting in the 1989 parliamentary elections, it neither achieved 2.5 percent of the vote, nor presented itself in more than half of the constituencies, both of which were required for accessing state funding.<sup>71</sup> This illustrates the constraining access criteria for state funds in the period. In the period after 1989, the parliamentary party grant that Future for Finnmark won thanks to having a candidate elected financed the party's tasks. There is no indication that the party had party tax (see e.g. Leirvik, 26.01.2018; Moe, 05.02.2018).

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<sup>70</sup> After 1999 the Nordland branch split and created the Coastal Party (1999). This financial independence between branches also meant that potential state funds won on the subnational level stayed there (and were not transferred to the national branch).

<sup>71</sup> The movement did access the parliamentary party grant, which was (partially) spent in part on paying down the debts incurred by the movement during the electoral campaign (Leirvik, 26.01.2018).

The analysis of the income structure of Norwegian parties in regulatory phase 1 reflects the constraining access criteria for national state funds, and the permissive criteria for subnational state funds. Concretely, four parties accessed subnational state funds, and three of them, i.e. the Greens, The Fatherland's Party, and the Pensioner Party, subsequently transferred a share to the national branch. State funds constituted a large share of the income in the Pensioner Party, while the Greens to a larger extent managed to raise money from the members and had a lower income from the state, which is why its state-dependency was lower than in the Pensioner Party. Similarly, the Fatherland's Party's reliance on state funds decreased throughout this regulatory phase, and membership fees and personal funds were important for its operation. Future for Finnmark and Cross Partisan MPs relied on personal funds, and to a certain extent membership fees (only the former), as they never accessed state funds.

#### *5.2.2 Regulatory phase 2: 2006-2016*

Regulatory phase 2 is characterised by a shift towards highly permissive access criteria for state funding on the national level, and a continuation of the permissive criteria on the subnational level. This is likely to be reflected in increased financial leeway in the national branches of the studied new minor parties. In terms of generosity, the state increasingly provided state funds throughout this phase, and since the majority was allocated to the fund for national state support, it was now (with more permissive access criteria) easier for new minor parties to access the most generous part of Norwegian state funds.


Table 5.5 Access criteria and generosity, regulatory phase 2 (2006-2016), and expectations for new minor parties' income structure: Norway

<b>Phase 2: 2006 - 2016</b>	
Access criteria	<i>National level:</i> <u>Vote support</u> : no threshold. <u>Basic support</u> : 2.5 percent of the vote. Vote support accounts for 9/10 of the total support. <i>Subnational level:</i> <u>Vote support</u> : no threshold. <u>Basic support</u> : 4 percent of the vote or one candidate elected.
<i>Expectation for new minor parties' access</i>	+ (all levels)
Generosity	Increasingly generous over time (particularly on the national level).
<i>Expected effect of state funding access on new minor parties' budgets</i>	+

Reflecting the permissive turn in regulation, the Greens, the Coastal Party, and the Pensioner Party accessed national state funding in 2006, while the Christian Conservative Party accessed it following participation in its first parliamentary elections in 2013. The Fatherland's Party did not present lists after 2001, and thus could not access state funds in this phase.<sup>72</sup> The figure below outlines the different parties' state-dependency in regulatory phase 2.

<sup>72</sup> Cross Partisan MPs only ran once in this regulatory phase, in 2009, and only won 64 votes overall in the region where it presented lists (Nordland). As highlighted previously, subnational state funding stayed on the subnational level.

Figure 5.7 Share of income from state funding. The Greens, the Pensioner Party, the Coastal Party, and the Fatherland's Party. Regulatory phase 2



**Sources:** Financial accounts.

The figure shows that the Coastal Party and the Pensioner Party were particularly state-dependent after 2006, which coincides with information from interviews in these parties (Falch Pedersen, 18.12.2017; Stabrun Johansen, 26.01.2018; Gjermundnes, 20.06.2017; Remman, 20.06.2017; Walseth, 01.06.2017). The Pensioner Party only won 0.5 percent of the votes in the 2005 elections, but still received nearly a million NOK in state support annually (Financial account, 2006) based on that result. The party's share of income from membership fees varies slightly, but ranges between 1 and 2 percent, and the low figure also reflects the party's decision to keep a share of membership fees on the subnational level (see e.g. Gjermundnes, 20.06.2017; Statutes, 2008). The Coastal Party received its highest amount of state funding in the period 2006-2009, when the party received around 1.5 million NOK per year. Due to disappointing electoral results in the parliamentary elections in 2009, the party's income from the state dropped to around 400,000 NOK a year. After the latest parliamentary elections in 2013, the sum is around 300,000 NOK per year. Still, the Coastal Party's state-dependency remains the same, and has been stable at around 70-80 percent, which also reflects the party's decision to keep much of

the membership fees on the subnational level (Financial accounts, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2011, 2012). The only year in which the share of state funding dropped below 80 percent was in 2011, when the party had an income of a little more than 160,000 NOK called “various income” which was probably related to the regional and local elections that were held that year.

The Christian Conservative Party and the Green Party had an overall lower state-dependency than the Pensioner Party and the Coastal Party in this phase, demonstrating their ability to attract donations and draw on income from members. The Christian Conservative Party received between 50 and 60 percent of its income from state funding in this phase. The actual amount received has been ca. 1.5 million NOK annually (ca. 150,000 EUR) (Financial accounts, 2014-2016). The dip in state-dependency in the election year 2015 was due to a steep increase in income from donations (Financial account, 2015), reflecting the argument of one of the party’s founders in 2012: *‘there are many Christians in Norway who have quite a lot of money. I do not think that the financial side of things will become a problem’* (Terje Simonsen, in Eikje, 14.03.2012). Besides state funds, the party has mainly relied on membership fees, which amounts to between 25 and 32 percent of the party’s income between 2013 and 2016 (Financial accounts, 2013-2016). There have not been any transfers of membership fees from the national to the subnational levels in the party (see e.g. Financial account, 2013, 2014).<sup>73</sup> Prior to accessing state funds on the national level, i.e. between foundation in 2011 and 2014, the Christian Conservative Party was funded with the help of membership fees, personal funds, and a personal

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<sup>73</sup> The statutes in the Christian Conservative Party do not mention transfers of a part of the membership fee (to either national or subnational levels).

loan taken by the then party secretary and founder Terje Simonsen (Husveg, 2017; see also Party representative, 08.02.2018).

In 2006 the Greens accessed state funding on the national level for the first time (237,000 NOK, ca. 23,700 euros), and following this, it was highly state-dependent (90 percent in 2006). However, the party's continued membership growth in this phase, as well as considerable donations in election years, explain the decrease in state-dependency (see Figure 5.7), and especially so in election years (Financial accounts, 2005-2016). Even though the party had party tax in its statutes until 2012 (Statutes, 2012), there is no indication from financial accounts that it was actually collected in this regulatory phase.

The party decided that 2/3 (not 1/3) of the membership fee was to remain on the national level from 2012 onwards, and 1/3 was to be allocated to subnational branches, increasing the national branch's income from membership fees (Statutes, 2012). The figure below outlines the party's income from membership fees and state funds in regulatory phase 2:

Figure 5.8 Income from membership fees and state funds (NOK). The Greens, 2006-2016



**Sources:** Financial accounts 2006-2016.

**Note:** To transfer the sums into euros, the reader can simply remove the last digit.

Despite the increase in income from members, party representatives report that state funding on the national level is the party's most important income source

(Golis, 02.06.2017; Simonsen, 16.06.2017), which the figure above demonstrates. The party's income from the state increased from 237,000 NOK in 2006 to over 10 million NOK in 2010 (i.e. 1 million euros) (Financial accounts, 2006-2016), reflecting the party's increasingly strong performance in elections. From 2013 this guaranteed the party access to both the basic component of state funds (flat grant) and vote support.

The shift to more permissive access criteria for national state funding in this phase significantly improved Norwegian new minor parties' financial leeway. The Coastal Party, for instance, had a solid income source on the national level for the first time, and the newly established Christian Conservative Party accessed state funds following its first ever national election in 2013. The state-dependency was particularly high in the Coastal Party and the Pensioner Party, due to limited income from other sources, of them membership fees. The Greens and Christian Conservative Party managed to a greater extent than the former two to rely on donations and membership fees, which accounts for their lower state-dependency in this phase.

### 5.3 Comparative discussion: New minor parties' income structure across Italy and Norway

This chapter has demonstrated that the existing literature's finding that new and/or minor parties tend to be state-dependent (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006), holds for new minor parties in Norway and Italy. The division of the analysis into two and three regulatory periods in Norway and Italy respectively has made clear how shifts in access criteria and generosity affect the financial means of new minor parties. In Italy, for instance, the shift from regulatory phase 1 to 2, reflected by a drastic decrease in generosity, led to the Communist Refoundation Party and the Greens having their income from the state nearly cut in half. Conversely,



the shift to more permissive state benefits in Italy from 2001 (making electoral reimbursements annual) gave new minor parties larger financial leeway. In a similar vein, the introduction of higher access thresholds for (decreasingly generous) Italian state funds, starting in 2009, effectively decreased the new minor parties' financial leeway in regulatory phase 3. Similarly, the shift in access criteria for state funding introduced in Norway in 2006 suddenly implied that all the Norwegian new minor parties in the sample (that ran in elections), accessed vote support on the national level, significantly changing the (financial) life of the Pensioner Party, the Greens, the Coastal Party, and the Christian Conservative Party.

The new minor parties' state-dependencies (not just their financial leeway) also mirror these regulatory changes. The table below outlines this, by providing an overview of each party's state-dependency (percentage) in each regulatory phase. The Italian new minor parties' very high state-dependency in regulatory phase one and two reflects the overall permissive environment in these phases. Interestingly, state-dependency remains high irrespective of brief (and smaller) shifts to the parties' actual income from the state. Only when drastic decreases (several million euros) in income from the state occur, does it affect the parties' overall state-dependencies, as illustrated by the Communist Refoundation Party in 2011. Specifically, all the Italian new minor parties have a mean state-dependency of *at least* 78 percent in these two regulatory phases. Unsurprisingly, the picture reverses with the entry into regulatory phase 3, reflecting the decreasing generosity and the stricter access threshold for funds. In that phase, four parties are not state-dependent at all, while the Greens exhibits the highest state-dependency with 'only' (compared to previously) 67 percent.

In a similar vein, the Norwegian new minor parties, had a mean state-dependency ranging from 24 to 76 percent in the largely constraining regulatory phase 1 (1970-2005), where the Greens and the Fatherland's Party were never more than 24 and 38 percent state-dependent respectively. However, the situation reversed when Norwegian new minor parties entered into regulatory phase 2 (2006). With a more permissive environment, the new minor parties increased their overall state-dependency, and no party was less than 59 percent state-dependent in Norway in this phase. The generally high state-dependency (in certain phases) in both contexts indicates that factors such as ideology, formative features (split or a newly born), or a party's age, has little role in shaping new minor parties' *overall* income structures.

Table 5.6 State-dependency, range and mean (percentage) in Italian and Norwegian new minor parties – across regulatory phases

Italy	Regulatory phase 1 (1974-1992)		Regulatory phase 2 (1993-2011)		Regulatory phase 3 (2012-2016)	
	Range	Mean	Range	Mean	Range	Mean
The Communist Refoundation Party	67-95	81	7-95	88	20-74	49
The Greens	78-98	91,2	27-98	78	41-78	67
The Pensioner Party	No data <sup>1</sup>	No data	35-99	87	0	0
Tricolour Flame			63-97	81	0 <sup>2</sup>	0
The Segni Pact			68-99,5	85		
The Communist Party of Workers			0	0	0	0
Act to Stop the Decline					0	0
Norway	Regulatory phase 1 (1970-2005)		Regulatory phase 2 (2006-2016)			
	Range	Mean	Range	Mean		
The Pensioner Party	60-92	76	79-92	86		
The Greens	0-47	24	16-89	61		
Future for Finnmark	0	0				
The Fatherland's Party	11-67	38	0	0		
Cross Partisan MPs	0	0	0	0		
The Coastal Party	0	0	59-87	80		
The Christian Conservative Party			53-63	59		

**Notes:** The figures only cover the years for which I have data. In the Italian case, that means that the data is only applicable for the years in which the parties had state funds. The zeroes indicate that the party had no access to state funds.

<sup>1</sup> The party had access to state funds, but no financial accounts are available, and I thus cannot calculate the party's state-dependency.

<sup>2</sup> The party drew on state funds until 2013, but since I do not have the party's individual financial account (only the joint financial account with the Right, with which the party fielded candidates in 2008), I cannot make a figure for the party's state-dependency.

Despite the generally high state-dependency in both contexts when state benefits and constraints are permissive, two parties stand out. The Christian Conservative Party and the Greens in Norway have both managed to draw a considerable share of their income from sources besides state funds, such as from donations in the permissive regulatory phase 2 in Norway. That interestingly counters those who argue that new minor parties are *generally* unattractive for donations (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 43), indicating that in some cases, donors look beyond a party's size and newness when giving money to politics. Both of these parties have also managed to draw a considerable share of their income from their memberships. The importance of fluctuations in the membership for brief (but not lasting) shifts in state-dependency is also something that the analysis found in a range of other parties, as illustrated by for example the Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the Pensioner Party in Italy, and the Fatherland's Party in Norway. Interestingly, larger donations from party representatives themselves (not party tax) were also found to shift the state-dependency temporarily in Italian new minor parties, such as Tricolour Flame and the Pensioner Party.

The definition of state funds in this thesis includes party tax. This analysis has outlined one core difference between the parties concerning party tax, which underpins existing literature (Bolleyer & Gauja, 2013). Concretely, the analysis found that only parties in certain party families and with certain ideological dispositions (leftist and green parties) had party tax. Thus, in my sample, only the Communist Refoundation Party, the Greens, and the Communist Party of Workers in Italy, and the Greens in Norway, had party tax. However, only in the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy did it constitute a substantial share of the parties' income from the state, while the Norwegian

Greens' income from this source in the 1990s was marginal. Interestingly, the statutes of Tricolour Flame – belonging to the far-right party family – outlined that the party was to have party tax, but in practice the rule was not enforced.

## 5.4 Summary

This chapter has outlined how different state regulations effectively shape the financial leeway of new minor parties, and their state-dependency. The core finding is that new minor parties, as already emphasised in the literature, are highly state-dependent. As such, the analysis has provided a solid foundation for the later analysis of the study's core indicator, namely access to/increase of state funds. This chapter showed that there was ample variation with regards to new minor parties' actual income from state funds, and the table above showed that state-dependencies differ as well, not just between parties within the same context, but also across Italian and Norwegian new minor parties. Interestingly, state-dependencies were found to not always coincide with changing income from the state. As such, the analysis has provided a fruitful starting point for the following analyses – both within life cycle and across context – of how state funds shape staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function. The first of these analyses is the staffing analysis, to which the thesis now turns.

## 6 State funding and staffing

### 6.0 Introduction

This chapter empirically explores the impact of state funds on staffing processes in new minor parties, as such shedding light on the thesis's first hypothesis (H1). Concretely, I analyse if an increase of state funding lead to staffing, and if a decrease or loss of state funding lead to downsizing, as H1 argues. Staffing is understood as processes that shift the number of permanent or temporary staff in new minor parties. This chapter builds on the previous one, which showed that overall, the Italian and Norwegian new minor parties have been highly state-dependent, almost irrespective of the level of income from the state. More specifically, the analysis in chapter 5 showed how the shift between regulatory phases in each context effectively changed the financial means of the parties. Reflecting these findings, H1 is in this chapter analysed within each of the two (Norway) and three (Italy) regulatory phases.

The analysis of H1 within phases starts by outlining how I expect state benefits and constraints to impact patterns of staffing, before staffing processes in each party's life cycle are analysed in detail. The chapter concludes with a comparative discussion, bringing together the findings from Norwegian and Italian and new minor parties.

### 6.1 State funding and staffing: An analysis of Italian new minor parties

#### *6.1.1 Staffing in regulatory phase 1: 1974-1992*

The table below outlines the low access criteria and the high generosity (both annual grants and electoral reimbursements) that characterises regulatory phase 1 in Italy, which leads me to expect that new minor parties will hire staff in this

phase. Concretely, access criteria for annual state grants and electoral reimbursements related to regional and European elections were tied to parliamentary representation (Senate/Chamber of Deputies). This was a permissive access criterion, as the electoral system at the time had an effective threshold for representation at all institutional levels below 1 percent (see among others Renwick et al., 2009).<sup>74</sup> To access electoral reimbursements related to national elections, a party had to win at least 2 percent of the vote and present lists in more than 2/3 of the constituencies. Parties accessing direct state funding were (only) required to disclose their financial accounts in newspapers and to the parliament, with failure to do so potentially resulting in a shortening of state funding. As this reporting did not require specialist skills, I do not expect that reporting per se will spark staffing.

Table 6.1 Regulatory phase 1 (1974-1992). Overview of state benefits and constraints, and expectations for new minor party staffing: Italy

<b>Type of regulation</b>	<b>Regulation in place</b>	<b>Expected consequence for staffing</b>
<i>Access criteria</i>	Access tied to institutional representation. Permissive due to proportional electoral system on all levels. High generosity.	New minor parties will take on staff following state funding access.
<i>Reporting requirements (related to maintenance of state funds)</i>	Permissive: Only disclosure of accounts.	None (a regularly appointed treasurer could perform the reporting duties, no staff needed).

Both the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party accessed state funding on the national level following participation in their first national elections in 1987 and 1992 respectively, and responded by taking on staff, supporting H1. The Pensioner Party only participated in regional elections before 1992, and

<sup>74</sup> Although the regulations were slightly different, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, had in practice the same proportional (electoral) system in the post war period (Grofman & Giannetti, 2011, p. 3).

accessed regional funds. However, the party did not take on staff, contrary to H1, and the Pensioner Party is thus discussed last.

While the Greens hired one permanent employee in 1987 (Katz & Mair, 1992),<sup>75</sup> the Communist Refoundation Party had 2-3 permanent hired staff in the national party organisation in 1991 (Bertolino, 2004).<sup>76</sup> In 1991, i.e. a year after the party's official foundation, nearly 70 percent of the Communist Refoundation Party's budget constituted state funds, and interviewees state: '*State funding put us in a financial position to hire staff*' (Meloni, 24.11.2016), lending support to H1. Similarly, Green Party representatives argue that access to state funding in the 1980s allowed the party to take on staff (Lion, 17.11.2016), which is also corroborated by the annual account from 1987, and current treasurer, Natale Ripamonti (Interview, 23.11.2016). In fact, the Greens got nearly 100 percent of their income from the state in 1987, which shows how state funds were crucial for staffing. The support for H1 is strongest with respect to the Greens, as the Communist Refoundation Party also got ca. 30 percent of its income from auto-financing in 1991, which could help finance staffing. However, as the previous chapter outlined, the Communist Refoundation Party transferred a large share of its membership fees to subnational levels, which indicates that the actual financial leeway to hire came from state funding. Both parties, before becoming subject to reporting requirements, had already recruited a treasurer who could see to the (permissive) reporting related to the maintenance of state funds in this regulatory phase.

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
<sup>75</sup> However, when we look at the financial account from 1988, there are no reported expenses on party staff. That said, the party reports a sum in administrative expenses, which was related to the party office, and thus could comprise staffing expenses (Financial account, 1988).

<sup>76</sup> In fact, Bertolino (2004, pp. 277-278) states that the party had a total of 10 employees, but that only 2-3 were hired, and that the rest were the founders of the party, who were parliamentarians (i.e. not staff according to the definition adopted in this thesis).



In 1992 The Communist Refoundation Party increased its income from state funding (see figure below) and simultaneously increased its number of staff to 26 (Bertolino, 2004), lending further support for H1. Bertolini (2004, p. 87) argues that the increased income from state funding following the successful 1992 elections allowed the party to hire *more* permanent staff, which underlines that it was the increase of funds that facilitated the hiring process, and not the elections themselves.

Figure 6.1 Income from the state (euros) and number of staff in the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party. Regulatory phase 1



**Sources:** Financial accounts, Vannucci (2007), and Bertolino (2004).

A similar development happened in the Green Party; it increased its staff between 1987 and 1992 at the same time as increasing its income from the state, which supports H1. While it scaled up to two staff members in 1989, it had six in 1990, and eight 1991 and 1992 (Vannucci, 2007). The exception is 1991, when income from the state dropped and a simultaneous increase in staff took place. The reason was that the party established a publishing house late in 1990 (Annual account, 1990), and started to release its weekly newspaper, *Notizie Verdi* (Federazione dei Verdi, undated) in 1991. For this activity, the party received a

substantial sum in state funding (Annual report, 1991),<sup>77</sup> which facilitated staffing. This lends some support to H1, even though state support for publishing activities is not included in the state funding concept here.<sup>78</sup> The staff taken on in the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party in this regulatory phase were permanent, and there is only indication that the 1992 electoral campaign led the Greens to take on temporary staff (Financial account, 1992).

The two parties differ concerning the *type* of tasks staff undertook. In the Green Party, staff carried out technical and administrative tasks, i.e. maintenance of both territorial branches and the national branch. For example, staff contributed to developing the party's financial account (Party representative, 23.11.2017). The staff also undertook important tasks related to the presentation of electoral lists and electoral campaigns (Party representative, 23.11.2017; Francescato, 14.11.2017). None of the political offices or other elected offices (such as that of the treasurer) were paid (Lion, 17.11.2016) in the Greens. In the Communist Refoundation Party, on the contrary, the staff was both political and administrative. More specifically, political staff, such as party leaders, deputy leaders, leaders of specific sections (on labour, immigration etc.), and the treasurer, were paid, while the party also had purely technical staff, dealing with everything from driving to supporting the technical elaboration of the financial account, to dealing with local branches (Celli, 25.06.2018; Meloni, 24.11.2016).

This summary outlines that both parties had staff that aided with the elaboration of the financial accounts, even though there is no indication that reporting per se contributed to inducing the parties to take on such staff. That

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<sup>77</sup> The party received 221,047 euros (428,008,400 lire, conversion rate 1936.27) from the state in publishing support (Financial account, 1991).

<sup>78</sup> One could speculate if the increased staff in 1991 is related to the Greens' merger with The Rainbow Greens (Verdi Arcobaleno) in December 1990 (Vannucci, 2007, p. 177). However, as the merger did not affect the income structure per se (see Figure 6.1), this is unlikely.

said, both the Greens (Financial account, 1990-1992) and the Communist Refoundation Party (Financial account, 1992) had expenses related to publication of the financial account, which was a requirement in the law.

Unlike the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party, the Pensioner Party did not take on staff in 1990 when it accessed modest amounts of (regional) state funding (100,000 euros)<sup>79</sup>:

We decided not to hire staff [...]. For us it was more important to make the party known than to have staff (Party representative, 10.11.2016).

One of the party's goals has been to provide recommendations and advice, for example concerning pensions, to pensioners (Party representative, 10.11.2016, 19.12.2017). So, instead of taking on staff, the party spent its state funds on frequent television broadcasts (see also Franzi, 2017), so that the party could both make itself known and provide a service for pensioners. This sheds light on why the party operates contrary to H1.<sup>80</sup> An interviewee (Party representative, 19.12.2017) also suggests that the party's operation without staff has been facilitated by having pensioners as members, a group usually better able to dedicate time to party work. The party has had a treasurer since the party was founded (Party representative, 19.12.2017), who could deal with the permissive reporting requirements in this regulatory phase.

The party also prioritised spending its state funds on television broadcasts following state funding access in 1995, 1997, and 2004. The annual account from 1997 states that the party had '*numerous transmissions on local television*

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<sup>79</sup> In comparison, the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party had an income from the state of more than 560,000 euros and 850,000 euros respectively in the years when they hired staff.

<sup>80</sup> One could respond to this that the amount of state funding that the Pensioners won in 1990 hindered them from hiring. However, the fact that the party did not hire staff following the 2004 elections, when the amount received was over 600,000 euros, shows that it was not the amount of money from the state that stopped the party from hiring staff.

*channels giving information on pension acts*’, while the annual account from 2004 states that *‘the information activities to citizens regarding the life and program of the party have happened [...] especially through television transmissions on private television’*. The party’s goal to both provide a service to pensioners and make itself known shed light on why the party does not support H1 over time, and the party will thus not be discussed further in the two other regulatory phases.

## Summary

The table below summarises the evidence for H1 from regulatory phase 1. Data from the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party supports H1, as the parties hired staff when increasing their income from the state. Contrary to H1, the Pensioner Party decided not to take on staff because it prioritised television broadcasts. As expected, the analysis shows that (permissive) reporting was dealt with by existing treasurers.

Table 6.2 Overview of support for H1 from regulatory phase 1: Italy

	<b><i>Support for H1</i></b>	<b><i>Description of evidence</i></b>
The Green Party	Yes	Increased income from state, and responded by hiring staff.
The Communist Refoundation Party	Yes	Same as the Greens.
The Pensioner Party	No	Accessed state funding, but prioritised to spend them on television broadcasts.

### 6.1.2 Staffing in regulatory phase 2: 1993-2011

Broadly, I expect staffing patterns in regulatory phase 2 in Italy to reflect the shifting access criteria for state funds, and the shifting generosity. The transition from the first to the second republic in Italy led to the abolition of annual state funding in 1993 (only electoral reimbursements left), representing the start of regulatory phase 2, lasting until 2011. This decreased generosity also coincided with more constraining access criteria (compared with regulatory phase 1) for

electoral reimbursements related to national and regional elections. That said, there was an increase in generosity in state funding allocations, first in 1997 when a new tax benefit was introduced, then from 1999 onwards when electoral reimbursements were paid out annually instead of in one lump sum (Pacini, 2009, p. 187), and finally from 2002 onwards, when funds were multiplied for each year of the legislature (Pizzimenti, 2017, p. 77). Simultaneously, the access criteria for electoral reimbursements related to Chamber of Deputies elections were made more permissive, first in 1999, then in 2002. The generosity decreased after 2008, which coincided with more constraining access criteria for state funds related to European and regional elections, introduced in 2009 and 2010 respectively. I thus expect that new minor parties early and late in the phase will downsize staff due to less generous state funding allocations, and hire between 1997 and 2008 due to more generous state funding allocations and more permissive access criteria to state funds. Even though the reporting requirements to maintain state funds became somewhat more comprehensive in 1997, they were still permissive, and did not require specialist skills, which means that I do not expect staffing due to reporting in this phase.

Table 6.3 Regulatory phase 2 (1993-2011). Overview of state benefits and constraints, and expectations for new minor party staffing: Italy

Type of regulation	Regulation in place	Expected consequence for staffing
<i>Access criteria</i>	Somewhat more constraining compared to phase 1, but still permissive. From 1999 and 2002 increasingly permissive for funds related to Chamber of Deputies. More constraining after 2009 and 2010 for funds related to EP and regional elections respectively. Increasing generosity from 1999 until 2008.	New minor parties will decrease staff figures early (1993-1996) in this phase, but hire in the period 1997-2008, due to increasingly permissive access criteria and increasing generosity.  Staff figures will go down following more constraining access criteria for state funding and less generous allocation from 2008 onwards.
<i>Reporting requirements (related to maintenance of state funds)</i>	Somewhat more constraining in 1997 when more comprehensive financial reports had to be compiled and disclosed.	None, as parties can still manage the reporting with a treasurer, as no professional knowledge (such as auditing) is required.

Tricolour Flame and the Segni Pact were formed early in this phase, and both managed to access state funds, while the Communist Party of Workers, established in 2006, did not. The Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the Pensioner Party continued to access funds. All the Greens' staffing processes in this phase support H1, which is why the Greens is analysed first. Then, I analyse the staffing patterns in the Segni Pact, Tricolour Flame, the Communist Refoundation Party, which offer partial support for H1. Finally, I analyse why the staffing process in the Communist Party of Workers diverge from H1.

### **When hiring and downsizing staff is linked to state funding (H1): The Greens**

Coming into regulatory phase 2, the Greens had eight staff members. Between 1995 and 1996, according to the treasurer at the time, the party suffered financially because of the removal of annual state funds in 1993: '*I found myself having serious troubles to balance the financial account*' (Lion, 17.11.2016). The consequence was to cut the number of staff in half (four remaining). Interestingly,

the Greens found themselves launching their first national membership campaign in the same period (1996), and also entered government for the first time (1996), which clearly did not affect the staff levels in 1996. That shows how being nearly completely state-dependent (the party received 92 and 80 percent in income from the state in 1995 and 1996 respectively), directly impacted staffing, supporting H1.


Conversely, the Greens scaled up its number of staff when the income from the state increased in the 2000s. Concretely, the Greens *doubled* its income from the state every year from 2003-2005, and tripled it from 2005 to 2006 (Financial accounts, 2003-2006), reflecting the generous turn in state funding regulations in 1999 and 2002. As a consequence, the party more than doubled its number of full-time (permanent and temporary) staff (from six to 13) between 2003 and 2006 and increasingly relied on external staff (Vannucci, 2007). The party also increased its income from membership fees in this period, even though the state-dependency was still between 76 and 94 percent from 2003 to 2006 (Financial accounts, 2003-2006). State funds were thus still the most crucial factor for understanding increased staffing in the Greens, even though an increased overall budget (due to membership fees) could have contributed.

After 2008 the party lost nearly all state funding (Financial accounts, 2008-2011), because it failed to win representation in parliament following the 2008 elections, lost governmental status,<sup>81</sup> and representation in the European parliament in 2009. The party continued to receive some state funds in 2009, but from 2010 onwards this income source shrunk drastically, as the figure below demonstrates.

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<sup>81</sup> The Greens was in government from 2006-2008.

Figure 6.2 Income from the state (euros) and staff figures (full time, permanent and temporary). The Greens, 2003-2011



**Sources:** Financial accounts and Vannucci (2007).

**Note:** Staff figures from 2007 and 2008 have been impossible to track down

The decreased (but not complete loss of) income from the state forced the party leadership to place all seven employees in redundancy schemes in 2010 (Financial account, 2010; Bonelli, 16.11.2016; Ripamonti, 18.03.2016; Party representative, 26.06.2018), and consequently (with time) all the staff were lost (Party representative, 26.06.2018).<sup>82</sup> Interestingly, the party did not hang on to any of its employees when the crisis struck in 2008/2009, illustrating the emergency the party entered into in financial terms, adding evidence to the proposition that a loss of state funding indeed constitutes an environmental shock for parties (see Panebianco, 1988). The financial emergency grew as the income from membership fees also dropped. In 2010 the party only had 1/10 of the income from membership fees as it had in 2007.<sup>83</sup> However, membership fees were never sufficient to cover the staffing expenses in the Green Party, so it is unlikely (also in light of what the interviewees say) that this drop sparked the shift

<sup>82</sup> Being in redundancy schemes meant that the party still had some staff after 2010, but they were less available for the party as they were required to participate in various courses. Eventually, the staff found themselves new jobs and were lost by the party (Party representative, 26.06.2018).

<sup>83</sup> In 2007 the party had nearly a million euros in income from membership fees. This sum was reduced to 150,000 euros in 2010 (Financial accounts, 2007-2010).



in staffing patterns. The fact that the party had administrative staff and a treasurer throughout the whole period demonstrates how the party had resources to manage the reporting.

**Analysing cases where staffing patterns partially support H1: Tricolour Flame, the Segni Pact, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the Communist Party of Workers**

The Segni Pact hired 10 staff members in 1994 (Annual account, 1994; Segni, 05.01.2018). The party received 90 percent of its income from the state in 1994, indicating the importance of state funding for staffing. Interviewees suggest that the party's staff had worked for party leader Mario Segni in the movement 'Popolari per la riforma', prior to establishing the Segni Pact (Soldani, 03.03.2018), which does not alter the fact that the state funds were crucial to pay for the staff's existence in the party after foundation, supporting H1. Interestingly, the Segni Pact took on temporary staff related to the 1994 election campaign, financed by contributions from electoral candidates and bank loans (Financial account, 1994), showing the relevance of electoral cycle for (temporary) staffing. The staff's tasks in the Segni Pact were mainly to keep in contact with the party's territorial branches, tend to members/supporters, and also deal with administrative matters (Soldani, 03.03.2018; Segni, 29.01.2018). The presence of administrative employees, in addition to a treasurer who was (by profession) a notary (Segni, 29.01.2018), meant that the party had sufficient resources to deal with the reporting requirements related to state funds in this phase.

The Segni Pact's income from the state shifted from 3 million euros in 1994 to 180,000 euros in 1998, and up to 1 million euros in 1999 (Financial accounts, 1994-1999), but regardless, the party kept the same number of employees (Segni, 05.01.2018; Soldani, 03.03.2018), contrary to H1. As the party's main source of income was state funding (Soldani, 03.03.2018), this is puzzling.

Interestingly, the party relied on support from the movements from which the Segni Pact originated (Segni, 29.01.2018), and the funds to pay the staff were most likely taken from these sources.<sup>84</sup> We already know that these movements paid for staff prior to the establishment of the Segni Pact, as these staff followed Segni into the party. It is also worth noting that an increase in income from membership fees between 1994 and 1998, and the income from some donations (Financial account, 1994-1998; Soldani, 03.03.2018), could have contributed to the party's ability to avoid downsizing when income from the state decreased.

From 1999 onwards the party reduced its number of staff (Segni, 05.01.2018), even though the party increased its income from the state in 1999. That said, the party had a considerable deficit in the financial account in 1999, despite state funding access that year, and also lost access to state funds the year after, in 2000. There is, however, little evidence for the relevance of the party's financial situation for this downsizing process, as party elites made the decision to close the party down. Concretely, following two failed referenda attempting to abolish the proportional component in the mixed electoral system in 1999 and 2000, party representatives decided that the party's mission to secure a majoritarian electoral system was best pursued outside the electoral, political arena (Segni, 05.01.2018, 29.01.2018; Masi, 13.03.2018). By 2001 the party had no staff left, and in 2002 it closed down. This sheds light on why this downsizing process did not operate according to H1.

As with the Segni Pact, Tricolour Flame offer partial support for H1. In 1997, i.e. one year after winning state funds for the first time, the party hired a secretary to perform administrative tasks (Annual account, 1997). Income from the state constituted 84 percent of the party's overall budget in 1997, outlining

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<sup>84</sup> Unfortunately, I have not had access to the financial accounts of the supporting movements.

how the party's increase of state funds in 1996 and onwards led to staffing, in line with H1. Interviewees also highlight the importance of state funds for staffing (Francescon, 25.11.2016; Condorelli Caff, 28.11.2016). Interestingly, when the party lost state funds between 2000 and 2003,<sup>85</sup> it did not downsize, contrary to H1. By exploiting the state funds won in 1999 (1.4 million euros), and membership fees, which amounted to 20,000 euros in 2004 (Financial account), the party avoided downsizing.<sup>86</sup> According to former party leader Luca Romagnoli (Interview, 16.11.2016), the party has always kept the maximum number of staff that it could with its level of income, indicating that the party avoided downsizing if it could. The party's overall budget thus enabled the party to keep its staff between 2000 and 2003. When Tricolour Flame increased its income from the state in 2004, it took on another person full-time (Annual accounts, 2004-2007), supporting H1. It thus had two staff members from 2004 onwards. 73 percent of the party's income came from the state in 2004, which facilitated staffing, supporting H1, despite a gradual decrease in membership fees and a split<sup>87</sup> in 2004 (Financial accounts, 1998-2000, and 2004). The annual account from 2004 states that '*Receiving state funding allows the party to plan with higher certainty for the future*' (Annual account, 2004), suggesting that state funds were important for the long-term commitments such as staffing.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> There are no financial accounts from these years, but the state's reports on the distribution of state funding do not have any information on Tricolour Flame, implying that the party had no income from the state in this period.

<sup>86</sup> Unfortunately, I do not have the financial accounts from 2001-2003, but the income from membership fees was relatively stable between 2000 (ca. 19,000 euros) and 2004 (ca. 18,000 euros), which means it is very likely that the party also had at least *some* income from members in 2001-2003.

<sup>87</sup> Former party founder Pino Rauti left the party in 2004 (La Repubblica, 09.05.2004).


<sup>88</sup> One could speculate whether the money the party managed to raise through its newspaper and through demonstrations (20 percent of the budget in 2004) could have contributed to the hiring process. However, given that this was an income the party had never managed to raise before, and the fact that taking on a full-time employee is an over-time commitment, this is unlikely.

Lending some support to H1, Tricolour Flame let one staff member go in 2007 (Annual account, 2007), due to an anticipated financial deficit. So, the party did not experience decreased income from the state in 2007. In fact, the party's income from state funds had been stable since 2004, due to electoral reimbursements being paid out annually. However, the treasurer and party leader stated that the 2008 elections would incur electoral expenses, and argued that it would be hard to balance the accounts in 2008 (Annual account, 2007), shedding light on why the party meant that it was necessary to let one employee go in 2007. One party representative also states that: *'It [the contract] was not renewed because of financial constraints [...]'* (Party representative, 31.01.2018). We thus see how an anticipation of a deficit led the party to take precautions and let one staff member go in 2007. Interestingly, that happened *prior* to an electoral campaign, showing how restricted funds trumped considerations concerning the electoral campaign.

The permanent staff in Tricolour Flame dealt with administrative and technical matters, such as answering the telephone, sending letters, dealing with the membership and membership register, and material related to campaigns (Bevilacqua, 14.11.2016; Condorelli Caff, 28.11.2016; Party representative, 31.01.2018). Interestingly, the party drew on external consultants to comply with the regulatory requirements related to the receipt of state funding when Luca Romagnoli was leader as *'We were never able to find someone to do things like this for us on a voluntary basis, we always had to pay someone'* (Romagnoli, 16.11.2016).

The final party whose staffing pattern (at times) support H1 in regulatory phase 2, is the Communist Refoundation Party. The party's income from the state throughout the phase is outlined below:

Figure 6.3 Income from the state (euros) and number of staff. The Communist Refoundation Party. Regulatory phase 2



**Source finances:** Financial accounts.

**Source staff figures:** 1993-2002: Bertolino (2004). 2003-2007: Financial accounts. 2008-2011: Rifondazione Comunista (undated).

In the early 1990s the party increased its number of staff from 25 in 1992 to 35 in 1994 (Bertolino, 2004; Calossi, 2007), which corresponded with a doubling of the party's income from the state between 1992 and 1994, from 3.5 million euros to nearly 7 million euros (Financial accounts, 1992, 1994), supporting H1. Interestingly, in the period after, between 1994 and 1996, the party operated contrary to H1. Then the level of staff increased (Bertolino, 2004; see also financial accounts), even though there was a decrease in income from the state due to the removal of annual grants in the state funding scheme. The income from the state was also affected by a loss of party tax in 1995 due to a split, where 14 MPs out of 36 and 3 senators out of 18 left (Bertolino, 2004, p. 102; Ignazi, 2008, p. 130). The increased staffing was facilitated by a generally large budget (amounting to over 5 million euros), and a decision to reduce the transfers to subnational branches, which gave the national branch more financial leeway (Bertolino, 2004, pp. 278-279).

Similarly, in 1997 the party experienced an increase in income from the state due to the introduction of the tax benefit Four for the Thousand, but did not scale up its number of staff. Rather, the party prioritised spending income from

Four for the Thousand on supporting the party newspaper, *Liberazione* (Annual account, 1997). In addition to supporting the party newspaper, the treasurer wrote in the annual account that the money went to investments and purchase of party offices (Annual account, 1997). The necessity to keep the most important information organ in the party running, and to invest in property, thus trumped increases in staff, not supporting H1. Between 1998 and 1999, the party decreased its income from the state, but still *increased* its number of full-time staff with nearly 10 people from 1998 to 1999, also operating contrary to H1. Bertolino (2004, p. 279) argues that the increase in staff was due to a strategic choice by the party '*following the loss of human resources related to the parliamentary party group, and more in general as a reaction to a situation outside the party that suddenly had become more hostile*' (Bertolino, 2004, p. 279). The quote first refers to a dramatic split in 1998, when founder and party president Armando Cossutta split, and took with him 21 out of 34 parliamentarians and 8 out of 11 senators (Bertolino, 2004, p. 125; Financial account, 1998). The incident that caused the split also made the Prodi-government, which the Communist Refoundation Party had supported, fall.<sup>89</sup> Secondly, the quote refers to the party's disappointing performance in the European elections in 1999 and the national elections in 2001 (Bertolino, 2004; Ignazi, 2008).

The party's flexible (and large) budget, amounting to 6.6 million euros in 1998, enabled the party, despite the decreased income from state and membership fees (Financial account, 1998), to scale up the number of staff further in 1999. This indicates that if a budget is of a certain size, minor shifts in

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<sup>89</sup> The split was the result of a long-lasting tension between Cossutta (the president of the party) and Fausto Bertinotti (the party secretary). The split was initiated by a disagreement over Government Prodi's budget of 1998, where Bertinotti wanted to vote against, and consequently make the government fall, while Cossutta wanted to support it (Corriere della sera, undated; La Repubblica, 07.10.1998; Bertolino, 2004, pp. 122-123).

levels of income from the state will not affect processes of downsizing in the same way as hypothesised. The flexible budget also sheds light on why the party scaled up its number of staff from 2001 to 2002 (47 to 62) (Bertolino, 2004) when there was no substantial change in the income from the state (nor the overall income for that matter). According to a party representative (Celli, 30.11.2017) the party supported the big anti-liberal and anti-global demonstrations in Italy at the time, particularly related to the G8 summit in Genova, which increased the need for staff.

Between 2002 and 2007, however, the party's staffing supports H1. The party massively increased its overall budget (just like the Greens), and (given its state-dependency) also its income from the state in this period (Financial accounts, 2003-2007). A simultaneous increase in staff from 2002 and onwards followed, and by 2007, the party had 98 staff members (up from 49 in 2004) (Financial accounts, 2004, 2007). Despite the support for H1, this increased staffing was curious, as in the 2002 congress the party had decided to prioritise expenses on the external work of the party (Statutes, 2002; see also Calossi, 2007). External pressures related to the party's record high representation in parliament and government participation (2006-2008) (Albertazzi et al., 2011) sheds light on why the party still prioritised increased staffing (in line with H1), despite the congress decision.<sup>90</sup> The party's representation in parliament and in government - and preparation for the elections in 2008 - also helps to understand why the party took on more staff in 2008, despite the fact that the income from the state had started to decline.

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<sup>90</sup> A split in 2006 also seems unrelated to staffing, as it did not affect the membership figures (in fact, the income from members increased from 2006 to 2007 (Financial accounts, 2006, 2007)). The split was led by Marco Ferrando, long standing leader of the far-left (Trotskyist) current of the party, who took with him some party members. This split became the Communist Party of Workers (also under scrutiny in this study).

As with the Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party experienced a drastic decrease in income from state funding following its loss of representation in the Italian parliament in 2008 and the European parliament in 2009 (Financial accounts, 2008-2010). This loss of representation in the European parliament (and in turn of state funds related to this level) reflected the newly established 4 percent threshold for representation there. According to the treasurer in 2008, this loss of representation and state funds would have '*dramatic consequences for the staff*' (Annual accounts, 2008, 2009). In 2009 and 2010 the party started to downsize and in 2010 all but two of the staff were (or were on their way) into redundancy schemes (Rifondazione Comunista, undated), supporting H1 (see also Annual account, 2010). A split in 2009 also contributed to the financial emergency, by draining the party of between 8000 and 10,000 members (Rifondazione Comunista, undated).<sup>91</sup> The income from membership fees dropped by 100,000 euros from 2008 to 2009 (Financial accounts, 2008, 2009). Still, it was the decrease in state funds that most strongly contributed to the downsizing, given the party's high state-dependency (91 percent in 2008).

The final party, the Communist Party of Workers, has a staffing pattern which counters the rationale in H1. The party hired its party leader in a part-time position in 2006 (Party representative, 21.11.2016; Terra, 31.01.2016), despite not accessing state funds. As chapter 5 outlined, the party relies solely on income from members (Terra, 31.01.2016; Party representative, 11.11.2016). There are two reasons that shed light on this staffing process. First of all, party leader (Marco Ferrando) left his job upon establishing the new party (Party representative, 11.11.2016), which created a need to finance his commitment.

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<sup>91</sup> Nichi Vendola, who ran in (but lost) the leadership contest in the party in 2008, led the split. The split also meant that the Communist Refoundation Party had a direct competitor in the EP elections in 2009 (Albertazzi et al., 2011, p. 483).



Secondly, the party is a communist one, which split from a party with a large number of staff (Communist Refoundation Party), and which aims to resemble the mass party model, in which having a centralised party bureaucracy is a central feature (Duverger, 1959). A perceived need to pay the party leader, a readily available membership base, and a communist heritage can therefore help in understanding why the party prioritised the hiring of its leader on a part-time basis, despite no state funding access.

## **Summary**

The evidence from regulatory phase 2 shows that state funding contributes to understanding all staffing processes in the Greens throughout this phase, both processes of hiring and downsizing. *Some*, but not all, staffing processes in Tricolour Flame, the Segni Pact, and the Communist Refoundation Party also support the rationale in H1. Interestingly, shifts in the regulatory framework, for instance the constraining turn at the start of this phase (abolition of annual state funds), and the increasing generosity in the early 2000s, directly affected staffing patterns, e.g. in the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party. As expected, staff were not taken on to deal with reporting requirements, apart from in the Tricolour Flame, which relied on external help to cope with reporting, as it did not succeed in finding anyone internal to the party to manage the reporting requirements.

The analysis identified that a large budget in the Communist Refoundation Party, the Segni Pact's support from the movement from which it originated and the party's eventual demise, and Tricolour Flame's exploitation of membership fees and previous income from the state, were factors in understanding patterns of staffing that diverge from H1. The staffing in the Communist Party of Workers,

the only party that did not access state funds, was found to be related to the party's communist heritage, and its dedication towards a party leader that left his job to work for the party.

Table 6.4 Overview of results on staffing from regulatory phase 2: Italy

	<b><i>Support for H1</i></b>	<b><i>Description of evidence for and contrary to H1</i></b>
The Green Party	Yes	Increased its income from the state, and responded by hiring staff (2006-2008). Decreased income from the state led to downsizing (1995-1996, and from 2008 onwards).
The Communist Refoundation Party	Yes *	Increased its income from the state, and responded by hiring staff (1992-1994, and 2002-2007). Decreased income from the state led to downsizing (from 2008 onwards).  Staffing patterns in 1994-1996, 1997, 1997-1999, and 2001-2002 do not support H1 (see details in analysis).
Tricolour Flame	Yes*	Increased income from the state, and responded by hiring staff (1997 and 2004).  Staffing pattern in 2000-2003 (did not downsize despite a loss of state funding) does not support H1.
The Segni Pact	Yes*	Increased income from the state, and responded by hiring staff (1994).  Staffing pattern in 1995-1998 (decreased income from the state, but no change in staff) and 1999 (increased income from the state, but scaled down number of staff) do not support H1.
The Communist Party of Workers	No	Hired staff despite no state funding access.

**Notes:** A star indicates that a party had staffing patterns (once or more throughout regulatory phase 2) where there is evidence contrary to the rationale in H1.

### 6.1.3 Staffing in regulatory phase 3: 2012-2016

The last regulatory phase in Italy starts in 2012 with the introduction of a party law, introducing common access criteria for electoral reimbursements for all levels (have one candidate elected) and more constraining reporting requirements. The generosity decreased in this phase, continuing the development started in 2008. From 2013 all direct state funding was abolished, and only the tax benefit Two for the Thousand was left. The access criteria for the latter were the most constraining to ever have been in place in Italy. I thus expect that the parties in this phase cut down staff due to more constraining

access criteria and decreasing generosity. Interestingly, registration in a new party register (2013) required external auditing, and registration was in turn a precondition to access Two for the Thousand. Thus, I expect parties to prioritise spending state funds (if access) or *other* funds (if no access) on external consultants to deal with this requirement in order to be eligible for state funds.

Table 6.5 Regulatory phase 3 (2012-2016). Overview of state benefits and constraints, and expectations for new minor party staffing: Italy


Type of regulation	Regulation in place	Expected consequence for staffing
<i>Access criteria</i>	One candidate elected (all levels). Decreasing generosity from 2012. In 2013, criteria to access state funds (Two for the Thousand) was registration and having institutional representation.	New minor parties will downsize.
<i>Reporting requirements (related to maintenance of state funds)</i>	Increasingly constraining: Auditing (from 2012) required. From 2013, auditing is tied to registration (i.e. to the access criteria for state funds).	Expect that new minor parties will draw on external professionals for auditing (in order to be eligible for funds).

The staffing patterns in the Tricolour Flame in this phase support H1, and are thus analysed first. Then I analyse why the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party, contrary to H1, abstained from staffing, despite an increase in income from state funds in this phase, and why Act to Stop the Decline took on temporary staff in 2013, despite lacking state funds.

In line with H1, Tricolour Flame let go of its final employee in 2013, when the party no longer had any income directly from the state – even though the income from the state had been very modest since 2010 (Bevilacqua, 14.11.2016).<sup>92</sup> The figure below shows the party's decreasing income from the state prior to 2013.

<sup>92</sup> I have not been able to establish exactly which year Tricolour Flame let go of its final employee, but as interviewees specifically say that it happened when the party lost access to state funds, it is likely to have taken place around 2012/2013.

Figure 6.4 Income from the state (euros). Tricolour Flame, 2007-2012



**Sources:** Financial accounts.

**Notes:** The figure from 2010 was the *total* sum received by the electoral coalition with which Tricolour Flame fielded candidates in 2008, hence just a small part of this sum actually went to Tricolour Flame.

The party also lost other sources of income, besides state funds, which contributed to a financial emergency. While the party had previously had some income from donations (see Financial accounts, 2005, 2007, and 2008; Bevilacqua, 14.11.2016), these decreased in this phase because *‘donors usually want something in return for their donations, and we are not currently in a position to offer that’* (Bevilacqua, 14.11.2016). There is also indication that the income from membership fees decreased in 2013 as former party leader Luca Romagnoli split from the party, taking with him a large part of the members in some regions, such as Lazio where *‘more than 95 percent of the members followed Luca Romagnoli’* (Party representative, 31.01.2018). So, even though the main reason (according to interviewees) for downsizing was loss of state funds, the decrease in other income sources also contributed.

Unlike with Tricolour Flame, the staffing patterns in the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party do not coincide with H1. When entering into this phase, both parties barely had any income from the state. Still, they took on external auditors when one criterion for access to state funding from 2013 was registration, which in turn required external auditing. Despite financial hardship, both parties thus prioritised complying with the eligibility criteria for state funds:

Imagine that we, without any form of state funding, have the obligation to certify our financial accounts with auditors that cost 8000 euros a year (...), this is a lot and a problem for us (...) (Bonelli, 16.11.2016, The Greens).

The external auditing of our accounts is a costly business, but we do it of course, no problem (Gelmini, 23.11.2016, Communist Refoundation Party).

There is thus indication that reporting specifically sparked staffing in both parties in 2013. Subsequently, both parties also accessed Two for the Thousand – the Communist Refoundation Party in 2015, and the Greens in 2016 – which made it easier for the parties to pay for auditing.<sup>93</sup> The Communist Refoundation Party increased its income from the state from ca. 115,000 euros in 2014 to ca. 450,000 euros in 2015, while the figures in the Greens went from 30,000 euros to 140,000 euros in 2015 and 2016 respectively. Still, neither party took on staff as a result, contrary to H1, due to both parties' financial emergency. The Communist Refoundation Party still presented a deficit in the financial account in 2015, while the Greens just managed to present a small surplus in 2016. The fact that both parties still had all their employees in redundancy schemes<sup>94</sup> shows that the parties were in no position to hire. Moreover, both parties experienced decreasing income from membership fees, a development that had already started in regulatory phase 2, and which also contributed to the financial problems.

Act to Stop the Decline was formed in 2012, and did not access state funding in its (short) life cycle, but still took on external consultants (marketing and advertising experts) to help with the party's PR in the 2013 electoral campaign (Boldrin, 27.11.2016; Brusco, 28.11. 2016). The hiring was facilitated by the party's income from small donations, amounting to nearly 1.5 million euros

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<sup>93</sup> The parties' use of external auditors *after* accessing Two for the Thousand is not support for H1, as prior to this access both parties drew on external auditors to be *eligible* for state funds.

<sup>94</sup> The only exception was the Communist Refoundation Party leader, who worked on a part-time contract (see Gelmini, 23.11.2016).

(Boldrin, 27.11.2016; Brusco, 28.11.2016). The party also organised mass rallies, where entry was subject to a fee (Buzzi, 2013; Boldrin, 27.11.2016). Moreover, the party representatives themselves spent considerable amounts of money on the party.<sup>95</sup> The type of tasks performed by the staff, and the timing of staffing suggests that electoral cycle is the most important factor for understanding the party's temporary staffing. Also the membership size contributed to shedding light on staffing, given membership fees' importance for the budget.<sup>96</sup>

## Summary

The analysis of staffing in this phase showed that the loss of state funding, in line with H1, contributed to the loss of staff in Tricolour Flame. Neither the Greens nor the Communist Refoundation took on staff following their increased income from the state in this phase, due to the parties' financial emergency, but did use external consultants (auditors) in order to be eligible for state funding. This shows how reporting requirements, independently of income from the state, impacted staffing patterns, which is understandable as the reporting was tied to being *eligible* for funds (and not only for maintaining them), and required professional knowledge. The analysis finally demonstrated how Act to Stop the Decline relied on self-generated income to hire external consultants in the 2013 electoral campaign.

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<sup>95</sup> Michele Boldrin states that he spent around 100-120,000 euros on Act to Stop the Decline (Boldrin, 27.11.2016).

<sup>96</sup> In the run-up to the party's first congress in May 2013, the number of members was reported to be 10,000 (Canetta, 2013).

Table 6.6 Overview of results on staffing from regulatory phase 3: Italy

	<b><i>Support for H1</i></b>	<b><i>Description of evidence for H1</i></b>
The Green Party	No	Increased its income from the state, but the financial emergency restricted staffing.
The Communist Refoundation Party	No	Same as the Greens.
Tricolour Flame	Yes	Lost state funding, and downsized as a result.
Act to Stop the Decline	No	Did not have state funding, but relied on self-generated income to facilitate temporary staffing in electoral campaign.

#### *6.1.4 Staffing in Italy across three regulatory phases: A summary*

The analysis of staffing in Italian new minor parties has provided support for H1 across all three regulatory phases. The Greens and Tricolour Flame consistently increased their number of staff when income from the state increased, and partial support for this argument was also found in the Segni Pact, and the Communist Refoundation Party. Similarly, the Greens let staff go in periods of decreased income from the state, supporting H1. Decreased income from the state also (sometimes) led to downsizing in the Communist Refoundation Party and Tricolour Flame. Only the Pensioner Party refrained from hiring staff following an increase of state funds, and its focus on providing council to pensioners on private television sheds light on this decision.

Tricolour Flame, the Segni Pact, and the Communist Refoundation Party operate contrary to the theorised rationale in H1 at different points throughout their life cycles. The Segni Pact kept a stable staff size despite decreasing income from the state in the mid 1990s, as it could draw on financial support from external movements. The party's downsizing in 1999 (and afterwards) coincided with a loss of state funds and a restricted financial situation, but was mainly due to the party's decision to close down. The Communist Refoundation Party's (overall) large budget meant that the party had the flexibility to increase its number of staff in times of decreasing income from the state, and vice versa. Finally, Tricolour

Flame hung on to staff despite decreasing income from the state by drawing on membership fees and previous state funding allocations. Finally, the two parties that did not access state funds, i.e. the Communist Party of Workers and Act to Stop the Decline still managed to take on (temporary) staff, contrary to H1, with the help of self-generated income.

The analysis in three regulatory phases has shown how the staffing patterns in state-dependent parties, like (most) of the new minor parties studied here, are vulnerable to changes in state benefits and constraints. When the system became less generous in the first years of regulatory phase 2 staffing in the Greens was directly affected. Similarly, the increasing generosity in the system, starting with annual electoral reimbursements in 1999 and continuing with a multiplication of the amounts available in 2002, facilitated increased staffing in the Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party, and eventually Tricolour Flame. Increasingly constraining access criteria for funds and decreasing generosity from 2008 and onwards similarly led to downsizing in the Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party, and Tricolour Flame. Finally, constraining reporting requirements introduced in regulatory phase 3 prompted the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party to take on temporary external consultants, despite low income from the state.

## 6.2 State funding and staffing: An analysis of Norwegian new minor parties

### *6.2.1 Regulatory phase 1: 1970-2005*

The access criteria for national state funding were constraining for new minor parties in regulatory phase 1 in Norway, while the criteria were permissive on the subnational level. Subnational state funds were paid out to the subnational level, and if a national branch was to benefit from them directly, they would have to be



transferred (which happened in some parties). I thus expect only limited (no full-time) staffing in the Norwegian new minor parties in this phase. That is also because even though increasing sums of money were made available in state funds throughout this phase, the largest bulk went to the national state funds (with constraining access criteria). State funds only existed in the form of annual grants in Norway in this phase (i.e. no electoral reimbursements). Only in 1998 were reporting requirements introduced in Norway, and I expect new minor parties to take on external consultants, as auditing (i.e. specialist skills) was required.

Table 6.7 Regulatory phase 1 (1970-2005). Overview of state benefits and constraints, and expectations for new minor party staffing: Norway


Type of regulation	Regulation in place	Expected consequence for staffing
<i>Access criteria</i>	<i>National level:</i> Win more than 2.5 percent of the votes and present lists in at least half the electoral districts. <i>Subnational level:</i> Vote support (no threshold). Increasingly generous allocations throughout phase.	Hiring of staff in new minor parties will be minimal due to high access criteria for national state funds, and income from subnational branches requires internal transfers.
<i>Reporting requirements (related to maintenance of state funds)</i>	1970-1998: No requirements. 1998-2005: For registered parties that had run lists at the previous parliamentary elections: Obligation to report income accounts every year (only national level). Audit required.	No expectation that this will lead to permanent staffing, but expect that parties will rely on external professionals for auditing purposes.

The Greens and the Pensioner Party accessed subnational state funding in this phase, transferred a share of it to the national branch, and subsequently took on staff, supporting H1. The Coastal Party, Future for Finnmark, and Cross Partisan MPs also support H1, in that they had no state funds and also no staff. These parties are thus analysed first. The Fatherland's Party did not take on staff despite state funding access, for which a separate analysis is conducted last.

The Greens took on one person in a temporary position in 1994 (Miljøpartiet de grønne, 1994a, 1994b), i.e. the year after the national branch first

received transfers of subnational state funding.<sup>97</sup> The Greens got nearly 50 percent of its income from the state in 1994, the rest stemmed mainly from membership fees (Miljøpartiet de grønne, 1994a). As staffing expenses amounted to half of the party's budget in 1994 (14,300 NOK), state funds were important for staffing, supporting H1, but so were membership fees.

Figure 6.5 Income from state funding (NOK), overall income and staff expenses. The Green Party, 1994-1997



**Sources:** Financial accounts. The 1994 figures are based on the party's budget, and not financial account.

**Notes:** To transfer the sums into euros, the reader can simply remove the last digit, so 50,000 NOK is ca. 5000 EUR.

The Greens increased its income from both state (1995 and 1996) and members (1994-1997), as the figure outlines. In parallel, the party had increased staff expenses in 1995 and 1996 (Financial accounts, 1995, 1996), further supporting H1. The party simply let the hired party secretary work in a 40 percent paid position (not 20 percent as usual) in the months preceding the regional and local elections in 1995 (Annual account, 1995). Election campaigning thus contributes to understanding the *timing* for scaling up the party's staff resources. The employee in the Greens was hired mainly to deal with administrative and organisational tasks, such as branches; *'The new secretariat [with one hired*

<sup>97</sup> The previous chapter showed that the Greens accessed subnational state funding following its first participation in (subnational) elections in 1991. The party introduced a rule in 1993 obliging the subnational branches to transfer 10 percent of their income from the state to the national branch (Statutes, 1993).

*employee] will keep better in touch with the subnational branches, and keep on top of what goes on in the local councils'* (Miljøpartiet de grønne 1994c). The employee also saw to recruitment and maintenance of members, and answered the phone, in addition to dealing with finances (Annual account, 1995, 1996; Miljøpartiet de grønne, 1998a). The reporting requirements introduced in 1998 were also dealt with by the hired employee (Simonsen, 23.10.2017).<sup>98</sup>

As outlined in the previous chapter on party income structures, I lack financial information on the Greens between 1998 and 2005. However, electoral statistics show that the party continued to draw on subnational state funds. As the subnational branches throughout this regulatory phase were obliged to transfer a share of their state funds to the national level, the national level also continued to draw on state funds. Also, the (few) organisational documents from the period indicate that the party continued to draw on (part-time) administrative staff, as it did between 1994 and 1996 (Miljøpartiet de grønne, 1998a, 2001, 2003, 2004), suggesting support for H1.

Also supporting H1, the Pensioner Party hired then party leader Jørgen Øydvin in a 40 percent position in late 1995 (Annual account, 1995-1996; Hansen and Støtvig, 1998), four years after the national party first accessed subnational state funds (1991).<sup>99</sup> Financial difficulty, stemming from a decision in 1991 to solve a severe internal conflict<sup>100</sup> (Pensjonistpartiet, undated) by covering two competing factions' expenses, combined with an already restricted financial

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<sup>98</sup> Unfortunately, I do not have financial accounts between 1998 and 2005, and I can thus not verify if the party spent funds on having the financial account audited, as the law required.

<sup>99</sup> The Pensioner Party introduced a rule obliging the subnational branches to transfer 10 percent of their state funds to the national branch in 1991 (Pensjonistpartiet, 1991a), and 20 percent from 1992 onwards (Pensjonistpartiet 1992b, 1993a).

<sup>100</sup> A faction from Oslo split from the party in 1986 because its right to vote was put into doubt by the majority (due to a lack of foundation documents from branches that the Oslo faction claimed to represent). After this, the Oslo faction and the rest of the party disagreed on who had the right to represent the party (Pensjonistpatiet, undated). Later, some subnational branches aligned with the Oslo faction and others with the 'original' faction (see e.g. Pensjonistpartiet, 1991c) creating a completely split party.

situation (Annual account, 1991), had hindered the party from taking on staff before then. In 1995, the party increased its income from the state (Annual account, 1995-1996; Financial account, 1995, 1996), which facilitated staffing, supporting H1. The party was 74 and 92 percent state-dependent in 1995 and 1996 respectively (Financial accounts, 1995, 1996), showing that state funds were crucial for hiring.

Figure 6.6 Income from state funding, income from members, and overall income (NOK). The Pensioner Party, 1995-1998



**Sources:** Financial accounts.

**Notes:** To transfer the sums into euros, the reader can simply remove the last digit, so 50,000 NOK is ca. 5000 EUR.

The (paid) party leader in the Pensioner Party was responsible for some administrative tasks, given that he was responsible for the secretariat in Bergen. It is likely that the hired party leader dealt with the reporting requirements introduced in 1998.<sup>101</sup> However, as party leader, he also (naturally) performed political tasks. The party had expenses related to auditing, e.g. from 1999 to 2001 (Financial accounts, 1999, 2000, 2001), which shows that reporting requirements from 1998 onwards required the party to draw on external professionals.

The Pensioner Party decreased its income from the state in 1998 (see figure above), and in 1999 the party leader was let go (Financial account, 1999), which indicates support for H1. Still, a more precise reason for the downsizing is

<sup>101</sup> No interviewees in the Pensioner Party were able to confirm this.

that the financial accounts of the party were blocked in 1999, as the (outgoing, paid) leader and the treasurer equally accused each other of financial mismanagement (Hansen and Støtvig, 1998). The criticism towards the leader was, interestingly, related to his allegedly generous salary from the party (ibid);

Jørgen Øydvin [the party leader] has earned good money from being the leader of the Pensioner Party. (...) During his term as party leader, he has earned around 100,000 NOK more than he would have in a full position as teacher in an agricultural high school<sup>102</sup> (Hansen and Støtvig, 1998).

The blocked financial accounts represented the culmination of yet another conflictual period in the party's history (see e.g. NTB, 16.09.1998). In addition to blocked financial accounts and a decrease in state funding, a new leader was elected in 1999 (Bekken, 1999), indicating that the paid leader also disappeared from the party. In other words, there is some support for H1 in this downsizing process, but the main reason for the party's loss of staff in 1999 was leadership change and financial mismanagement.

In line with H1, the Coastal Party did not take on any staff as it had no financial means to do so in regulatory phase 1 (see e.g. Kystpartiet, 2004). Unlike the Greens and the Pensioner Party, subnational state funds were not transferred to the national level (Falch Pedersen, 18.12.2017; Stabrun Johansen, 26.01.2018). The party, as a registered party running in elections, had to comply with the income reporting introduced in 1998. Interviewees state that prior to 2005 the responsibility for financial management lay with the party leader in parliament (see e.g. Party representative, 21.02.2018), and the leader and his staff in parliament thus also saw to the reporting (see also Kystpartiet, 2001). Similarly, Cross Partisan MPs operated with minimal financial resources, and relied upon personal funds for its operation (Party representative, 21.02.2018; Party

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<sup>102</sup> This was the party leader's profession.

representative, 15.02.2018; Øverland, 16.05.2018; Tverrpolitisk folkevalgte, 1997a, 1997e). The lack of state funds meant that it had no financial means to employ staff, in line with H1.<sup>103</sup> Its staffing pattern is not discussed in relation to regulatory phase 2, as the party's financial situation remained unchanged (ibid). Future for Finnmark elected one MP in 1989, but did not exceed the (constraining) reporting requirements for national state funds.<sup>104</sup> There was a membership from 1989, but it was not maintained from 1990 onwards (Leirvik, 26.01.2018), showing how there was no financial possibility to employ staff in the party, supporting H1.

Contrary to H1, the Fatherland's Party did not hire staff following state funding access in 1991, even though nearly all of the state funds were transferred to the national level (Fedrelandspartiet, 2002a; Statutes, 1990; Fedrelandspartiet, 1992). Party documents show that the income from state funding in 1991 was spent almost entirely on party work on the national level, mainly relating to the parliamentary elections in 1993 (Fedrelandspartiet, 1992, 1993). In addition, some party documents demonstrate that the state funding won in 1991 was spent to cover debts incurred during party work, for example by party leader Harald Trefall (Fedrelandspartiet, 2002a). The party's priorities and a restricted overall budget significantly impeded the party from hiring staff, despite state funding access. The party became subject to income reporting in 1998. As the party had a treasurer in regulatory phase 1 (see e.g. Fedrelandspartiet, 1993, 2002), there is indication that this was the person who dealt with the income reporting in the Fatherland's Party.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> I have not been able to confirm if the party complied with the reporting requirements introduced in 1998.

<sup>104</sup> The party never fielded candidates in regional/local elections.

<sup>105</sup> Unfortunately, the data does not provide conclusive answers to this.

## Summary

Data from the Greens and the Pensioner Party supports H1, as both parties took on staff following an increase of state funding (transferred from subnational branches). Moreover, when the Green Party experienced a further increase of state funding, it scaled up staffing, also supporting H1. Similarly, the Pensioner Party let staff go when the income from the state decreased, supporting H1, even though the most important reasons for this decision were internal conflict and leadership change. Future for Finnmark, Cross Partisan MPs, and the Coastal Party did not have state funds in their national accounts and, in line with H1, did not take on staff either. The reporting requirements introduced in 1998 were dealt with by existing staff in the Greens and the Pensioner Party. The latter party also incurred expenses related to the external auditing required in order to comply with the new law. Contrary to H1, the Fatherland's Party did not take on staff following state funding access due to a restricted budget and its decision to spend the funds on covering debts and financing an electoral campaign.

Table 6.8 Overview of results on staffing from regulatory phase 1: Norway

	<b><i>Support for H1</i></b>	<b><i>Description of evidence for H1</i></b>
The Green Party	Yes	Increased income from state funds and hired staff as a result. When it further increased its income from the state, it increased the employee's workload (i.e. increasing staff expenses).
The Pensioner Party	Yes	Increased income from state funds and hired staff as a result. When it experienced decreasing income from the state, it downsized (but other factors also relevant for that).
Cross Partisan MPs	Yes	Did not access state funding, and did not have the finances to hire staff.
The Coastal Party	Yes	Did not access state funding, and did not have the finances to hire staff.
Future for Finnmark	Yes	Did not access state funding, and did not have the finances to hire staff.
The Fatherland's Party	No	Accessed state funding, but did not take on staff. Restricted budget and party priorities made staffing difficult.

## 6.2.2 Regulatory phase 2: 2006-2016

Regulatory phase 2 is characterised by a shift towards highly permissive access criteria for state funding on the national level. After 2006 annual state funds (on all levels) were divided into two parts: a vote support granted proportionally to all parties winning one or more votes; and a basic support granted to all parties winning more than 2.5 percent of the vote on the national level (4 percent/one candidate elected on the subnational level). As in regulatory phase 1, the allocation of state funds grew throughout this period. Both the permissive access criteria and the increased generosity lead me to expect staffing in the Norwegian new minor parties in this phase. Regulatory phase 2 also saw the introduction of more constraining reporting – first in 2006, then later in 2013/2014. This change to reporting was most prominent in 2013/2014, when parties were obliged to report *both* income and expenses (previously it had only been income), and became subject to more comprehensive enforcement mechanisms.

Table 6.9 Regulatory phase 2 (2006-2016). Overview of state benefits and constraints, and expectations for new minor party staffing: Norway


Type of regulation	Regulation in place (1970-2005)	Expected consequence for staffing
<i>Access criteria</i>	<i>National level:</i> <u>Vote support:</u> no threshold. <u>Basic support:</u> 2.5 percent of the vote. Vote support constitutes 9/10 of the total support. <i>Subnational level:</i> <u>Vote support:</u> no threshold. <u>Basic support:</u> 4 percent of the vote or one candidate elected.	New minor parties will take on staff.
<i>Reporting requirements (related to maintenance of state funds)</i>	2006: More comprehensive income reporting introduced. Sanctions for non-compliance introduced. 2013: More constraining reporting: Reporting of expenses was introduced, and independence of auditors was specified.	New minor parties will either hire people to deal with reporting or have expenses related to reporting services. This is especially so after 2013/2014, less so before.  Audit introduced in 1998 still required, and expenses related to this expected.



Staffing patterns in the Greens, the Coastal Party, and the Christian Conservative Party coincide with shifts in income from state funds, supporting H1, and are thus analysed first. The Pensioner Party only partially operates according to H1 in this phase, and is thus discussed second. Future for Finnmark and the Fatherland's Party<sup>106</sup> did not exist in this phase, and so are not mentioned here.

The Greens increased its income from the state from 2006 onwards, which in turn affected staffing, supporting H1. The party's income development in regulatory phase 2 is portrayed below:

Figure 6.7 Income from state funding, members, and overall income (NOK). The Greens, 1994-2016



**Sources:** Financial accounts.

**Notes:** To transfer the sums into euros, the reader can simply remove the last digit, so 50,000 NOK is ca. 5000 EUR.

In parallel with the increased income from the state, the party consistently increased either the number of staff or the quantity of work allocated to staff from 2008 to 2015. More specifically, the party went from having two part-time members of staff in 2008 (Annual account, 2008), to three (at the most) working longer hours in 2009. In 2010, 2011, and 2012 the party decided to have two full-time positions (Annual account, 2010, 2011, 2012), and in 2013 the party had a

<sup>106</sup> The Fatherland's Party formally existed until 2008, but in practice its operation stopped late in regulatory phase 1.

party secretary in a full-time position, and a person responsible for finances (20 percent position). Moreover, two employees (paid by NAV)<sup>107</sup> worked for the party, one of them with members. During 2013, a head of communications, a financial officer (100 percent positions) and three project workers were employed (Annual account, 2013).<sup>108</sup> Another person was employed to deal with digital communication in 2014 (Annual account, 2014). According to party interviewees, increased state funding contributed to the staffing development, supporting H1. Party secretary Lars Gaupset (Interview, 15.05.2017), for example, reports that state funding '*has given us the possibility to have a larger secretariat (...)*'. Annual accounts (2014) also show that state funding contributed to running the party, and paying for staff. The state-dependency of the party in these years ranges mostly between 60 and 80 percent, which furthermore demonstrates the importance of state funding for staffing. That said, the party's membership growth (see figure above) also increased the overall budget of the party, aiding staffing. One could speculate about whether the party's ability to attract a considerable share of income from donations, particularly in parliamentary election years (2009, 2013), contributed to staffing. However, given that donations were dependent on election year, it is more likely that the state funds and the membership fees combined are the most important factors for understanding the increase in staff figures.

The staff in the Greens mainly occupied itself with administrative tasks. In 2008 the staff dealt with finances, mailing, and subnational branches (Annual account, 2008). In 2009 one of the (now three) employees worked on the election campaign, showing how a more flexible financial situation allowed the party to

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<sup>107</sup> NAV is the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration.

<sup>108</sup> In 2014 the expansion of the secretariat continued (Annual account, 2014), and for the first time regional staff were employed (five in total). This is just mentioned in a footnote as regional staff are not part of the definition of staff in this thesis.

take on staff to deal with this task specifically (Annual account, 2009). The employees' tasks in 2011 and 2012 were membership management, finances, subnational branches, web editing, and functioning as the party secretary (Annual account, 2010). The party hired staff specifically to deal with social media, press, and finances in 2013. The party thus took on staff that could deal with the increasingly constraining reporting requirements introduced in regulatory phase 2. There is also indication that the increasingly constraining reporting related to donations in election campaigns (non-compliance with which can lead to a loss of state funding) has influenced the party staff's tasks – but not hiring processes per se. Current party secretary Lars Gaupset (Interview, 15.05.2017) states that *'there is a lot of bureaucracy related to that [reporting], which means that we have to spend a lot of resources on reporting'*. Moreover, the party (as the other Norwegian parties) has consistently paid for auditing services (see e.g. Financial account, 2008, 2014).

The national branch of the Coastal Party accessed state funds in 2006, and responded by taking on temporary staff (Party representative, 21.02.2018; Falch Pedersen, 04.07.2018; Kystpartiet, 2006a). One party representative says that it was the state funding that paid the salaries (Party representative, 21.02.2018),<sup>109</sup> which is supported by the party's high state-dependency. In 2006, the party received 80 percent of its income from the state, lending support to H1. The party only had 682 members in 2006 (Financial account, 2006), and the low membership makes it an unlikely source for staffing. There is indication that the loss of parliamentary representation in 2005 contributed to the perceived need in the party to hire staff, as both administrative management and policy development had been the responsibility of MP Steinar Bastesen and his staff in

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
<sup>109</sup> The staff were hired on an hourly basis.

parliament between the party's foundation in 1999 and 2005 (Party representative, 2018; Olsen, 25.01.2018; Falch Pedersen, 18.12.2017; see also Bjørnbakk, 2003). When the party lost parliamentary representation in 2005, and Bastesen exited the party altogether in 2006, the party lost its focal point of reference for both political and organisational matters, creating a need for staffing.

The Coastal Party's staff at the party office in Bergen dealt with administrative tasks such as finances, financial reporting, the membership register, and phone/mail (Kystpartiet, 2006a). We thus see that the administrative staff dealt with the financial reporting, which became more constraining in 2006. The party also had expenses related to the legally required auditing (see e.g. Financial account, 2007). Political tasks, such as drafting press releases and motions to the annual state budget, were executed by the party's office in Oslo (Olsen, 25.01.2018; Party representative, 21.02.2018; Kystpartiet, 2006a). Additionally, the party hired its then party secretary in a 20 percent position for about a year (2006-2007) because *'There was a need [...] to create active contact towards members and the organisation, as a whole'* (Falch Pedersen, 18.12.2018; Kystpartiet, 2006a).

The Coastal Party's staff expenses decreased nearly linearly with the party's decreasing (electoral support, and in turn) income from the state, which is unsurprising given the party's high state-dependency after 2006 (between 70 and 80 percent), supporting H1. The first decrease in state funds happened after 2009 and led to decreased use of (hourly paid) staff (Financial account, 2009). Concretely, one interviewee states that the party has always adjusted its staffing level to match its financial abilities (Stabrun Johansen, 26.01.2018).

Figure 6.8 Development in income from the state and members (NOK). The Coastal Party, 2006-2016



**Sources:** Financial accounts.

**Notes:** To transfer the sums into euros, the reader can simply remove the last digit, so 50,000 NOK is ca. 5000 EUR.

The figure above also shows that the amount of income from membership fees dropped significantly from 2009 to 2010, because the membership reduced from 800 in 2009 to 392 in 2010 (Financial account, 2009, 2010). This naturally also affected the overall budget of the party, thus contributing to the reasons for its failing ability to maintain staff. After 2013 the party's income from state funding further decreased, which resulted in a complete loss of staff, supporting H1. According to one party representative, there was '*not the financial means*' to hire office help after 2013 (Stabrun Johansen, 26.01.2018). In 2013 and 2015 the party still received 80 percent of its income from the state, even though the actual amount received dropped significantly (to around 300,000 NOK in 2015), which demonstrates the importance of decreased income from state funds to understanding the downsizing, supporting H1. The decision in 2013 to downsize also coincides with a decrease in membership figures.<sup>110</sup> According to interviewees, the party prioritised holding on to their administrative staff (rather than the political staff) longest (Stabrun Johansen, 26.01.2018).


<sup>110</sup> In fact, in 2014 the party only had 62 paying members, which increased to 239 the year after.

The Christian Conservative Party accessed state funding after its first parliamentary election in 2013, receiving its first state funding instalment in 2014 (see figure below). Supporting H1, the party decided to take on two staff members, the party leader and the party secretary, both of whom had already worked full-time for the party ahead of the elections. Their wages had, prior to accessing state funds, been covered by loans (Husveg, 18.12.2017; Party representative, 08.02.2018). State funding access thus enabled the party to pay them directly:

[...] the vote support was so good that we could pay for those that were hired in the party, and in addition pay our debts (Husveg, 18.12.2017).

The support for H1 is strengthened as the party was 60 percent state-dependent in 2014 (Financial account, 2014). With a large debt, it is unlikely that the party would have been able to take on staff (and especially two) had it not been for the state funding.

Figure 6.9 Income from state funding, overall income, and staff expenses (NOK). The Christian Conservative Party. Regulatory phase 2



**Sources:** Financial accounts. Accessed at [www.partifinansiering.no](http://www.partifinansiering.no)

**Notes:** To transfer the sums into euros, the reader can simply remove the last digit, so 50,000 NOK is ca. 5000 EUR.

The party leader's role was to encourage the party members, conduct travels in the electoral campaign, organise conferences and seminars, deal with

political issues, hold speeches, and write letters to editors (Party representative, 08.02.2018; Husveg, 18.12.2017). He was also tasked with motivating members and party office holders (Husveg, 18.12.2017). The paid party secretary (who later was substituted with a paid secretary), was responsible for administrative issues such as answering email and telephone, preparing meetings and the congress, and dealing with the membership register (Party representative, 08.02.2018; Husveg, 18.12.2017). The secretary dealt with the management of the reporting requirements related to state funding (Husveg, 18.12.2017; Party representative, 08.02.2018). The party also had administrative costs related to, for example, the auditing required to comply with reporting requirements, as expected (Party representative, 08.02.2018).<sup>111</sup>

Also supporting H1, the Christian Conservative Party's decreased income from the state in 2017<sup>112</sup> led the party to operate without a paid party leader from 2018 onwards, and to decrease the secretary's percentage of employment (Husveg, 18.12.2017; Party representative, 08.02.2018). This is also evidenced by the annual account:

The electoral result meant a reduction in state funding for the period 2018-2021. The executive thus made several financial changes. The party leader's paid position was terminated on 31.12.2017. He continued as an unpaid party leader. The payment to the administrative secretary was reduced on the same date (Annual account, 2017).

Interestingly, this shows that the Christian Conservative Party, just like the Coastal Party, prioritised letting its politically-oriented staff go, and keeping the administrative staff longer.


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<sup>111</sup> Interestingly, the interviews indicate that it is the subnational branches that struggle the most with the reporting: *'it is tougher for them [the subnational branches] to manage all the deadlines'* (Party representative, 08.02.2018).

<sup>112</sup> The Christian Conservative Party's process of letting staff go in 2017 happened outside the time-frame of the thesis (i.e. after 2016), but I include it anyway due to the short life cycle of the party.

The Pensioner Party both has staffing patterns that support H1, and some that do not in this phase. First, the party's access to (national) state funds in 2006, due to the permissive turn in the access criteria, led the party to hire a party secretary (Annual account, 2007; Pensjonistpartiet, 2007), supporting H1. As the party was 92 percent state-dependent in 2008, the staffing expenses could not have been covered by other sources. Income from membership fees only amounted to about 21,000 NOK (ca. 2100 euros) (Financial account, 2008). The figure below shows the development in the party's income from state funds across phases, to show the drastic increase that marks entry into regulatory phase 2 (2006).

Figure 6.10 Income from state funding (NOK). The Pensioner Party. Regulatory phase 1 and 2



**Sources:** Financial accounts.

**Notes:** To transfer the sums into euros, the reader can simply remove the last digit, so 50,000 NOK is ca. 5000 EUR.

It is also possible that a leadership change in 2005 contributed to the hiring process, as indicated by an interview with the leader who took over in 2005:

You can put it this way: The precondition for me to take over as leader, was that I would get a party secretary (...), I still worked full-time (Dahl, 16.05.201).

Consequently, the party leader, since he was still working (and not in effect a pensioner), demanded that he get help with the administrative burdens of leading



a party, leading to staffing. The hired party secretary's tasks were to answer the telephone and email, and to deal with membership recruitment and membership registration (Annual account, 2007, 2008). The party's financial accounts show that the party had expenses related to auditing (see e.g. Financial accounts, 2011-2016), indicating that the party drew on external professionals to comply with reporting requirements.

Interestingly, the party decided to operate on a voluntary basis from 2012, which is contrary to H1, as the party's income from the state was stable (see figure above). In late 2012 the party's employee decided to resign (Financial account, 2013; Annual accounts, 2012-2013; Remman, 20.06.2016; Gjermundnes, 20.06.2017). She had since 2011 seen to (among other things) the maintenance of the party office, and the membership register (Financial account, 2011, 2012; Remman, 20.06.2017; Gjermundnes, 20.06.2017).<sup>113</sup> According to party representatives, the expenses related to having a paid employee had grown too large for the returned benefit (Remman, 20.06.2017), which sheds light on why the party decided not to replace the employee when she stepped down in 2012. Concretely, the staff expenses had grown from 45,000 NOK in 2011, to nearly 200,000 NOK in 2012 (Financial accounts, 2011-2014). Instead of paying for an employee, the party decided to prioritise transferring funds to local branches to help with their electoral campaigns (Remman, 20.06.2017). So where other parties (such as the Greens) *hired* staff ahead of the elections, the Pensioner Party rather prioritised spending funds on internal transfers to subnational branches ahead of elections (and not staff).

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<sup>113</sup> The party secretary hired in 2006 was taken ill in 2009/2010 (Annual account, 2010), and quit, after which two people in the executive dealt with his tasks (Gjermundnes, 20.06.2017; Dahl, 16.05.2018; see also financial account, 2010). In 2011 the party decided to take on a new person to maintain the party office (who is the one who resigned in 2012).

## Summary

The analysis of Norwegian new minor parties in regulatory phase two has provided ample support for H1. The Greens, the Coastal Party, and the Christian Conservative Party all hired staff following increased income from state funding, supporting H1. The latter two parties also decreased their number of staff when experiencing decreased income from the state. The analysis showed how the Greens, the Pensioner Party, the Christian Conservative Party, and the Coastal Party had staff to deal with the increasingly constraining reporting requirements in this phase, and that all had expenses related to auditing. Contrary to H1, the Pensioner Party decided to operate without staff after 2012, and to instead spend state funds on supporting subnational branches.

Table 6.10 Overview of results on staffing from regulatory phase 2: Norway

	<b><i>Support for H1</i></b>	<b><i>Description of evidence for H1</i></b>
The Green Party	Yes	Increased its income from the state throughout the phase, and increasingly hired more staff.
The Pensioner Party	Yes*	Increased income from state funds, and hired staff as a result.  Staffing pattern in 2012 (when the party downsized despite stable income from state funds) does not support H1.
The Coastal Party	Yes	Increased income from the state in 2006, and hired staff as a result. Experienced decreasing income from the state and responded by downsizing.
The Christian Conservative Party	Yes	Increased income from state funds in 2014 and hired staff as a result. Experienced decreasing income from the state and responded by downsizing.

**Note:** A star indicates that a party had staffing patterns (once or more throughout regulatory phase 2) where there is evidence contrary to the rationale in H1.

### *6.2.3 Staffing in Norway across two regulatory phases: A summary*

The analysis of Norwegian parties has provided support for H1, across both regulatory phases. The Greens, the Pensioner Party, the Christian Conservative Party, and the Coastal Party all took on staff when they increased their income

from state funding. Conversely, the Coastal Party and the Christian Conservative Party downsized when the income from the state decreased, also supporting H1. As expected from H1, no staff were taken on by Cross Partisan MPs, Future for Finnmark, or the Coastal Party, none of which accessed state funds in regulatory phase 1. The Fatherland's Party operated contrary to the rationale in H1, as it did not take on staff after accessing state funding in phase 1, which was due to the party's difficult (overall) financial situation. Moreover, the Pensioner Party in regulatory phase 2 prioritised spending state funds on internal transfers rather than on staff, shedding light on why the party's process of downsizing in this phase did not coincide with the rationale in H1. There is furthermore indication that membership fees contributed to staffing in the Greens, and that a loss of membership fees contributed to a decrease in staff in the Coastal Party.

The analysis outlined how shifts in access criteria with the advent of regulatory phase 2 particularly changed the staffing patterns in the Greens, the Pensioner Party, and the Coastal Party, by enabling them to take on more staff than in regulatory phase 1 (the Greens and the Coastal Party), or to employ staff for longer time periods than they had in regulatory phase 1 (the Pensioner Party). The analysis showed that the parties have mainly relied on existing staff or existing treasurers in order to comply with reporting requirements that were introduced in 1998, and made more constraining throughout phase 2. Findings do indicate, however, that the parties have used external professionals to audit their accounts, as the law prescribed from 1998 onwards.

### 6.3 Comparative overview and discussion

This chapter has shown how an increase of state funds contributed to hiring processes, and a decrease to processes of downsizing, in new minor parties in

Norway and Italy. All staffing processes in the Coastal Party, the Christian Conservative Party, and the Greens in Norway were shaped by the parties' income from the state, as suggested by H1. New minor parties where several (but not all) staffing processes lent support to H1 were the Greens, the Segni Pact, Tricolour Flame, and the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy, and the Pensioner Party in Norway. As such, the analysis corroborates the empirical results found in other case studies of Western European countries investigating the link between state funding provision and staffing (Gidlund, 1991, p. 48; Sundberg, 1994, p. 173; Svåsand, 1994a, p. 325). However, the results here add more detail to this link than existing studies, by systematically analysing each and every staffing process in the parties studied. By doing so, the results from this chapter not only counter the claim that the timing of staffing in parties is unrelated to the availability of state funding (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 50), but also specify why this is so. Concretely, the results from this analysis indicate that new minor parties – unless restricted by, for instance, internal conflict or deep financial troubles – take on staff quickly following state funding access (or lose staff when staff funds decrease/are lost), confirming that timing of staffing is related to state funding. The new minor parties' state-dependency, which was argued in chapter 1 to be of crucial importance to understanding the actual impact of state funds, shed light on *why* state funds are found to matter for the timing of hiring/downsizing processes in this study, but to a lesser extent in others. Casas-Zamora (2006, p. 50), for instance, builds his argument on Katz and Mair's data (1992), which with some exceptions include only a few new minor parties.

On a more general level, the staffing analysis in this chapter showed that specific changes to state benefits and constraints in permissive or constraining directions nearly 'mechanically' affected staffing patterns in new minor parties,

adding evidence to the contention made elsewhere that electorally minor parties are particularly susceptible to regulatory change (Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017; Rashkova & Spirova, 2014). Concretely, the abolition of annual state funds at the start of regulatory phase 2 in Italy led to a process of letting staff go in the Greens, and the increasingly generous system from 2002 onwards led to hiring processes in both the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy. Similarly, constraining access criteria towards the end of regulatory phase two in Italy effectively shut new minor parties out from state funding access, contributing to downsizing in Tricolour Flame, the Greens, and the Communist Refoundation Party. Similarly, the drastic increase in the permissiveness of access criteria for state funds in Norway facilitated hiring processes in the Coastal Party, the Greens, the Pensioner Party, and the Christian Conservative Party.

These examples also highlight another novel finding of the study. This chapter has been able to pin-point specifically what type of state benefits and constraints shape staffing, thus deepening our understanding compared to the existing literature, which has mainly focused on how the *availability* of state funds is linked to staffing (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006; Farrell, 1994; Gidlund, 1991; Svåsand, 1994a). Concretely, the analysis outlined how shifts to a) access criteria (state constraints) contributed strongly to shaping staffing patterns in both Norway and Italy, while b) the type (annual grants versus electoral reimbursements), and c) generosity of funds (i.e. amount of money in the system), also significantly contributed to shifts in staffing in Italy. In turn, this means that reporting requirements related to the maintenance of state funds are less important for understanding staffing. In fact, reporting requirements had to involve external auditing, i.e. professional, independent expertise, to prompt staffing. The analysis showed that, in order to comply with other reporting

requirements besides external auditing, the new minor parties in both contexts either drew on their existing staff or their existing (unpaid) treasurers, instead of scaling up staff to deal with them specifically.

Reflecting the argument in H1 that new minor parties need staff to cope with organisational tasks, the analysis found that both Italian and Norwegian new minor parties mainly prioritised taking on administrative and/or organisational staff when hiring, dealing with tasks such as members, branches, and finances. This was evidenced in Tricolour Flame, the Greens, and the Segni Pact in Italy, and the Greens, the Christian Conservative Party, the Coastal Party, and the Pensioner Party (2006) in Norway. That is not to say that the parties did not have political staff (i.e. hire their party leader etc.), but overall the new minor parties always hired at least one administrative employee when hiring for the first time, as illustrated by the Greens, Tricolour Flame, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the Segni Pact in Italy, and the Greens, the Pensioner Party, the Coastal Party, and the Christian Conservative Party in Norway. Moreover, the new minor parties also prioritised *keeping* this type of staff longer than political staff in times of downsizing, as illustrated by the Christian Conservative Party and the Coastal Party in Norway. This finding thus indicates that new minor parties first and foremost prioritise having staff resembling the traditional party bureaucrat (see e.g. Panebianco, 1988, pp. 220-235), i.e. an employee in charge of administrative tasks, with little (or no, at least formal) involvement in strategic political decisions (see also Karlsen, 2010; Karlsen & Saglie, 2017, p. 1334). These findings counter the claim that state funds contribute to alienating parties from their members (for an overview of this argument, see Biezen & Kopecký, 2017; Casas-Zamora, 2006; Pierre et al., 2000), by showing how state funds in fact contribute to the

exact opposite by funding staff who specifically work to recruit and maintain members, and the branches to which they adhere.

Moreover, these findings suggest that new minor parties indeed prioritise work to increase their membership sizes, reflecting the usefulness for new minor parties of members as voters, volunteers, and financial supporters (see e.g. Scarrow, 2015). So, even though the existing literature has shown that new parties tend to have poorly developed membership structures (Casas-Zamora, 2006; Mair & Biezen, 2001), the analysis of new minor parties' here shows that they themselves work to address this limitation. The fact that new minor parties in Italy and Norway, both early and late in their life cycles, prioritise hiring (or keeping) staff who specifically deal with members and branches, suggests that their need for members is just as much related to their minority status as their newness. This adds another layer to the existing literature which thus far has stated that members are particularly crucial to parties early on in their life cycles (Köln, 2014, p. 472). Concretely, both the Italian Greens, which has existed since the 1980s, and the Christian Conservative Party in Norway, which was formed in 2011, prioritised organisational staff. Future studies could benefit from further disentangling the specificities of these relationships between newness, (electoral) size, and party membership.

The staffing analysis in this chapter has also outlined how other factors, besides state benefits and constraints, have contributed to staffing. One of the most interesting findings is that new minor parties with significantly larger budgets (compared to other new minor parties) hired and downsized staff independently of shifts to their income from state funds. Illustrative of this is the Communist Refoundation Party in regulatory phase 2 (until 2008-2010), a period in which the party's budget ranged between 5 and 15 million euros (Financial accounts, 1993-

2008). As such, the study brings us closer to understanding when, in financial terms, a *new* party stops being particularly shaped by external pressures (Stinchcombe, 1965), and when a *minor* party stops being particularly susceptible to regulatory change (Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017; Rashkova & Spirova, 2014). Interestingly, the results from the analysis of staffing patterns in the Communist Refoundation Party thus qualify the argument made above that state-dependency is what makes state funds matter for the timing of staffing (see also Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 50). Rather, state-dependency and budget size seem to be the two factors that matter for whether shifts in income from the state is related to the *timing* of hiring/downsizing processes. Concretely, state funds are crucial for understanding the timing of staffing in state-dependent new minor parties with relatively small budgets (i.e. less than 5 million euros), but less so in state-dependent parties with budgets exceeding 5 million euros. The importance of both state-dependency and budget size for the timing of staffing is also well illustrated by the Communist Refoundation Party, which drastically downsized its staff at the end of regulatory phase 2, when its budget was considerably smaller (had dropped to ca. 1.1 million euros by 2011). Thus, the timing of its downsizing coincided with a decrease in state funds. Future studies could benefit from exploring these initial findings further to establish when, and why, a new minor party's vulnerability due to newness and electoral size is overcome.

A party's overall budget was also found to matter – but in a different way – for staffing processes in other parties. A highly restricted overall budget in the Norwegian Fatherland's Party prevented it from hiring staff, despite state funds, while the size of the Tricolour Flame's overall budget enabled it to hold on to staff despite decreased income from the state. Both cases operated contrary to H1 in these instances. Similarly, increased income from members contributed to the



Norwegian Greens' capacity to hire staff (in addition to the importance of state funds), which was also found in the two parties which did not access state funds, but still took on (temporary) staff, i.e. the Communist Party of Workers and Act to Stop the Decline in Italy. Finally a drastic decrease in income from membership fees helps us to understand the downsizing in the Coastal Party from 2009 onwards.

Leadership changes in new minor parties contribute to understanding staffing patterns in two of the Norwegian cases. Firstly, the replacement of the paid party leader in the Pensioner Party in 1999 with an unpaid one effectively contributed to downsizing in the party. Secondly, the exit of party leader Steinar Bastesen in the Coastal Party in 2006 (and the loss of parliamentary representation in 2005) created the *need* for staff in this party. Other findings also suggest that parliamentary representation (and governmental representation) contributed to shaping staffing patterns, as illustrated by the Communist Refoundation Party's decision to take on more staff from 2002 onwards, due to external pressures related to parliamentary/governmental representation. Finally, the analysis, as expected from the existing literature emphasising the link between electoral campaigning and staffing (Farrell, 1996, 2006; Farrell & Webb, 2000), showed that some of the parties, when they have the financial leeway to do so, do take on more staff ahead of election campaigns. This happened across the two contexts, as illustrated by the Greens in both contexts and by Act to Stop the Decline (which did not access state funds) and the Segni Pact in Italy.

## 6.4 Summary

This chapter has analysed how state funds shape processes of hiring and downsizing staff in new minor parties in Norway and Italy. Staffing has been

analysed in a life cycle perspective, investigating the role of state funds in each and every staffing process in all the selected parties over three (Italy) and two (Norway) regulatory phases. The analysis found broad support for H1, since both increasing and decreasing income from the state was shown to shape processes of hiring and downsizing staff respectively in new minor parties. The distinctions between regulatory phases outlined how shifts in access criteria, type of state funds available, and generosity had a nearly mechanical impact on staffing patterns in the parties. Despite the broad support for H1, some other factors were also found to shape staffing patterns, such as parliamentary representation, leadership change, size of overall budget, and changes in the membership. In the next two empirical chapters, the impact of not just state funds, but also staff, is analysed. Even though state funds and staff were found to be inter-linked in this chapter, their individual impacts on centralisation (and consolidation) is the topic of the next chapter.

## 7 State funding and centralisation

### 7.0 Introduction

This chapter explores the impact of state funding and staff presence (in the previous chapter found to be inter-linked) on centralisation of the executive council in new minor parties in Italy and Norway, and thereby sheds light on the thesis' second hypothesis. As outlined in the analytical framework, centralisation is defined as the process in which elites increasingly, at the expense of party members, control the executive council, commonly described as the core organ that runs political parties on a daily basis (Katz & Mair, 2002, pp. 98-99; Michels, 1962 [1911], p. 58; Poguntke, 1998, p. 161; Von dem Berge et al., 2013, p. 25). The argument of H2 is that state funds and staff strengthen party elites' position, enabling them to initiate reform, and that state funds and staff contribute to executing centralising reforms. In parties that already have a completely centralised executive (i.e. composed entirely of elites), the argument is that state funds and staff consolidate party elites' strong position by enabling them to decrease the importance of other core organs besides the executive.

This chapter has three main parts, the first and second analysing Italian and Norwegian new minor parties respectively, and the third providing an overarching, comparative discussion. The analyses of Italian and Norwegian parties are structured in a similar way. First the statutory and de-facto composition and role of the executive council in the different parties is analysed over time, reflecting the argument that statutes have limitations with regards to describing actual party behaviour (see e.g. Smith & Gauja, 2010). This constitutes the life cycle analysis of centralisation for each party, and outlines whether centralising reforms of the executive took place (if there was room to centralise),

or if consolidating reforms were undertaken (if there was no room to centralise). Secondly, based on the life cycle analysis, I select the first centralising or consolidating reform process that took place in each of the parties following state funding access and/or staffing. The subsequent in-depth study of reform processes systematically analyses the impact of state funds and/or staff on centralisation/consolidation, relying on four indicators. The first two indicators capture whether state funds and/or staff strengthen party elites, in turn enabling them to initiate reform, as measured by party elites' management of state funds, and their control over staff and hiring processes, or whether elites themselves are hired. The two last indicators capture whether state funds and/or staff are used to execute centralising/consolidating reforms.

## 7.1 The implications of state funding access and staff for centralisation in Italy

### *7.1.1 Italian new minor parties' statutory and de-facto governing structures*<sup>114</sup>

The Greens in Italy introduced an executive council charged with the crucial task of initiating and carrying out the policy goals approved by the party's national executive (Federal Council) and congress in 2001 (Statutes, 2001). Since 2001, the party has been run by this executive and the so-called Federal Council<sup>115</sup> between congresses, as meeting documents show (see e.g. Federazione dei Verdi, 2006). The Federal Council was set up in 1990 (Statutes, 1990),<sup>116</sup> but no statutory executive was established until 1993. Rather, the so-called Coordinating organ was the de-facto executive council of the party until 1993, as

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<sup>114</sup> The full overview of composition and shifts to the composition of executive councils in each of the parties' life cycles is outlined in Appendix F.

<sup>115</sup> The Federal Council comprises mostly regionally elected representatives.

<sup>116</sup> Before that there was only an informal leadership on the national level in the Greens (Biorcio, 2016, p. 185).

it had organisational and representative tasks, and was vested with the power to make urgent decisions in the interest of the local federations (Vannucci, 2007, p. 177; Statutes, 1990). Size-wise, it also resembled an executive with its 11 members elected by the Federal assembly (congress). Two representatives from the party's parliamentary group were invited to take part, without voting rights. The composition of the party's executive was thus highly de-centralised as no party elites took part, which in turn meant that there was 'room' to centralise it. Nevertheless, given that the organ was the (collegial) leader of the party, it was arguably a form of elite group internal to the Greens. In 1993, the party introduced an organ which is described by party representatives as an executive (Party representative, 23.11.2017). It was appointed within the Federal Council, and comprised the president and vice-president of the Federal Council, the treasurer, the person responsible for information, and the spokesperson (Statutes, 1993). The shift from having a de-centralised 'executive' (the Coordinating organ) to an executive comprising elites such as the president, the vice-president, and the treasurer, is to be considered a centralising turn.<sup>117</sup> This was the party's first reform of the executive in its lifetime, and was also the first reform following access to state funding and staff. In line with the selection criteria, this reform process will be analysed in-depth to shed light on H2.

Unlike the Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party has had an executive charged with responsibility over the organisational and political activity of the party throughout its lifecycle. For example, its executive has decided on urgent policy-related matters, such as the party's electoral cooperation in the European elections in 2009 (Rifondazione Comunista, 2009a), and it has passed

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<sup>117</sup> This argument is strengthened by the fact that the Coordinating organ per se was replaced with an individual spokesperson (Statutes, 1993).

the party's internal financial regulations (Rifondazione Comunista, 2005). The executive is, and has always been, elected by the National Political Committee (among its members) which in turn is elected in the congress. The number of members of the executive has varied, and in recent years the National Political Committee (i.e. the national executive) has decided how many representatives it should have (Statutes, 2005). Throughout the party's lifetime the party secretary has had an ex-officio seat in the executive. Between 2002 and 2005 the treasurer, the president of the parliamentary party group, and the leader of the internal audit group also enjoyed this privilege. The other members have thus by definition been non-elites, which means that there has been room to centralise the executive. In 2002 the number of representatives in the executive was reduced from 60 to 39 members. This increased the share of elites as the party secretary, the treasurer, and the presidents of the parliamentary party groups still had ex-officio seats. The party had enjoyed access to state funding and staff since its foundation in 1991, and the reform in 2002 is the first reform of the executive in this party that this study has been able to trace, and is thus selected for in-depth analysis.

Tricolour Flame was, from its foundation in 1995 until 2002, governed by an executive council composed of between 30 and 40 members, and a Central Committee (i.e. the national executive). The executive council, for example, developed guidelines and directives for the party's parliamentary party group and approved appointment of positions in the party (Statutes, 1999). All the regional coordinators participated in the executive, while additional members were proposed by the party leader, whose potential entry into the executive was determined by the Central Committee (Statutes, 1999; see also Romagnoli, 16.11.2016). The leader's role in proposing candidates, and the presence of

regional leaders (i.e. elites), indicates that the executive was centralised, but not completely so, as there was no mention of the party secretary, treasurer (or other elites). That said, the party leader until 2002 (Pino Rauti) had a particularly strong position in the party.<sup>118</sup> After the 1996 congress, newspapers reported that he only accepted the position as leader of the party under a guarantee of *'having the most wide liberty of action, because a party in growth needs an iron hand'* (La Stampa, 18.11.1996). So, even though the *statutes* did not explicitly state that the executive was only to be composed of party elites (as it did not mention that the secretary/treasurer/deputy leader was to be represented), the de-facto leadership structure was completely centralised due to Rauti's strong role, and I thus argue that there was no room to centralise further. In 2002 the executive was abolished, indicating a consolidating reform, as it left the party with its national executive<sup>119</sup> (as before), and a secretariat at national level. The latter composed 15 members, all appointed by the party secretary himself. This was the party's first revision of the executive since foundation, and the party had state funding access<sup>120</sup> and staff prior to its introduction, which is why it is selected for in-depth scrutiny.

The Pensioner Party's main organ on the national level is the so-called National Council (i.e. the national executive) comprising regional secretaries, as well as up to 20 councillors elected by the National Congress (Statutes, 2002). There has, however, been no executive council, only a small secretariat with

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<sup>118</sup> Rauti had for a brief period also been the leader of The Italian Social Movement (Movimento Sociale Italiano), and had been a parliamentarian on both the national and European level for many years. This also contributed to give him a strong position in the party.

<sup>119</sup> This organ was also, after 2002, to be composed of 100 members elected by the congress, plus 20 proposed by the leader, and all regional leaders. A change after 2002 was that representatives from the party's youth and feminist organisations were to be included (Statutes, 2006).

<sup>120</sup> Tricolour Flame had enjoyed access to state funds until 2000, so even though the party did not have access to state funds in the year of the reform (2002), their impact can still be analysed.

members appointed by the leader himself (Statutes, 2002; Party representative, 19.12.2017). Throughout time, the party has been effectively governed by party leader Carlo Fatuzzo, and crucial decisions on candidate selection, resource allocation, and policy development have always been made by him (Party representative, 10.11.2016, 19.12.2017), rather than by the National Council. An interviewee states: *'The party secretary has always been Carlo Fatuzzo. That is untouchable'*, and goes on to say that the party is governed top-down (Party representative, 19.12.2017). This is corroborated by the statutes, which state that the party secretary has the widest discretion concerning when and how to address congress decisions (Statutes, 2002).<sup>121</sup> The party can thus be described as highly centralised, both because the party leader is so prominent, but also because there is effectively no executive to keep him in check (only a small secretariat and the larger executive). After 2005, the party decreasingly convened the National Council, which indicates that the position of the party leader was increasingly strengthened – amounting to consolidation. Prior to this shift to the National Council, the party had state funding access, which means that this consolidating reform in 2005 is analysed in-depth below.

Similarly to the Pensioner Party, the Segni Pact had a de-facto completely centralised executive in its life cycle from 1993 to 2002.<sup>122</sup> The executive council was the main leadership organ in the party (Segni, 29.01.2018), and comprised the party's elected representatives and some regional councillors. Of them were Mario Segni, the party's president, and some close collaborators, for example the

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<sup>121</sup> Also, the press refers to the party leader's power, for instance in candidate selection. In 1992 a porn star was put on the ballot for the Pensioner Party (for background, see Corrias, 1991; Dipollina, 1991), which led to the resignation of the party's president. According to the press, it was the decision of the *'secretary of the party to put the porn star on the ballot for the next elections'* (La Repubblica, 21.01.1992).

<sup>122</sup> According to interviewees (Segni, 29.01.2018; Masi 13.03.2018) the party did operate according to statutes, but they have been impossible to track down.



party's spokesperson, Diego Masi, and its treasurer, Mario Soldani (Segni 05.01.2018, 29.01.2018; Masi 13.03.2018; Soldani, 03.03.2018). The organ was thus completely centralised, as only regional and national elites participated. Further centralisation of the executive could thus not take place. However, neither could consolidation take place as there were no national organs (besides the executive) (Segni, 29.01.2018) that could either be removed or have their meeting frequency reduced. This lack of reform (and potential for reform) explains why the Segni Pact is not further analysed in the second, in-depth part of this chapter.

The Communist Party of Workers' executive council has managed organisational matters and political initiatives (Statutes, 2008, 2014) throughout its life cycle, operating alongside the national executive (called the Central Committee),<sup>123</sup> which has been the highest decision-making body between congresses (Party representative, 21.11.2016; Terra, 29.11.2016; Party representative, 11.11.2016). The party's executive had 15 members from foundation until 2014, and was initially (2008-2011) elected by the Political Committee, and later (2011-2014) by the congress. There was no mention in the statutes that particular elites were to be represented prior to 2014, and the executive was thus by definition completely de-centralised, and had room to centralise. In 2014 the executive changed composition, and rather than having 15 elected members, the organ was now to have between 7 and 9 members, elected among the members of the main decision-making organ, the Central Committee.<sup>124</sup> There is still no mention in the statutes of elites being part of the organ, but it was stated that the executive's members were to have responsibility

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<sup>123</sup> The Central Committee was called the Political Committee between 2008 and 2011.

<sup>124</sup> The organ then also changed its name from *Direzione nazionale* (translated as 'executive' here) to *Il Comitato Esecutivo* (also translated as 'executive council' here, which is the same as the literal translation from Italian).

for specific tasks in the party, such as the treasury (Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori, 2017; Statutes, 2014). There is thus indication that the new executive was more centralised than before. The party never accessed state funding, but had staff prior to the introduction of this reform, which was the first reform of the executive's composition after foundation. It will thus be analysed in light of H2 below.

Act to Stop the Decline, despite having a statute that gave provisions for an executive council comprising 21 members, elected among the members of the party's National Council (i.e. national executive), was governed by fewer than ten representatives (Di Turi, 2013) between foundation in late 2012 and the party's first congress in May 2013 (Brusco, 28.11.2016). These ten representatives were the party's founders and some local elites (Brusco, 28.11.2016), indicating a centralised structure. In the party's first congress it was decided to revise the composition of the executive in the statutes to 24 members (Di Turi, 2013; Fare per Fermare il Declino, 2013b). As all members of the party could stand as candidates (Fare per Fermare il Declino, 2013a), the new executive was more de-centralised than the centralised executive that had run the party since foundation, and also more de-centralised (given its large number of members) than the statutory executive (which had never been elected). After 2013 there was no further change to the executive. However, given that the party had neither state funding nor staff prior to the reform in May 2013, the impact of these factors on this de-centralising reform cannot be assessed, which means that Act to Stop the Decline is excluded from the below analysis.

The table below summarises the findings from the above analysis of centralisation by outlining whether the different parties had room to centralise, whether they underwent reform, and which type of reform

(centralising/consolidating) has been selected for in-depth analysis. Moreover, their access to state funds and/or staff, as the two core indicators whose impact is studied, is also reported in the table. Since the Segni Pact never underwent either centralising or consolidating reforms, and Act to Stop the Decline had neither state funding access nor staff, these two parties are not part of the table below, nor the following in-depth analysis.

Table 7.1 Overview of Italian parties, their room to centralise, and reform process to be analysed

Party	State funding access <sup>1</sup>	Staff presence <sup>1</sup>	Room to centralise	Year of change	Instance of change	Centralisation/ Consolidation
<i>The Greens</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	1993	The party removed the Coordinating organ (until then the de-facto executive), replacing it with an executive elected internally from the Federal Council.	Centralisation
<i>Tricolour Flame</i>	No <sup>2</sup>	Yes	No	2002	The executive council was abolished.	Consolidation
<i>The Communist Refoundation Party</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	2002	Reduction of members in the executive, enhancing the position of the elites (with ex-officio seats).	Centralisation
<i>The Pensioner Party</i>	Yes	No	No	2005	Decreased meeting frequency of National Council, i.e. the national executive.	Consolidation
<i>The Communist Party of Workers</i>	No	Yes	Yes	2014	The number of members in the executive was reduced, and elites were invited in.	Centralisation

**Sources:** *The Green Party*: Statutes from 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2010, 2012, 2015. *The Communist Refoundation Party*: Statutes from 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2013. *Tricolour Flame*: Statutes from 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2017. *The Pensioner Party*: Statutes from 2002 and interviews. *Act to Stop the Decline*: 2012, 2013, 2014. *The Communist Party of Workers*: Statutes from 2008, 2011, 2014. *The Segni Pact*: Interviews.

**Notes:** <sup>1</sup> Refers to whether the party in question had state funding access/staff in the year of the reform process.

<sup>2</sup> The party had enjoyed stable state funding access up until 2000, and the impact of state funds is thus still assessed.

The analysis below firstly explores the implications of state funding and/or staff for the centralising reform processes in the Greens (1993), the Communist Refoundation Party (2002), and the Communist Party of Workers (2014). It then analyses how these factors contributed to the consolidating reform processes in the Pensioner Party (2005) and Tricolour Flame (2002).

### *7.1.2 The implications of state funding and staff for centralisation: The Green Party, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the Communist Party of Workers*

Staff in the Greens, in line with H2, contributed to strengthening party elites prior to the 1993 centralising reform, which replaced a de-centralised executive (the Coordinating organ) with a spokesperson, and introduced an executive comprising several elites (e.g. the treasurer). More specifically, in 1992/1993, the Coordinating organ (i.e. executive) in the Greens had the administrative support of eight staff members (1992). According to interviews, staff was indispensable for the leadership group. One party representative, for example, states that technical staff was crucial for the treasurer's ability to make a financial account (Party representative, 23.11.2017). This suggests that the leaders in the Coordinating organ could control party staff's tasks, in turn strengthening them ahead of the 1993 reform, supporting H2. Interestingly, state funding had a minimal role in reinforcing the position of party elites prior to the reform, contrary to H2, even though the management of state funds was concentrated in the Coordinating organ. The reason was that the Greens had strict rules regarding how much state funding should be transferred to the subnational branches (see for example Party representative, 23.11.2017). In the early 1990s this amounted to 60 percent (Financial account and Annual reports, 1989, 1990). There was also a strong understanding that the money was to be spent on campaigns and not on organisation (Lion, 17.11.2016; Annual account, 1988). The Coordinating

organ's restricted leeway to manage state funds freely meant that state funds did not strengthen elites' position. As the party's resources were '*very few*' (Stefano Boato to Radio Radicale, 29.05.1992), this leeway was further constrained. This restriction on the use of state funds also suggests that state funds had little impact on the execution of the centralising reform.

The Coordinating organ, strengthened by staff, initiated the centralising reform (Party representative, 23.11.2017; Ripamonti, 18.03.2018). Interestingly, however, there is no indication that the Coordinating organ needed to use its strengthened position in order to initiate the reform, as there were three other factors that sparked the reform. First, there was a general understanding in the early 1990s that the Coordinating organ was unable to cope with the challenges of an increasingly popular party (Vannucci, 2007, p. 177). According to Biorcio (2016, p. 185) the Green Party was characterised by fragile and uncertain organisational structures, and a lack of strong leadership, while Rhodes (1992, 1995) argued that the Greens suffered from internal weaknesses in the early 1990s.<sup>125</sup> Party representatives state the same:

[...] the Coordinating organ was dispersed and often did not speak with one voice. Thus, it was necessary to identify one single person that was recognisable both for citizens and for the press (Party representative, 23.11.2017).

Secondly, a leadership change contributed to the initiation of the reform. Specifically, the few members of the Coordinating organ who originated from the radical green movement, with which the Greens had merged in 1990 (see e.g. Vannucci, 2007), had brought with them new ideas about how to organise a party leadership (Party representative, 23.11.2017), ideas different to the Greens

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<sup>125</sup> This was also an established understanding in the news media, which frequently referred to the vivid internal discussions in the Greens over whether it should stay a movement or become a traditional party with a secretary and a national leadership (see e.g. De Gregorio, 07.10.1992).

collegial leadership model adopted thus far. Thirdly, there were concerns in 1992 that only the parliamentary party group, and not the party in central office, was capable of political initiative (Franco Corleone to Radio Radicale, 30.05.1992). This concern was related to the fact that the Greens had constraining internal incompatibility regulations that restricted the participation of elected representatives in the executive (Coordination organ) between 1990 and 1993 (Statutes, 1990). This led, according to party representatives (Party representative, 23.11.2017) to a relatively strict division between the party in public office and party in central office before 1993 (see also Rhodes, 1995, p. 186).

After the reform was initiated, staff were used in the work of executing the reform process, supporting H2. Concretely, three out of five members in the group that developed the reform proposal were also members of the Coordinating organ (the executive) (Radio Radicale, 31.10.1992). The staff's importance (Party representative, 23.11.2017) for elites' execution of core tasks (see also above), suggests that staff were also important for the works concerning the reform process, and not least for relieving the elites of other tasks so that they could focus on the reform. That was especially important as the reform process was long – it was debated in meetings throughout the whole of 1992 (Radio Radicale, 26.04.1992, 29.05.1992, 08.12.1992). Finally, staff intervened in decision-making on an informal basis (Bonelli, 16.11.2016; Fracescato, 14.11.2016; Party representative, 23.11.2017), providing another avenue for aiding the execution of reform.

The congress had to approve the statutory changes, and was composed of 400 delegates elected from the subnational level in the party (Statutes, 1990). The theoretical framework argued that members will accept centralising changes

if they are financially dependent on the national level. This was partially the case in the Greens in 1992, as the branches received large sums of state funds from the national level (Financial account and Annual accounts, 1989, 1990). Still, the branches controlled the membership fees coming in. Rather than resource-dependencies, however, the congress' approval of the centralising reform seems to be related to the fact that the organ from which the new executive was to spring after 1993, namely the Federal Council, had 44 out of 78 members elected directly by the regions. Consequently, even though it was a centralising reform, it was not necessarily seen as such, as an organ comprising mainly representatives elected by regional congresses (comprising either all members or delegates of members) was to be the source of the new executive (see Statutes, 1993).

Unlike in the Greens, state funds in the Communist Refoundation Party impacted the centralising reform in 2002 by strengthening one faction's party elites, levelling the playing field between the two core (competing) factions of the party,<sup>126</sup> supporting H2. The reform cut the number of members of the executive from 60 to 39. Specifically, as Bertolino (2004, p. 118) and interviews (Gelmini, 23.11.2016) suggest, party leader Fausto Bertinotti had slowly strengthened his position in the party from the mid-1990s onwards. This was partially because of an alleged increasing personalisation of Italian politics, and Bertinotti's ability to communicate with the press (Bertolino, 2004, p. 118), and partially because the dual leadership structure (party leader and president) was abolished after a split

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<sup>126</sup> Two factions had run the party since foundation, one represented by the party secretary (Fausto Bertinotti) and one by the party president (Armando Cossutta). Even though Cossutta split from the party in 1998, the division was still very much present in 2002. For instance, the "Cossutta"-faction still had its stronghold in the party organisation, i.e. on local and regional levels, and also led the treasury. Bertinotti controlled the party's external relationships, and the relationship with voters (Bertolino, 2004, p. 118).



in 1998<sup>127</sup>, leaving Bertinotti as the sole leader (Bertolino, 2004, p. 131). Moreover, Bertinotti was a member of both the European and Italian parliaments prior to the reform in 2002, which strengthened his position (see also Gelmini, 23.11.2016). However, what was crucial in this reform process was that the faction competing with Bertinotti's, i.e. the one led by treasurer Claudio Grassi, controlled the treasury. So, this faction managed the party's state funds, and the related reporting (see e.g. Bertolino, 2004, p. 284). Consequently, while Bertinotti's position in the party was crucial, the other faction controlled the most important resource in the party (the party's state-dependency was over 90 percent prior to 2002), strengthening its position, and securing it leverage in the negotiations over new statutes, supporting H2.

The party had 62 staff members in 2002 (Bertolino, 2004; Calossi, 2007, p. 233), and the executive controlled the hiring processes (Bertolino, 2004, p. 277). However, as the executive was not solely composed of party elites, the elite control over staffing was not unequivocal. Elites (of both factions) did, however, strengthen their position due to staffing, in line with H2, as elites themselves were to a large extent hired. For example, the treasurer was hired, and party leaders were generally paid by the party (Celli, 25.06.2018; see also Gelmini, 23.11.2016), giving them freedom to work on party-related tasks on a daily basis.

The centralising reform was initiated following poor electoral results in the European Parliament elections of 1999, which led the party to conclude that it needed to be more open towards civil society, and undergo a process of democratisation. The goal was that this would address the party's weak social roots, and the lack of coordination between the centre and periphery of the party

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<sup>127</sup> When Armando Cossutta (the party's president from foundation until 1998) split from the party in 1998, the dual leadership which had characterised the party since formation was abolished. This left the party with one leader, namely Bertinotti.

(Bertolino, 2004, pp. 132-133). Moreover, the G8 summit demonstrations in July 2001 led the party to start discussions over whether identification with this movement, and its integration into the party, was a desirable solution or not (Bertolino, 2004, p. 138), in turn also contributing to the initiation of the reform.<sup>128</sup> The strengthening of elites by state funds and staff is thus of little relevance to the initiation of the centralising reform.

However, when it comes to the execution of the reform, hired (and as such strengthened) party elites were important. The leader of the statutory commission, which counted no less than 55 members, was treasurer Claudio Grassi (Rifondazione Comunista, 2001a). Hired party elites with leeway to dedicate themselves fully to party work thus contributed directly to executing the centralising process. There is also indication that administrative and other political staff contributed to the reform process, as a long standing staff member states that the national leadership structure benefitted the most from staff in the party (as opposed to members and parliamentarians) (Celli, 30.11.2017), supporting H2. There is no indication that state funds directly contributed to the execution of the reform.

The proposal of centralising reform from the statutory commission had to be approved in the congress.<sup>129</sup> Even though the centralising changes to the executive council were said to benefit party leader Bertinotti, other changes satisfied the competing faction (that of treasurer Grassi), whose stronghold was the organisation (Bertolino, 2004, p. 118). Concretely, the proposal suggested strengthening the regional branches, which from then on were to hold regional

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<sup>128</sup> Party leader Fausto Bertinotti (leading the “innovative wing”), suggested including the no-global movement within the party, while the “conservative wing”, led by treasurer Claudio Grassi, rejected this idea (Bertolino, 2004, p. 139).

<sup>129</sup> The congress comprised delegates elected at subnational (so-called federal) party congresses (Statutes, 1999).

congresses, something they had not had the mandate to do previously (Rifondazione Comunista, 2001b). This secured the maintenance of the Grassi faction's *'peripheral strongholds (...)'* (Bertolino, 2004, p. 145). So, even though the change to the composition of the executive in a centralising direction benefitted certain party elites (Bertinotti), the introduction of regional congresses benefitted the party on the ground (and Grassi's faction), shedding light on why the members accepted the change, irrespective of their resource-dependency in relation to the national branch (for examples, see Bertolino, 2004; Financial and annual account, 2001).<sup>130</sup>

The final Italian new minor party that introduced a centralising reform is the Communist Party of Workers. In 2014 it changed its executive council from a 15-member organ elected by the congress (no elites), to a smaller organ elected among the members of the Central Committee (the national executive), comprising elites such as the leader of the treasury. The party did not have state funding, but had its party leader hired in a part-time position. Thus, the party's top elite was hired as staff, indicating a strengthened position for the leader, lending evidence to H2. However, there is no indication that this contributed to the centralising reform, as one party representative states that the party leader (Marco Ferrando) was only minimally involved in organisational matters: *'Ferrando handles next to no matters regarding the organisation'* (Terra, 31.01.2018).

Rather, the core factor contributing to initiating and seeing the reform through, was the ambition to secure a properly functioning central executive. Prior to 2014, the executive had failed to work as a central, coordinating organ (Partito

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<sup>130</sup> It is worth noting that the subnational branches (mainly) controlled the membership fee (see chapter 5).

Comunista dei Lavoratori, 2017). The party had a membership ranging around 1000 members (Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori, 2008, 2011, 2017) widely dispersed in the country (Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori, 2011, 2017). This, in addition to a poor financial situation, had contributed to preventing the party from creating a central reference point, as was outlined in the congress in 2014:

The so-called “centre of the party” is thus divided into different structures: apart from the political leadership organs (...), we can identify the Financial Commission, the membership and the GCL, the internet page and the section in Rome. This decomposition naturally makes it hard to work (...) (Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori, 2017, p. 3).<sup>131</sup>

This lack of a strong centre going into 2014 is particularly interesting in the case of the Communist Party of Workers, as ever since its foundation it had expressed a wish to organise itself based on the principle of centralism (see e.g. Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori, 2008, 2011). In practice, such a principle, according to the party, meant constructing a central leading group, i.e. a single structure that would define the party’s choices and priorities (Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori, 2008). The party’s lack of central organisation was already emphasised in 2011, and it is thus no surprise that the party was eager to address this come congress in 2014. Concretely, the organisational document from 2011 states:

(...) in the next phase of the party it is pivotal to construct a minimum of apparatus, and build a capacity at the centre. Without a functioning centre, the local units of the party cannot work (Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori, 2011, p. 21).

Thus, the centralising change in 2014 can be seen as one step towards fulfilling the party’s quest to create a party based on centralism, and to be rid of organisational vulnerability. Given that the party leader has been the same throughout, and fluctuations in the membership have been small, there is little

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<sup>131</sup> This document is from 2017, but includes this quote from the 2014 organisational document.

indication that these factors influenced the party's reform of the executive in 2014. In sum, therefore, ideological concerns, combined with a poorly developed leadership structure, most strongly contributed to the centralising reform in 2014. The only support for H2 is thus that the party leader indeed had a strengthened position as he was himself hired in the party.

In brief therefore, the above analysis shows that state funding and/or staff played a role in the centralising reforms in the Green Party and the Communist Refoundation Party, evidencing H2. Concretely, staff strengthened party elites in the Greens, and also contributed to executing the centralising reform process in 1993. State funding played no role, because of the party's restricted financial leeway. In the Communist Refoundation Party, state funds contributed to strengthening the treasurer's faction in the party, and staff contributed to strengthening party elites and executing the reform. In the Communist Party of Workers, the role of staff was non-existent, contrary to H2.

### *7.1.3 The implications of state funding and staff for consolidation: The Pensioner Party and Tricolour Flame*

The Pensioner Party's National Council (i.e. national executive) stopped convening after 2005 (Party representative, 10.11.2016, 19.12.2017).<sup>132</sup> This shift in meeting frequency of the party's top national organ (the party has no executive), constitutes a consolidating reform. Prior to the reform in 2005, state funding access had strengthened party leader Carlo Fatuzzo's position. Specifically, Fatuzzo had alone controlled the state funds flowing into the party, both prior to the reform, but also over time (Party representative, 10.11.2016, 19.12.2017), despite the existence of a treasurer.<sup>133</sup> The leader's leeway to

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<sup>132</sup> Another interviewee (18.01.2018) states that it has been *some time* since the council was last convened.

<sup>133</sup> In fact, the party's treasurer died a few years ago, without being replaced (as of 2018) (Party representative, 10.11.2016, 19.12.2017; Party representative, 18.01.2018), which means that

manage state funds was further strengthened by the fact that the party rarely held congresses where budgets or financial accounts could be discussed. In fact, only 3 congresses have been held since the party was founded in 1987, the last in 2005 (Party representative, 10.11.2016, 19.12.2017; Party representative, 18.01.2018).

There is strong indication that Fatuzzo's leeway to spend the funds in the manner he saw fit, contributed to the consolidating reform, evidencing H2. Concretely, in 2005 the party received generous amounts of state funding (over 800,000 euros). Despite this, a party representative suggests that the decreasing meeting frequency of the National Council (i.e. the consolidating reform) was due to scarce financial resources:

It has been a while since the council has met, and it is for financial reasons, we cannot have people coming in from Calabria, from Sicily, and from other parts of Italy without compensating their expenses for the trip (Party representative, 19.12.2017, also supported by Party representative, 18.01.2018).

The reason for this difficult financial situation (despite state funding access), was the party's decision to spend money on television broadcasts (Party representative, 15.01.2018). Given that the party leader himself was in charge of spending the state funds on television broadcasts in 2005, rather than on summoning the national executive, the consolidation reform was facilitated by his strong role and broad leeway to spend party funds freely. State funding, in line with H2, has thus both strengthened Fatuzzo's position and contributed to executing the consolidating reform.<sup>134</sup>

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Fatuzzo has had sole responsibility for the funds in recent years (Party representative, 18.01.2018).

<sup>134</sup> As a substitute for the lack of meetings in the National Council, the party leader has discussed urgent matters with his closest collaborators via email or telephone (Party representative, 18.01.2018; Party representative, 19.12.2017), and met with the representatives of the different regions when visiting these regions (Party representative, 19.12.2018).

Additionally, one other reason helps us understand exactly why the party stopped convening the national executive besides the considerations of Fatuzzo himself: to avoid factionalisation in the party:

By experience we know that when we are all united, someone always tries to make currents, and we seek to avoid that (Party representative, 15.01.2018).

There is limited evidence for this, but it suggests that the party leader has attempted to avoid conflict within the party by not summoning the national executive. There is no indication that a shift in members contributed to the consolidating reform in 2005, as the income from membership fees was stable between 2003 and 2006 (Financial accounts, 2003-2005).

Similar to the situation in the Pensioner Party, Tricolour Flame had a strong leader whose position was reinforced by state funds, supporting H2. Concretely, prior to the consolidating reform in 2002, which abolished the executive, party leader Pino Rauti had reinforced his position, by means of state funding access. Interviewees state that the resource allocation in the party was left to him (Romagnoli, 16.11.2016; Condorelli Caff, 28.11.2016; Party representative, 31.01.2018), meaning that Rauti had far-reaching powers over the management of state funding. This also coincides with information from the statutes (Statutes, 1999), where it is stated that the party's secretariat (headed by Rauti) was to manage the resources of the party. Another interviewee states:

Of course the access to state funding reinforced Rauti's position internally in the party. He managed it with full discretion (Party representative, 31.01.2018).

In line with H2, therefore, state funding allocations strengthened Rauti's position in the party in the years prior to the statutory change. There is also some indication that staff presence did the same, as the party had one (administrative)

staff member from 1996 onwards. The data shows that the employee aided Rauti with administrative tasks such as transcribing his works (Party representative, 31.01.2018), indicating that Rauti could allocate specific tasks to the staff. Thus, there is some evidence that he exercised staff control, which strengthened his position, supporting H2.

Rauti's strong position contributed to giving him leeway to propose changes to the statutes prior to the 2002 congress. Concretely, he announced that he would step down as leader, but simultaneously suggested strengthening the position of president (Radio Radicale, 10.02.2002), a position he was due to take up (Corriere della sera, 08.02.2002). Moreover, the proposal to eliminate the executive council – which is the specific consolidating reform of interest here – came from Luca Romagnoli, Rauti's selected successor to the leadership (La Repubblica, 09.02.2002; Party representative, 31.01.2018), indicating how the two top elites of the party proposed the changes (that later were adopted). Apart from Rauti and Romagnoli's considerations, a wish to make the party structure lighter was another reason to initiate the reform, according to the then leader of the statutory commission, Rocco Tauro (Radio Radicale, 10.02.2002; and interviews):

[The reason for suggesting the reform was to] simplify the party organisation and allow the party leadership figures to save time and money, as they were often kept busy with repetitive meetings (Party representative, 31.01.2018).

The reason was that the executive was composed of the same representatives as the other two organs on the national level.<sup>135</sup> Luca Romagnoli, who proposed the change, also says that the number of members in the organs was disproportionate compared to the number of rank-and-file members in the party

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<sup>135</sup> The National Secretariat and the Central Committee.



(Romagnoli, 16.11.2016). This statement indeed coincides with the party's income from membership fees, which declined by 13,000 euros between 1998 and 2000, from 32,000 to 19,000 euros (Financial accounts, 1998-2000). In addition to the wish to simplify the organisation, one of the reasons for initiating the change was also financial, as meeting often – in many different forums – required resources. This reflects a wish to allocate the state funding to issues other than meetings.

A separate commission elected in the congress developed the (consolidating) statutory changes in the two days of the congress. Neither Rauti nor Romagnoli was leader of this commission (Radio Radicale, 10.02.2002). This suggests that the state funds and staff that had strengthened Rauti's position, were of little concrete importance for the execution of the reform process per se, contrary to H2. Subnational branches in Tricolour Flame were financially dependent on the national branch prior to the reform as they had neither (direct) access to state funds nor to the membership fee (which was collected at and remained on the national level), and hence relied on transfers from the national branch (see e.g. Financial account, 2000; see also chapter 5). In the congress itself, therefore, as theorised in H2, the congress delegates approved all the statutory changes proposed by the statutory committee, with no objections – despite the centralising turn this represented.<sup>136</sup>

In brief, therefore, this analysis of consolidating reforms in Tricolour Flame and the Pensioner Party shows how party leaders' management of state funds strengthened their position in both parties, supporting H2. Staff also contributed to this in Tricolour Flame, as the party leader could allocated tasks and hence

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<sup>136</sup> Interestingly, the particular article concerning the president (i.e. the position Rauti was to take on), was approved individually (prior to the adopting of the other changes to the statutes), because it was described as particularly important (Radio Radicale, 10.02.2002), further delineating the particular role of Rauti in the party.

decide on the activities of the staff member. The Pensioner Party had no staff. In Tricolour Flame, this increased elite power gave the party leader (and his successor) leeway to propose a consolidating reform, but did not aid in the execution of the reform *per se*. In the Pensioner Party, however, state funding both strengthened the party leader, and contributed to seeing the consolidating reform through, supporting H2.

## **Summary**

This analysis has found that *state funding* broadly contributed to strengthening party elites prior to centralising or consolidating reforms, evidencing H2. Concretely, ahead of the consolidating reform processes in The Pensioner Party in 2005 and Tricolour Flame in 2002, state funds strengthened the position of the party leaders in both these parties, due to their leeway to manage these funds freely. Similarly, state funds contributed to strengthening one faction (headed by the party treasurer) in the Communist Refoundation Party ahead of its centralising reform process in 2002, levelling the power structure between the two factions competing for influence in the party. Moreover, *staff* contributed to strengthening party elites in the Greens prior to its centralising reform in 1993, and in Tricolour Flame, as elites in both parties had the power to control the allocation of tasks to staff, evidencing H2. In the Communist Refoundation Party and the Communist Party of Workers, the fact that party elites were themselves hired contributed to strengthening the elites' position. The analysis found that this strengthened position of party leaders in the Pensioner Party and Tricolour Flame enabled both leaders to initiate consolidating reform processes, supporting H2. The levelled power structure between factions (due to state funding) in the Communist Refoundation Party helps us to understand why the centralised reform of the

executive (party leader's priority) was countered with efforts to strengthen the local branches (treasurer's priority).

*Staff* contributed to executing centralising reform processes in both the Communist Refoundation Party and the Greens, supporting H2. More specifically, elites were either helped directly by staff in these processes (the Greens) or were themselves staff who worked on the reform (the Communist Refoundation Party). Similar evidence is not found in Tricolour Flame's consolidating or the Communist Party of Workers' centralising reforms, as the staff here had no role in the reform processes. Only in the Pensioner Party did *state funds* contribute to executing a reform (consolidating reform). Finally, one interesting finding contrary to H2 is found in the Greens: State funding did not contribute to strengthening elites prior to the party's centralising reform in 1993, due to the restricted leeway of elites to manage state funds freely. The table below outlines the empirical evidence in relation to the study's indicators of centralisation and consolidation.

Table 7.2 Empirical overview, the impact of state funding and/or staff on centralisation and consolidation: Italy

	Type of reform	Does state funding and/or staff contribute to centralisation/consolidation? Support for H2 on four indicators			
		Elites manage state funds	Elites hire staff, control staff, or are themselves staff	State funding used to execute reform	Staff used to execute reform
<i>The Green Party</i>	Centralising	Yes, but no impact as restricted leeway	Yes	No	Yes
<i>The Communist Refoundation Party</i>	Centralising	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
<i>The Communist Party of Workers</i>	Centralising	NA	Yes	NA	No
<i>The Pensioner Party</i>	Consolidating	Yes	NA	Yes	NA
<i>Tricolour Flame</i>	Consolidating	Yes	Yes	No	No

**Notes:** NA (non-applicable) refers to a party's lack of a resource prior to a reform (either state funds or staff).

## 7.2 The implications of state funding access and staff for centralisation in Norway

### 7.2.1 Norwegian new minor parties' statutory and de-facto governing structures<sup>137</sup>

The Green Party had a stable, national leadership structure between foundation in 1988 and 2012, as the party was run and governed (see e.g. Miljøpartiet de grønne, 1993, 1998b, 2004) by an executive council called the National Council (landsstyret). The executive discussed and decided matters related to party tax, study circles, policy motions and the organisation of party seminars (see e.g. Miljøpartiet de grønne, 1994d). The organ consisted of between 5 and 7 representatives (Statutes, 1990, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009)

<sup>137</sup> The full overview of composition and shifts to the composition of the Norwegian new minor parties' executive councils is outlined in Appendix F.

elected by the congress,<sup>138</sup> comprising the spokespersons<sup>139</sup> and members. The organ's composition was thus de-centralised. The de-facto governance in the party was also democratic as this de-centralised organ was the one to run the party. Moreover, members had a crucial position in the party in the 1990s and early 2000s. Concretely, due to the party's (very) low membership (between 200 and 500) '*[...] you could risk being elected to anything at any time*' (Simonsen, 16.06.2017). The party thus had ample room to centralise. In 2012 the congress changed the leadership structure in the Greens for the first time. The executive council (the National Council) was extended to become a broader, territorial organ, while an Executive Council, now comprising the two spokespersons, the party secretary, the international contact, and six members elected by the congress, was created. One of the spokespersons of the Youth Group could participate (Statutes, 2012), and so could parliamentarians (but without voting rights). This reform was centralising in that afterwards the executive comprised more party elites, i.e. the party secretary in addition to the spokespersons, than before. Prior to the reform the party had both access to state funds and staff. As this reform was the first to change the executive council's composition in the party's life cycle, it will be analysed in-depth below.

The Pensioner Party introduced an executive council in its first statutes from 1985, and, apart from a change to its composition in 1992,<sup>140</sup> it stayed the same until 2008. The executive has had a crucial role over time, making decisions

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<sup>138</sup> The organ was called the Political Committee (Politisk utvalg) between 1990 and 1993 (Statutes, 1990). This was the highest decision-making authority in the party between congresses, *as long as* a so-called National Committee (Landsutvalget) had not been constituted. I have not been able to identify any evidence that the latter was ever constituted.

<sup>139</sup> After 1997 this person was to be elected by the congress. Prior to this the spokesperson was appointed internally within the executive (1993-1997), while one member of the executive (1990-1993) was to be part of the party's collegial leadership, called the Coordinating Group (comprising three people).

<sup>140</sup> In 1992 the executive was expanded to seven congress-elected members (from five), and the right of the leader of the parliamentary party group and governmental leaders to be part of the executive was abolished.

on exclusions (Pensjonistpartiet, 1992d), appointing evaluation committees, and dealing with policy and administrative matters (Pensjonistpartiet, 2005). The executive was, according to the 1992 statutes, to be composed of the leader, two deputy leaders, treasurer, secretary, and two board members, indicating that there was room to centralise it further. In 2008 the congress decided that the leader of the parliamentary party group was to be part of the executive. This change had no practical consequences, as the Pensioner Party has never had representation in parliament. Still, it represented a centralising turn given that (possible future) elected representatives were invited into the organ. The Pensioner Party had enjoyed access to (national) state funding since 2006, and also had staff in 2008, meaning that the centralising turn in 2008, the first after access to state funds and staff,<sup>141</sup> will be analysed below.

The Christian Conservative Party has in its short life been governed by the executive council, which, according to the statutes, is composed of the leader, two deputy leaders, the leader of the youth organisation, 4-6 congress-elected members, and the leader of the parliamentary party group. According to annual accounts, this is the organ that has run the party on a daily basis, making decisions on, for example, staffing (Annual account, 2013, 2014). Despite access to state funds and staff since 2014, and despite there being room to centralise, the party has not done so. Interestingly, however, there is evidence of consolidation, as the national council (i.e. the other national organ besides the executive) was barely convened in 2015, indicating increased power for the executive. This consolidating reform will thus be analysed in-depth below.

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<sup>141</sup> The party did introduce internal transfers of subnational state funds in 1991, but the national party struggled greatly to collect such funds initially (Annual account, 1991), which is why state funding's role in the 1992 reform process has not been selected as the first reform process following access to state funds.

Since its foundation in 1999, the Coastal Party has been, on paper, governed by an executive council, comprising the party leader, two deputy party leaders, and four board members (Statutes, 2001).<sup>142</sup> In 2003 the party decided to make the secretary and the full parliamentary party group (not just its leader) members of the organ. In 2007 another party elite, the treasurer, was added to the organ, indicating centralisation, while in 2012 the treasurer was once again removed from the organ, indicating de-centralisation. The centralising process in 2007 is selected for in-depth analysis here, as it is the first reform process taking place following state funding access and hiring of staff (2006). Interestingly, this centralising reform in 2007 coincided with dramatic changes to the de-facto leadership of the party. Because, even though there had been room to centralise the executive on paper (which also happened in 2003), there had been no possibility (nor need) to do so in *practice* before 2006, as the party leader (and not the executive) had been in charge of the party's political and administrative maintenance and development (Party representative, 21.02.2018; Olsen, 25.01.2018; Falch Pedersen, 18.12.2017; see NTB, 23.10.2003). Between foundation in 1999 and 2006, therefore, the executive was effectively side-lined, as the focal reference point in the party was the party leader, who was also a member of parliament. This shows that the party, despite its seemingly democratic structure on paper, was de-facto highly centralised between foundation and 2006. As the leader disappeared from the executive in 2006, there was not just room to centralise the statutes, which happened in 2007, but also to allow for this change to have effect in practice.

Three parties, the Fatherland's Party (Statutes, 1990; Fedrelandspartiet, 2002b, 2005), Cross Partisan MPs (Øverland, 16.05.2018; Party representative,

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<sup>142</sup> The party was formed in 1999, and these are the first statutes that I have accessed.

15.02.2018), and the Popular Movement for the Future for Finnmark (Future for Finnmark) (Moe, 05.02.2018; Leirvik, 26.01.2018), made no changes to the composition of their executive council, nor to any other organs on national level throughout their life cycles.<sup>143</sup> This means that there are no reforms to select for in-depth scrutiny.<sup>144</sup> That said, their statutory and de-facto governance structures are still analysed here: The Fatherland's Party had an executive responsible for running the party throughout its life cycle, comprising the leader, deputy leader, treasurer, and as many board members as deemed necessary (Statutes, 1990; Fedrelanspartiet, 2002b, 2005), which leaves it open for a high level of de-centralisation. However, in the first part of its life cycle, until 1997, the Fatherland's Party had a strong leader, Harald Trefall, who ran the party, making it de-facto centralised (see e.g. Moseng, 26.02.2018). One party interviewee (Jonstad, 18.12.2017) states that Trefall's style of leading the party was 'despotic', while another states that he had a firm hand on the organisation (Party representative, 16.04.2018a). A third party representative argues that he was *not* authoritarian (Party representative, 19.04.2018). Still, Trefall himself acknowledged his strong position in a party newsletter, where he outlined that he had been criticised from within for being too dominating in decision-making (Fedrelandet nr. 1/1997). Trefall was the party leader in two periods, from when the party was founded in 1990 until 1993 and then again from 1993 to 1997. He remained in the executive council between 1993 and 1997 as treasurer. It is worth noting that Trefall himself selected his successor as leader (Moseng, 26.02.2018; see also Fedrelandet nr. 1/1994). Consequently, while the statutes had room to

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<sup>143</sup> I have not been able to access the statutes of Future for Finnmark and Cross Partisan MPs, even though they allegedly exist for the latter party (Party representative, 15.02.2018).

<sup>144</sup> In fact, neither Cross Partisan MPs nor Future for Finnmark accessed state funding and staff in their life cycle either, also disqualifying them from being analysed in the second part of this analysis. The Fatherland's Party had state funding (but no staff) early on in its life cycle.



centralise, there was less possibility to do so in practice (before 1997) given the party leader's strong position.

Cross Partisan MPs has been a loosely organised party since it was founded in 1992. According to current party representatives (Interview, 15.02.2018) the party has never convened a congress, even though the executive invited regional representatives to a joint meeting in June 1997 (Tverrpolitisk folkevalgte, 1997e). The party has generally been run by an executive council, now comprising seven people (Party representative, 15.02.2018). The members of this organ have been recruited by the existing executive or leaders (Party representative, 15.02.2018; Tverrpolitisk folkevalgte, 1997f), indicating a centralised structure, given that the possibility for outsiders (potential supporters) to access the organ is limited. Interestingly, however, this executive has on various occasions been effectively side-lined, due to the interdependence between regional branches and the national branch. In 1999, for instance, the party branch in Nordland – which later split and formed the Coastal Party – enrolled members in its own branch and developed a separate program, which neither the executive nor the party leader of the party had any power over (see e.g. Tverrpolitisk folkevalgte, 1997c; Tverrpolitisk folkevalgte, 1997d). In 2009, a party representative simply fielded a list under the party's name, but *'he did not get the program, so he ran an individual election campaign'* (Party representative, 15.02.2018). This shows that the party's leadership structure, despite the centralised executive, more than anything has been highly vulnerable. Moreover, it has been prone to takeovers by influential individuals (on the regional level) seeking a registered party name under which to field an electoral list.

The final party in the sample, Future for Finnmark, did not have any formal governing structures in the four years that it existed (Moe, 05.02.2018; Leirvik,

26.01.2018), indicating an even more informal structure than that of the Cross Partisan MPs. The members in the party were members of the movement (Popular Movement for the Future for Finnmark), from which the electoral list sprung in 1989, but was not maintained after 1990 (Leirvik, 26.01.2018). The governance of the party was in the hands of the movement's figurehead, MP Anders Aune (Moe, 05.02.2018; Leirvik, 26.01.2018), indicating a de-facto completely centralised structure with no room to centralise.

The findings from this analysis are summarised in the table below, which outlines the different parties' room to centralise, their access to state funding and staff, and specifies the reform process that has been selected for in-depth analysis. As mentioned previously, the first reform process taking place in each of the parties following state funding and/or staff access is selected. The table also indicates whether this reform process is a centralising or consolidating reform. Given that Future for Finnmark, Cross Partisan MPs, and the Fatherland's Party never changed their executive council's composition (nor that of other national party organs), there are no in-depth reform processes to study, which explains why these parties are omitted from the table below.

Table 7.3 Overview of Norwegian parties, their room to centralise, and reform process to be analysed

Party	State funding access <sup>1</sup>	Staff presence <sup>1</sup>	Room to centralise	Year of change	Instance of change	Centralisation/ Consolidation
<i>The Green Party</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	2012	Introduced a new leadership structure, with a more centralised executive.	Centralisation
<i>The Pensioner Party</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	2008	The leader of the parliamentary party group got a seat in the executive.	Centralisation
<i>The Coastal Party</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	2007	The treasurer was to have a fixed seat in the executive.	Centralisation
<i>The Christian Party</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes	2015	The national executive barely convened.	Consolidation

**Notes:** <sup>1</sup> Refers to whether the party had state funding access/staff in the year of the reform process or not.

**Sources:** *The Greens*: statutes 1990, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2016. *The Pensioner Party*: statutes 1985, 1986, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2016. *The Coastal Party*: statutes 2001, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2014. *The Fatherland Party*: statute 1992. *The Christian Party*: statutes 2013, 2017.

The following analysis will firstly explore how state funding and staff contributed to the centralising reforms that took place in the Greens (2012), the Coastal Party (2007), and the Pensioner Party (2008), and secondly how state funds and staff contributed to the consolidating reform in the Christian Conservative Party in 2015.

### *7.2.2 The implications of state funding and staff for centralisation: The Greens, the Coastal Party, and the Pensioner Party*

State funding access on the national level (from 2006) significantly improved the financial situation in the Green party's national branch<sup>145</sup> (see e.g. Annual account, 2007) prior to the 2012 reform, which saw the introduction of a more centralised executive. There is indication that one of the party's elites, namely the spokesperson, Hanna Marcussen, strengthened her position by means of the management of state funds prior to the reform, supporting H2. Even though the party's budget was decided upon in the congress (Statutes, 2007): '*Marcussen (...) worked very closely with the party office, and had a lot of the responsibility for the party altogether*' (former party secretary Mikkel Storm Glomstein in Siem Knudsen, 2016, pp. 47), indicating financial responsibilities. Another party representative also states that Marcussen '*saved*' the party due to her efforts in the years prior to the reform (Simonsen, 16.06.2017), underlining this argument. Consequently, there is indication that Marcussen had leeway to manage the state funds ahead of the reform in 2012, thus strengthening her position in line with H2.

Additionally, there is indication that Marcussen was strengthened by her role in staffing processes, also supporting H2. The previous chapter on staffing demonstrated that the party consistently increased its number of staff in the years

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<sup>145</sup> This also meant that the party was less dependent on the transfer of subnational state funds, upon which it had heavily relied before.


prior to the 2012 centralising reform. Since Marcussen was the only one of the party elites living in Oslo, the '*building and professionalisation*' of the secretariat was left to her (Annual report, 2010). This also implies that she had a hand in staffing processes, supporting H2. That said, the executive (of which Marcussen, was a crucial member) could hire staff temporarily, and also hired the party secretary (Statutes, 2007, 2009), which strengthened the full executive council. Finally, the annual account states that Marcussen herself was hired in smaller positions during the spring of 2010 (Annual account, 2010). There is thus indication that Marcussen, as spokesperson, could contribute to controlling staffing, and also herself was hired, which strengthened her elite position prior to the 2012 reform, supporting H2.

There is indication that this reinforced position of Marcussen, and her strategic goals and aspirations for the party's future (see Lars Gaupset in interview with Siem Knudsen, 2016, p. 49) enabled her to contribute to initiating the centralising reform in 2012, and fending off internal opposition to the changes, supporting H2.<sup>146</sup> This is because the centralising reform was initiated despite the fact that some Green hardliners left the party (Sand Holth and Mide Solberg, 2015; see also Siem Knudsen, 2016), following what Marcussen herself called her '*streamlining*' of the Greens (Hanna Marcussen, in Sand Holth and Mide Solberg, 2015) after 2008. Besides the role of Marcussen as party spokesperson, the massive growth in members and branches (see figure below) also contributed to the initiation of the reform.

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<sup>146</sup> Specifically, prior to 2012 there was internal conflict regarding how the party should be organised pertaining to staffing and having an Oslo-based party office. Establishing a permanent, central party office in the capital was not uncontroversial, as the party had had rotating party offices (in for example Trondheim, Oslo, and Grimo) for nearly three decades.

Figure 7.1 Development of membership and number of local branches in the Green Party, 2007-2016



**Sources:** Annual and financial accounts, obtained from party office.

More specifically, the rapid growth meant that *‘we have large challenges when it comes to organising ourselves in the most appropriate way’* (Annual report, 2011). The party’s control committee<sup>147</sup> stated that so-called growing pains led to discussions about power and authority in the party (Miljøpartiet de grønne, 2010). Current party secretary Lars Gaupset states that the executive organ prior to 2012 (i.e. the so-called National Council) was unable to make decisions (Gaupset, 15.05.2017; see also interview with Gaupset in Siem Knudsen, 2016).

With the increased resources, from both state funding and membership fees, the party’s executive prepared seminars which resulted in proposals for changes to the governing structure (Miljøpartiet de grønne, 2011). This shows some support for H2, as state funding partially contributed to executing the centralising reform. The executive had the main responsibility for preparing the reform (Miljøpartiet de grønne, 2011). As no staff members were part of the executive in 2011, there is little direct impact of staff on the execution of the reform. That said, one interviewee states that staff have been involved in strategic decision-making (Gaupset, 15.05.2018), which could suggest that the staff, for

<sup>147</sup> The control committee was the highest organ between congress in matters pertaining to interpretation of statutes, audit of the compliance with statutes, and budget control (Statutes, 2007).

instance the hired party secretary, could have intervened in the process.<sup>148</sup> In 2012 the centralising reform was passed in the congress, and the internal opposition to it was minimal (Miljøpartiet de grønne, 2012). The branches enjoyed financial autonomy, due to the de-centralised state funding allocation system in Norway. Thus, one would expect opposition to this centralising reform. The reason why members/delegates did not oppose the reform was that elites on different party levels (not just the national) were reinforced by the new (centralising) reforms. Concretely, whereas the party previously had just one National Council (i.e. executive) to govern the party, the leadership structure now had two central organs, one executive council and one National Council where all the regions were represented, which allowed more people to have a say, even though the change itself represented a centralising turn.

State funding access contributed to the centralising reform of the Coastal Party in 2007, but not in the way theorised. Concretely, state funding access in 2006 did not strengthen elites as expected by H2, but rather contributed to highlighting an organisational vulnerability that had emerged following party leader Steinar Bastesen's exit from the executive in 2006. More specifically, between foundation and 2006, Bastesen had handled the party's administrative (financial) matters on a day-to-day basis from his position as MP (Party representative, 21.02.2018; Olsen, 25.01.2018; Falch Pedersen, 18.12.2017; see also NTB, 23.10.2003). The executive's role in financial matters was thus very limited. When both Bastesen and his support staff in parliament disappeared in 2005, and when Bastesen disappeared from the party's executive altogether in 2006, financial management had to be dealt with by the party's executive (as statutes prescribed, see Statutes, 2001) for the first time. This happened at the

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<sup>148</sup> This has not been possible to confirm.

same time as the party's first access to national state funding,<sup>149</sup> which carried management responsibilities and reporting requirements. According to party representatives, it thus became necessary to include the treasurer in the executive (Party representative, 16.04.2018b; Falch Pedersen, 16.04.2018). The reason was that the executive council had little or no overview of the party's financial situation, which was hardly surprising given that former party leader Bastesen had previously dealt with this. After 2006 this created difficulty for the party, as its top leadership could not necessarily answer questions about the financial situation in the party, nor be completely on top of dispositions and financial availability (Party representative, 16.04.2018b). An interviewee also states that there was a tendency that *'some people felt that they owned the money that came in'* (Party representative, 16.04.2018b). So, instead of strengthening the party elites or enabling centralising reform, the state funds rather contributed to highlight the executive's lack of control over finances, which became particularly pressing due to state funding access. The discussion above also shows that leadership change (i.e. Bastesen's exit from the executive) contributed to sparking the reform.

There is indication that the hired staff in the Costal party in 2006 did contribute to enhancing the executive's position, as it was the executive's responsibility to hire staff, and decide what tasks they were to execute (Statutes, 2001; Kystpartiet, 2006a). However, as the executive also consisted of representatives that were not elites, the staff's impact in strengthening elites is neutralised, not lending evidence to H2. Also, there is no indication that this proposal needed the support of staff and/or state funding in order to happen.

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<sup>149</sup> Even though the party had been represented in parliament between 1999 and 2005, it had not accessed state funding for the party organisation, as the threshold to do so was set at 2.5 percent of the vote prior to 2006 (see regulatory chapter). However, from 2006 onwards the access criteria were drastically lowered, which facilitated access in 2006, even though the party lost its only MP.



Concretely, the proposal for the reform was made in a national council meeting in April 2006 and unanimously accepted there (Kystpartiet, 2006b), before it was later passed on to the congress for final approval. In the Coastal Party in 2007, all of the regional, local, and national branches had state funding access. That said, the financial account from 2007 does indicate that the national branch transferred ca. 20,000 NOK (ca. 2000 euros) to the regional branches. Given that this sum was small, there is no indication that resource-dependencies existed between the different branches. Unfortunately, I lack the minutes from the 2007 congress where the statutory change was passed. The reason why it passed, despite the centralising turn that it represented, was probably the perceived benefit of including the treasurer in the executive organ, to ensure proper financial management in the national branch.

Similarly to the Coastal Party, state funds – contrary to H2 – did not help to strengthen elites in the Pensioner Party prior to the centralising reform in 2008, which gave the leader of the parliamentary party group an ex-officio seat in the executive. The reason was the party leader and treasurer's restricted leeway to spend state funds freely. Concretely, the national party transferred state funds to local branches (Dahl, 16.05.2018; see also Remman, 20.06.2017), restricting the elites' freedom to spend funds as they wished. In addition, there was a deficit of nearly 240,000 NOK in the 2007 accounts (Pensjonistpartiet, 2008). So, despite the fact that the party leader and treasurer have been in charge of the party's state funds (and financial situation more generally) throughout (Dahl, 16.05.2018; see also Remman, 20.06.2017), they had limited scope for strengthening their position by means of these funds in the period before the centralising reform of 2008, lending evidence contrary to H2. The restricted financial situation also indicates that state funds most likely had no role in executing the centralising

reform, also contrary to H2. Having said that, the staff – being paid for by state funds – did strengthen the position of the party leader, supporting H2. The paid party secretary worked on a range of tasks related to communication, such as the new webpage and the party newspaper (Annual account, 2007, 2008; Dahl, 16.05.2018), projects which the party leader had initiated, indicating that the party leader had some control over the staff. Moreover, the party leader had himself set the hiring of an employee as a precondition of his taking on the role of leader (Dahl, 16.05.2018), indicating that the employee was taken on to relieve the works of the party leader specifically.

There is no indication that the leader needed this staff to initiate or execute the statutory process, as a separate statutory committee was responsible for developing the centralising reform (Pensjonistpartiet, 2008).<sup>150</sup> The initiation of the reform resulted from a heightened confidence about gaining parliamentary representation for the party in the 2009 parliamentary elections, which in turn would necessitate a link between the party in central office and in public office (Dahl, 16.05.2018; see also I Vindusposten nr. 2, 2006). This belief in the party's ability to have an MP elected, erupted following the party's growth in the years prior to 2008, and the increased activity in the party. First, the party increased its membership between 2005 and 2008. In 2005 the income from membership fees amounted to ca. 19,000 NOK, while the sum was nearly 22,000 NOK in 2008. The membership growth was also mentioned in the party's newsletter in 2006 (I Vindusposten nr. 2, 2006), and Annual account from 2007. Moreover, the party managed to establish more local branches (in 2006) (I Vindusposten nr. 2, 2006).

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<sup>150</sup> There is no indication that Dahl himself proposed the change, as his insecurity as to who specifically proposed it, indicates that it was not himself (see Dahl, 16.05.2018).

Secondly, the election of a new party leader (Ragnar Dahl), described by others as a highly competent leader (Gjermundnes, 20.06.2017), ended (yet another) conflictual period in the party, sparking optimism.<sup>151</sup> Moreover, he had precise goals for the party, such as representation in parliament and increased regional representation (Dahl, 16.05.2018), and he initiated a set of organisational activities, such as improving the flow of communication in the party by establishing a party newspaper and working on updating the webpage (Annual account, 2007, 2008; Dahl, 16.05.2018). A leadership change and the increased activity thus contributed to the aforementioned surge of optimism in the party prior to 2008 – in turn sparking the reform.

Unfortunately, the minutes from the congress have been impossible to access, which makes it hard to establish whether or not the party members opposed the change, and whether the subnational branches' receipt of funds from the national branch (see above) in any way contributed to swinging the vote, as the theoretical argument would predict. It is worth noting that the subnational branches themselves accessed state funds. Based on the fact that the Pensioner Party never had a parliamentarian elected, I would suggest that the delegates in the congress would perceive the inclusion of a potential parliamentary party leader into the executive as uncontroversial, given that electing an MP would represent a milestone and a big achievement for the party.

In brief, therefore, state funding and staff contributed to strengthening elites in The Greens, as expected by H2, which contributed to the spokesperson's ability to initiate the centralising process. Only staff strengthened the position of elites in the Pensioner Party, due to elites' restricted leeway to spend state funds

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<sup>151</sup> During 2004 the party's executive council members and the leader were in a bitter dispute, which ended with the suspension of the leader (Pensjonistpartiet, 2004).

and the party's financial deficit prior to reform. That said, neither staff nor state funding were relevant for the actual execution of reforms in the Pensioner Party, while state funds played a minor role in executing the centralising reform in the Greens. In the Coastal Party state funding did not strengthen the elites as expected, but rather created a need for financial management in the executive, pushing forward the centralising reform. State funding thus neither strengthened party elites, nor contributed to seeing the reform through. Staff in the Coastal Party helped to strengthen the executive more broadly, but not elites particularly, as the executive comprised both elites and members, not evidencing H2.

### *7.2.3 The implications of state funding and staff for consolidation: The Christian Conservative Party*

In the Christian Conservative Party state funding access and subsequent staffing contributed to strengthening party elites, and the elites' leeway to spend funds freely contributed to the consolidating reform that took place in 2015, when the national executive was only convened once. The Christian Conservative Party is thus a case where I expected centralisation, as there is room in the statutes to centralise the executive, but where consolidation happened instead. As the analysis will show, the consolidation process secured the party elites the leeway they needed to steer the party (and to secure their own power), eliminating the need for a (more laborious, statutory) centralising reform.

State funding access on the national level in 2014 strengthened the position of the party secretary ahead of the consolidating reform, in line with H2, as he specifically (and the executive more broadly) was responsible for both reporting and the distribution of state funding on the national level (Party representative, 18.12.2018; see also Statutes, 2013). In addition, there is evidence that staffing contributed to strengthening the elites prior to the

consolidating change in 2015 because elites themselves were staff. Concretely, Erik Selle, who had been crucial in the work of building up the party, and was elected leader in 2013 (Partiet de Kristne, 2013) was hired in the party after it accessed state funding in 2014 (Party representative, 08.02.2018). Thus, prior to the 2015 consolidating reform, the party had a leader who had reinforced his position in the party due to his position as hired staff, supporting H2.

The control over state funds by the elites (mainly the party secretary) enabled them to prioritise *not* spending state funds on convening the national executive more than once in 2015. This effectively outlines how the management and use of state funds played a role in executing the elites' consolidating reform, supporting H2. According to party representatives, the consolidating reform happened because of the party's restricted financial situation (Partiet de Kristne, 2016; Akerhaug, 2017), making it difficult to arrange a meeting with all regional leaders due to the travel reimbursements this would incur. Still, the party had nearly doubled its budget from 2013 to 2014, due to access to state funds (Financial accounts, 2013, 2014). This shows how party elites consolidated their position by deciding to spend the party's funds on other activities besides convening the national executive, supporting H2. Interestingly, this consolidating reform also strengthened the position of the executive council more broadly (not just the elites within it), as it was left as the sole nationally-operating organ. In the Christian Conservative Party, therefore, the consolidating reform had a dual nature, strengthening mainly elites, but also the few members (not elites) in the executive. Contrary to H2, there is no specific data suggesting that the party leader's *hired* position contributed to executing the consolidating reform.

There were good reasons to execute a consolidating rather than centralising reform in the party. The most important was that the reform did not

change the statutes, which eased its introduction. One additional factor (besides strengthened elites) sheds light on why the party was easily able to introduce the reform: an inexperienced membership. The National Council pointed out that there was a need to do internal training in the party in 2015 (Annual report, 2015), and the annual account from 2016 documents that the party did invest in training courses conducted by its own representatives (Partiet de Kristne, 2013, 2014, 2015a; Husveg, 18.12.2017). In the congress in May 2017, the then party deputy leader Arne Husveg said to a newspaper:

Organisationally, there are many that do not have any deep experience of political work and activity. These are people [i.e. members] that have a standpoint, but that lack political experience. There is of course a share with experience from other parties, but the majority must be trained (Akerhaug, 2017).

Even though this quote is from 2017 and the information regarding the training course from 2016, i.e. from before the consolidating reform happened, it is highly likely that this evidence was also valid in 2015. Maybe even more so, as the party overall was newer in 2015. An inexperienced membership thus gave the strengthened leadership more leeway to execute the consolidating reform in 2015 without interference.

## Summary

This analysis has outlined that *state funding* contributed to strengthening party elites in the Greens and the Christian Conservative Party, evidencing H2. Elites, mainly the party spokesperson in the former and the party leader and party secretary in latter, controlled and managed the state funds, enhancing their positions. In a similar vein, the elites' control over *staff* in these two parties, and the fact that they themselves (at least sometimes) were staff, contributed to strengthening them prior to the two parties' reforms. The Pensioner Party leader's

control over staff strengthened his position there, also evidencing H2. In the Greens and the Christian Conservative Party these strengthened elites used their position to initiate reform processes, supporting the rationale in H2. There is some indication that state funding contributed to executing the centralising reform in the Greens, and the elites' use of state funding in the Christian Conservative Party in 2015 also contributed to the consolidating reform there, lending evidence to H2. That said, neither staff nor state funds contributed to the execution of centralising reforms in the Pensioner Party and the Coastal Party, contrary to H2.

There is also some other evidence contrary to H2 in the Norwegian new minor parties. State funds were unable to strengthen party elites' position when financial accounts were in deficit, as they were in the Pensioner Party prior to its centralising reform in 2008. Interestingly, state funding access played a different role than theorised in the centralising reform process in the Coastal Party, as state funding did not contribute to strengthen elites, but impacted on the reform anyway, by creating an urgent need for financial management in the executive. Finally, staff did strengthen the overall work of the executive in the Coastal Party prior to the centralising reform in 2007, but, given the executive's composition of both elites and members, there was no unequivocal strengthening of elites. The table below outlines these empirical results.

Table 7.4 Empirical overview, the impact of state funding and/or staff on centralisation and consolidation: Norway

	Type of reform	Does state funding and/or staff contribute to centralisation/consolidation? Support for H2 on four indicators			
		Elites manage state funds	Elites hire staff, control staff, or are themselves staff	State funding used to execute reform	Staff used to execute reform
<i>The Green Party</i>	Centralisation	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
<i>The Pensioner Party</i>	Centralisation	Yes, but no impact as accounts were in deficit	Yes	No	No
<i>The Coastal Party</i>	Centralisation	No, state funds rather created a need for financial management	No	No	No
<i>The Christian Conservative Party</i>	Consolidation	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

### 7.3 Comparative overview and discussion

The analysis showed that state funding and staff help us to understand centralising and consolidating reforms in new minor parties in Norway and Italy, supporting H2. Four indicators were analysed to shed light on this. The first two indicators captured whether state funding and staff strengthened elites, in turn enabling them to initiate centralising or consolidating reforms, as measured by a) party elites' management of state funds, and b) elites' control over staff, ability to hire staff, or their position as staff themselves. The last two indicators captured whether c) state funds, and d) staff, contributed to executing centralising and consolidating reforms.

First of all, the analysis found that when party elites, such as the party leader, the treasurer, or the party secretary themselves manage the receipt and allocation of *state funding* in a party, their position is strengthened. Thus, elites in



Tricolour Flame, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the Pensioner Party in Italy, and the Greens and the Christian Conservative Party in Norway, were all empowered due to state funding access prior to the studied reform processes. These results contribute to the literature in two ways. First, the results corroborate existing claims that those party actors who have access to their own resources become stronger and more independent from others in a party (Nassmacher, 2009, p. 379; see also Mendilow, 1992). Secondly, the analysis pin-points exactly *which* actors in a party are reinforced due to state funding access, namely treasurers, party leaders, and party secretaries, i.e. those in control of state funds. As such, the results add detail to existing literature which has found that state funding empowers certain *faces* of a party over others, for example the party in central office versus the party on the ground (Hagevi, 2018; Katz & Mair, 2002).

Echoing the existing literature (see e.g. Bardi et al., 2017; Katz & Mair, 2002), the analysis also showed that *staff* contributed to strengthening party elites, thus adding to Panebianco's (1988, p. 227) contention that the control of staff (even though he refers to a strong, bureaucratic apparatus) advantages those who control it over those who do not (see also Nassmacher, 2009, p. 379). In some parties, such as the Green Party and Tricolour Flame in Italy, and the Green Party, and the Pensioner Party in Norway, the empowerment of elites happened because the elites controlled staff – either the staffing process per se or the tasks that staff were employed to do. Elites were also strengthened by staff because they themselves were staff, granting them leeway to dedicate more time to party work, as illustrated by the Communist Refoundation Party and the Communist Party of Workers in Italy, and the Christian Conservative Party, and to a certain extent the Greens, in Norway. Broadly, these findings add to the existing literature which uses staff as an indicator for changing power structures

in parties (see e.g. Bardi et al., 2017), by specifying how exactly staff strengthen party elites.

The analysis shed further light on H2, by showing how the empowered party elites (by means of staff or state funding) contributed to *initiating* the consolidating reforms that took place in the Christian Conservative Party in Norway and the Pensioner Party and Tricolour Flame in Italy, and the centralising reform in the Greens in Norway. These findings reflect Barnea and Rahat's (2007) contention that politicians will try to either keep or change the status quo to protect or increase their status, and show how (reform) initiatives, in line with Ware (1999, p. 110) are more likely to develop among elites due to their access to resources. This analysis thus adds more detail to existing studies that link the provision of *state funds* to (the national branch) to centralisation, but that do not explore this relationship in-depth (see e.g. Ebbighausen, 1996, cited in Koss, 2011, p. 22; Mendilow, 1992, pp. 100-102; Nassmacher, 1989, p. 250). It does so by specifying that state funding and staff strengthen party elites, who in turn use their enhanced position to initiate centralising or consolidating reforms. Finally, the results in this study outlining how *staff* can strengthen elites (that in turn initiate centralising and consolidating reforms) reflect the literature linking staff presence to increased concentration of power in the national branch of parties (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006; Michels, 1962 [1911]) and centralisation (Poguntke & Webb, 2005; Tan, 1997).

Adding more evidence to the literature linking state funding and staff to centralisation (see above) is the analysis' finding that state funding contributes to *executing* (i.e. not just initiating) consolidating reforms in the Pensioner Party in Italy and the Christian Conservative Party in Norway, and to a limited extent to a centralising reform in the Greens in Norway. This lends further support to H2.

Thus, when it comes to the direct contribution of state funds to executing a reform, the finding is that state funding most often mattered to executing processes of change in parties where party elites already had a strong position, once again highlighting the importance of studying the impact of state funding in-depth. *Staff* contributed to executing centralising reforms in the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy, adding empirical evidence to Moe's (1980) claim that staff can be crucial for elites in developing centralising reforms, as they, for example, can gather necessary data and develop proposals. Staff's contribution to executing centralising reforms was found to be dependent on whether party elites themselves were directly involved in the centralising reform processes, as they were in the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy, but not (for example) in the Pensioner Party and the Greens in Norway.

More broadly, the results show that state funding (and related staff) can contribute to centralising and consolidating reforms both in contexts with a centralised state funding allocation system (e.g. a most likely context for centralisation such as Italy<sup>152</sup>) and contexts with a de-centralised system (e.g. Norway). In the existing literature, it has often been argued that a context's allocation system for state funds modifies the impact of state funding on centralisation (Casas-Zamora, 2006; Nassmacher, 2009). However, this study shows that the core indicator for understanding how state funds shape centralisation is not whether state funds are allocated in a centralised or de-centralised manner, but whether party elites manage state funds or not, and whether they are used to execute centralising or consolidating reforms. This emphasises the difference between focusing exclusively on the role of state funding in centralising reforms and analysing centralisation in light of state

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<sup>152</sup> See discussion of Italy as a most likely case for centralisation in chapter 4.

funding access (for the discussion of state funding as dependent and independent variable, see Koss, 2011).

The empirical support for the theoretical argument (H2) notwithstanding, there are also some cases where state funding and/or staff plays a different role than theorised, or no role at all, in centralising or consolidating reforms. Specifically, state funding has been found to *not* strengthen party elites – and subsequently to have no impact on centralising reforms – in parties where the elites either have a restricted leeway to spend these funds freely (the Greens in Italy) or because the financial accounts overall were in deficit (Pensioner Party in Norway). This also effectively outlines the importance of the factor *overall budget* for centralising reforms. Similarly, staff's and/or state funds' role in strengthening elites was found in the Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the Communist Party of Workers in Italy, and the Pensioner Party in Norway, without this having an impact on elites' propensity to initiate or propose centralising and consolidating reforms in these parties as hypothesised. The reason was either that other party representatives (not elites) were responsible for the initiation of the reform (the Pensioner Party in Norway), or that other factors, besides the wish of strengthened elites to enhance their own position, were clearly more important for understanding the initiation of the reform (the Communist Party of Workers, the Communist Refoundation, and the Greens in Italy).

Interestingly, in all the three latter parties, i.e. the Communist Party of Workers, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the Greens in Italy, centralising reforms were initiated in order to address organisational vulnerabilities, such as poorly functioning national leadership organs. Such vulnerabilities concerning the operation of the national organs were also found to be a factor in understanding the reforms that were initiated by empowered party elites (i.e. those operating

according to H2), in Tricolour Flame in Italy, and the Greens in Norway. These findings reflect the argument that new parties have less institutionalised party structures (Gauja, 2016, p. 115). Correspondingly, state funding access in the Coastal Party emphasised the organisational vulnerability of the executive council with respect to the management of finances, which contributed to initiating a centralising reform.

Leadership change was important to either triggering or shaping the centralising reform processes in Tricolour Flame and the Greens in Italy, and the Coastal Party in Norway, in this way adding to the evidence of other studies that emphasise individual leaders' impact on party reform (Albinsson, 1986; Gauja, 2016; Müller, 1997; Wilson, 1980). Fluctuations in the membership, either decreasing or increasing, were also found to impact reforms, supporting existing studies that emphasise how considerations regarding (mostly decreasing) membership contributes to party reforms (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Kenig, Rahat, & Hazan, 2015). Concretely, Tricolour Flame experienced membership loss prior to the consolidating reforms it underwent, while the Greens and Pensioner Party in Norway experienced the opposite before centralising their executives. This indicates that diverging development in membership size can trigger similar reform processes, highlighting the feasibility and necessity of studying such processes in-depth. Electoral decline and loss of parliamentary representation, supporting findings outlining the relevance of these factors for party reform (Albinsson, 1986; Harmel & Janda, 1994), played a role in the centralising reforms in the Communist Refoundation Party and the Coastal Party. Interestingly, the importance of ideology (the principle of centralism) was an important trigger for centralising reform in the Communist Party of Workers.

## 7.4 Summary

This chapter has analysed the thesis' second hypothesis, by exploring whether and how state funds and staff shape centralising or consolidating reform processes in new minor parties in Norway and Italy. To do so, the analysis in each context (Norway and Italy) was divided into two parts. The first analysed the statutory and de-facto role and composition of the executive council in each of the new minor parties over time, which constituted a life cycle analysis of centralisation. In a second step, which was based on the first, the first reform process following access to state funds and/or staff – either in a centralising or consolidating direction, depending on whether the life cycle analysis showed that the party had room to centralise or not – was selected for an in-depth analysis in relation to H2. A total of three centralising and two consolidating reforms were selected for Italy, and one consolidating and three centralising reforms for Norway.

The broad findings from the in-depth analysis, of how state funds and staff shape centralisation and consolidation, support H2. Firstly, both state funds and staff were found to strengthen party elites in new minor parties across contexts. Secondly, the analysis documented that elites in some (but not all) parties used this empowered position – either it originated from state funds, staff or both – to initiate centralising reforms. Thirdly, state funds were found to contribute to the execution of two consolidating and one centralising reform in both contexts, while staff was found to contribute to executing two centralising reforms in Italian new minor parties. The next and last empirical chapter further explores the impact of both state funds and staff, by turning to their influence on facilitating new minor parties' pursuit of constitutive function, i.e. their ability to overcome signature requirements for ballot access and present an electoral list.

## **8 State funding and pursuit of constitutive function**

### **8.0 Introduction**

This chapter analyses the thesis' third hypothesis (H3), and thus explores whether and how state funding and staff directly and/or indirectly impact new minor parties' ability to surpass the threshold of authorisation (Pedersen, 1982), i.e. overcome signature requirements for ballot access and present lists in elections, also referred to as 'electoral participation' here. The argument for H3 is that state funds and staff aid parties to directly overcome signature requirements and present electoral lists, by contributing to planning and executing signature campaigns and facilitating candidate recruitment. Indirectly, state funds and staff can contribute to electoral participation by recruiting members and establishing and/or strengthening subnational branches. Following the structure of the previous chapters, I analyse Italian and Norwegian parties separately, and conclude with an overarching discussion bringing together the findings from both contexts.

The analysis in each context starts with an overview of signature requirements for ballot access across time, as they lay the groundwork for a) selecting an electoral contest for in-depth scrutiny, and b) analysing how state funds and staff each enable parties to comply with such requirements. Secondly, I outline each new minor party's electoral trajectory, i.e. the share of constituencies in which it fielded candidates in different elections over time. This constitutes the life cycle analysis of the parties' pursuit of constitutive function. Thirdly, I select one electoral contest in each of the parties' life cycles in order to explore in-depth the dynamics of the ways in which state funding and staff influence electoral participation. To select an electoral contest, I first identify when

each of the new minor parties under scrutiny experienced an increase or decrease of state funding and/or staff, in order to ensure variation with respect to the study's two factors of interest. The first electoral contest after such a shift is selected in a majority of the cases. However, in order to ensure the broadest possible variation concerning signature requirements for ballot access, and the institutional tier of the election, the second electoral contest following a new minor party's increase or decrease of state funding or staff is selected in a minority of the cases. To explore H3, i.e. the impact of state funds and staff on electoral participation, I rely on four indicators: whether state funds and staff are used to overcome the signature requirements related to ballot access and present an electoral list (direct impact), and whether state funds and staff are used to recruit members and/or establish and strengthen subnational branches (indirect impact).

## 8.1 Pursuit of constitutive function in Italian new minor parties

### *8.1.1 Italian signature requirements for ballot access – an overview*

Overall, the signature requirements for presenting electoral lists for Chamber of Deputies elections have become more permissive over time. Specifically, prior to 1993, party lists had to be supported by signatures from between 500 and 1000 eligible voters (L361/1957), with no exemptions. In 1993, when the electoral system shifted from a largely proportional to a mixed system (see e.g. Donovan, 1995; Katz, 2003), two distinct signature requirements were introduced: one for the presentation of lists in uninominal colleges (between 500 and 1000 signatures required), and one for the presentation of lists in proportional constituencies (between 1500 and 4500 signatures required, depending on the number of inhabitants in the constituency). There was no exemptions, but in the event of snap elections the number of required signatures was halved (L277/1993;



L73/1994; L162/1994). Exemptions from the signature requirement were introduced for the first time in 2005, when parties represented in a parliamentary party group in both chambers of parliament, or parties with one representative in the European parliament that aligned (in a coalition) with two or more parliamentary parties, were exempted (L270/2005). Other parties still had to collect between 1500 and 4500 signatures to field lists (only proportional constituencies).<sup>153</sup> In 2008 the signature requirements were made even more permissive, as an additional exemption (to the ones introduced in 2005) was passed: From 2008 onwards, parties with at least two deputies in the outgoing parliament or two deputies in the European parliament were exempted (L24/2008; L30/2008).

On the regional level, the same signature requirements applied to parties in all regions until 2005, when regions – following a constitutional amendment – started to introduce their own electoral laws. The signature requirements have thus shifted – not just between different regional elections – but also (after 2005) between different regions. Before 1995, parties that wished to present a (so-called provincial) electoral list had to collect signatures from between 750 and 3000 eligible voters, depending on the size of the constituency (L108/1968). From 1995, when both provincial lists and regional lists were to be presented (due to a change in the electoral laws),<sup>154</sup> the signature requirement for provincial lists stayed the same while regional lists required the support of between 1000 and 5000 eligible voters depending on the size of the constituency. The signature requirement was halved in the case of snap elections (L43/1995), but there were

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<sup>153</sup> Specifically, the mixed electoral system was replaced with a proportional system (with a majority bonus), meaning that electoral lists were only presented in one type of (proportional) constituency. For details, see Giannetti & De Giorgi (2006).

<sup>154</sup> From 1995, 4/5 of the regional councillors were elected based on competing provincial lists, and 1/5 based on a majoritarian model on the basis of competing regional lists (see L43/1995). Prior to that, only provincial lists were presented.

no exemptions. Ahead of the regional elections in 2005, five regions had introduced a regional electoral law, and three regions had introduced exemptions from the (nationally imposed) signature requirement for a) parties represented in the Italian parliament (Calabria), and b) parties with a parliamentary party group in parliament or a council group in the region (Puglia and Lazio). These regions thus represented a more permissive environment for new minor parties in 2005. In 2010 the permissiveness increased across Italian regions, as Campania, Piemonte, and Umbria also introduced exemptions from the signature requirement for parties with institutional representation (but see details in Appendix G). This development culminated in the 2015 regional elections, when Veneto, Liguria, and Toscana also introduced exemptions.<sup>155</sup>

The signature requirements for ballot access to European elections have, overall, been more permissive for new minor parties than those in place for regional and national elections, because an exemption from signature collection has always existed. Specifically, parties represented in either the national or European parliament have always been exempted from collecting the required 30,000 to 35,000 signatures from eligible voters in each constituency (L18/1979). From 1990 this exemption also applied to parties aligned with such parties (L53/1990). The details of the signature requirements for ballot access across elections and time – comprising ballot access requirements besides signature requirements – are outlined in Appendix G.

### *8.1.2 Italian new minor parties' electoral trajectory*


National, regional, and EU elections in Italy are held every five years, except in cases where an assembly (national/regional) is terminated early. The figure

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<sup>155</sup> The different *regional* legal texts are cited in Appendix G.

below outlines the development in the share of constituencies in which the different parties fielded candidates over time.

Figure 8.1 Share of constituencies in which parties fielded candidates (percentage). Elections to the Chamber of Deputies, the European parliament and Regional councils: Italy, 1987-2016



**Notes:** Only data on regional elections in which seven or more regions held elections simultaneously are included in the figure. Only Chamber of Deputies (not Senate) elections are included. CD stands for Chamber of Deputies, R for regional elections, and EP for European elections. Only the parties' participation in the proportional component of Chamber of Deputies elections (only between 1994 and 2001) is registered. In cases where a new minor party fields an individual candidate on the electoral list of another party, this is not counted as electoral participation, but a party's participation in electoral coalitions is included as this means that the party did have to surpass the threshold of authorisation and present an electoral list (even though this was in conjunction with other parties/party).

**Sources:** The Ministry of Interior's electoral statistics, elaborated by author.<sup>156</sup>

The main implication of the above figure is that the selected new minor parties have been on a downward electoral trend. Since 2008/2009, all the parties have seen a decrease in the share of constituencies in which they exceed the threshold of authorisation, irrespective of institutional tier. Most prominent is the development in the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party, which are the only two parties to consistently field candidates in all constituencies in

<sup>156</sup> Can be accessed here (last accessed 28.08.2018): <https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/>.

national, regional, and EU elections since they were founded in the late 1980s and early 1990s respectively. However, since 2009 (Greens) and 2014 (Communist Refoundation Party), both parties have struggled to maintain this record on the regional level. The drop is most prominent for the Green Party. The Segni Pact has had a similar trajectory. Its ability to exceed the threshold of authorisation declined steeply after the European elections in 1999, and it eventually dissolved in 2002. Prior to that, the party had fielded lists in more than 60 percent of the constituencies in all elections.

The Pensioner Party and Tricolour Flame have differed greatly throughout their life cycles from election to election concerning the number of constituencies in which they have exceeded the threshold of authorisation. That said, both parties have generally been more successful in fielding candidates in all the electoral constituencies in European elections than they have in elections on regional and national levels. Similar to the Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the Segni Pact, both parties have since 2009 struggled to surpass the threshold of authorisation, and have presented lists in at most 40 percent of the constituencies (on all institutional tiers). The downward trend is also visible for the Communist Party of Workers and Act to Stop the Decline. While the latter stopped pursuing its constitutive function in 2014 and died, the former has exceeded the threshold of authorisation in a decreasing share of constituencies. The ultimate low was in 2014, when for the first time in its life cycle the party did not field lists in an electoral contest (the European elections).

The first and core criterion for selecting electoral contests for in-depth scrutiny of H3, is that a party experienced a shift in either income from the state or staff prior to the electoral contest. Chapter 5 (on parties' income structure) outlined how the Communist Refoundation Party and the Greens had stable

access to state funding throughout their life cycles until 2008. From 2009 onwards both parties experienced a drastic decrease in income from the state. Reflecting that, the staffing chapter showed that the two parties started to downsize staff, the Greens in 2010 and the Communist Refoundation Party in 2009. The first electoral contest for these two parties following this decrease in resources is thus the 2010 regional elections. In 2010, the Communist Refoundation Party had experienced a recent decrease in both state funding and staff, and the Greens a decrease in state funds (only). Since these parties had to collect signatures in a different number of regions (due to their diverse representation in the outgoing regional councils), the selection of the 2010 regional electoral contest for in-depth scrutiny for these two parties also secures variation concerning the signature requirement, which is another selection criterion for the electoral contests to be analysed in-depth. The Segni Pact experienced shifting levels of income from the state throughout its (short) life cycle. After 1999, however, the party lost access to state funds completely (for the first time), and it never re-accessed state funds. After 1999 the party also downsized its staff, and by 2001 it had no staff left. The first electoral contest following this was the 2001 parliamentary elections, which is the electoral contest that will be analysed below.

The Pensioner Party and Tricolour Flame share the trait of having irregular state funding access throughout their life cycles. The latter accessed state funding in 1998 and 1999, but then lost it, before it once again accessed state funding in 2004. In 2004 the party decided to take on a second employee, meaning that it then had two staff members. This increase in state funds *and* staff in 2004 represented a significant shift, and the first election that took place afterwards was the regional elections in 2005, which is thus selected for in-depth analysis. The party was subject to different signature requirements in the regional

election in 2005 than the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party were in the regional elections in 2010, ensuring variation. The Pensioner Party accessed state funding in 1990, 1997, and 2003. Between 2003 and 2005 the party increased its income from the state. The party never had staff. In order to secure the inclusion of another election for the Chamber of Deputies, the electoral contest in 2006, and not the regional election in 2005, is selected for in-depth analysis. This secures variation in signature requirements, as there was a shift (in a permissive direction) to the relevant signature requirements between the general elections in 2001 (analysed for the Segni Pact) and 2006 (analysed for the Pensioner Party). Finally, the Communist Party of Workers never had access to state funding, but has had one part-time staff member since its foundation in 2006. The party's first electoral contest was in 2008, but in order to include one election to the European parliament, I analyse how staff contributed to its electoral participation in the 2009 European elections. Act to Stop the Decline did not access state funds (nor did it have staff), and is thus not discussed further in this chapter.

In total therefore, three regional electoral contests, two electoral contests for the Chamber of Deputies, and one for the European Parliament are selected, ensuring the inclusion of all institutional tiers and a variety of signature requirements. The table below summarises the case selection, and gives core information for the following in-depth analysis of H3 in the Italian context.

Table 8.1 Selection of electoral contests for in-depth scrutiny of H3: Italy

<b>Party</b>	<b>State funding</b>	<b>Staff<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Electoral contest to analyse</b>	<b>Type of election</b>	<b>Details on parties' ability to surpass threshold of authorisation in selected electoral contest</b>
<i>The Greens</i>	Steep decrease in 2009	Yes	2010	Regional	The party decreased the share of constituencies in which it fielded lists compared to previous regional elections.
<i>The Pensioner Party</i>	Increase from 2003 onwards	No	2006	Chamber of Deputies	The party presented lists in all constituencies in an election for the Chamber of Deputies (for the first time).
<i>The Communist Refoundation Party</i>	Steep decrease in 2009	Yes (but decrease after 2008)	2010	Regional	The party presented lists in all constituencies (no change compared to before).
<i>The Segni Pact</i>	Loss after 1999	No	2001	Chamber of Deputies	The party (for the first time) did not present lists.
<i>Tricolour Flame</i>	Increase in 2004	Yes (increase in 2004)	2005	Regional	The party increased the share of constituencies in which it fielded candidates compared to previous regional elections.
<i>Communist Party of Workers</i>	No	Yes	2009	European	The party decreased the share of constituencies in which it fielded candidates.

**Notes:** <sup>1</sup> The values in this column refer to the existence of staff at the time of the electoral contest to be analysed.

The selected electoral contests from the Pensioner Party, Tricolour Flame, the Greens, and the Communist Refoundation Party are analysed first as they all lend evidence to H3. Concretely, state funds and staff are found to impact electoral participation in all these four parties. In a second section, I explore why a decrease of state funds and staff in the Segni Pact did not affect the party's pursuit of constitutive function in the 2001 elections, contrary to H3, and why staff presence did not aid electoral participation for the Communist Party of Workers, also contrary to H3.

### *8.1.3 When state funding and staff impact electoral participation (H3): The Pensioner Party, Tricolour Flame, the Greens, and the Communist Refoundation Party*

The following discussion will show how an increase of state funds in the Pensioner Party ahead of the 2006 Chamber of Deputies election, and an increase of state funds *and* staff in Tricolour Flame ahead of the 2005 regional elections, facilitated these parties' electoral participation, supporting H3. Furthermore, the analysis shows how a decrease in income from the state in the Greens before the 2010 regional elections complicated the party's pursuit of constitutive function, also supporting H3. Finally, I discuss how state funds and staff in the Communist Refoundation Party enabled its electoral participation in the 2010 regional election, supporting H3, even though both resources had drastically decreased.

Interestingly, the data suggests that the Pensioner Party's<sup>157</sup> increased income from state funds, from 2003 to 2005, directly contributed to setting up the electoral list ahead of the 2006 Chamber of Deputies elections, but in a different way than theorised in H3. Concretely, Emanuela Rocchi, Pensioner Party

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<sup>157</sup> As previous chapters have outlined, the Pensioner Party did not have staff, which is why this factor is not discussed for the Pensioner Party.



candidate for Lombardy in the 2006 Chamber of Deputies elections, stated in an interview that she first became aware of the Pensioner Party through one of party leader Carlo Fatuzzo's television broadcasts, which, as mentioned previously, were financed with the help of state funds.<sup>158</sup> After getting in touch with him and discussing her joining the party, she was recruited as a candidate (Telelombardia, 2006). The Pensioner Party was present in television broadcasts in 16 out of 20 Italian regions at least once a week in the period running up to the 2006 Chamber of Deputies elections. Only in Lombardy was the party present on 10 different channels (Partito Pensionati, undated; see also Annual account, 2006). Thus, there is some evidence that state funds, by financing television broadcasts, served as an additional way of recruiting electoral candidates, which aided the party, for whom candidate recruitment had been difficult (Party representative, 10.11.2016).

Apart from this, state funding was of little relevance to the candidate selection process, as candidacies are identified and decided upon by the top elites, mainly the party leader Carlo Fatuzzo (Party representative, 10.11.2016; Party representative, 18.01.2018). This completely centralised candidate selection mechanism lessened the theorised importance of having viable local branches to coordinate and facilitate recruitment of candidates, which was convenient for the Pensioner Party as it had active local branches in only eight out of 20 Italian regions in 2006 (Partito Pensionati, 2006). This also resonates with the fact that no funding transfers to subnational branches took place in 2006 (Financial account, 2006). This suggests that there was no indirect impact of state

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<sup>158</sup> See chapter 6 on staffing, which outlined how the Pensioner Party has refrained from having staff, instead prioritising spending state funds on television broadcasts.

funds – by means of strengthening the membership or branches – on electoral participation in 2006.

Additionally, there is little evidence that state funds assisted with the overcoming of signature requirements, as the party's decision to field candidates within a coalition (Romano Prodi's centre-left coalition), combined with its presence in the European parliament, exempted it from signature collection. The party was thus able to exploit the newly introduced exemption to the signature requirement in 2005.<sup>159</sup> The party's ability to do so was also facilitated by the strong incentives for the two dominant centre-right and centre-left coalitions to take electorally minor parties (such as the Pensioner Party) on-board in 2006, due to the majority bonus awarded to the winning coalition (Bardi, 2007; Diamanti, 2007; Giannetti & De Giorgi, 2006). Interestingly, there is indication that the Pensioner Party's small budget (despite state funding access) contributed to the party's decision to enter into an electoral coalition specifically to avoid the signature requirement. Interviewees from the party state that the signature requirement for electoral participation has been a real challenge for the party throughout its life cycle, as their collection (due to travels) and authentication have been costly (Party representative, 10.11.2017).

In sum, therefore, state funding directly aided the Pensioner Party in the process of recruiting candidates (by paying for television broadcasts), supporting H3, while there was little impact of state funds on compliance with signature requirements. Neither was there any indirect impact of state funds in building a membership or establishing and/or strengthening subnational branches. In fact, the party's participation in the centre-left coalition in 2006 seems to be the primary

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<sup>159</sup> See section 8.1.1. Specifically, the new exemption was for parties that adhered to a coalition (where two or more parties were represented in parliament), and that simultaneously had representation in the European parliament.

factor in its managing to field candidates in *all* constituencies in a national election for the first time.

Unlike the Pensioner Party, Tricolour Flame was not exempted from signature collection in any of the regions in the 2005 regional elections, which, according to interviewees, presented a challenge: '*The collection of signatures is really a problem*' (Condorelli Caff, 28.11.2016; see also Romagnoli, 16.11.2016). The collection of signatures was arguably particularly demanding in 2005 due to the party's restricted financial situation, despite the increase in state funds that the party had experienced in 2004:

In the end, the money that we had was limited. Once we had spent one part on rent, one part on salary [...], and one part to the subnational levels, there was something left to print some material, and that was it. Done (Romagnoli, 16.11.2016).

The party's income from other sources – besides state funds – had decreased the year before the 2005 regional elections due to membership decline, as former party leader Pino Rauti split from the party and created a new party (Movimento Idea Sociale) (see e.g. La Repubblica, 09.05.2004; Financial account, 2004, 2005).

The combination of the signature requirement, a perceived vulnerable financial situation (despite state funding access), and membership loss contributed to the party's decision to enter into an electoral coalition in 2005.<sup>160</sup> This did not exempt Tricolour Flame from the signature requirement (see e.g. Amabile, 2005; La Mattina, 2005), but spread it out between several parties, making it more manageable. The participation in a coalition was also an attempt to increase the party's chances of representation (La Mattina, 2005). One

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<sup>160</sup> The coalition comprised Tricolour Flame, the New Force (Forza Nuova), and the National Social Front (Fronte Sociale Nazionale), and was called The Social Alternative (Alternativa Sociale).

interviewee states that having state funds was crucial for both the collection and authentication of signatures (Romagnoli, 16.11.2016), which coincides with the party's high state-dependency in 2005 (86 percent) (Financial account, 2005). This shows that expenses related to the signature campaign were bound to (at least) partially be taken from the state funds received, supporting H3.

There is also evidence that state funds were transferred to the local branches in the course of the regional campaign in an attempt to increase the membership base of the party (Annual account, 2005; see also Romagnoli, 16.11.2016), which in turn – indirectly – could help enable the party's electoral participation, in line with H3. However, since the funds were transferred during the electoral campaign, there is little indication that they arrived in time to strengthen the party's presence on the territory before needing to exceed the threshold of authorisation in 2005, thus lending no support to H3.


In 2005, the party had two staff members, and according to interviewees, the staff in the party dealt (strictly) with administrative matters (e.g. the membership register, campaign material) (Party representative, 31.01.2018; Bevilacqua, 14.11.2016). This indicates that the staff likely also contributed to managing the formalities concerning signature requirements and the presentation of lists, indicating some support for H3. Interestingly, there is evidence that the staff, as trusted collaborators in the party, facilitated the process of setting up the electoral list by providing (informal) advice on candidacies (Romagnoli, 16.11.2016), supporting H3. Arguably, this was particularly crucial in a party like Tricolour Flame, which rarely had the luxury of selecting between candidates, and often had to rely on self-recruited candidates (Romagnoli, 16.11.2016; Bevilacqua, 14.11.2016) when the final decision regarding candidacies was made in the party's Central Committee (Francescon, 25.11.2016; Romagnoli,

16.11.2016; Condorelli Caff, 28.11.2016). Given the party's membership loss due to the split in 2004, the recruitment pool was even more restricted, arguably making the staff's informal advice even more crucial.

Thus, the data shows that state funds and staff contributed to facilitating electoral participation for Tricolour Flame in 2005, supporting H3. What seems to have enabled the party's fielding of candidates in *all* constituencies on the regional level for the first time, however, seems to be the party's participation in an electoral coalition, which lessened the demands related to both signature collection and candidate recruitment.

Whilst the analyses of the Pensioner Party and Tricolour Flame have shown how an increase of state funds (and staff in Tricolour Flame) facilitated electoral participation in line with H3, the following analysis of the Greens outlines how a decrease in state funds contributed to the party's failure to field an electoral list in all constituencies in the 2010 regional elections, also supporting H3. Specifically, the Greens had to collect signatures in nine out of 13 regions that held elections in 2010, but had experienced a significant decrease in state funds in 2009. This made the financial situation of the party restricted and difficult (Bonelli, 16.11.2016; Ripamonti, 23.11.2016; Financial reports, 2009-2012; Radio Radicale, 09.10.2009), which the figure below outlines.

Figure 8.2 Income from state funding and membership fees (euros): The Greens, 2007-2011



**Sources:** Financial accounts.

According to the Green Party's treasurer, the party's decreased income from the state made the signature requirement in the nine regions difficult to achieve in 2010, supporting H3:

The collection of signatures is a costly and laborious task. The signatures must be approved by a public employee, or by a notary. (...) The financial situation made the collection of signatures difficult (Ripamonti, 18.03.2018).

This quote is supported by current party leader, Angelo Bonelli, who emphasises the importance of state funding (in the past) for signature collection campaigns (Bonelli, 16.11.2016). Another factor that complicated the party's signature campaign in 2010 was a significant loss of members between 2009 and 2010 (see figure above). The treasurer states, '*In the Greens the number of members available to organise events and collect signatures decreased*' (Ripamonti, 18.03.2018), which is also supported by another interviewee:

(...) If you do not have elected representatives in a region, you have to collect many signatures to present a list. It was one thing to do that before

2008/2009 with 40,000 members on the territory, but another thing to do it now with 2000/3000 members (Party representative, 14.03.2018).<sup>161</sup>

Despite the party's financial difficulty due to decreased state funds, it still managed to transfer funds to the subnational branches in 2010 (Annual and financial account, 2010). The transfer shows how the presence of *some* state funds, despite being much lower than before, were still important for keeping branches running, reflecting the theoretical argument in H3. It is also likely that some of these funds were used to execute the signature campaign, supporting H3. The transfers to the subnational level to secure branches' operation were particularly important as the Regional Federal Councils were in charge of deciding on the electoral lists, and dealing with candidate proposals emerging from the local branches (Bonelli, 16.11.2016; Ripamonti, 18.03.2018).

The party's staff was not placed in redundancy schemes until *after* the 2010 regional elections (Annual account, 2010), and staff had a special eye on '*that which had to do with the presentation of lists*' (Party representative, 23.11.2017), such as keeping up to speed on ballot access requirements (see also Francescato, 25.11.2016). Consequently, staff directly contributed to aiding the party's electoral participation in the regional elections in 2010 by supporting (among other things) the signature campaign, in line with H3. Additionally, there is indication that staff contributed indirectly to electoral participation by supporting and strengthening the branches, as some of the staff primarily worked specifically to maintain the territorial branches of the party (Party representative, 23.11.2017; see also chapter 6).

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<sup>161</sup> The party representatives' reference to membership figures refer to current (2018), figures. However, the income from membership fees had already dropped significantly in 2010, highlighting the importance of his argument for the 2010 election as well.

The decreased income from the state hindered the collection of signatures in the 2010 regional elections, supporting H3. Also a membership loss contributed to this. These findings shed light on why, for the first time in 2010, the party did not present lists in all electoral constituencies in a regional election. That said, the existence of staff and *some* state funds still assisted with the party's electoral participation and helps us understand how the party managed to field lists in 10 out of 13 constituencies.


The final electoral contest that lends support to H3, is the Communist Refoundation Party's participation in the 2010 regional election. On the basis of the theoretical framework, the expectation is that the Communist Refoundation Party would have a harder time presenting electoral lists in the 2010 regional election, as the party experienced a drastic decrease in income from the state and in staff from 2007/2008 onwards. Contrary to the rationale in H3, however, this decrease in income from state funds and staff did not hamper the party's electoral participation in 2010. In fact, it fielded candidates in all the electoral constituencies that it had in prior elections. Despite this, the party's 2010 regional electoral contest is still presented as a case of support for H3, given the fact that state funds and staff (despite being decreased), were crucial for facilitating electoral participation in this contest, in line with H3.

None of the Communist Refoundation Party's interviewees, contrary to interviewees in other Italian new minor parties, mentioned the signature requirement for ballot access when they were asked about constraining regulations more generally (Gelmini, 23.11.2016; Meloni, 24.11.2016). This indicates that signature requirements have not been a prominent matter of concern for the party throughout its life cycle, including in 2010, when the party was obliged to collect signatures in eight of the 13 regions where elections were



held. It is likely that having an income of 6.6 million euros from the state was sufficient to cover expenses related to signature collection in 2010, supporting H3. This was the case even though the party's income from the state had decreased drastically prior to 2010 (see figure below), and the treasurer described the financial situation as immensely dire that year (Annual account, 2010). Moreover, the party had over 40,000 members in 2010 (Rifondazione Comunista, undated) who could aid in a signature campaign, even if it had lost some income from membership fees due to a split in 2009 (see figure below).<sup>162</sup> The large pool of members would also decrease the need to spend state funds on specific campaigns or efforts to identify and recruit candidates.

Figure 8.3 Income from state funding (euros) and number of staff: The Communist Refoundation Party, 2007-2010



**Sources:** Staffing 2008-2010: Rifondazione Comunista (undated). Income figures: Financial accounts.

**Notes:** In 2009, 41 of the staff in the figure above were in redundancy schemes, in 2010 the number was 72.

Now, there is evidence that the party reduced the transfers from the national branch to the regional branches (Annual and financial account, 2010), thereby reducing the branches' financial leeway. In fact, the transfers to subnational branches was more than halved from 2009 to 2010.<sup>163</sup> This surely could have (indirectly) affected the party's ability to file electoral lists, as decisions

<sup>162</sup> The split in 2009 drained the party of several top representatives (see e.g. La Repubblica, 24.01.2009; La Stampa, 24.01.2009).

<sup>163</sup> From ca. 2 million euros in 2009 to ca. 800,000 euros in 2010 (Financial account, 2009, 2010).

concerning candidacies for regional elections would normally be taken on the regional level (Regional Political Committee) (Gelmini, 23.11.2016; Meloni, 24.11.2016). That said, as some transfers still took place, this gave the branches some, albeit decreased, leeway to ensure operation and enable electoral participation, supporting H3.

As outlined in chapter 6, staff in the Communist Refoundation Party worked on administrative, organisational, and political matters (see e.g. Bertolino, 2004, p. 284), thereby also contributing to maintaining the membership and the territorial branches, and contributing to electoral campaigns, supporting H3. Even though 72 out of the 83 staff members were placed in redundancy schemes in 2010, and hence had less time to work for the party as they also had to attend mandatory courses etc. (see e.g. Celli, 25.06.2018; Party representative, 26.06.2018), the party still had 83 staff members – working to various degrees – in 2010. In brief, therefore, there is no indication that the party's decreased income from the state and reduced staff negatively impacted the party's electoral participation in 2010, rather the large presence of staff and state funds still contributed to the party's pursuit of constitutive function (both directly and indirectly), supporting H3.

Besides the party's access to (relatively) large resources such as staff, income, and members, the Communist Refoundation Party's ability to field lists in all constituencies in 2010, despite decreasing income from the state and lower staff levels, can also be partially be related to its participation in an electoral coalition. For the first time, the party fielded lists in an electoral coalition on the regional level. This move (as for Tricolour Flame) helped by distributing demands regarding signature collection and recruitment of candidacies between the

coalitions' constitutive parties.<sup>164</sup> Interestingly, the coalition had already been established for the European elections in 2009, and was a result of the party leader's (Paolo Ferrero) wish to cooperate with other forces, which he had pursued since he was elected leader in 2008 (see e.g. *La Repubblica*, 13.08.2008; Fusani, 2008; *Rifondazione Comunista*, 2009a; see also *Rifondazione Comunista*, 2009b). This indicates that the decreased income from the state and falling staff levels preceding the regional elections in 2010 was less important for understanding this electoral cooperation, a hypothesis also supported by interviewees (Celli, 09.04.2018), contrary to the case of Tricolour Flame and the Pensioner Party.

#### *8.1.4 When an increase or decrease of state funding and staff do not impact electoral participation: The Segni Pact and the Communist Party of Workers*

The following section explores why state funds and staff were not relevant to the Segni Pact's electoral participation in the 2001 parliamentary elections, and why the staff in the Communist Party of Workers, contrary to H3, did not aid the party's pursuit of constitutive function in the European elections in 2009.

After 1999, the Segni Pact lost access to state funds (Financial account, 1999-2001). The financial account from 2001 presented a small deficit, due to the lack of contributions from both '*private and public*' sources (Annual account, 2001). In fact, the party's only income in 2001 stemmed from editorial activities and demonstrations/rallies, and amounted to circa 31,000 euros. The party had also started to decrease its staffing figures from 1999 (Segni, 05.01.2018; see also chapter 6), and by 2001, there was no staff left (Annual account, 2001). This loss of staff meant that the party prior to 2001 had not nurtured its territorial

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<sup>164</sup> The coalition was called The Left Federation (*Federazione della Sinistra*), of which the Communist Refoundation Party and the Italian Communist Party were the largest components.

branches and supporters, as this was the core task of the party's staff (Soldani, 03.03.2018; Segni, 29.01.2018). Thus, even though the party had one representative in the European parliament ahead of the 2001 general elections (elected in 1999), the party's financial and human resources were very limited, which in turn could have hindered the party's pursuit of constitutive function 2001, supporting H3. This was especially so since the party would have had to collect signatures to participate in the 2001 Chamber of Deputies elections. That said, this lack of resources would not have posed a problem for the candidate *selection* process per se, as the candidacies were decided by the top (national) party elites (Masi, 13.03.2018; Segni, 29.01.2018).

However, contrary to H3, this resource shortage did not contribute to the party's failure to field candidates in the 2001 elections. The reason why the party did not exceed the threshold of authorisation (nor attempt to do so) in 2001, was that the party leaders had decided to pursue the goal of the party – i.e. the introduction of a majoritarian electoral system in Italy (Segni, 29.01.2018; Warner, 2008) – outside the electoral arena. Following two failed referenda in 1999 (La Repubblica, 12.01.1999; La Repubblica, 21.11.1998) and 2000 (La Repubblica, 08.02.2000; La Repubblica, 17.05.2000; La Repubblica, 15.05.2000), both seeking to abolish the proportional component in the mixed electoral system, Segni and his allies decided that, as a party, there was limited possibility to change the system further. This ended the Segni Pact's existence on the national level (Segni, 05.01.2018). One party representative states that when the final referenda was over in 2000 '*also the function of the party was over*' (Masi, 13.03.2018).<sup>165</sup> The party was officially closed down in 2002. In brief,

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<sup>165</sup> It is worth noting that the party had also struggled in elections since its foundation in 1994. Warner (2008, p. 71) argues that the 1994 electoral result of 4.6 percent for the Segni Pact was a '*resounding rejection*' of Segni's party. In the 1996 general elections, the party presented itself within an electoral coalition (Lista Dini – Rinnovamento Italiano), as the party knew it did not have

therefore, the reason why the Segni Pact does not lend evidence to H3, i.e. why a lack of state funds and staff did not affect the party's pursuit of constitutive function in 2001, was that the party had decided to close down.

Similar to the Segni Pact, the Communist Party of Workers also operated contrary to the rationale of H3. Specifically, the data suggests that the party's one employee did not aid the party's electoral participation in the 2009 European elections, as expected. The main reason was that the party leader (Marco Ferrando), employed on a part-time basis, was not employed to deal with organisational matters: '*Ferrando handles next to no matters regarding the organisation*' (Terra, 29.11.2016). Rather, he is a political figurehead, and work related to signature campaigns and development of the electoral list were thus dealt with by volunteers (ibid). Also, this means that he, as staff, was not responsible for establishing and strengthening branches, something which would have (indirectly) facilitated electoral participation. There is thus little indication that the presence of staff either directly or indirectly contributed to enabling the party to surpass the threshold of authorisation in the European elections in 2009, contrary to H3.

Interestingly, the data from the Communist Party of Workers indicate that the lack of *organisational* staff and state funds seems to have complicated electoral participation in 2009, evidenced by interviews with party representatives (Party representative, 11.11.2016; Party representative, 21.11.2016; Terra, 29.11.2016), in line with H3. Concretely, the party had to collect between 30,000 and 35,000 signatures in order to present an electoral list in the 2009 European elections, as it did not qualify for the exemption. The party's lack of state funds

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a chance of reaching the threshold for entry to parliament (4 percent) (Soldani, 03.03.2018). The participation in the 1999 European elections (in which the party ran with The National Alliance) was also a disappointment (see e.g. Buzzanca, 1999).

specifically, and the party's '*limited financial resources*' more generally (Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori, 2008), and lack of organisational staff, hindered this process:

The larger parties that have money, that have state funding, and many paid people in their secretariats, have many benefits. We are all volunteers, we work. So that makes it all more complicated (Terra, 29.11.2016).

The party has never accessed state funds, and has relied on membership fees as its main source of income (Party representative, 11.11.2016; Party representative, 21.11.2016; Terra, 29.11.2016).

The lack of organisational staff has led party representatives to take one week off from work when a new signature campaign starts, in order to deal with it properly (Terra, 29.11.2016). Another party representative argues that the low membership figures, amounting to around 1000 members in 2008 (Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori, 2008), also complicated the signature campaign in 2009:

This [signature collection] is the most difficult regulatory requirement because the small parties do not have many members, and have to collect signatures for many months, and often do not succeed in the end. So, this is the largest obstacle (Party representative, 11.11.2016).

In brief, therefore, the party's staff did not – contrary to H3 – assist with electoral participation. That said, the party's lack of (state) funds, (organisationally oriented) staff, and members, hindered electoral participation (in all constituencies) in the European elections of 2009, thereby also indicating some support for the rationale of H3.

### 8.1.5 Summary

The in-depth analysis of Italian new minor parties' electoral contests lent broad support to H3. The analysis showed that an increase in *state funds* contributed to facilitating electoral participation in Tricolour Flame in the regional elections in 2005, and the Pensioner Party in the 2006 Chamber of Deputies elections. In the former, state funds contributed to financing the signature campaign, while in the latter they financed television broadcasts which in turn aided recruitment. Similarly, a decrease in income from the state contributed to the Green Party's failure to present lists in all constituencies in the 2010 regional elections. That said, the presence of some state funds, still aided the party in executing the signature campaign, and in ensuring the operation of branches, as state funds were transferred to subnational levels. Similarly, the *decrease* in state funds did not impact electoral participation in the Communist Refoundation Party, contrary to H3. However, *in line with H3*, the party's (still comparatively high) income from the state ensured the execution of the signature campaign, and some (albeit decreased) transfers to subnational levels secured the operation of branches. Thus, the results showed that state funds both directly and indirectly aided electoral participation in these parties, by supporting signature campaigns, the development of the electoral list, and the operation of branches.

Moreover, *staff* was found to impact electoral participation – both directly and indirectly – in Tricolour Flame, the Greens, and the Communist Refoundation Party, supporting H3. In Tricolour Flame, staff aided with recruitment of candidates and with formalities regarding the presentation of the electoral list, while party staff in the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party helped with both the signature campaign and with ensuring the operation of subnational branches. Once again, the decrease in staff in the Communist Refoundation

Party was not detrimental for electoral participation (contrary to H3), rather, the party's (still large staff) contributed to enabling electoral participation, supporting H3.

In two parties shifts in staff and state funds did not have the expected impact on electoral participation. In the Communist Party of Workers, staff was not found to aid electoral participation, as the hired person did not occupy himself with organisational matters. Interestingly, however, the exploratory analysis found that the party's lack of organisational staff and state funds made electoral participation more difficult there, which in turn also supports the rationale of H3. In the Segni Pact, the decreased state funds and staff were not relevant for the party's failure to pursue constitutive function in the 2001 Chamber of Deputies elections, as the party had decided to dissolve.

The analysis found that *shifts* in income from state funds and staff sometimes contribute to changing a party's ability to pursue constitutive function (the Greens, Tricolour Flame, the Pensioner Party), and sometimes not (the Communist Refoundation Party, the Communist Party of Workers). Regardless of shifts in state funds and staff, however, the analysis found that the presence of such resources is always useful for electoral participation as long as the resources exist (to whatever degree) and are used to deal with the demands of signature requirements for ballot access and the development of the electoral list. Correspondingly, the absence of state funds and (organisational) staff was found to complicate electoral participation, as illustrated by the Communist Party of Workers. The table below summarises the findings from the analysis.



Table 8.2 Summary of analysis: The impact of state funds and staff on electoral participation: Italy

	State funding	Staff <sup>1</sup>	Electoral contest to analyse	Type of election	Support for H3	Specification of evidence
<i>The Pensioner Party</i>	Increase from 2003 and onwards	No	2006	Chamber of Deputies	Yes	Increase of <i>state funds</i> directly paid for television broadcasts which in turn aided recruitment, facilitating electoral participation.
<i>Tricolour Flame</i>	Increase in 2004	Yes (increase in 2004)	2005	Regional	Yes	Increase of <i>state funds</i> paid for expenses to signature campaign. Increased <i>staff</i> contributed in candidate selection and with formalities regarding the electoral list.
<i>The Greens</i>	Steep decrease in 2009	Yes	2010	Regional	Yes	Decreased <i>state funds</i> made signature requirement difficult to cope with. <i>Staff</i> (no change in staff) contributed to signature campaign, and to ensuring operation of branches.  The (decreased) state funds the party had were used on internal transfers, ensuring the operation of subnational branches, which facilitated electoral participation, supporting H3.
<i>The Segni Pact</i>	Loss after 1999	No (had lost after 1999)	2001	Chamber of Deputies	No	The party's elites had decided to dissolve the party. Loss of state funds and staff is thus not relevant for understanding the party's failure to pursue constitutive function in 2001.
<i>The Communist Refoundation Party</i>	Steep decrease in 2009	Yes (but decrease after 2008)	2010	Regional	Yes*	In line with H3, both <i>state funds</i> and <i>staff</i> were used to facilitate electoral participation (aiding signature campaign, supporting branches).  <i>Decreased</i> state funds and staff did not complicate electoral participation, contrary to H3.
<i>The Communist Party of Workers</i>	No	Yes	2009	European	No*	Increased <i>staff</i> presence (i.e. party leader in part-time position), did not facilitate electoral participation, contrary to H3, since the employee did not occupy himself with organisational matters.  In line with H3, however, the lack of (organisational) staff and state funds overall complicated electoral participation.

**Notes:** (\*) indicates mixed evidence (both supporting and not supporting H3).

<sup>1</sup> The values in this column refer to the existence of staff at the time of the electoral contest to be analysed.

## 8.2 Pursuit of constitutive function in Norwegian new minor parties

### *8.2.1 Norwegian signature requirements for ballot access – an overview*

The Norwegian signature requirements for ballot access have barely changed in the course of the studied new minor parties' life cycles. The Electoral Act from 1985 stated that registered parties<sup>166</sup> simply had to have the electoral list signed by the leader and secretary of the regional branch (in national and regional elections) in order to present it. For unregistered parties, the electoral list had to be supported by the signatures of at least 500 voters. The changes to the Electoral Act in 2002 made one important change to this, as it extended the signature requirement to those registered parties that in the previous parliamentary election had failed to *either* achieve 5000 votes on the national level, *or* 500 votes in at least one constituency. This was thus a constraining turn for the minor contestants in Norway. The details of other ballot access requirements – besides the signature requirement – are found in Appendix G.


### *8.2.2 Norwegian new minor parties' electoral trajectory*

The figure below outlines the electoral trajectory of each of the Norwegian new minor parties, i.e. the share of (the 19) constituencies in which each party fielded candidates in parliamentary and regional elections over time. Both national and regional elections are held in odd-numbered years in Norway, and the term for each is four years.

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<sup>166</sup> Registration required a foundation document, signatures of the members of the party's executive council, and signatures of 5000 eligible voters (Art. 17, Electoral Act, 1985). The new Electoral Act passed in 2002 kept these requirements, but also stated that a party wishing to be registered also had to submit a statute (outlining which organ was charged with the responsibility to select the executive), and be registered on the Legal Entity Register (Art. 5.1 and 5.2, Electoral Act, 2002; see also Political Party Act, 2005).

Figure 8.4 Share of constituencies in which the parties fielded candidates (percentage). Regional and parliamentary elections: Norway, 1987-2016



**Notes:** N stands for national election, S for subnational (regional) elections. There are 19 electoral constituencies in both national and regional elections. Cross Partisan MPs ran as “The Freedom Party against the EU” in 1993, and as the Freedom Party in 1995.

**Sources:** For figures from 2001 onwards: NSD (undated), and for figures prior to 2001: Statistics Norway (Undated (a)).

The figure shows how the Greens and the Pensioner Party increased the share of constituencies in which they fielded candidates throughout their life cycles. The Pensioner Party started this trend in 1993, since when it has presented lists in between 60 and 80 percent of the electoral constituencies on both national and regional levels. The turning point for the Green Party came later, and only from 2003 did the party increase the share of constituencies in which it fielded candidates. From 2009 onwards, the party systematically exceeded the threshold of authorisation in all constituencies. The Coastal Party only presented lists in the two northernmost constituencies (Finnmark and Nordland) in its first elections in 1999, while in the subsequent elections the party fielded candidates in all (or nearly all) constituencies. However, in the regional

elections in 2015 the party – for the first time since 2003 – presented lists in only 53 percent of the constituencies.

The Christian Conservative Party has been very successful in exceeding the threshold of authorisation, and has, since its foundation (2011), consistently run in all constituencies in both regional and national elections. The Fatherland's Party, Cross Partisan MPs, and Future for Finnmark stand out from the four aforementioned parties as they have generally exceeded the threshold of authorisation in a lower share of constituencies. Future for Finnmark only ran in the parliamentary elections in 1989, and only fielded electoral lists in one constituency (Finnmark). After 1989 the party never participated in elections again and died in 1993. Cross Partisan MPs exceeded the threshold of authorisation in between 11 and 37 percent of the constituencies from 1993 to 2001. After 2001, it did not present itself again until 2009, when it fielded a list in one constituency (Nordland). The Fatherland's Party managed to present lists in all constituencies in the national elections in 1993, 1997, and 2001, but to a very varying degree on the regional level. After 2001, the party did not field lists in any constituency, and officially died in 2008.

The most important criterion for selecting an electoral contest for in-depth scrutiny is variation with regards to state funding and staff. Chapter 5 (on income structure) outlined how the Pensioner Party accessed state funding for the first time, by means of internal transfers from the subnational levels, in 1991. Whilst 10 percent of the income from the state was to be transferred to the national level in 1991 (Pensjonistpartiet, 1991a), it increased to 20 percent in 1992 (Pensjonistpartiet, 1992b; Pensjonistpartiet, 1993a), and there was thus a stark increase in the (national) party's income from the state in 1992, even though, as chapter 6 outlined, the party did not have staff at the time. The party's first election

following this shift was the 1993 parliamentary elections, which will be explored in-depth below. Similarly, the Greens also accessed state funds in the mid-1990s, but, as outlined in chapter 5, the party experienced its greatest increase in income from the state in the years following 2006, when the party accessed state funds on the national level for the first time. In parallel, the party also increased its staffing figures from 2008 onwards. In order to explore the impact of both increased state funds *and* staff, the 2009 parliamentary election is thus selected, and not the 2007 regional elections. In a similar vein, previous chapters have outlined how the Christian Conservative Party accessed state funds for the first time following (its first ever) parliamentary election in 2013, and took on two staff members as a result. The first electoral contest following this increase in state funds and staff is the 2015 regional elections, which is selected for in-depth analysis.

Both the Coastal Party and the Fatherland's Party experienced decreasing income from the state, and reduction in staff (only the Coastal Party), in their life cycles. Specifically, the Fatherland's Party had irregular access to state funds in the early years of its life cycle (1992-1999), but received its very last instalment in 1999. The first election following this was the 2001 parliamentary election, which would be the first choice for the in-depth analysis below. However, in order to investigate how a new minor party responded to the constraining turn in the signature requirement for ballot access in 2002, the second election following the party's loss of state funding is selected for in-depth scrutiny, i.e. the regional elections in 2003. Similarly to the Fatherland's Party, the Coastal Party – which had enjoyed stable access to state funds and staff from 2006 onwards – first experienced a stark decrease in income from the state in 2009, and then again in 2013. From 2013 onwards, the party also operated on a completely voluntary

basis (i.e. without staff), which is why the regional elections in 2015 (and not the 2013 parliamentary elections) are analysed below.

Given that Cross Partisan MPs and Future for Finnmark had neither state funding nor staff throughout their life cycles, the dynamics between state funds and/or staff and electoral participation cannot be explored. These parties are thus omitted from analysis below. In brief, five electoral contests will be analysed in-depth in the next section, two parliamentary (1993 and 2009) and three regional (2003, and two in 2015) elections. This ensures an analysis of elections on different institutional tiers, and of electoral contests where the new minor parties are exposed to different signature requirements for ballot access.

Table 8.3 Selection of electoral contests for in-depth scrutiny of H3: Norway

<b>Party</b>	<b>State funding</b>	<b>Staff<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Electoral contest to analyse</b>	<b>Type of election</b>	<b>Details on parties' ability to surpass threshold of authorisation in selected electoral contest</b>
<i>The Pensioner Party</i>	Increase in 1992	No	1993	National	The party increased the share of constituencies in which it fielded candidates.
<i>The Green Party</i>	Increase after 2006	Yes (increase after 2008)	2009	National	The party increased the share of constituencies in which it fielded candidates.
<i>The Fatherland's Party</i>	Loss in 1999	No	2003	Regional	The party did not field candidates in any constituency.
<i>The Coastal Party</i>	Decrease in 2013	No (lost in 2013)	2015	Regional	The party decreased the share of constituencies in which it fielded candidates.
<i>The Christian Conservative Party</i>	Increase in 2014	Yes	2015	Regional	No change. As in 2013, the party fielded lists in all constituencies.

**Notes:** <sup>1</sup> The values in this column refer to the existence of staff at the time of the electoral contest to be analysed.

### 8.2.3 *When state funding and staff impact electoral participation (H3): The Pensioner Party, the Greens, the Christian Conservative Party, the Coastal Party, and the Fatherland's Party*

The following analysis outlines how either state funds or staff – or both – contributed to facilitating electoral participation in all the Norwegian new minor parties under scrutiny, supporting H3.

State funding facilitated the Pensioner Party's increased ability to field electoral candidates in the parliamentary elections in 1993 by contributing to solving a conflict and to establishing branches. First and foremost, state funding – accessed on the subnational level and transferred to the national level – helped make possible the unification between two factions in 1991. Concretely, since the party's foundation in 1985, two factions had quarrelled over the right to represent the party, meaning that two competing executive councils on the national level (and in several regions) were present (Pensjonistpartiet, 1992a; Pensjonistpartiet, 1992c). Attempts to unite the two factions before the subnational elections in 1991 failed (Pensjonistpartiet, 1991b), but following what was characterised as an '*exceptionally good*' electoral result in that election (Loraas, 1991), the leaders of the two competing factions agreed to hold an extraordinary congress in 1991 to unite the party '*with the main goal to continue the good electoral result also in the parliamentary elections in 1993*' (Pensjonistpartiet, 1991c). State funds contributed to this unification as the extraordinary congress decided to spend them on covering expenses that each of the factions' executive councils had incurred in 1991. Additionally, the income from state funding was to cover the two executive councils' legal expenses (up to a limit of 30,000 NOK, ca. 3000 euros) (Pensjonistpartiet, 1991a). Consequently, the availability of state funding enabled the two factions to enter into a united

party without considerable (personal) debts, easing the transition into a joint party.

The unification of the party was particularly important for electoral participation, as candidate selection happened on the regional level, and the regional branch, in collaboration with the local branches, identified and decided on the candidacies (Lonstad, 08.06.2017; Remman, 20.06.2017; Gjermundnes, 20.06.2017; see also Pensjonistpartiet, 1993b). Consequently, the elimination of the party's two executive councils (on both national and regional levels) ahead of the 1993 elections, meant that the number of regions with coherent executive councils was larger. This also made the work of compiling electoral lists in a wider range of regions more simple and feasible than it had been before. State funds also contributed to establishing new branches, supporting H3. The Pensioner Party's budget from 1992 outlines that the party planned to spend 30,000 NOK on preparation of the election campaign and on travels related to the establishment of three new regional branches (Pensjonistpartiet, 1992b). In fact, the party increased its number of regional branches from 11 in 1990 (Nygaard, 1991) to 14 in 1991 (Pensjonistpartiet, 1991b), and then to 16 in 1994 (Pensjonistpartiet, 1994).<sup>167</sup> The Pensioner Party, being a registered party in 1993, had no obligation to collect signatures. This is why there is no indication that the party needed either state funding or staff (which the party did not have) in order to exceed ballot access requirements.

Similarly to the Pensioner Party, the Greens was not subject to a signature requirement in the 2009 parliamentary elections, as it achieved more than 500 votes in at least one constituency in the previous (2005) parliamentary elections,

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<sup>167</sup> Unfortunately, I have not been able to access membership figures for the Pensioner Party in this phase, and I thus cannot assess the potential impact of state funds on shifts in the membership.



exempting it from the signature requirement. State funds and staff thus enabled electoral participation in 2009 by contributing to creating and strengthening subnational branches and increasing the membership. This arguably contributed to the party's ability to present lists in all electoral districts in 2009, supporting H3. More concretely, prior to 2008/2009, the Greens had mostly relied on one part-time employee, dealing with everything from administrative and financial matters, to members and branches. This restricted the party's ability to maintain and secure the operation of (vulnerable) regional branches, and in 2008, the party's executive did not achieve its goal of having an annual meeting in all regions (Annual account, 2008), showing how poorly functioning many of the Green's regional branches were in 2008. Early in 2009, however, the party took on one employee specifically to work on the establishment of new branches and on strengthening the existing ones (Annual account, 2008), which '*significantly improved*' the work within this field (ibid). Three new regional branches were established,<sup>168</sup> while the work on three other regions was well underway (Annual account, 2008). An interviewee also emphasises that the presence of state funds (not just staff) granted the national branch leeway to support the branches:

It [state funding] makes it possible to more effectively follow up on the regional branches, and offer services to the rest of the organisation (...) (Gaupset, 15.05.2017).


As candidacies for national elections are recruited and decided upon by the regional branch, with the help of local branches and members (Golis, 02.06.2017; Gaupset, 15.05.2017), the role of state funds and staff in establishing and strengthening branches was particularly important for electoral participation,

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<sup>168</sup> Telemark, Østfold and Hedmark.

supporting H3. The figure below shows the increase in subnational (regional and local) branches in the period of interest:

Figure 8.5 Development of membership and number of local branches in the Green Party, 2007-2010



**Sources:** Annual and financial accounts, obtained from party office.

This figure also shows that the party experienced a surge in membership from 2007 onwards, which was also emphasised as necessary for the increased presentation of lists in the 2009 election (MDG-nytt 8/2008; MDG-nytt 9/2008). This demonstrates how having a solid recruitment ground is important for the process of setting up electoral lists, as theorised. Given that the party's staff was concerned with the maintenance of the membership register (among other things) (see chapter 6), the staff may have also contributed to this membership increase, in turn facilitating electoral participation, lending support to H3.

In addition to the importance of having staff to deal with branches, and members to recruit from, the party's increased electoral participation in 2009 was thanks to one of the two new spokespersons elected in 2008, Hanna Marcussen. She brought in a very clear vision and strategy for the Green Party, which rubbed off on the party, according to Green politician Hans Borgen: '*We became much more strategic. You saw the first seeds of this in 2009 (...)*' (Sand Holth and Mide Solberg, 2015). For example, the National Council initiated a relaunch of the party after the 2008 congress, initiated work on a new party program (as the previous program had its basis in the program from 1997), and by June 2008 it had already

developed a detailed strategy for the 2009 elections. Moreover, one of the regions (Nordland) was declared to be a focus region. A new graphic profile for the party was also to be developed (Annual account, 2008; Sand Holth and Mide Solberg, 2015). Marcussen's role in leading and coordinating these various processes has been highlighted both by my and others' interviewees (Simonsen, 16.06.2017; former and current party secretaries Mikkel Storm Glomstein and Lars Gaupset in Siem Knudsen, 2016). Moreover, Marcussen also worked tirelessly, starting in the 2009 elections, to increase the Greens' media visibility, for example by working to become included in voting advice applications, and to be included in television debates (Siem Knudsen, 2016; see also Sand Holth and Mide Solberg, 2015).

In brief, therefore, staff and state funds contributed to strengthening branches and increasing the membership which in turn helped the party to increase the share of constituencies in which it fielded candidates in 2009, supporting H3. The presence of a resourceful leader also helped.

State funds and staff also indirectly contributed to electoral participation in the Christian Conservative Party in the regional elections in 2015, when the party fielded candidates in all electoral constituencies. As with the Greens, the Christian Conservative Party's performance in the 2013 parliamentary elections exempted the party from having to collect signatures in the 2015 regional elections, as the party received more than 5000 votes overall in the country. Coming into election year 2015, the party had two employees, and, according to party interviewees, these contributed in different (indirect) ways to electoral participation in 2015. More specifically, staff aided in ensuring the operation of the subnational branches. The party had established branches in all

constituencies prior to the parliamentary elections in 2013,<sup>169</sup> and the staff worked specifically on supporting these, for example by '(...) *checking and following up that everything was right, and that procedures were followed [...]*' (Party representative, 08.02.2018). The party's annual account from 2015 states that the staff, of them party leader Erik Selle, along with two other party representatives, visited a range of regional (and local) branches throughout 2015. Also, a party representative states that one of the hired party leader's tasks was to motivate the party's regionally (and locally) appointed representatives (Husveg, 18.12.2018). This shows how the presence of staff contributed to ensuring the operation of subnational branches ahead of the 2015 regional elections.

Staff support of regional branches was particularly important as the regional branch was responsible for setting up the electoral list, while members and local branches supported the process by suggesting candidates (Party representative, 08.02.2018; Husveg, 18.12.2017). The staff's effort to ensure the operation of the branches was arguably also important as the financial resources in the Christian Conservative Party's branches were very poor coming into the election year 2015. The reason was that none of them had had the opportunity to access state funds themselves,<sup>170</sup> and were thus dependent on transfers from the national level. In 2014 no such transfers took place (Financial account, 2014), but there were some transfers in 2015 (Financial account, 2015; Husveg, 18.12.2017).<sup>171</sup> However, the transfers in 2015 were mainly meant to support the electoral campaign (Husveg, 18.12.2017), i.e. they were not intended for the

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<sup>169</sup> The travels and efforts related to the establishment of all the branches were financed with loans. These loans, after 2014, were then paid down with the help of state funds (Party representative, 08.02.2018; Husveg, 18.12.2017).


<sup>170</sup> In the 2011 subnational elections, the party did not present electoral lists in any regions (only in one municipality, Bømlo).

<sup>171</sup> The party's membership fees were paid to the national branch (see Partiet de Kristne, 2015b).

process of exceeding the threshold of authorisation, which takes place months ahead of the campaign. Thus, staff support of the (financially weak) branches was important to keep them operative, supporting H3.

Additionally, there is some indication that staff presence contributed to the membership growth that the party experienced prior to the 2015 regional elections (see figure below), which was important for securing a recruitment pool, lending some support to H3. The hired party leader worked on motivating members and, in addition to the administrative employee, seeing to tasks related to maintenance of members, for example responding to their queries on email/telephone, and maintaining the membership register (Husveg, 18.12.2018).

Figure 8.6 Membership development, the Christian Conservative Party, 2013-2015



**Source:** Partiet de Kristne (undated).

Finally, the party prioritised spending some of its state funds specifically on strengthening the branches prior to the 2015 election, supporting H3. Concretely, the annual account from 2014 states that the party had started to arrange training courses on the regional level within the financial range that it could allow itself, concerning '*work methodology, ideology, and program*' (Annual account, 2014). As the party received more than 50 percent of its income from the state in 2015, it is likely that state funds, in addition to the party's two other core income sources (donations and membership fees), contributed to financing this training (Financial account, 2015).


In brief, the evidence from the Christian Conservative Party reveals that state funds and staff both contributed to strengthening the operation of party branches ahead of the 2015 regional campaign, supporting H3. That said, the party's recent effort (prior to the 2013 parliamentary election) to establish branches in all regions – an effort that was financed with the help of loans (see e.g. Party representative, 08.02.2018; Husveg, 18.12.2017) – laid important groundwork for the party's ability to field candidates in all constituencies in 2015.

So far, the analysis has shown the importance of an increase of state funds and staff for electoral participation. The evidence from the Coastal Party echoes these findings, but shows how the loss of staff prior to the 2015 regional election was detrimental to the party's membership, supporting H3, in turn shedding light on why the party only presented lists in 10 of the 19 regions in 2015. Concretely, the loss of staff in 2013, sparked by decreased income from the state (see chapter 6), put extra pressure on the members, as they increasingly had to deal with administrative, rather than purely political, tasks prior to the 2015 election (Stabrun Johansen, 26.01.2018). A long-standing regional and local representative, who left the party in 2016, states:

I used to say that the Coastal Party is a party that eats its own people. Because it only demanded more and more of us who were left and who stayed on until the end, and to put it this way: The less we managed. Because the fewer people we were, the less we managed to accomplish (Olsen, 25.01.2018).

Thus, there is strong indication that the party's loss of staff made it much harder to be a party member in the Coastal Party, as more work, not just related to elections, but also generally, fell on these members, showing how the loss of one resource (staff) also contributed to the loss of another (members). The figure below shows that the party's income from membership fees was nearly halved ahead of the 2015 elections.

Figure 8.7 Income from membership fees (NOK): The Coastal Party, 2009-2016



**Sources:** Financial accounts 2009-2013, and from 2015-2016.

This decrease in membership drained the regional branches of representatives. This was problematic as it was the regional branches that were responsible for seeing the candidate selection process through (Olsen, 25.01.2018; Stabrun Johansen, 26.01.2018; see also Kystpartiet, 2014). According to interviewees, the party's loss of regular – but also more prominent – members, such as elected representatives on the subnational level, particularly hindered electoral participation in 2015. Former party leader Bengt Stabrun Johansen states:

(...) The number of members has decreased, but even worse is the fact that central, active members, so to speak, those who have been active in regional branches and in local branches, have also left the party, and we have not been able to recruit new members (Stabrun Johansen, 26.01.2018).

A concrete example from the 2015 electoral campaign illustrates how the loss of members, and prominent ones at that, affected the party. In one municipality (Loppa), the Coastal Party had held the mayoral position for two election periods (eight years) prior to 2015. However, when the mayor decided not to stand for another electoral term, nobody else in that party branch wished to take his place on the electoral list (the first position). Moreover, throughout the eight years the pool from which the branch could draw candidates had shrunk to five (all local councillors), which meant that the number of candidates necessary to create a list was too small. Thus, loss of both regular and prominent members meant that

a party that had held the mayoral position for two periods did not manage to present a list in 2015 (Stabrun Johansen, 26.01.2018; Mjøen, 2015), highlighting an acute emergency in the party's recruitment pool.

Thus, a loss of staff (sparked by a stark decrease in income from the state), contributed to complicating electoral participation in the regional elections in 2015, due to its impact on membership loss, supporting H3. The party did not have to collect signatures in order to field lists in this election, as it was exempted, showing how the signature requirement is not relevant for understanding the party's decreased ability to field electoral lists in this election.


Adding to the findings from the Coastal Party, the loss of state funds in the Fatherland's Party (the party never had staff), hindered the party's ability to comply with the signature requirement in the 2003 regional elections, supporting H3. As the Fatherland's Party had failed to win at least 5000 votes nationally or 500 votes in a region (constituency) in the previous parliamentary election in 2001, the new law (introduced in 2002) stated that the party had to collect signatures to field lists in the 2003 regional election. However, the Fatherland's Party was (as it was throughout its life cycle) in deep financial trouble before the 2003 election. Already in 1997, party leader Harald Trefall stated that the party '*is financially weaker than ever*' (Fedrelanspartiet, 1997). In 2002, the year before the election, the executive council stated that '*When the debts concerning the newsletter and the Oslo regional branch, and expenses concerning the congress, are paid, it is not financially possible for the executive to do more in 2002*' (Fedrelanspartiet, 2002a). The congress in 2002 was held as a telephone meeting to reduce costs (ibid). This shows that the Fatherland's Party had few funds to spend on a signature campaign related to the 2003 elections, in turn hindering electoral participation in line with H3. Moreover, there were no funds



available to support the operation of subnational branches and to boost membership campaigns. There was even a lack of funds available to execute basic meetings, meaning that potential meetings to recruit candidates – as outlined in the theoretical argument – were impossible to arrange.

In addition to a lack of (state) funds, the party's membership decreased, which meant a smaller recruitment pool, and fewer people it could rely on for signature collection. The figure below shows the party's declining trend in income from members:

Figure 8.8 Income from membership fees (NOK): The Fatherland's Party, 1993-1999



**Source:** Fedrelandspartiet (2002a).

By the parliamentary elections in 2001 the decreasing membership had already presented challenges for candidate recruitment, as the same group of party representatives (of them party leader Harald Trefall) were candidates in nearly all of the 19 electoral constituencies (NSD, undated). The membership decline was partially caused by internal splits. For example, the party lost some people to a group in 1998 called the National Alliance (Bergens Tidende, 2000), and to a marginal party called the National People's Party (Nasjonalt Folkeparti) in 2000/2001 (Ellingsen, 2001). Moreover, the party had to eject certain members due to their support for Nazi beliefs (Moseng, 26.02.2018). There is no indication that the loss of state funds per se contributed to the decrease in members, but the party did struggle in the late 1990s to send out membership fee payment slips

to all members on a regular basis (Fedrelandspartiet, 1997), showing how organisational incapacity affected the party's income from members.<sup>172</sup>

Party representatives themselves argue that the main reason that the party did not present lists in the 2003 elections was the signature requirement for ballot access (see Jensen, 2003; Løschbrant, 2003). This analysis has outlined why this was so, namely due to the loss of state funds, supporting H3, the lack of other sources of income, and a decreasing membership. The analysis has also shown how the party's loss of members would have hindered the development of electoral lists, and how the lack of funds would have made basic meetings to secure recruitment difficult to execute, in line with H3.

#### *8.2.4 Summary*

The in-depth analysis of the ways in which state funds and staff affect electoral participation in Norwegian new minor parties has provided ample support for H3. The analysis has mainly shown how state funds and staff indirectly facilitate electoral participation in Norwegian new minor parties. *State funds* were found to impact electoral participation in the Pensioner Party, the Greens, the Christian Conservative Party, and the Fatherland's Party, supporting H3. In the Pensioner Party state funds helped to solve a conflict which had split the party, hindering its presentation of electoral lists across regions, and helped to establish branches. State funds in the Greens and the Christian Conservative Party helped to strengthen party branches, in the latter by paying for training courses for regional party representatives. Finally, the loss of state funds in the Fatherland's Party contributed to make the party's financial leeway (even more) restricted, thereby

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<sup>172</sup> It is likely that this also explains the large shifts in income from the membership, for example between 1997 and 1998 in the figure above.

– directly – contributing to make the execution of a signature campaign in 2003 highly difficult. It also prevented the party from arranging basic meetings.

In a similar vein, *staff* contributed to establishing and strengthening subnational branches in the Greens, facilitating the party's ability to surpass the threshold of authorisation in a higher number of constituencies (compared to before) in 2009. There was also some indication that staff presence contributed to the party's increase in membership ahead of the 2009 elections. Staff similarly secured the operation of (financially constrained) branches in the Christian Conservative Party ahead of the 2015 regional elections, contributing to the party's presentation of lists in all electoral constituencies. Similarly, the loss of staff (linked to a decrease in state funds) in the Coastal Party put strain on the members, which in turn led to membership loss and to a decreased ability to present lists in the 2015 regional election. The results from the analysis are summarised in the table below.

Table 8.4 Summary of analysis: The impact of state funds and staff on electoral participation: Norway

	State funding	Staff <sup>1</sup>	Electoral contest to analyse	Type of election	Support for H3	Specification of evidence
<i>The Pensioner Party</i>	Increase in 1992	No	1993	National	Yes	Increase of <i>state funds</i> contributed to solving conflict (leading to united branches, and a united party), and to establishing branches.
<i>The Greens</i>	Increase after 2006	Yes (increase after 2008)	2009	National	Yes	Increase of <i>state funds</i> contributed to strengthening branches. <i>Staff</i> contributed to establishing new and strengthening existing branches. There is also indication that staff contributed to membership increase.
<i>The Christian Conservative Party</i>	Increase in 2014	Yes	2015	Regional	Yes	<i>Staff</i> contributed to strengthening party branches, and also to membership increase. <i>State funds</i> contributed to strengthening branches by paying for training courses on the regional level.
<i>The Coastal Party</i>	Decrease in 2013	No (lost in 2013)	2015	Regional	Yes	Loss of <i>staff</i> (linked to decrease of state funds) put strain on members, thus contributing to membership loss, which hindered electoral participation due to restricted recruitment pool.
<i>The Fatherland's Party</i>	Loss in 1999	No	2003	Regional	Yes	Loss of <i>state funds</i> made the financial situation very restricted, contributing to limiting the party's ability to execute a signature campaign. Also, the lack of (state) funds meant that branches were not supported, nor could meetings (to recruit candidates) be held.

**Notes:** <sup>1</sup> The values in this column refer to the existence of staff at the time of the electoral contest to be analysed.

### 8.3 Comparative overview and discussion

The analyses in this chapter found that state funds and staff both affect electoral participation for new minor parties in Norway and Italy, supporting H3. Four indicators were used to analyse this. The first two captured whether state funds and staff were used to overcome signature requirements for ballot access and to develop and present the electoral list, thereby capturing the direct impact of state funds and staff on electoral participation. The second two indicators captured the extent to which state funds and staff indirectly contributed to electoral participation, i.e. whether state funds and staff were used to recruit members, and/or establish and strengthen subnational branches.

*State funds* directly influenced electoral participation across Norwegian and Italian new minor parties, supporting H3. Broadly, the results from this chapter thus support Nassmacher's (2009, p. 292) contention that state funds keep parties alive from one election to the next, by showing how such funds help new minor parties to exceed the threshold of authorisation, allowing them to continue to field lists in elections. More specifically, the results from this chapter add detail to results from previous studies that have found a link between state funding and new minor parties' (and other parties) ability to remain in the electoral race (i.e. survive) (see Bolleyer, 2013; Casal Bértoa & Taleski, 2016; Casal Bértoa & Walecki, 2014; Spirova, 2007), empirically outlining exactly *how* exactly state funds (can) matter. More specifically, the analysis found that state funds helped to pay for expenses related to signature campaigns, as illustrated by Tricolour Flame in Italy, to pay for television broadcasts that facilitated recruitment in the Italian Pensioner Party, and to solve conflict in the Norwegian Pensioner Party. Conversely, a decrease of state funds made the signature campaign more complicated to execute in the Greens in Italy and the Norwegian Fatherland's

Party, while the complete lack of state funds had the same impact in the Communist Party of Workers. Indirectly, state funds contributed to establishing and/or strengthening branches, or contributed to membership growth, in the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy, and the Pensioner Party, the Greens, and the Christian Conservative Party in Norway. A loss of state funds meant that the Fatherland's Party in Norway was unable to support its branches.

In a similar vein – and also supporting H3 – the presence or loss of *staff* was found to affect electoral participation across new minor parties in Norway and Italy. More specifically, staff was found to directly aid electoral participation in Tricolour Flame and the Greens in Italy, by contributing to executing the signature campaigns. In Tricolour Flame, staff also helped to decide on candidacies. In terms of indirect impact on electoral participation, staff aided in the establishment and strengthening of branches in the Greens and the Christian Conservative Party in Norway, and the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy. The loss of staff in the Coastal Party led to membership loss, which in turn hindered electoral participation. These results thus add another layer to the aforementioned literature linking state funding to new minor parties' continued ability to field electoral lists. They show how staff – largely found to be linked to state funding access in this study – specifically contribute to electoral participation for new minor parties, and do so in ways different to the contribution made by state funds directly. Whereas existing studies have shown how both state funds and staff are useful for election campaigns (Casas-Zamora, 2006; see e.g. Farrell, 1996; Farrell, 2000; Karlsen, 2010), the findings from this chapter demonstrate how both resources are crucial for new minor parties' ability to make it to the election campaign at all – by aiding them in the stage prior to that, that of exceeding the threshold of authorisation. As such, the findings from this study

highlight one particular reason why income<sup>173</sup> and staff are crucial indicators of party organisational strength (see e.g. Webb, 2002; Webb & Keith, 2017). Specifically, both types of resource individually contribute to new minor parties' ability to pursue their constitutive function, while a decrease or lack of such resources hinders it.

The findings from the in-depth analysis of electoral contests in relation to Norwegian and Italian new minor parties coincide with previous research which has documented that costs related to electoral participation (such as signature requirements) particularly impact electorally minor parties (Rashkova & Spirova, 2014). More specifically, this analysis found that the way in which new minor parties prioritise the *use* of state funds and staff in the pursuit of constitutive function is largely a response to the requirements concerning signature collection in place in each context. To elaborate, in the Italian context, where all the new minor parties (except the Pensioner Party) were subject to signature requirements to exceed the threshold of authorisation, state funds and staff were found to most often have a direct impact on electoral participation by contributing to processes of planning and executing signature campaigns. Conversely, state funds and staff in the Norwegian context, where just one party was subject to a signature requirement, for the most part had 'only' an indirect impact on electoral participation, and were (mainly) spent on establishing and/or strengthening branches, or securing membership growth. Existing studies on new party entrance into the electoral system (see e.g. Bischoff, 2006; Rashkova, 2010; Tavits, 2006, 2008) evidence the importance of ballot access criteria. This study extends those findings by showing how one type of ballot access requirement, namely signature requirements, shapes new minor parties' *operation* in the

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<sup>173</sup> As new minor parties are highly state-dependent, income here refers to state funds.

electoral system, by prompting them to prioritise using two of their core resources to secure their continued electoral participation.

The theoretical argument for H3 contended that state funds and staff can shape membership size, which, it was in turn argued, has the potential to impact new minor parties' ability to pursue constitutive function. In line with the literature which argues that the extra-parliamentary units of parties '*prepare the party for the next electoral event*' (Kölln, 2015, p. 707), the analysis showed how the wealth of members in the Communist Refoundation Party enhanced the party's ability to execute a signature campaign, and how an increase of members in the Greens and Christian Conservative Party in Norway helped the parties to construct an electoral list. Conversely, a decrease of members or low membership figures in the Tricolour Flame, the Communist Party of Workers, and the Greens in Italy, complicated signature campaigns and the recruitment of candidates, while decreased membership figures in the Coastal Party and Fatherland's Party in Norway made the recruitment of candidates difficult, hindering electoral participation. These results contribute to the literature in two ways. First of all, they empirically demonstrate how important members can be as a recruitment pool for candidacies in elections (Scarrow, 2000, p. 84; 2015, p. 102), thereby addressing Art's (2011, p. 35) contention that '*one thing that parties absolutely cannot do without (...), is candidates*'. Secondly, the findings show how important members can be as providers of volunteer labour, for instance related to the execution of signature campaigns (Katz, 2002; Scarrow, 2000, 2015). Whilst existing studies have argued that members are particularly important for new parties because of the electoral support they can provide (Kölln, 2014, p. 465), this study adds another dimension, and shows that members are



equally important for new (minor) parties in ensuring that they are able to run at all.

Two parties operated contrary to the hypothesised rationale of H3. In the Segni Pact, state funds and staff were not relevant for the party's failed pursuit of constitutive function in 2001, as the party had decided to close down. The other party operating contrary to H3 was the Communist Party of Workers. The analysis found that staff with purely political (not organisational) tasks, did not contribute as theorised to electoral participation, outlining how staff must be directly utilised in efforts to collect or execute signature campaigns, or must work on establishing or strengthening subnational branches, in order to aid electoral participation for new minor parties.

Echoing the results in chapter 6 (on staffing), the Communist Refoundation Party's (comparatively large) resources once again made the party an anomalous case in the analysis. Even though state funds and staff were found to be important for its exceeding the threshold of authorisation in the 2010 regional elections – supporting H3 – the party also lent evidence contrary to H3, as its stark decrease in income from state funds and staff prior to the election did not affect the party's ability to exceed the threshold of authorisation in 2010 *per se*. This finding coincides with the finding from chapter 6, where I found that when a new minor party's budget is of a certain size, shifts in income from the state cease to matter in intra-organisational dynamics such as staffing. Similarly, the analysis of the Communist Refoundation Party in this chapter showed that shifts in income from the state and shifts in staff do not matter as long as the party still has (comparatively large) staff resources and state funds available. This argument was effectively demonstrated by the fact that shifts in income from the state and shifts in staff impacted the electoral participation of new minor parties with smaller

budgets and less staff (than the Communist Refoundation Party), such as the Greens in Italy and the Coastal Party in Norway. The analysis of the Communist Refoundation Party once again indicates how organisationally strong (in terms of state funds and staff) a new minor party has to be in order to avoid being vulnerable to shifting external pressures such as regulation.

Similarly, new minor parties' overall budget was also shown to have an impact on electoral participation in Tricolour Flame and the Pensioner Party in Italy. Concretely, both parties – despite an increase in income from the state – decided to participate in an electoral coalition in 2005 and 2006 respectively, due to the parties' limited budgets (and hence limitations with regards to signature collection). These findings in turn add more empirical evidence to studies that have found that parties' financial considerations can shape their particular electoral choices (Kostadinova, 2005; Rashkova & Spirova, 2014; Spirova, 2007, p. 146). In a related vein, the analysis showed how participation in electoral coalitions facilitated parties' pursuit of constitutive function, for example by easing the demands of signature collection, as illustrated by the Pensioner Party, Tricolour Flame, and the Communist Refoundation Party. In turn, this helps to understand how the Pensioner Party and Tricolour Flame for the first time could manage to field lists in *all* constituencies on national and regional levels respectively.

## 8.4 Summary

This chapter has analysed in-depth how state funds and staff influence new minor parties' pursuit of constitutive function, i.e. electoral participation. The analyses of Italian and Norwegian parties each started with a brief outline of the characteristics and developments of signature requirements for ballot access in

the relevant context, before the electoral trajectory of each of the individual new minor parties was outlined. Concretely, the number of constituencies in which each of the parties fielded candidates in supra-national (only Italy), national, and regional elections, over time was presented. This constituted the life cycle analysis of pursuit of constitutive function for each of the new minor parties. One electoral contest following either an increase or decrease of state funds and/or staff was selected for each party (that had either state funds and/or staff), in order to explore in-depth the dynamics of whether and how state funds and staff shape parties' electoral participation (H3). The selection of electoral contests also took into account the institutional tier of the election and signature requirements for ballot access. The overall finding of the in-depth analysis was that state funds and staff shape electoral participation, thus supporting H3. First, these resources directly influence electoral participation, by either facilitating (if increase of resources) or hindering (if loss/decreased resources) the execution of signature campaigns and/or the development and presentation of electoral lists. Secondly, and indirectly, state funds and staff contribute to membership growth and the establishment and strengthening of subnational branches, thereby contributing to electoral participation. Conversely, a decrease/loss of such resources was found to contribute to membership loss and failure to maintain branches, in turn hindering electoral participation. This chapter concludes the empirical part of the thesis. The next chapter, the conclusion, delves further into the implications of the findings of this chapter, and of the staffing and centralisation analysis, and addresses both their normative implications and their implications for future research.

## 9 Conclusion

### 9.0 Introduction

This thesis started out by describing the increased tendency around the world to distribute state funding to parties (Casas-Zamora, 2006), the growing tendency to regulate these funds through transparency and disclosure requirements (Biezen, 2008), and the importance of state funds for party budgets (Poguntke et al., 2016). These developments highlighted the importance of understanding in-depth whether and how state funds shape intra-organisational dynamics in contemporary parties.

In order to aid such understanding, this thesis zoomed in on the specific role state funding plays (or does not play) in staffing, the centralisation of the executive council, and pursuit of constitutive function in new minor parties, thereby complementing previous studies which (mainly) analyse correlations between state funds and different intra-organisational processes. In order to analyse the impact of state benefits and constraints in parties where it was most likely to manifest itself, newly established (post-1980) and electorally minor parties (winning less than 10 percent of the vote) were analysed. These parties are largely state-dependent (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 43), arguably shaped more by external pressures than other parties due to their newness (Stinchcombe, 1965), and more susceptible to changes in regulation due to their minority status (for examples, see Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017; Lanzalaco, 1985, cited in Pridham, 1991; Rashkova & Spirova, 2014). The research question was thus: **How does state funding influence processes of staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function in newly established, electorally minor parties?**

This concluding chapter first summarises the empirical findings in relation to this research question, discusses how the results contribute to the existing literature outlined in detail in chapter 1, and assesses the generalisability of the results. Then, the empirical results are used to shed light on whether state benefits and constraints in any way can shape the linkage function of parties today to elucidate the normative implications of the results. The final part of the chapter outlines – based on this study’s findings – future avenues for research. A final conclusion brings the thesis to a close.

## 9.1 Empirical results and contribution to literature

### *9.1.1 State funding and staffing (H1)*

Staffing was defined as the process of hiring or downsizing temporary or permanent staff, and H1 argued that an increase of state funding would contribute to hiring, and a decrease or loss of state funding would lead to downsizing in new minor parties. The exploratory analysis found broad support for this, both *within* individual parties’ life cycles, and *across* new minor parties in Norway and Italy. Concretely, when the Coastal Party, the Green Party, the Pensioner Party, and the Christian Conservative Party in Norway, and Tricolour Flame in Italy, increased their income from the state, they always – throughout their life cycles – hired staff, or increased existing employee’s workloads, thereby increasing staff expenses. Similarly, the Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party, and the Segni Pact in Italy sometimes, but not always, hired staff when increasing their income from the state. Conversely, the Christian Conservative Party and the Coastal Party in Norway, and the Greens in Italy, downsized when they decreased their income from the state, while the same happened (sometimes, but not in all staffing processes) in Tricolour Flame and the Communist

Refoundation Party in Italy, and the Pensioner Party in Norway. By exploring these patterns within regulatory phases, the analysis went beyond previous findings that have mainly found a correlation between the *availability* of state funds and staffing (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006; Farrell, 1994; Gidlund, 1991; Svåsand, 1994a), and showed how changing access criteria were crucial for understanding staffing patterns in both Norwegian and Italian parties, while the generosity of funds and the type of funds (annual funds vs. electoral reimbursements) were important for understanding staffing patterns in Italy.

The results from the staffing analysis contribute to closing two gaps in the literature on state funds and staffing, as outlined in chapter 1. First of all, the results showed that state funds are crucial for the *timing* of staffing in new minor parties, countering Casas-Zamora's (2006, p. 50) claim that this is not the case. More importantly, the analysis illuminated the reasons for this; state funds impacted new minor parties' timing of hiring or downsizing staff because of these parties' state-dependency, demonstrating that general conclusions about the concrete impact of state funds on staffing must be based on a broader selection of parties, including state-dependent new minor parties. Casas-Zamora (2006) based his argument on the staffing patterns in (larger, established) parties whose state-dependency is not as high as for the new minor parties studied here. Interestingly, the analysis of the Communist Refoundation Party, which over time had considerably more income from state funds than the other studied parties, showed that state-dependency matters less for the timing of staffing when a party's budget is larger. Specifically, the Communist Refoundation Party hired and downsized staff irrespective of shifts in income from the state in periods when its budget exceeded five million euros (even though it was highly state-dependent). This suggests that both state-dependency *and* budget size are

important factors for understanding how state funds impact on the timing of party staffing processes.

The second contribution of the staffing analysis was to explore how other income sources besides state funds – when present – contributed to staffing patterns, thereby filling another gap in the literature. Despite the main finding that an increase or loss of state funds is a core driver for hiring and downsizing staff in new minor parties, the analysis also showed that membership fees, personal funds, and the funds of external organisations contributed to *keeping* staff and thereby bridging (shorter) periods during which parties did not have state funding, as illustrated by Tricolour Flame and the Segni Pact. Moreover, membership fees financed a part-time position in the Italian Communist Party of Workers, external consultants in Act to Stop the Decline, and contributed to facilitating increased staffing in the Greens in Norway. Overall, this finding exemplifies the fact that other sources of income contribute to (smaller) shifts in staffing patterns in new minor parties. This illustrates why analyses of the ways in which state funds impact staffing in larger, established parties provide more mixed results (Casas-Zamora, 2006, pp. 50-51), as these parties rely on broader and larger sources of income that can also (in addition to state funds) facilitate staffing.

By analysing the type of staff new minor parties take on, I showed that new minor parties are, on the whole, highly interested in recruiting and maintaining members, as all the new minor parties in both Italy and Norway that accessed state funds prioritised taking on staff to deal with administrative and organisational matters, such as maintenance of membership and branches. Interestingly, in times of downsizing, the administrative and organisational staff was the staff that was kept the longest in the Norwegian parties, as illustrated by the Coastal Party and the Christian Conservative Party. A notable contribution of

this analysis is thus to show that new minor parties in both Italy and Norway prioritise membership recruitment and maintenance, underpinning Kölln's (2014, p. 467) argument that party members are particularly useful for new parties in virtue of the electoral support they can provide early in a party's life cycle. Interestingly, it also shows that new (minor) parties indeed try to build memberships, even though existing studies have found that new parties tend to have under-developed memberships (Casas-Zamora, 2006, p. 43; Mair & Biezen, 2001, p. 14). Furthermore, the analysis shows that new minor parties – irrespective of whether they are early or late(r) in their life cycles – prioritise putting staff to work on membership recruitment and maintenance. My results thus suggest that it is not just parties' *newness* that creates the particular need for members, as Kölln (2014) argues, but also their minority status.

#### *9.1.2 State funding and centralisation (H2)*

H2 argues that state funding and staff will strengthen party elites, who, subsequently, depending on whether the executive council in the party is centralised or not, will be enabled to either centralise the composition of the executive council or consolidate their already strong position. The centralisation analysis found support for H2, and first showed how elites' management of *state funds* contributed to strengthening new minor party elites in both the Norwegian and Italian contexts, as illustrated by evidence from the Communist Refoundation Party, the Pensioner Party, and Tricolour Flame in Italy, and the Greens and the Christian Conservative Party in Norway. The exploratory analysis showed that elites were only empowered by state funds if they had leeway to use this income freely, and if the financial situation in the party more broadly was flexible. Concretely, state funds did not strengthen party elites in parties riddled by financial deficit (e.g. the Pensioner Party in Norway). In line with the existing



literature, the analysis found that the actors who manage state funds (treasurers, party leaders, etc.) are able to reinforce their position (Nassmacher, 2009, p. 379; see also Mendilow, 1992), due to their control over the receipt and allocation of *the* most crucial financial resource in new minor parties. By outlining the mechanisms through which party elites strengthen their position following state funding access, the results add more detail to those studies that more broadly refer to how different party faces, mainly the party in public office, are strengthened by state funding access (Bardi et al., 2017; Hagevi, 2018; Katz & Mair, 2002).

Moreover, *staff* also empowered party elites, across parties and contexts, as illustrated by all the Italian parties studied (which had staff), namely the Greens, the Communist Refoundation Party, the Communist Party of Workers, and Tricolour Flame. In all but one of the Norwegian parties studied in the centralisation analysis, staff strengthened elites' position, as illustrated by data from the Greens, the Pensioner Party, and the Christian Conservative Party. Staff reinforced elites when elites controlled hiring processes or determined the tasks conducted by employees, reflecting Panebianco's (1988, p. 227) contention that the control of staff (even though he refers to a strong, bureaucratic apparatus) advantages those who control it over those who do not. Elites who were themselves staff were also reinforced by their position, which gave them increased leeway to dedicate themselves to party work. These findings thus go beyond previous studies that have mainly equated staff presence with increased intra-party control (e.g. for the party in public office) (for examples, see Bardi et al., 2017; Biezen, 2003b; Katz & Mair, 2002), by outlining the mechanisms through which staff reinforce elites.

In turn, there is evidence from some of the parties that elites empowered by state funds and/or staff use their position to initiate consolidating or centralising reforms, further supporting H2, and echoing the literature outlining the importance of party leaders as core promoters of organisational change (Gauja, 2016, p. 147; see also Harmel et al., 1995). This was illustrated by the Christian Conservative Party (consolidating reform) and the Greens (centralising reform) in Norway, and consolidating reform processes in the Pensioner Party and Tricolour Flame in Italy. Secondly, the empirical analysis showed that *state funds* were used to execute consolidating reforms in the Pensioner Party in Italy and the Christian Conservative Party in Norway, and (to a limited extent) the Greens' centralising reform in Norway. Similarly, *staff* were used to execute centralising reforms in the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy. These results contribute to filling a gap in the literature by unveiling how exactly, i.e. the mechanisms through which, state funds and staff can contribute to introducing changes that ultimately benefit party elites at the expense of members in new minor parties. As such, the analysis enriches research that has suggested that state funding entails centralisation (see e.g. Ebbighausen, 1996, cited in Koss, 2011).

The broader finding is that state funds and staff play a role in intra-organisational reform processes which leave party elites, at the expense of members, with an increased control over the party's day-to-day management (i.e. control over the executive council). This is an important contribution to the state of the art and contributes to filling a gap in the literature, both by studying and evidencing who it is that controls that rarely-studied organ, the executive council, and secondly by evidencing how state funds and staff can contribute to shaping its composition. The study thus adds a new dimension to the party organisational literature, as existing studies have mainly aimed to shed light on which party

actors (members, delegates, elites, etc.) control crucial party decisions (see e.g. Gauja, 2013; Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Lisi et al., 2015).

### *9.1.3 State funding and pursuit of constitutive function (H3)*

Pursuit of constitutive function was defined as the process of overcoming the threshold of authorisation (Pedersen, 1982), i.e. the ability of parties to comply with ballot access requirements and present an electoral list (electoral participation). H3 argued that state funding and staff would directly and indirectly contribute to facilitating electoral participation, while a decrease or loss of state funding and staff would hinder it. The analysis showed that *state funds* contributed both directly (i.e. by paying for expenses) and indirectly (e.g. by building branches) to enabling electoral participation by new minor parties, supporting H3. Concretely, state funds contributed directly to electoral participation by paying for expenses related to the signature campaign in Tricolour Flame and the Communist Refoundation Party, while a decrease in state funds complicated the execution of a signature campaign for the Greens in Italy, and the loss of state funds made a signature campaign impossible to execute for the Fatherland's Party in Norway. Furthermore, state funds contributed to electoral participation in the Italian Pensioner Party by paying for television broadcasts that facilitated recruitment, and helped to solve conflict and establish branches in the Norwegian Pensioner Party, which enabled the party to participate in elections. State funds also helped to strengthen branches in the Norwegian Greens, and to increase membership in the Christian Conservative Party. These results thereby extend the existing literature, by empirically outlining some potential reasons why previous studies have found that parties with access to state funds – but which lack parliamentary representation – manage to continue to run in elections (i.e. survive) (Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017; Spirova,

2007), and why parties that suffer loss of electoral support, but still rely on state funds, manage to continue to field candidates in elections (Casal Bértoa & Walecki, 2014).

Moreover, the study also explored in detail the role of *staff* in new minor parties' pursuit of constitutive function, and found that staff – as well as state funds – matter, supporting H3. As such, the results contribute to filling a gap in the literature, which has mostly been concerned just with the role of state funds. More specifically, staff contributed to the development of the electoral list in Tricolour Flame in Italy by providing advice on candidacies, and to executing signature campaigns and dealing with the operation of subnational branches in the Greens and the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy. In Norway, staff in the Greens contributed indirectly to electoral participation by working to establish more branches, strengthening those already in place, and increasing the membership. The strengthening of subnational branches was also one of the tasks set for staff in the Christian Conservative Party in Norway. In the Coastal Party a loss of staff (linked to a stark decrease in income from the state) contributed to membership loss, which in turn made electoral participation difficult. These results show how state funds and staff are not just helpful in electoral campaigns (Casas-Zamora, 2006; see e.g. Farrell, 1996; Farrell, 2000; Karlsen, 2010), but also in the processes prior to them.

Interestingly, the analysis of the richest new minor party in the sample (Communist Refoundation Party in Italy) showed how a *shift* (in this case a decrease) in state funds and staff did not affect the party's electoral participation in the 2010 regional elections, as theorised in H3. Still, state funds and staff, as theorised, contributed to enabling the party's electoral participation in 2010. As in the staffing analysis, this finding suggests that in terms of the impact of state

funds, the extent to which parties' intra-organisational dynamics are affected by shifts to state funds and staff is conditional upon the size of the parties' overall budget and staff.

#### *9.1.4 Filling an empirical gap on new minor parties (in Norway and Italy)*

This study of Norwegian and Italian new minor parties fills two important empirical gaps. First of all, the in-depth intra-organisational analyses of the selected new minor parties' income structures, and their patterns concerning staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function, make an important empirical contribution to the general literature on electorally minor parties. Electorally minor parties have barely been covered in the existing literature (Fisher, 1980; Muller-Rommel, 1991; Pedersen, 1982; Pridham, 1991; but see e.g. Spoon, 2011), and especially in organisational terms. For instance, electorally minor parties have only to a small extent been covered in the broad efforts to collect comparative, party organisational data (see e.g. Katz & Mair, 1992; Poguntke et al., 2016). New parties (which are often also minor parties, see e.g. Pedersen, 1982) are covered to a greater extent than minor parties, especially parties of specific (new) party families, such as green parties (Poguntke, 2002a; Spoon, 2011; van Haute, 2016) or the far-right (Art, 2011; Enyedi & Linek, 2008; Ignazi, 2003). That said, organisational studies of new parties per se (irrespective of party family) are few (but see Bolleyer, 2013). Thus, the selection and analysis of new minor parties – irrespective of party family – sheds light on how a broader group of parties operate, contributing to closing one (large) gap in the general party literature.

Secondly, the empirical analyses conducted here contribute extensively to the country-specific literatures on political parties in Italy and Norway. To date, no in-depth, comparative, organisational analysis has been conducted across different new minor parties in Norway and Italy, even though some excellent case

studies exist on the Greens (Biorcio, 2016; Vannucci, 2007), and the Communist Refoundation Party (Bertolino, 2004; Calossi, 2007) in Italy, and the Greens in Norway (Heglum, 2015; Jupskås, 2013; Siem Knudsen, 2016). This study's in-depth analyses of organisational dynamics in a broad range of different new minor parties (e.g. of different ideologies), thus represents a rich empirical addition to the literature on party organisation in Norway and Italy. This addition is timely, as some of the cases studied have been part of the party systems in Norway and Italy for over three decades, but barely mentioned in the academic literature (such as the Pensioner Parties in both contexts).

Given that political parties – both large/established and new/minor – are crucial for the working of contemporary democracies, only in-depth studies like the one presented in this thesis can bring us closer to a full understanding of the representative capacities of political parties today. In sum, therefore, the empirical results of new and electorally minor parties in Norway and Italy means that future studies analysing Norwegian and Italian parties and party systems specifically, but also Western European parties and party systems more broadly, will have a much richer empirical basis upon which to build their conclusions.

#### *9.1.5 Generalisability of findings*

An important question is whether – and, if yes, how broadly – the empirical findings discussed in the previous section can be applied to other parties and contexts. The aim of this thesis has been to say something concrete about the impact of state funding (and staff) on staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function in new minor parties. These are parties where the impact of state funds – both due to their minority status and to their newness – is likely to manifest itself (for similar arguments, see Casal Bértoa & Spirova, 2017; Rashkova & Spirova, 2014; Stinchcombe, 1965). New minor parties also have

very limited income sources, and have been found to rely heavily on state funds (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006; Ikstens et al., 2002; Mair & Biezen, 2001). Based on this, it has been argued in this thesis that new minor parties constitute most-likely cases, i.e. cases where I expect to see the theorised impact of state funds to take place. Such cases could limit the generalisability of the study's scope, as outlined in chapter 1. However, the in-depth, exploratory analysis of the specific ways in which state funds shape staffing, and how state funds *and* staff shape centralisation and pursuit of constitutive function, allows me to discern how the studied parties' newness and (electoral) size themselves impacted the findings. In turn, this opens up a broader discussion of the extent to which the empirical results in this thesis can be applied to electorally larger and established parties.

Before engaging in that discussion, I shall briefly outline how broadly the results might extend to other new minor parties – outside Norway and Italy, thereby developing a contingent generalisation (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 31), that applies to '*well-defined types or subtypes of cases*'. This thesis explored the impact of state funds on intra-organisational dynamics in 14 new minor parties in two established democracies in Western Europe. The universe of new minor parties in this thesis is thus limited to those operating in established democracies in Western Europe. The selection of Italy and Norway, i.e. two regulatory contexts within Western Europe that have exposed their new minor parties to a range of different state benefits and constraints, is a good starting point for extending the relevance of the findings beyond Norway and Italy.

Still, the fact that parties – both new and minor, and large and established – in both contexts have generally received a large share of their income from the state, is a limitation. For example, the analysis of staffing, which was found to (partially) hinge on the *amounts* of state funding available to parties, could look

different in other contexts where parties are generally less state-dependent, such as the UK or Germany (Poguntke et al., 2016). That said, the new minor parties analysed here differ on a range of factors, which arguably makes them representative of other (new minor) parties. They differ in size (within the category 'new and minor'), ideology, formation, and age (but all formed post-1980). Broadly, therefore, the findings from this study shed light on how state funding and staff contribute to processes of staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function in largely state-dependent new minor parties operating in Western European, established democracies, where state funding constitutes a majority of (all) parties' income (more than half). Having established the group of new minor parties to which the empirical results here have relevance, the next section explores the extent to which parties' newness and electoral size is relevant to the empirical results obtained, thereby indicating the potential relevance of the findings for electorally larger and older parties.

Both a new minor party's state-dependency and its overall budget size were crucial factors for understanding whether or not state funds shaped the staffing patterns of that party (i.e. the timing of staffing). Concretely, the Communist Refoundation Party's large budget (even if it was nearly completely state-dependent) enabled it to hire or downsize staff relatively independently of minor shifts in income from the state. Conversely, the other studied new minor parties, with much more limited budgets (i.e. well below 5 million euros), hired and downsized staff following shifts in income from the state. Now, a party's budget size, as argued in this thesis, is often related to both a party's *newness* and *electoral size* (see e.g. Casas-Zamora, 2006; Mair & Biezen, 2001). That said, it does not have to be, as there are (for instance) examples of new parties with large budgets, such as Forza Italia and the Five Star Movement in Italy. The



take-away point is thus that the results concerning the impact of state funds on staffing are often (because income structure is often related to size and age), but not necessarily always, limited to new minor parties.

More specifically, the results of the staffing analysis suggest that electorally larger (i.e. not minor), and/or established (i.e. not new), state-dependent parties with overall low budgets that operate in contexts where the state-dependency of parties overall is high (for an overview, see e.g. Poguntke et al., 2016), will respond to shifts in income from the state by hiring or downsizing staff – just like the new minor parties in this thesis. The reason is that their state-dependency and budget size will coincide with those of the new minor parties studied in this thesis.

The centralisation analysis showed how both state funds and staff contributed to strengthening the position of party elites. Arguably, elites can only empower themselves due to the management of state funds if these funds constitute a crucial income source for the party, which they do in new minor parties. Specifically, if a party only receives a minimal share of its overall budget from the state, the receipt and allocation of these funds hardly equates to intra-party power. The elites of new minor parties are thus empowered by managing state funds given the centrality of this money for their operation (i.e. the party's state-dependency). Therefore, there is reason to expect that elites who operate in electorally larger and/or established parties, but equally manage state funds that constitute a large share of these parties' income, will also be able to strengthen their position by means of this financial control. This shows, as in the discussion of the wider relevance of the staffing analysis above, that party size and age per se are not necessarily the most important factors for understanding

an empirical result – rather, it is often parties' state-dependency that matters (even though these two are often inter-linked).

The centralisation analysis also found that the control of new minor party elites over staff (hiring processes or employees' tasks) similarly empowered their positions. This is interesting, as new minor parties' staff resources are often small (see staffing analysis). Theoretically, the argument that party actors who control staff have an advantage has been advanced for parties with a large and strong bureaucracy (Panebianco, 1988, p. 227). Thus, there is reason to believe that this study's finding that party elites strengthen their position due to control over staff (hiring or their tasks) in new minor parties, is also highly relevant to large, established parties, echoing similar findings in the literature (see e.g. Bardi et al., 2017; Katz & Mair, 2002).

Thirdly, the centralisation analysis found that elites empowered by state funds and staff, in some parties across Norway and Italy, used their strong position to initiate centralising or consolidating reforms. There are two reasons why it is problematic to extend the relevance of this finding to electorally larger, established parties. First and foremost, new parties have more malleable and less institutionalised party structures (see e.g. Gauja, 2016, p. 115). Thus, party elites empowered by state funds and/or staff may have an easier time initiating (potentially controversial) reforms in new than in established parties. This resonates with the finding that some party reforms are more common in new *and* small parties (see e.g. Chiru et al., 2015, p. 46; Cross & Blais, 2012, p. 39). To this, one could answer that elite empowerment due to state funds and/or staff is the extra leeway that elites in large, established parties need in order to initiate (potentially controversial) reform there. However, the potential difference in organisational structure, and in likelihood that reforms take place, leads me to

refrain from extending the relevance of this finding (i.e. that elites empowered by state funds and/or staff initiate reform) to large and established parties.

Fourthly, the centralisation analysis found that state funds and staff contributed to the execution of (some) centralising and consolidating reforms. The contribution of both state funds and staff was found to be dependent on the direct involvement of these resources in the reform process itself. The importance of staff and state funds in these reforms was thus not attributed to either a party's size or its age, but rather to the role these resources played in the reform processes. Therefore, this finding also has relevance for larger and established parties. That said, for state funds to play the same role in large and established parties as in new minor parties, the former must be state-dependent (as the latter are). If not, other income sources, besides state funds, will most likely take their place.

In the analysis of pursuit of constitutive function, I found that both state funds and staff contribute to facilitating new minor parties' electoral participation. Concretely, state funds and staff contributed both directly, by enabling compliance with signature requirements for ballot access and setting up the electoral list, and indirectly, by building branches and boosting the membership. Both a party's size and age are relevant for these findings.

Firstly, due to their size, electorally minor parties are often subject to signature requirements that larger parties (often enjoying institutional representation) are exempted from. The importance of institutional representation, for being eligible for exemptions from the signature requirement, was effectively outlined in the Italian context. In effect, major parties may simply not need to collect signatures, removing the potential impact of state funds and/or staff in the execution of signature campaigns. Secondly, because of their age,

new minor parties have poorly developed membership structures and branches (Casas-Zamora, 2006), which hinders both candidate recruitment and the ability to collect signatures. Established (i.e. older) parties, which were to a larger extent formed in the era of mass membership, will often have a more solid recruitment pool and better developed branches, both of which can aid in processes of signature collection, and development of the electoral list (but see also literature on membership decline, e.g. Biezen et al., 2012). The *indirect* impact of state funds and staff on established parties' electoral participation is thus likely to be limited, given that they face fewer pressures concerning the operation of branches and the membership.

Having said this, for large and/or established parties that either – contrary to the expectations outlined above – have low memberships or vulnerable branches, and/or are exposed to signature requirements, there is reason to believe that state funds (if the party's state-dependency is similar to that of new minor parties), and staff, will contribute to enabling electoral participation, either indirectly or directly.

The above discussion first showed how the results of this thesis have relevance for state-dependent new minor parties in other established Western European democracies where state funds constitutes a relatively large share of these parties' income. Then, I discussed how newness and electoral size impacted on the study's various findings, thereby outlining the applicability of the results to large and established parties. Broadly, I outlined how state-dependency – which may or may not be related to electoral size and age – mattered. Concretely, if also large, established parties have restricted budgets and are state-dependent, the patterns of staffing found in this thesis are also of relevance to them. Moreover, the finding that state funds strengthen party elites can

arguably also extend to larger, established parties if these parties are state-dependent. Similarly, the impact of staff on strengthening party elites extends particularly well to large, established parties, as these parties often have more staff than new minor parties. Finally, the importance of state funds and staff for the execution of centralising reforms had little in particular to do with size and newness (and more to do with the actual *use* of these resources in reform processes), which means we can extend the findings' relevance beyond new minor parties. Conversely, the organisational differences between new minor parties, and large, established parties, made it difficult to extend the findings concerning the initiation of centralising or consolidating party reforms (by empowered party elites) to the latter. Finally, I contended that both electoral size and newness matter for the results concerning the impact of state funds and staff on electoral participation, making it difficult to extend the relevance of these findings beyond new minor parties.

## 9.2 Normative implications of empirical findings

As outlined in chapter 1, the views of both proponents and opponents of state funding are rooted in normative conceptions of political parties' role as core linkage structures between citizens and the state. Linkage is understood as '*the provision of a connection between those in elite positions and the electorate at large*' (Poguntke, 2002b, p. 44; see also Gunther & Diamond, 2001; Webb, 2002). The following section discusses how the empirical findings of this thesis can shed light on whether state funding promotes or hinders new minor parties' ability to perform this citizen-state linkage function.

The analysis first demonstrated that state funding constitutes a large share of new minor parties' income in Norway and Italy, which by definition indicates

that state funding enables parties that lack a strong membership structure and other sources of income (e.g. donations), to face (if not all, then some of) the costs related to the basic operation of a party. This in turn enables fulfilment of their role as linkage structures in contemporary democracies – because parties without activities like congresses, campaigns, and policy and program development would not constitute a party able to absorb opinions from members and citizens and transfer them upwards in the political system. The state-dependency of new minor parties also undermines the claim, proposed by opponents of state funding, that state funds ‘ossify’ the existing party system by only benefitting the established parties that design state funding regulations. Naturally, there is indication that the established parties can – if they wish – introduce state funding regulations that disadvantage new minor parties, which was the case in Norway prior to 2006 when access criteria to state funds were constraining towards new minor parties. However, the broad evidence from Norway and Italy is that ossification or freezing (due to state funding regulations) of the party systems has not taken place to any great degree.<sup>174</sup> Rather, the results from the period I have analysed show that state funding has not just enabled new minor parties to perform their linkage function, but also contributed to ensuring the overall ability of the Italian and Norwegian party systems, by securing the operation of a range of new minor parties, to link citizens to the state.

Furthermore, state funds contribute to promoting the linkage function of parties by paying for staff, which is another way of granting new minor parties leeway to execute their tasks, and thereby operate more effectively. Concretely, in most of the analysed new minor parties, staff had organisational and

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<sup>174</sup> The question is whether the Italian state’s ban of all direct forms of state funds from 2013 onwards (whose effects are yet to be seen) will ossify the party system.

administrative tasks, seeing to everything from telephone and email, to membership recruitment and maintenance, to the establishment and maintenance of branches. Some parties also had politically oriented staff employed to develop policy and communicate with the press. The presence of staff means that a range of party tasks are dealt with by the same people on a regular basis, ensuring consistency and regularity.

Additionally, having staff that handle the membership and local branches specifically contributes to enabling performance of the linkage function of new minor parties. Concretely, members have the value of transforming politicians from self-interested and independent actors into agents of the people (Katz, 2002, p. 106; see also Scarrow, 2000). The efforts of new minor parties' staff to recruit and maintain members is thus vital for enabling parties to act as structures of linkage. Interestingly, these results indicate that state funding access does not mean that party leaders have a reduced incentive to recruit members in new minor parties (even when demands to collect 'matching funds' are not present). Rather, state funding has the exact opposite impact in new minor parties: It pays for staff which in turn aids membership recruitment, assisting parties in the performance of their linkage function, effectively undermining one of the core claims of critics of state funds.

Furthermore, state funds ensure the linkage function of new minor parties by contributing to electoral participation, as running in elections is the only way in which a party can secure representation, i.e. the possibility of channelling the wishes of citizens into the actual state apparatus (into institutions). The analysis demonstrated that state funding and staff facilitate the process of exceeding the signature requirement for ballot access. Moreover, state funds and staff contribute to processes of setting up the electoral list, and to the establishment

and strengthening of local branches, which are important steps in achieving electoral participation. So, state funds help get new minor parties into the electoral arena, which is also further evidence contrary to the claim that state funds lead to the ossification of party systems.

Despite the role of state funding and staff in advancing the linkage function of new minor parties, there is indication from the analysis that state funds and related staff can also contribute to shifting intra-party dynamics in a way that disadvantages members, in turn potentially harming the parties' ability to effectively capture and subsequently promote members' wishes in the political arena. This finding coincides with a prominent claim concerning party staff in the literature, which outlines how staff marginalise party members and how party grassroots are increasingly replaced by professional staff (see e.g. Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002; Mair et al., 2004). The analysis of this thesis showed that state funds and staff (paid for with the help of state funds) strengthen party elites at the expense of members, and contribute to either shifting the power in the executive council towards elites, or consolidating an already completely centralised leadership structure. A decrease or removal of members from the crucial executive council, which deals with the management of the party on a day-to-day basis, ultimately also threatens a party's ability to perform its linkage function, as members will be hindered from directly expressing their opinion on urgent and pressing matters. Moreover, consolidating reforms effectively deepen members' exclusion from the (national) leadership. To this, one could respond that elites also represent the members. Still, a loss of members in the executive still effectively removes the direct link between members and the governing organ (and core decisions). Rather, members will be left to voice their opinion in the party congress, held much more rarely than executive council meetings.



There is thus a tension with regards to how exactly state funds (and related staff) impact on the linkage function of new minor parties. On the one hand state funds contribute to effective operation and electoral participation, but on the other state funds and staff contribute to internal power-shifts that disadvantage the members, in turn also undermining the party's linkage function. Whether effective operation or internal power distribution is more important, with regards to new minor parties' linkage function, is difficult to decide conclusively here. However, in terms of securing democracies' overall capacity to represent the broadest possible group of citizens, the effective operation of new minor parties, rather than their internal power structure, is arguably more important. This is especially so since this study has restricted itself to investigating how state funds and staff shape the composition of the executive council (centralisation), and the operation of other national executive organs (consolidation), i.e. 'just' the (albeit crucial) national arena of decision-making. Thus, further studies, also investigating how state funds and staff (potentially) shape the power of members to participate in the congress, and in crucial party decisions such as candidate and leadership selection, are necessary in order to disentangle the specificities of this normative tension concerning the impact of state funds and staff on new minor parties' linkage function. Only when we know more exactly how it is that state funds and staff can impact membership rights more broadly can a final judgement be passed on whether or not the benefits of these resources for promoting new minor parties' linkage function outweigh the drawbacks.

### 9.3 Avenues for future research

Existing research has demonstrated that state funding regulations (and party laws more generally) differ between old and new democracies (see e.g. Biezen

& Borz, 2012; Biezen & Kopecký, 2014). An insightful avenue for further research is thus to explore whether the impact of state funds on intra-organisational processes is the same for new minor parties that operate in new democracies as it is in the two established democracies studied here. This would not just provide a broader overview of how state funds shape party organisations, but also of how different regulations for state funds do so. In a related vein, this analysis has studied new minor parties in two Western European countries where parties generally (not just new minor parties) receive a large share of their income from the state (see e.g. Biezen & Kopecký, 2014, 2017). The field could thus benefit from future studies that explore whether state funds shape intra-organisational patterns in the same way in contexts where state funds are less generous, such as in Germany and France (Biezen & Kopecký, 2017). This would enhance our insight regarding how new minor parties in such contexts finance their operation, but also regarding whether state funds impact staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function in the same way when they are provided in (much) smaller sums. Even though my analysis was a life cycle analysis, and thus able to shed light on how both large and small incomes from the state shaped intra-organisational dynamics, we cannot take for granted that the dynamics are the same when there is, per definition, less money available from the state.

Future studies aiming to explore how state funds and staff shape party reform, can draw on the framework developed in this thesis. Concretely, this analysis demonstrated the importance of exploring how state funds *and* staff strengthen elites, how this in turn enables them to initiate reform, and finally how state funds and staff directly contribute to the execution of reform. This framework can be applied to studies analysing how state funds and staff impact centralisation/consolidation in new minor parties (in other contexts), and, just as

importantly, to studies of electorally larger, and established parties. Now, analyses of large, established parties do not necessarily have to look at the impact of state funds – a factor that is less important given that such parties (often) rely on a wider range of income sources. However, to assess the impact of money in politics more generally, future studies could explore the extent to which the management of (different types of) income sources and staff strengthen party elites, and whether that in turn enables them to initiate and execute reform.

Interestingly, the analysis of the ways in which state funds and staff shape centralisation showed how several of the new minor parties' centralising reforms were also attempts to adjust or improve poorly functioning leadership organs, corroborating the contention that new parties have less institutionalised structures than established parties (Gauja, 2016, p. 115). This study thus suggests that state funds and staff not only contribute to centralising and consolidating reforms, but also to processes perceived (at least by elites) as organisational building. Future studies could benefit from exploring further this role of state funds and staff in shaping crucial new minor party (leadership) structures, by comparing parties with and without such resources to shed light on whether the development happens at the same speed and in the same direction (centralising vs. de-centralising) across different new minor parties. This is particularly interesting in light of this study's finding that all the new minor parties studied here introduced a centralising (not de-centralising) reform to their executive as their first reform following access to state funds and/or staff.

This study has focused on the national party branch of new minor parties. Apart from exploring electoral participation on regional, national, and EU-levels, and capturing state funding paid out to different levels (but only appearing in the national financial account), it was beyond the scope of this study to systematically

analyse how state funding affects regional and local party branches. The importance of the national branch in organisationally vulnerable new minor parties, and a wish to ensure comparability across new minor parties due to limited availability of financial data, drove this decision. Complementing the findings of this thesis, future studies may benefit from exploring whether state funds in regional/local party branches shape staffing in the same way as on the national level. This would further enhance our knowledge of the capacities of new minor parties as a whole, and their constituent parts. Only such multi-level analyses, documenting both state funds and staff, can give us a complete overview of the full organisational strength of new minor parties.

Similarly, the framework on centralisation argued that party elites (on either national or subnational levels) will be strengthened by state funds. However, the focus on state funds and staff in relation to the national branch restricted the thesis from analysing specifically how these resources affected the position of subnational party elites, apart from acknowledging that resource-dependencies between party branches might affect elites' possibility to have centralising reforms passed in the party congress. Future studies may thus benefit from analysing the impact of state funds (and staff) on elites on different levels, which would also lay the groundwork for studies analysing how strengthened elites on different levels cooperate (or clash with one another) to promote or restrict intra-organisational reform processes. This would in turn broaden our understanding of how state funding in relation to different party branches can shape intra-organisational dynamics in new minor parties.

In terms of methodology, the analyses of H1-H3 in this thesis have explored the impact of state funding on staffing, centralisation, and pursuit of constitutive function in new minor parties, but have not aimed to systematically

determine the importance of state funding in such processes compared to other factors. It has thus not established (i.e. weighed) how important state funding (and staff) has been for the outcome. Future in-depth qualitative studies with a similar number of cases can thus contribute to the literature by adopting methodological approaches such as qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), in order to bring us closer to understanding how important state funding is (is it necessary and/or sufficient?), in comparison to other factors to determine the outcome of intra-organisational processes.

Finally, the analysis showed how one party, namely the Communist Refoundation Party in Italy, (often) operated contrary to the theorised rationales concerning staffing (H1) and pursuit of constitutive function (H3). This was mainly due to the party's large budget, substantial group of staff, and large membership. In other words, the analysis has also shed light on the quantity of resources a party needs in order to stop being vulnerable to external pressures such as state funding regulations (see Stinchcombe, 1965). Now, the results of this study merely suggest that a party with a budget of between 5 and 10 million euros, and with a group of staff of more than 10, has an organisational strength that enables it to hire staff when necessary and exceed the threshold of authorisation without trouble. Albeit limited, this finding provides a fruitful starting point for future organisational studies attempting to explore more in-depth the conditions under which a party is (organisationally) resilient enough to withstand fluctuations in state funding regulations specifically, and other regulations (e.g. regarding electoral laws) more broadly.

## 9.4 Closing remarks

This thesis started out by outlining how state funds and attached regulation have become an increasingly prominent part of contemporary democracies. The aim of the thesis has been to shed light on how state benefits and constraints contribute to processes of staffing, centralisation of the executive council, and pursuit of constitutive function in newly established minor parties. One main contribution of the thesis has thus been to zoom in and pin-point the exact role that state benefits and constraints play in intra-organisational dynamics, without attempting to analyse these processes per se. By approaching the research question by means of a comparative analysis of most-likely cases, namely new minor parties, the thesis has contributed to the state of the art in two important ways.

First and foremost, the analysis has detailed the specific ways in which state funding matters for processes of staffing, centralisation of the executive, and pursuit of constitutive function. Broadly, the analysis found that an increase of state funding led parties to hire staff, while a decrease or loss of state funding fostered the opposite process. In a similar vein, access to state funding and staff contributed – both directly and indirectly – to facilitating the electoral participation of new minor parties, while a decrease or loss of such resources hampered it, leading new minor parties to present lists in a lower number of electoral constituencies. Finally, state funding and staff were found to strengthen party elites, who in turn – in some parties – used their strengthened positions to initiate centralising or consolidating reform processes. There was also data showing that state funds and staff were in some cases used explicitly in the work to execute centralising and consolidating reforms. Normatively, these results broadly imply that state funding contributes to performance of the linkage function of new minor

parties in contemporary democracies, countering the pessimistic view in the literature that state funding is one of the factors that turn parties away from citizens and into the state, making them resemble public utilities more than free, voluntary organisations (see e.g. Biezen, 2004).

The second main contribution of the thesis has been to elucidate the internal workings of new, electorally minor parties generally, and new minor parties in Italy and Norway specifically, both of which have received scarce attention in the literature. Thus, by analysing the specific impact of state funding in intra-organisational processes in new minor parties (in Italy and Norway), the study has provided a new angle on, and evidence for, discussions concerning state-party entanglement. Equally importantly, it has enhanced our knowledge of the operation of a broader range of parties in contemporary democracies, in turn shedding new light on the representative capacities of democracy at large.

# **State Funding and Intra-Party Dynamics:**

Exploring the Impact of State Funding on  
Staffing, Centralisation, and Electoral Participation in New Minor  
Parties in Norway and Italy

*Volume II of II*

Submitted by Torill Stavenes  
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as a thesis for the degree of  
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Signature .....



# Appendices

## Appendix A: Overview of Italian and Norwegian new minor parties

**Table 1:** Italian new minor parties: Formation and establishment date

Party name (English)	Party name (Italian)	Split/newly born	Foundation year
The Lombardy League	Lega Lombarda	Split	1982 <sup>1</sup>
Communist Refoundation Party	Rifondazione Comunista	Split	1991
The Segni Pact	Patto Segni	Split	1993
Party for the Italian Communists (Italian Communists)	Partito dei Comunisti Italiani (Comunisti Italiani)	Split	1998
Italy of Values – Pietro's List	Lista di Pietro – Italia dei Valori	Split	1998
The Green Party (the Greens)	Federazione dei Verdi	Newly born	1986
The Network – Movement for Democracy	La rete – Movimento Democratico	Split	1991
The Pensioner Party	Partito Pensionati	Split	1987
The Autonomy Veneto League	Lega Autonomia Veneta	Split	1992
Tricolour Flame	Fiamma Tricolore	Split	1995
Yes, referendum	Si, referendum	Split	1992
Christian Democratic Centre	Centro Cristiano Democratico	Split	1994
United Christian Democrats	Cristiani Democratici Uniti	Split	1995
Dini List – Italian Renewal	La Lista Dini – Rinnovamento Italiano	Newly born	1996
Autonomy Movement	Movimento per le Autonomie	Split	2005
The Communist Party of Workers	Partito Comunista dei Lavoratori	Split	2006
Brothers of Italy	Fratelli d'Italia	Split	2012
The Right	La Destra	Split	2007
Work to stop the decline	Fare per Fermare il Declino	Split	2012
European Democracy	Democrazia Europea	Split	2001
The Democratic Centre	Centro Democratico	Split	2012
Civic Choice with Monti for Italy	Scelta Civica con Monti per l'Italia	Newly born	2013
AT6 Southern Action League	AT6 Lega d'Azione Meridionale	Split	1992
Social Christians	Cristiani Sociali	Split	1993
Centrist Union	Unione di Centro	Split	1993
Union for the Republic	Unione per la Repubblica	Split	1999

**Notes:** <sup>1</sup> Officially 1984.

**Table 2:** Norwegian new minor parties: Formation and establishment date

Party name (English)	Party name (Norwegian)	Split/newly born	Foundation year
Future for Finnmark	Folkeaksjonen Framtid for Finnmark	Split	1989
Cross-Partisan MPs	Tverrpolitisk Folkevalde	Newly born	1992
The Coastal Party	Kystpartiet	Split	1999
The Pensioner party	Pensjonistpartiet	Split	1985
The Greens	Miljøpartiet de grønne	Split	1988
The Fatherlands Party	Fedrelandspartiet	Split	1990
The Political Party	Det politiske parti	Newly born	2000
The Christian Conservative Party	Partiet de Kristne	Split	2011

## Appendix B: Overview of primary sources used in thesis

### ***Primary sources, Italian new minor parties***

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## Appendix C: Overview of interviewees

**Table 1:** Interviewees in Italian new minor parties

Name	Party	Position in party	Interview date(s)	Form of interview
Party representative	The Pensioner Party	Anonymous	10.11.2016 19.12.2017	Telephone (both)
Party representative	The Pensioner Party	Anonymous	18.01.2018	Telephone
Michele Boldrin	Act to Stop the Decline	Founder and later leader	27.11.2016	Skype
Sandro Brusco	Act to Stop the Decline	Founder	28.11.2016	Skype
Angelo Bonelli	The Greens	Current party leader. Held a range of offices in the party since foundation	16.11.2016	In person
Grazia Francescato	The Greens	Former spokesperson, president, MP	14.11.2016	In person
Marco Lion	The Greens	Former treasurer (throughout the 1990s). Also member since foundation	17.11.2016	In person
Natale Ripamonti	The Greens	Current treasurer, former senator for the party in three periods	23.11.2016	Telephone
Party representative	The Greens	Anonymous	23.11.2017	Telephone
Mario Segni	The Segni Pact	Founder and party president	05.01.2018 29.01.2018	Written interview (the first). Telephone (the latter)
Mario Soldani	The Segni Pact	Treasurer	03.03.2018	Written interview
Diego Masi	The Segni Pact	Founder, and various positions in party (secretary/leader of parliamentary party group)	13.03.2018	Telephone

Francesco Condorelli Caff	Tricolour Flame	Member of the executive council. Long-standing party member.	28.11.2016	Telephone
Luca Romagnoli	Tricolour Flame	Party leader 2002-2013	16.11.2016	In person
Party representative	Tricolour Flame	Anonymous	31.01.2018	Written interview
Ferdinando Francescon	Tricolour Flame	Member of the executive council	25.11.2016	Telephone
Roberto Bevilacqua	Tricolour Flame	Member of the executive council. Long-standing party member.	14.11.2016	In person
Marco Gelmini	Communist Refoundation Party	Treasurer	23.11.2016	In person
Vito Meloni	Communist Refoundation Party	Regional representative (Rome), former responsible for school related matters in the party	24.11.2016	In person
Alberto Celli	Communist Refoundation Party	Staff member	30.11.2017	Written interview
Michele Terra	The Communist Party of Workers	Member of central committee	29.11.2016	Telephone
Party representative	The Communist Party of Workers	Member of central committee	11.11.2016	In person
Party representative	The Communist Party of Workers	Anonymous	21.11.2016	In person

**Table 2:** Follow-up Interviews in Italian new minor parties

Name	Party	Position in party	Interview date(s)	Form of interview
Alberto Celli	The Communist Party of Workers	Staff member	09.04.2018 25.06.2018	Written (both)
Party representative	The Pensioner Party	Anonymous	15.01.2018	Written

Party representative	The Greens	Anonymous	14.03.2018 26.06.2018	Written
Natale Ripamonti	The Greens	Treasurer	18.03.2018	Written
Michele Terra	The Communist Party of Workers	Member of the central committee	31.01.2018	Written

**Table 3:** Interviewees in Norwegian new minor parties

Name	Party	Position in party	Interview date(s)	Form of interview
Arne Husveg	The Christian Conservative Party	First deputy leader, deputy regional leader	18.12.2017	Telephone
Party representative	The Christian Conservative Party	Anonymous	08.02.2018	Telephone
Bengt Stabrun Johansen	The Coastal Party	Former party leader, elected representative (subnational level)	26.01.2018	Telephone
Party representative	The Coastal Party/Cross Partisan MPs	Anonymous	21.02.2018	In person
Rut Olsen	The Coastal Party	Former executive council members, elected representative (subnational level)	25.01.2018	Telephone
Stig-Harold Falch Pedersen	The Coastal Party	Former party secretary (1998-2004/2005)	18.12.2017	Telephone
Reinert Andreas Leirvik	Future for Finnmark	Advisor to party leader in parliament	26.01.2018	In person
Erling Moe	Future for Finnmark	Advisor to party leader in parliament	05.02.2018	In person
Birte Simonsen	The Greens	Founder, spokesperson, elected representative (subnational level)	16.06.2017	In person
Lars Gaupset	The Greens	Current party secretary	15.05.2017	In person

Natalia Golis	The Greens	Regional leader	02.06.2017	In person
Party representative	The Greens	Former spokesperson	28.06.2017	Telephone
Herlov Kåre Øverland	Cross Partisan MPs	Executive council member (long-standing)	16.05.2018	Telephone
Erik B. Næss	Cross Partisan MPs	Current party leader	15.02.2018	In person
Einar Lonstad	The Pensioner Party	Former party leader, local leader, former executive council member	08.06.2017	Telephone
Ragnar Dahl	The Pensioner Party	Former party leader, local elected representative	16.05.2017	Telephone
Per Walseth	The Pensioner Party	Former party leader	01.06.2017	Telephone
Ottar Gjermundnes	The Pensioner Party	Former party leader	20.06.2017	In person
Liv Remman	The Pensioner Party	Treasurer	20.06.2017	In person
Anonymous	The Fatherland's Party	Anonymous	16.04.2018a	Telephone
Oddbjørn Jonstad	The Fatherland's Party	Former party member. Currently leads the party <sup>1</sup>	18.12.2017	In person
Arnljot Moseng	The Fatherland's Party	Former party secretary and member	26.02.2018	Telephone

Note: <sup>1</sup> The party officially died in 2008 (see case selection in chapter 3), but he currently runs a party with this name, without it being registered.

**Table 4:** Follow-up Interviews in Norwegian new minor parties

Name	Party	Position in party	Interview date(s)	Form of interview
Birte Simonsen	The Greens	Founder, spokesperson, elected representative (subnational level)	23-24.10.2017	Written (email)
Anonymous	The Fatherland's Party	Anonymous	13. and 16.04.2018	Written (email)
Einar Lonstad	The Pensioner Party	Former party leader, local leader, former	14.05.2018	Written (email)



		executive council member		
Party representative	The Coastal Party	Representative close to the process of introducing centralising reform in 2007	16.04.2018b	Telephone
Stig-Harold Falch Pedersen	The Coastal Party	Former party secretary (1998-2004/2005)	16.04.2018	Written (email)
Stig-Harold Falch Pedersen	The Coastal Party	Former party secretary (1998-2004/2005)	04.07.2018	Written (email)
Party representative	The Fatherland's Party	Anonymous	19.04.2018	Written (email)

## Appendix D: Ethics approval



### COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Amory Building  
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#### CERTIFICATE OF ETHICAL APPROVAL

**Academic Unit:** Politics

**Title of Project:** Friend or Foe? State Regulation's Impact on New Minor Party Development and Survival

**Research Team Member(s):** Torill Stavenes

**Project Contact Point:** [ts433@exeter.ac.uk](mailto:ts433@exeter.ac.uk)

**Supervisor:** Nicole Bolleyer

**This project has been approved for the period**

From: 30<sup>th</sup> June 2016  
To: 1<sup>st</sup> October 2018

**Ethics Committee approval reference:** 201516-110

Signature:

Date: 29<sup>th</sup> June 2016

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Lise Storm', with a small circular stamp or mark below it.

(Lise Storm, Chair, SSIS College Ethics Committee)

## Appendix E: Italian and Norwegian interview guides and consent forms

### *Italian interview guide:*

#### **PRIMA PARTE:**

1. Secondo Lei, esistono elementi nel quadro legislativo che sono vantaggiosi (utili) per il Suo partito? (*rimborsi elettorali, co-finanziamento, accesso ai media, finanziamento dei gruppi nel senato/parlamento, consegna gratuita/accesso ad edifici/strutture/locali, agevolazioni fiscali*).
  - Se sì, potrebbe specificare quali leggi sono?
  
2. Direbbe che la sua percezione di questi leggi vantaggiosi è cambiata tramite tempo?
  - Se sì, riesce a ricordare perchè?
  - Se sì, riesce a ricordare quando (potrebbe essere legata ai cambiamenti che sono stati introdotti nel quadro legislativo, e.g 1981, 1993, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2013)?
  
3. Direbbe che l'operazione quotidiana del partito è stata influenzata, in qualsiasi modo, da questi leggi vantaggiosi?
  - Se sì, potrebbe spiegare più in che modo – e dove (nella quale parte) del partito?
  - Se sì/no: Secondo Lei, questa influenza/il fatto che il partito non è stata influenzata, è stato diverso nel passato? (in altre parole: è così che leggi vantaggiosi hanno avuto un impatto più o meno significativo nel passato/prima)
    - a) Se sì, si ricorda quando? E perchè?
  
4. Secondo Lei, esistono elementi nel quadro legislativo che sono vincolanti per il Suo partito? (*criteri di accesso a risorse statali, regole di ripartizione, obbligazioni di trasparenza, uso di revisori, limitazioni su erogazioni liberali ai partiti (sia sulla somma sia sugli enti che possono erogare), restrizioni di spesa, organi di controllo, sanzioni*).
  - Se sì, potrebbe spiegare quali leggi sono?
  
5. Direbbe che la sua percezione di questi leggi vincolanti è cambiata tramite tempo?
  - Se sì, riesce a ricordare perchè?

- Se sì, riesce a ricordare quando (potrebbe essere legata ai cambiamenti che sono stati introdotti nel quadro legislativo, e.g 1981, 1993, 1999, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2013)?
6. Direbbe che l'operazione quotidiana del partito è stata influenzata, in qualsiasi modo, da questi leggi vincolanti?
- Se sì, potrebbe spiegare più in che modo – e dove (nella quale parte) del partito?
  - Se sì/no: Secondo Lei, questa influenza/il fatto che il partito non è stata influenzata, è stato diverso nel passato? (in altre parole: è così che leggi vincolanti/limitanti hanno avuto un impatto più o meno significativo nel passato/prima)
    - a) Se sì, si ricorda quando? E perchè?
7. Potrebbe indicare alle quali risorse statali il Suo partito al momento accede?
- Rimborsi elettorali
  - Co-finanziamento
  - Accesso ai media
  - Sovvenzioni/contributi per i gruppi del parlamento/senato
  - Consegna gratuita (posta)/accesso a strutture/edifici/locali
  - Agevolazioni fiscali (per il partito o per i vostri donatori)
8. E nel passato: Il partito ha accesso le stesse risorse anche prima?
- Se sì/no: Potrebbe dire quando precisamente il partito ha accesso risorse?
  - E potrebbe indicare anche quali risorse?
9. Secondo il Suo partito, è facile o difficile accedere alle risorse nominate sopra?
- Era più facile/difficile nel passato accedere alle risorse statali?
  - Ci sono state risorse che secondo il Suo partito sono state più facili/più difficili ad accedere paragonato a altre? (Se sì, quali risorse sono)?
10. Potrebbe indicare se il Suo partito riceve erogazioni liberali (o da persone fisiche o da enti/aziende etc o tutti e due)?
11. (Dipende delle risposte sopra) Mi potrebbe dire quali risorse statali/fonte di reddito sono considerati particolarmente importanti per il Suo partito adesso?

- Questa risorsa/queste risorse è/sono sempre stata/state importanti per il Suo partito?

## **SECONDA PARTE: CARATTERISTICHE DEI PARTITI – ORA E PRIMA**

12. Vorrei sapere di più come il suo partito assume decisioni nei seguenti campi:

- Selezione dei candidati elettorali
- Selezione dei leader del partito
- Stabilire e sviluppare il programma politico
- Ripartire risorse

13. Come descriverebbe il coinvolgimento dei membri/iscritti nei campi nominati sopra (al momento)?

14. (Solo nel caso che manco informazione su staff): Il Suo partito ha al momento personale (cioè personale stipendiato).

15. Come descriverebbe il coinvolgimento dello staff nei quattro campi nominati sopra?

16. Secondo Lei, il partito ha cambiato il modo di assumere decisioni nei campi nominati sopra tramite tempo (tra la fondazione del partito e oggi)?

→ Se ci sono stati dei cambiamenti: In che modo è cambiato il meccanismo decisionale?

- In che misura direbbe che il coinvolgimento dello staff è cambiato tra oggi e la Fondazione del Suo partito?
- In che misura direbbe che il coinvolgimento dei membri/iscritti è cambiato tra oggi e la Fondazione del Suo partito?

→ Se ci sono stati dei cambiamenti: Mi potrebbe spiegare cosa è stata la causa di questi cambiamenti?

- A) Secondo Lei, il quadro legislativo potrebbe essere responsabile per cambiamenti di questo tipo (i.e. per cambiamenti nel meccanismo decisionale)?

### TERZA PARTE: IL QUADRO LEGISLATIVO E L'IMPATTO AI PARTITI

17. *(Solo per partiti che hanno avuto accesso a risorse statali)*: Se riflette sull'occasione in cui il suo partito ha accesso risorse statali per la prima volta: In che misura, o nulla, ha questo accesso alle risorse contribuito a introdurre cambiamenti nell'organizzazione del Suo partito?

- ➔ Staff
- ➔ Meccanismo decisionale
- ➔ Membri/iscritti

18. Tramite tempo, pensa che il fatto che il partito ha avuto accesso/non accesso a risorse statali, ha contribuito a introdurre cambiamenti nell'organizzazione del suo partito?

- Se sì, quali cambiamenti? (staff, meccanismo decisionale, sopravvivenza)

19. *(Solo per partiti che hanno avuto accesso a risorse statali)*: Prima nella intervista (Q7 e Q8) ha raccontato che il suo partito, tramite tempo, ha avuto accesso continuato/non continuato a risorse statali. Secondo Lei, questo continuato accesso/non continuato accesso a risorse statali ha avuto un impatto al suo partito?

- Se sì, in che modo? (staff, meccanismo decisionale, sopravvivenza)

21. *(Solo per partiti che hanno avuto accesso a risorse statali)*: Direbbe che il *tipo* di risorse statali che il partito accede, determina la natura di cambiamenti (*se ci sono cambiamenti*) che vengono introdotti nella organizzazione del partito?

- In altre parole, è diverso avere accesso ai media, agevolazioni fiscali e/o rimborsi elettorali per gli eventuali cambiamenti che succedono?

22. Generalmente, direbbe che avere accesso/non accesso alle risorse statali, è una cosa negativa o positiva per il suo partito?

- Positiva: In che modo?
- Negativa: In che modo (vincolanti)?
- La Sua percezione di questo è cambiata tramite tempo (era più negativo/positivo per il partito accedere/non accedere risorse statali prima?)

23. Secondo Lei, l'accesso alle risorse statali è importante per la sopravvivenza dei partiti politici in Italia oggi?

- E prima/nel passato?
- Se no, perchè no (puo essere perche i partiti sono ben legati alla societa civile per esempio)?

#### **QUARTA PARTE: DOMANDE FINALI**

24. Secondo Lei è più facile mantenere e tenere vivo un partito che accede risorse statali?

- Perchè?

25. Secondo Lei, I dirigenti hanno più potere nei partiti che hanno accesso risorse statali paragonato ai partiti che non hanno accesso risorse statali?

- Perchè?

26. Secondo Lei, un partito che accede risorse statali assume personale?

- Perche?

27. Secondo Lei, un partito che si trova in un ambiente nel quale il quadro legislativo spesso cambia, dà più potere ai suoi dirigenti paragonato a partiti che lavorano in un ambiente nel quale il quadro legislativo cambia raramente?

- Perchè?

28. Direbbe che è più facile per un partito a sopravvivere se si trova in un ambiente nel quale la soglia per accedere risorse statali è bassa, e nel quale gli elementi vincolanti sono pochi?

- Perchè?

#### **FINALE:**

Abbiamo raggiunto la fine. C'e qualcosa che desidera aggiungere?

## *Italian consent form:*

**Titolo della ricerca:** The influence of state funding on new minor party development and survival

### **Informazione sul progetto**

Tale ricerca investiga se, e nel caso di sì, come le leggi statali sul finanziamento dei partiti politici influiscono caratteristiche interne di partiti nuovi e minori in Norvegia e Italia. In altre parole, il progetto cerca di analizzare se diverse leggi statali (per esempio sul finanziamento pubblico, su erogazioni liberali, sulla trasparenza) esercitano un'influenza al numero di personale dei partiti nuovi e minori, il finanziamento, il meccanismo decisionale e le prospettive di sopravvivenza. L'obiettivo è quello di capire meglio come lo stato, tramite vantaggi nella, e limiti della legge, influisce lo sviluppo interno dei partiti fondati dopo 1980 e che sono minori, cioè che non hanno mai vinto più di 10 per cento dei voti in elezioni per la Camera dei Deputati. Essendo la nostra conoscenza di questo tema molto limitata, interviste saranno indispensabili per l'analisi. Senza interviste, informazione dettagliata su cambiamenti interni nei organizzazioni sarebbe stato difficile a ottenere.

Questo progetto è un dottorato finanziato dal European Research Council, e fa parte di un progetto quinquennale che si chiama *Regulating Civil Society*. Il progetto ha base all'Università di Exeter in Inghilterra, dura dal 2013 al 2018, e cerca di investigare la influenza della legge (coprendo sia vantaggi nella, sia limiti della legge) su organizzazioni volontari come ONLUS e partiti politici. La dottoranda non ha nessun interesse commerciale.

### **Dettagli di contatto**

Per ulteriore informazione sul progetto, potrebbe contattare:

Nome: Torill Stavenes

Indirizzo: Department of Politics, University of Exeter, Amory Building, Office 502, Rennes Drive. Exeter EX4 4RJ, UK

Telefono: 00 44 (0) 7492 242024

Posta elettronica: [ts433@exeter.ac.uk](mailto:ts433@exeter.ac.uk)

Se Lei avrebbe domande o preoccupazioni sulla ricerca che desidererebbe discutere con un'altra rappresentante dell'università, potrebbe contattare professoressa e relatrice Nicole Bolleyer, [n.bolleyer@exeter.ac.uk](mailto:n.bolleyer@exeter.ac.uk).

### **Confidenzialità**

Interviste e trascrizioni di questi saranno tenuti in confidenzialità. Non verranno usati per altro che gli obiettivi descritti sopra, e terze parti non potranno accessarli (se non obbligatorio secondo la legge). Se Lei desidera, potrebbe avere una copia del testo trascritto della Sua intervista, così che può dare ulteriori commenti (in questo caso, per favore fornisca la Sua posta elettronica sotto). Le sue dati verranno tenuti in conformità alla cosiddetta "Data Protection Act".

### **Notizia sulla protezione delle dati**

La informazione che Lei fornisca sarà usata soltanto per scopi di ricerca, e le sue dati personali saranno trattati in conformità alla legge in vigore su protezione di dati e in conformità alla notifica dall'Università di Exeter nel Information Commissioner's Office (ICO). Le interviste e le trascrizioni saranno archiviati in server nell'Università di Exeter per un periodo indefinito. I



suoi dati personali verranno trattati in confidenzialità rigida, e non verranno rivelati a terzi non autorizzati. Il finanziamento di questo progetto viene dal European Research Council, ma il consiglio non ha nessun diritto di accedere né interviste né trascrizioni. La consegna della tesi é fissato per Ottobre 2018, ma risultati preliminari potranno essere pubblicati in varie conferenze/workshop e in riviste prima questa data. Esiste anche una possibilità che la tesi verrà pubblicata come una monografia accademica.

### Anonimato

Le dati dalle interviste saranno tenuti anonimati, senza riferimento al Suo nome, se altro non é stato concordato. In qualsiasi caso, la dottoranda fa riferimento al partito politico nel quale Lei lavora/ha lavorato. Le chiedo di indicare la scelta di anonimato che preferisce qui sotto:

Nome completo e titolo ☐

Titolo solo (non nome) ☐

Anonimato completo ☐

### Consenso

Io sono informato sui scopi di questo progetto, e capisco che:

- non é mandatorio partecipare in questa ricerca, e se decido di partecipare, posso nel qualsiasi momento ritirare il consenso
- ho il diritto di rifiutare che qualsiasi informazione su me venga pubblicato
- qualsiasi informazione che do, sarà usato soltanto per gli obiettivi di tale ricerca, che può includere per esempio pubblicazioni (ad.es. in riviste), conferenze o presentazioni seminari
- se applicabile, la informazione che fornisco, potrebbe essere condiviso con altri ricercatori che partecipano in questo progetto ("Regulating Civil Society")
- tutta la informazione che fornisco sarà trattato con confidenzialità
- se niente altro é concordato, la dottoranda si sforza di preservare il mio anonimato

.....

(Firma di informatore)

(Data)

.....

(Nome di informatore in lettere maiuscole)

.....

(Posta elettronica di informatore se desidera ricevere una copia della trascrizione della intervista)

.....

(Firma di dottoranda)  
maiuscole)

.....

(Nome di dottoranda in lettere

Una copia di questa scheda sarà tenuta del informatore, mentre una seconda copia sarà tenuta dalla dottoranda. I Suoi recapiti sono tenuti separatamente dalle dati della intervista.

## INTRODUKSJON TIL PARTIETS INDRE FORHOLD

1. Når du tenkjer på heile livsløpet til partiet, frå det var stifta til i dag: Vil du sei at partiet har gjennomført interne, organisatoriske reformar?
  - ➔ Dersom ja: Kva slags reformar?
  - ➔ Dersom ja: Kva var årsaka til desse reformane?  
(tilgang til statsstøtte, skattefordelar eller registrering, td)
2. I kva grad vil du sei at organisasjonen har endra seg over tid?
  - a. Kor mange landsmøte har partiet hatt – og når?
3. I kva grad fekk reformane konsekvensar for...?
  - Tilsette/årsverk
  - Medlemene si rolle i A) aktivitetar og B) I å fatta avgjerder
4. Kan du sei litt om kva for aktivitetar medlemene i partiet er involvert i?
5. Vil du sei at medlemene er involvert i aktivitetar på ein annan måte enn før?
  - **Viss JA:** Når skjedde det?
  - Kva var årsaka til desse endringane?
6. *Dersom personalsituasjonen er uklar.* Har partiet tilsette pr i dag?
  - I kva grad har personalsituasjonen i partiet endra seg over tid (sidan partiet vart stifta til i dag?)
  - Kva oppgåver har tilsette jobba med?
  - Kven eller kva delar av organisasjonen vil du sei hadde mest *nytte* av dei tilsette? (jobba dei tilsette mest *med* og *for* leiarar, medlemmer etc?)
  - I dei periodane partiet var representert på Stortinget/på andre nivå: Medverka tilsette som jobba for partiet der til *partiorganisasjonen*?
7. Kven vil du sei hadde ansvaret for den daglege drifta av partiet?

8. Så er eg interessert i å vita meir om korleis partiet fattar avgjerder på ulike område. Kan du skildra korleis partiet...
- a) Nominerer og vel dei som skal stå på vallistene
  - b) Nominerer og vel ny leiar
  - c) Utviklar partiprogram (kven har ansvaret)
  - d) Kven handterer pengestraumen/ressursane
9. Korleis vil du skildra medlemene si mogelegheit til å delta i prosessane nemnd ovanfor?
10. Kva med tilsette: Medverkar dei (formelt eller uformelt) i prosessane nemnde ovanfor?
11. Vil du sei at måten partiet fattar avgjerder på har endra seg over tid?
- a) Nominerer og vel dei som skal stå på vallistene
  - b) Nominerer og vel ny leiar
  - c) Utviklar partiprogram (kven har ansvaret)
  - d) Kven handterer pengestraumen/ressursane
12. Har dei tilsette sin posisjon endra seg sidan partiet vart stifta?
- Viss JA: Når skjedde det?
  - Kva var årsaka til desse endringane?
13. Har medlemene si rolle i å fatta avgjerder endra seg over tid
- Viss JA: Når skjedde det?
  - Kva var årsaka til desse endringane?

## **INTRODUKSJON TIL DET JURIDISKE RAMMEVERKET**

14. Finst det statlege reguleringar/statlege ordningar nedfelt i lovverket som du opplever gagnar eller er fordelaktige for partiet (til dømes: statsstøtte-reglar, gruppetilskot, skattefordelar)?
- a. Viss ja: Vil du sei at dei har hatt noko innverknad på den daglege drifta av partiet? Og i tilfelle ja – korleis?
15. Vil du sei at oppfatninga di av desse fordelaktive reguleringane/statlege ordningane har endra seg over tid?
- a. Viss ja: Greier du å hugsa kvifor – og når?

16. Finst det statlege reguleringar/statlege ordningar nedfelt i lovverket som du opplever som begrensande for partiet? (til dømes: registrering, kriterium for å motta statsstøtte, fordelingsnøkkel av statsstøtte, krav om rapportera rekneskapsopplysningar, krav om bruk av revisor, restriksjonar på å motta gåver/donasjonar, kontrollorgan, sanksjonar)
  - a. Viss ja: Vil du sei at dei har hatt noko innverknad på den daglege drifta av partiet? Og i tilfelle ja – korleis?
17. Vil du sei at oppfatninga di av desse fordelaktive reguleringane/statlege ordningane har endra seg over tid?
  - a. Viss ja: Greier du å hugsa kvifor – og når?

## INNTEKTER OG STATSSTØTTE

18. Kva er dei viktigaste inntektskjeldene til partiet no?
  - a. Kva med tidlegare?
  - b. I kva grad får partiet pengegåver?
19. **(Til parti som har motteke direkte statsstøtte):** Når du tenkjer tilbake på den FYRSTE gongen partiet fekk tilgang til direkte pengestøtte frå staten (statsstøtte). På kva måte påverka det partiet, vil du sei?
  - a) Personale?
  - b) Endringar i måten å fatta avgjerder på?
  - c) Medlemene si involvering i a) aktivitar, b) avgjerdsprosedyrar
20. I kva grad førte tilgang til statsstøtte til endringar i...
  - a) Personale?
  - b) Endringar i måten å fatta avgjerder på?
  - c) Medlemene si involvering i a) aktivitar, b) avgjerdsprosedyrar
21. **(Til parti som har mista statsstøtte):** Når du tenkjer tilbake på når partiet har mista statsstøtte. På kva måte påverka det partiet, vil du sei (td møtefrekvens, medlemsaktivitetar osv)?
  - a) Personale?
  - b) Endringar i måten å fatta avgjerder på?
  - c) Medlemene si involvering i a) aktivitar, b) avgjerdsprosedyrar
22. **(Til parti som har hatt lengre periodar med stabil tilgang til statsstøtte)** Korleis har det påverka partiet å ha lengre periodar med stabil tilgang til statsstøtte?
  - a) Personale?
  - b) Endringar i måten å fatta avgjerder på?
  - c) Medlemene si involvering i a) aktivitar, b) avgjerdsprosedyrar

23. Meiner du at det å ha tilgang/ikkje tilgang til statlegge ressursar som statsstøtte og skattefordelar er positivt eller negativt for partiet?
- Positivt: På kva måte (nøkkelord: overleving, personale, medlemmer)
  - Negativt: På kva måte (meir begrensningar, restriksjonar)
  - Har ditt syn på korvidt tilgang til statsstøtte og skattefordelar er positivt/negativt endra seg over tid?
24. På generelt grunnlag: Meiner du at tilgang til statlege ressursar er viktig for at parti skal overleva?
- Viss ja: På kva måte?
  - Viss ikkje: Kvifor ikkje?

## **SISTE SPØRSMÅL**

25. Vil du sei at det er lettare å oppretthalda og halda i live eit parti som har statsstøtte?
- a. Kvifor?
26. Vil du sei at leiarar har meir makt i parti som har statsstøtte samanlikna med parti som ikkje har statsstøtte?
- a. Kvifor?
27. Vil du sei at parti som får tilgang til statsstøtte tilset personale?
- a. Kvifor?
28. Vil du sei at eit parti som opererer i ein kontekst der det juridiske rammeverket ofte endrar seg gjev meir makt til leiarane sine, samanlikna med parti som opererer i ein kontekst der det juridiske rammeverket endrar seg sjeldan?
- a. Kvifor?
29. Vil du sei at det er lettare for eit parti å overleva i ein kontekst der grensa for å få tilgang til statsstøtte er låg, og der ufordelaktige reguleringar er få?
- a. Kvifor?

## **AVSLUTNING**

Er det noko du ynskjer å leggja til som me ikkje har snakka om endå?

*Norwegian consent form:*

## **Samtykkeskjema**

### **Prosjekttittel**

The influence of state funding on new minor party development and survival

### **Informasjon om prosjektet**

Dette prosjektet undersøker den moglege innverknaden av lover og reguleringar på interne forhold i og overlevingsraten av nye småparti i Noreg og Italia. Prosjektet er med andre ord interessert i å finna ut om fordelar (td. statsstøtte) og avgrensingar (td. krav om rapportering) i lovverket fører til endringar i talet på tilsette, medlemene si rolle og avgjerdsprosedyrar i nye småparti, og ser på om slike statlege reguleringar innverkar på slike parti sine overlevingsutsikter. Ingen tidlegare studiar har undersøkt innverknaden av lover og reguleringar på dei mest sårbare politiske partia i eit partisystem. Intervjua vil bli brukt for å belysa problemstillingane skildra ovanfor. Utan intervju er slike opplysningar om interne partiorganisatoriske forhold vanskeleg å få informasjon om.

Denne studien er eit doktorgradsprosjekt finansiert av Det europeiske forskingsrådet (European Research Council). Prosjektet er også ein del av eit større, femårig forskingsprosjekt (2013-2018) med base ved Universitetet i Exeter i Storbritannia, *Regulating Civil Society*. Det overordna prosjektet ser på korleis lover og reguleringar påverkar frivillige organisasjonar som interessegrupper og politiske parti. Stipendiaten som er ansvarleg for dette prosjektet har ingen kommersielle interesser.

### **Kontaktinformasjon**

For ytterlegare informasjon om prosjektet, kontakt gjerne:

Namn: Torill Stavenes

Adresse: Department of Politics, University of Exeter, Amory Building, Office 502, Rennes Drive. Exeter EX4 4RJ, UK

Telefon: 0047 97001356

Epost: [ts433@exeter.ac.uk](mailto:ts433@exeter.ac.uk)

Dersom du har spørsmål om prosjektet som du ynskjer å diskutera med andre ved Universitetet i Exeter, kan du kontakta professor og rettleiar Nicole Bolleyer, [n.bolleyer@exeter.ac.uk](mailto:n.bolleyer@exeter.ac.uk).

### **Konfidensielle opplysningar**

Intervjuopptak og transkriberte versjonar av desse blir handsama konfidensielt. Dei vil ikkje bli brukt til anna føremål enn det som er skildra ovanfor, og tredjepersonar vil ikkje få tilgang til materialet (så lenge dette ikkje er lovpålagt). Viss du ynskjer, kan du få ein kopi av det transkriberte intervjuet slik at du kan gje kommentarar på det (ver snill å oppgje epost under dersom du ynskjer dette). Data om deg vil bli oppbevart i samsvar med den såkalla Data Protection Act.

### **Informasjon om oppbevaring av data**

Den informasjonen du gjev i dette intervjuet vil kun bli brukt til forskingsføremål. Alle personlege data vil bli handsama i samsvar med gjeldande regelverk om datahandsaming og i

tråd med Universitetet i Exeter sine avtalar med det britiske datatilsynet (Information Commissioner's Office). Alle intervjuopptak og transkriberte versjonar av desse vil bli oppbevart på serverar ved Universitetet i Exeter på ubestemt tid. Dine personlege data vil bli handsama på strengt konfidensielt vis. Som nemnd ovanfor, finansierer Det europeiske forskingsrådet (European Research Council) dette prosjektet, men rådet har ingen rett til å få tilgang til intervjumaterialet. Planlagt disputas er i løpet av hausten 2018, sjølv om førebelse resultat frå studien er planlagt å bli presentert og publisert før det. Det er også ein liten sjanse for at doktorgraden kan bli publisert i bokform.

### Anonymitet

Dersom ikkje anna er avtalt, vil intervjudata bli oppbevart i anonymisert form, utan at namnet ditt blir nemnd. Me vil likevel referera til det politiske partiet du arbeider/arbeidde for. Ver snill å kryss av for ynskt grad av anonymitet i prosjektet i ei av rutene under.

Bruk av fullt namn og tittel (noverande eller tidlegare) ☐  
Bruk av noverande/tidlegare tittel i partiet (td. «leiar») ☐  
Full anonymitet ☐

### Opptak

Ver snill å kryss av for om du tillet opptak (kun lyd) av intervjuet eller ikkje.

Eg tillet at stipendiaten gjer opptak av dette intervjuet:

☐

Eg tillet ikkje at stipendiaten gjer opptak av dette intervjuet:

☐

### Samtykke

Eg har fullt ut blitt informert om føremåla ved dette prosjektet. Eg forstår at:

- det ikkje er obligatorisk å delta i dette forskingsprosjektet, og dersom eg ynskjer å delta, kan eg likevel trekkja meg til ei kvar tid
- eg har rett til å nekta at informasjon om meg blir publisert
- den informasjonen eg gjev kun vil bli brukt til dette forskingsprosjektet, som kan innebera publikasjonar eller akademiske konferansar/andre seminarpresentasjonar
- informasjon som eg gjev kan delast med andre forskarar som deltek i prosjektet (i anonymisert form, og kun dersom det er relevant)
- all informasjon eg gjev blir handsama konfidensielt
- dersom ikkje anna er avtalt, vil forskaren søkja å ivareta min anonymitet

.....

(Signatur av deltakar)

.....

(Dato)

.....

(Namn på deltakar i blokkbokstavar)

.....

(Epost-adressa til deltakaren, dersom denne har bede om å sjå ein transkribert versjon av intervjuet)

.....

(Signatur av stipendiat)

Deltakaren og forskaren skal ha kvar sin kopi av dette dokumentet. Kontaktinformasjonen din er oppbevart separat frå intervjudataene dine.

## Appendix F: Composition of executive councils in Norwegian and Italian new minor parties over time

**Table 1:** Analysis of changes to composition of executive council (centralisation) in new minor parties in Norway

Party/Year	Formation year	Composition of executive in first statutes (that I have accessed)	Changes to the executive made in later versions of statutes
<i>The Pensioner Party</i>	1985	<p>1985:</p> <p>Art. 2: The main party organisation is to consist of an executive council of 5 people (...).</p> <p>Art. 4: The executive (hovedstyret): The executive consists of the party leader, first and second deputy leader, and two members. In addition, the parliamentary party group's leader and the leader of the party's group in government are members.</p> <p>Art. 6: The congress elects the executive.</p>	<p>1986: The executive was extended with one board member. Two of the board members were to be the treasurer and the party secretary.</p> <p>1992: The executive was extended with two (regular) member. The right of the parliamentary party group's leader and the leader of the party's group in government to be part of the executive was abolished.</p> <p>1994: No change 1996: No change 2004: No change</p> <p>2008: (first reform after state funding access)<sup>1</sup>: The executive was extended with the leader of the parliamentary party group and the leader of the youth organisation.</p> <p>2010: The leader of the parliamentary party group and the leader of the youth organisation were no longer to be part of the executive (i.e. reversing the 2008 reform).</p> <p>2016: The 'study' leader was to be included in the executive, so was the secretary (take the places of the two neutral board members from before).</p>
<i>The Greens</i>	1988	<p>1990:</p> <p>Art 7: The Congress elects a Political committee (a smaller executive council) of 5 people, which has the daily responsibility for the external activities of</p>	<p>1993: The council was to allocate the following positions internally after being elected: leader, deputy leader, secretary, treasurer, international contact (Art. 11.2 and 11.3).</p> <p>1997: No change, except that two of the members of the executive were to be appointed spokespersons (Art. 11.3).</p>



		the party, including being the editor of the party newspaper (Grønn kontakt).	<p>2000: The executive <i>could</i> now have either five or seven members.<sup>2</sup></p> <p>2004: No change 2007: No change 2009: No change</p> <p>2012 (<u>first reform after state funding access</u>): The executive committee was to comprise two spokespersons (one of each gender), the party secretary, the international contact, 6 other members elected by the congress and one of the spokespersons for the youth organisation (...) (Art 9.1).</p> <p>Parliamentarians were automatically part of the executive, without voting rights, unless they were also (already) members of the executive (Art. 9.5).</p> <p>2014: Only the leader of the parliamentary party group (and not all parliamentarians) had meeting (but not voting rights) in the executive.</p> <p>2016: No change.</p>
<i>The Fatherland's Party</i>	1990	<p>1990:</p> <p>Art 2a: The congress elects the executive.</p> <p>Art. 2c: The executive council runs the party on a daily basis. It should comprise the leader, deputy leader, treasurer, and as many board members that are deemed appropriate.</p>	<p>1993: No change</p> <p>2002: No statutes, but description of executive on webpage in 2002 indicates no change</p> <p>2005: Same as above.</p>
<i>The Coastal Party</i>	1999	<p>2001:</p> <p>Art. 12: The members of the executive council are: The executive council members elected by the congress, and the party's parliamentary party leader.</p> <p>Art. 7.10: The national congress is to elect the members of the executive council (Hovedstyret): a). The party</p>	<p>2004: The executive council was extended with a party secretary. The full parliamentary party group (and not just its leader) became full members of the executive (Art. 7.9)</p> <p>2007: (<u>first reform after state funding access</u>): The executive was extended to include the treasurer (Art. 7.10)</p> <p>2008: No change.</p>

		leader, b) the first deputy leader, c) the second deputy leader, d) four board members and 4 deputy members.	2012: The treasurer was removed from the executive (Art. 7.12). Side organisations (one representative from each organisation) were granted representation in the executive for the first time (Art. 12).  2014: No change.
<i>The Christian Conservative Party</i>	2011	2013:  Art. 6: The executive council comprises the leader and two deputy leaders elected by congress. 4-6 members elected by congress. Leader of the youth org (from 2014 onwards), and leader of the parliamentary party group are also members.  The party secretary meets in the executive with the right to speak and suggest proposals, but without voting rights. The representative for the employees have full rights in all matters, apart from political issues where he/she only has the right to propose and speak.	2017: No change.

**Notes:** There are no statutes for the Cross Partisan MPs or Future for Finnmark, which explains why these parties are omitted from the table.

<sup>1</sup> The party did introduce internal transfers of subnational state funds in 1991, but the party struggled greatly on collecting such funds on national level initially (Annual account, 1991), which is why state funding's role in the 1992 process has not been selected as the first reform process following state funding here.

<sup>2</sup> This has not been perceived as a shift here, as it was not a definite change from 5 to 7 members (only a possibility).

**Sources:** *The Greens*: statutes 1990, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2016. *The Pensioner Party* statutes: 1985, 1986, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2016. *The Coastal Party*: statutes 2001, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2014. *The Fatherland Party*: Statutes: 1990, 1993. *The Christian Conservative Party*: Statutes 2013, 2017.

**Table 2:** Analysis of changes to composition of executive council (centralisation) in new minor parties in Italy

Party/Year	Formation year	Composition of executive in first statutes (that I have accessed)	Changes to the executive made in later versions
<i>The Greens</i>	1986	<p>Foundation document (atto costitutivo)</p> <p>Art 4: To be part of the first Coordination group, the following people have been elected unanimously and by acclamation: (list of 11 people).</p>	<p>1990: The Coordinating group was (still) composed of 11 members, elected at the federal assembly. Two representatives from the parliamentary party group were invited to take part, without voting rights (Art. 15).<sup>1</sup></p> <p>1993 (<u>first reform following state funding access</u>): The Federal Council (comprising 60 members elected by regional assemblies, the spokesperson, and MPs and senators that participated without voting rights) was to elect internally a president, a vice-president, a treasurer, a person responsible for information in the party. These, along with the spokesperson constituted the federal coordination group of the greens (i.e. executive) (Art. 12).</p> <p>1996: No change.</p> <p>1998: The Federal Council was now only to elect internally a president, a vice-president, and a treasurer. Simultaneously, a so-called Political office was introduced (which was now to be the executive organ of the party), composed of the spokesperson, the treasurer, 10 members elected by the national assembly, the president and vice-president of the federal council, the leader of the Senate group, of the parliamentary party group, and the leader of the delegation in the European Parliament. The latter three did not have a right to vote (Art. 12 BIS).</p> <p>2001: The executive was now composed of the president, and seven elected representatives. The presidents of the parliamentary party groups in Parliament/Senate and a representative from the European Parliament, and a representative from government participated without voting rights (Art. 13).</p> <p>2006: No change 2010: No change</p> <p>2012: The executive was now composed of two spokespersons (not just the president) (Art. 13)</p>

			2015: The executive was extended from 7 regular members to 12 (excluding spokespersons and elected representatives) (Art. 13).
<i>The Pensioner Party</i>	1987	<p>2002 (no executive, only larger, national executive):</p> <p>Art. 2.1. (Chapter 4): The national council is made up of the regional federation secretaries and by the chairmen of the associations federated to the party, who automatically are part of the council. In addition, and up to 20 other councillors (...).</p>	Not accessed other versions of the statutes.
<i>The Communist Refoundation Party</i>	1991	<p>1999:</p> <p>Art 39: The executive (direzione nazionale) is composed of a number given by the National Political Committee, that is no larger than 60. The secretary, the treasurer, the presidents of the parliamentary party groups, the president of the internal audit group are part of the executive by right.</p>	<p>2002 (<u>first reform following state funding access</u>)<sup>2</sup>: The maximum number of representatives in the executive was decreased to 39. The secretary, the treasurer, the president of the parliamentary party groups, the president of the internal audit group still had ex-officio seats (Art. 39).</p> <p>2005: The number of representatives was now decided by the National Political Committee (the national executive council). Only the secretary was now part of the organ by right (Art. 39).</p> <p>2008: No change. 2011: No change 2013: No change</p>
<i>Tricolour Flame</i>	1995	<p>1999:</p> <p>Art. 39: The executive (direzione nazionale) is composed of between 30 and 40 members elected by the Central Committee on the basis of a proposal from the national secretary. The regional coordinators participate with full rights.</p>	<p>2002: (<u>first reform following state funding access</u>): The executive council was removed from the statutes (i.e. abolished).</p> <p>2006: The executive was re-introduced, now with 18 members elected by the Central Committee (national executive). The national secretary participated with full rights, so did the members of the national secretariat, the president of the Central Committee and the president of the Central Commission of Discipline (Art. 33).</p> <p>2010: The executive was once again removed from statutes.</p> <p>2013: No change</p>

<i>The Communist Party of Workers</i>	2006	2008:  Art. 10.3: The national leadership is composed of 15 members, elected by the Political Committee on the basis of the norms given in the statutes.	2011: The 15 members were now elected by the congress, otherwise no change (Art. 9.3).  2014 ( <u>first reform following staffing</u> ): The executive was now to compose between 7 and 9 members, elected by the Central Committee (i.e. the national executive). They were to hold specific responsibilities (e.g. of the treasury) (Art. 10).
<i>Act to Stop the Decline</i>	2012	2012:  Art. 8.1: The executive is composed of up to 21 individuals, nominated by absolute majority by the national council among its members (...).  Art. 8.2: Among the members of the executive, a treasurer is identified. One or more vice-presidents may also be appointed.	2013: The executive was to comprise 25 people, comprising the national coordinator, and 24 members elected by the national assembly (Art. 24.1)  2014: No change.

**Notes:** There are no statutes from the Segni Pact, which is why this party is omitted from the table.

<sup>1</sup> Given that these were not granted voting rights, this has not been treated as a (centralising) reform process.

<sup>2</sup> There is indication that the 1999 statutes also reformed the composition of the executive council (Bertolino, 2004). In line with the approach adopted here, I have selected the first reform (that I have been able to identify with my primary sources) as the first reform following state funding access. The Communist Refoundation Party's office did not manage to find statutes prior to 1999, which has made it impossible to trace development prior to 1999.

**Sources:** *The Green Party*: statutes from 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2010, 2012, 2015. *The Communist Refoundation Party*: statutes from 1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2013. *Tricolour Flame*: statutes from 1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2013, 2017. *The Pensioner Party*: statutes from 2002. *Act to Stop the Decline*: statutes from 2012, 2013, 2014. *The Communist Party of Workers*: statutes from 2008, 2011, 2014.

## Appendix G: Ballot access criteria, Norway and Italy

**Table 1:** Ballot access criteria, Norway (national and regional level)

Introduction year (of legislation)	Description of ballot access criteria	Source
1985	<p>Art. 25: The electoral list has to be submitted by the 31<sup>st</sup> of March in election year. The list has to clearly indicate for which election it is submitted, and have a title that indicates the party/group. For registered parties, the title has to be the (registered) party name. The number of candidates is equal to the number of candidates to be elected from the relevant constituency (and 6 more candidate can be added to this). In regional elections the additional number of candidates amounts to 10 in regions where the regional council has at least 41 representations, and 20 additional candidates in regions that have at least 71 regional councillors.</p> <p>Art. 25 (continued): For non-registered parties (in regional and national elections), the electoral list must be signed by at least 500 people eligible to vote in that constituency (region). If a party is registered according to §17 in the Electoral Act (for which 5,000 signatures from eligible voters are required), the electoral list (in national and regional elections) has to be signed by the leader and secretary of the regional branch, and in local elections the leader and secretary for that local branch (if they are eligible to vote there). A candidate can only run for one party.</p>	'Valgloven' (Law 1985-03-01.3). [The Electoral Act]
2002	<p>Art. 6 (mostly similar to the regulation outlined above, changes are noted here): The number of candidates on regional electoral lists has to comprise at least seven candidates, and not more than the number of representatives that are to be elected to the regional council – plus six candidates.</p> <p>Art. 6 (continued): For non-registered parties (in regional and national elections), and for registered parties that in the previous parliamentary elections either received less than 5,000 votes overall (in the whole country), or less than 500 votes in each constituency in which it fielded candidate, the electoral list must be signed by at least 500 people eligible to vote in that constituency (region). For registered parties that either received 500 votes in a region or 5,000 votes in the country in the previous national elections, the electoral list only has to be signed by two board members in the relevant branch. The signatories must be eligible to vote in the constituency.</p>	'Valgloven' (Law 2002-06-28-57). [The Electoral Act]. <sup>177</sup>

<sup>177</sup> Can be accessed here: [https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2002-06-28-57#KAPITTEL\\_6](https://lovdata.no/dokument/NL/lov/2002-06-28-57#KAPITTEL_6)

**Table 2:** Ballot access requirements. Chamber of Deputies elections. Italy

Introduction year (of legislation)	Description of ballot access criteria	Source
1957	<p>Art. 14: A logo has to be presented for parties that intend to present a list of candidates. Logos that are similar to other parties' logos will not be accepted.</p> <p>Art. 15: The logo has to be presented not before 8 am of the 68th day, and no later than 4pm of the 62nd day before election day. It must have been verified by a notary, and presented by either the president or secretary of the party or political group.</p> <p>Art. 17: The parties also have to, when they register the logo, indicate a person in each constituency who will be charged with right to submit the electoral list in that constituency. A declaration, approved by a notary, must outline who this person is.</p> <p>Art. 18: The list of candidates for each constituency has to be presented by at least 500 and no more than 1,000 voters that are eligible voters in the relevant constituency. Each candidacy has to be followed by a declaration, signed and authenticated by a mayor or a notary, stating that the candidate has accepted the candidacy. The electoral list cannot have less than three candidates, and not more than the total number of candidates that are to be elected from that constituency.</p>	L361/1957.
1993 and 1994	<p><b>L277/1993:</b></p> <p>Art. 14 (small change to Art. 14 from 1957 law): A logo has to be presented for parties that intend to present a list of candidates, or candidates for the uninominal constituencies.</p> <p>Art. 2 (eliminates Art. 18 from the 1957 law): The presentation of candidates in the uninominal constituencies is made as individual candidates align themselves to (proportional) lists (according to art 1, comma 4, which states that in each constituency, 25 percent of the total number of seats are allocated proportionally (...)). A candidate's alignment to a list must be followed by a written letter by the representative (in line with art 17 in the 1957 law, see above) charged with the right to deposit the list to which the individual candidate is aligned. A candidate can just present him/herself in one electoral college.</p> <p>Art. 18: The declarations that present a candidate in the uninominal colleges have to be signed by no less than 500 and no more than 1,000 voters who are eligible to vote in the municipalities within the relevant uninominal college. The candidacy has to be accepted by (the candidate him/herself), documented through a signed declaration, authorised by a mayor or a notary.</p> <p>Art. 18-bis (new): The presentation of lists for the distribution of seats within the proportional component has to be signed by at least 1,500 and no more than 2,000 voters in the relevant constituency, in constituencies</p>	L277/1993 L73/1994 L162/1994

	<p>with up to 500,000 inhabitants. The numbers are 2,500-3,000 voters in constituencies with between 500,000 and 1,000,000 inhabitants, and between 4,000 and 4,500 in constituencies with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants.</p> <p>Art. 18-bis (continued): The lists have to contain a number of candidates that is not superior to a third of the seats assigned to that constituency (in the proportional quota of the election).</p> <p><b>L73/1994 and L162/1994:</b> Art. 1: In cases where the parliament is dissolved more than 120 days before the anticipated time, the number of required signatures to collect is halved [of what is outlined in the 1993 law text].</p>	
2005	<p>Art. 14: Changed back to how it was in 1957 law (see above).</p> <p>Art. 14-bis (new): Parties or groups of parties that intend to align themselves in a coalition must present a declaration where they outline that they wish to do so when the logo is registered. Upon registration of the logo, parties or groups of parties also submit their electoral program. Coalitions present one single program, and they also have to give the name of the leader of the coalition.</p> <p>Art. 18-bis (changed): The presentation of lists for the distribution of seats with the proportional method has to be signed by at least 1,500 and no more than 2,000 voters in the relevant constituency, in constituencies with up to 500,000 inhabitants. The numbers are 2,500-3,000 voters in constituencies with between 500,000 and 1,000,000 inhabitants, and between 4,000 and 4,500 in constituencies with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants. If the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved more than 120 days ahead of schedule, the number of signatures to be collected is halved. The signatures must be verified. Parties that are part of a parliamentary group in both chambers of parliament (Senate and the Chamber of Deputies) may register candidate lists without collecting supporting signatures from voters. The same is true for parties running in coalitions with two or more parliamentary parties and that have at least one elected member of the European Parliament elected under the same logo (with which it is now competing in the Chamber of Deputies elections).</p> <p>Art. 18-bis (continued): Each list, when presented, is composed of a list of candidacies that contains no less than a third, and no more than the number of seats assigned to that constituency.</p>	<p>OSCE. "Italy Parliamentary elections 9 and 10 April 2006".<sup>178</sup></p> <p>L270/2005.</p>
2008	<p>Rules from 2005 still applied. However, the 2008 elections were snap elections, and the number of signatures required for ballot access were thus halved. Furthermore, an extraordinary law passed in 2008 extended the category of the parties and political groups eligible for the exemption of collecting signatures, to all parties which had two deputies in the dissolved Parliament or two deputies in the European parliament.</p>	<p>OSCE. "Italy Parliamentary elections 13 and 14 April 2008".<sup>179</sup></p> <p>L24/2008 L30/2008</p>

<sup>178</sup> <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/italy/19405?download=true> Accessed 19.06.2018

<sup>179</sup> <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/italy/33280?download=true> Accessed 19.06.2018



2013	Rules from 2005 still applied. But, due to the early dissolution of parliament, and a new law introduced (see sources) the number of required signatures was reduced to a quarter of the regular numbers (not halved, like the 2005 law stated).	L223/2012 L232/2012  Camera dei deputati: "Manuale elettorale 2013" <sup>180</sup>
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<sup>180</sup> [http://leg16.camera.it/temiap/temi16/Manuale4febbraio2013\\_WEB.pdf](http://leg16.camera.it/temiap/temi16/Manuale4febbraio2013_WEB.pdf) Accessed 16.08.2018.

**Table 3: Ballot access requirements. Regional elections. Italy.**

Introduction year (of legislation)	Description of ballot access criteria	Source
1968	<p>Art. 9: The list of candidates in each constituency (so-called provincial lists) have to be presented between 9 am on the 30<sup>th</sup> day before the election day and noon on the 29<sup>th</sup> day prior to election day.</p> <p>Art. 9 (continued): The lists have to be presented by at least 750 and no more than 1,100 people eligible to vote (i.e. signatures) in constituencies that have a up to 100,000 inhabitants. The numbers are 1,000 to 1,500 signatures in constituencies that have between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants, 1,750 to 2,500 signatures in constituencies that have between 500,000 and 1,000,000 inhabitants, and between 2,000 and no more than 3,000 signatures in constituencies with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants. The signatures must be verified.</p> <p>Art. 9 (continued): Each electoral list has to comprise a number of candidates not exceeding the number of regional councillors that are to be elected from the constituency, and no less than a third of this number.</p> <p>Art. 9 (continued): Along with the electoral list, specific declarations to confirm that those who signed the electoral list really are eligible to vote must be presented. These declarations are issued by the mayor in the municipalities in which the signatories live. Furthermore, each candidacy must be followed by a document stating the candidate's approval, which has to be signed by a mayor or a notary. Also, a declaration stating that the candidates are eligible voters in any municipality in Italy must follow.</p>	L 108/1968
1995	<p>The turn towards a majoritarian system meant that from 1995 and onwards 4/5 of the regional councillors were elected based on competing provincial lists, and 1/5 based on a majoritarian model on the basis of competing regional lists. The rules below refer to the regional list (while the rules regarding the provincial lists are the ones outlined in L108/1968, referred to above, and which were still in force).</p> <p>Art. 1: The declaration of the presentation of each regional list has to take place within the time frame outlined in L108/1968. The list has to be accompanied by a declaration, which states that the list is linked to provincial lists presented in no less than half of the provinces in the relevant region. This declaration is only valid if also the provincial lists declare the same (i.e. provincial lists have to declare to which regional list they are linked). The regional list has to be signed by between 1,000 and no more than 1,500 people eligible to vote in municipalities in regions with up to 500,000 inhabitants. The numbers are between 1,750 and 2,500 in regions with between 500,000 and 1,000,000 inhabitants, between 3,500 and 5,000 in regions with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants. The signature requirement is halved if the regional council is dissolved more than 120 days ahead of schedule.</p>	L43/1995

	Art. 1 (continued): Each regional list comprises a number of candidates that counts no less than half of the candidates that are to be elected. The regional and provincial electoral lists cannot comprise more than 2/3 of one gender.	
1999	In 1999 ordinary, statutory regions (Regioni a statuto ordinario) were given the constitutional right to adopt their own regional electoral laws. However, no region did so ahead of the 2000 regional elections, and the 1968 and 1995 laws thus applied in the 2000 regional election.	Regione Campania: “Le elezioni regionali sotto il nuovo titolo V” <sup>181</sup>  Fiumicelli, 2009. <sup>182</sup>
2005	<p>The laws regulating the presentation of provincial lists (see L108/1968 above), and regional lists (see L43/1995) above) still applied, unless the regions had themselves introduced their own electoral laws. An overview of the ballot access criteria in the different regions (that had introduced their own regional laws) follows:</p> <p>5 regions introduced an electoral law in time for the 2005 regional elections:</p> <p><b>Toscana</b> (LR 25/2004): Art. 8: Provincial lists: Each provincial lists is marked with a logo, and attached to a candidate for the president for the regional government ('giunta'). The provincial lists are formed of one or two regional candidates (if two, one of each gender has to be present, Art. 10), and by constituency candidates (listed after the regional candidates). The number of candidates depends on the number of inhabitants in the province. The lists have to have gender parity (no more than 2/3 of one gender on the list).</p> <p>Art 10: A candidacy can only be presented in a maximum of three constituencies. Regional candidates can also present themselves as constituency candidates (in a total of two constituencies). Candidates for the president of the regional government cannot be presented as regional and/or constituency candidates.</p> <p>Art. 11: The logo of each group of lists has to be presented. A declaration from each list which outlines its alignment to a candidate for the president of the regional government must also be submitted. A signature requirement applies for the presentation of provincial lists: Between 750 and 1,000 signatures (from eligible voters) are required in constituencies with up to 200,000 inhabitants. Between 1,000 and not more than 1,500 signatures from voters in constituencies with between 200,000 and 500,000 inhabitants. Between 1,750 and not more than 2,500 signatures from voters in constituencies with between 500,000 and 1,000,000 inhabitants. Between 2,000 and not more than 3,000 signatures from voters in constituencies with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants. The signatures have to be authenticated, and no person can sign more than one list.</p>	<p>Regione Campania: “Le elezioni regionali sotto il nuovo titolo V”<sup>183</sup></p> <p>Fiumicelli, 2009.<sup>184</sup></p> <p>LR 25/2004 (Toscana)</p> <p>LR 27/2005 (Le Marche)</p> <p>LR 1/2005 (Calabria)</p> <p>LR 2/2005 (Puglia)</p> <p>LR 2/2005 (Lazio)</p>

<sup>181</sup> Accessed 25.08.2018: <http://www.sito.regione.campania.it/Elezioni/Normativa/dossiersenatoelezregionali.pdf>

<sup>182</sup> Accessed 25.08.2018: <https://www.osservatoriosullefonti.it/mobile-saggi/fascicoli/fasc-3-2009/325-davide-fiumicelli/file>

<sup>183</sup> Accessed 25.08.2018: <http://www.sito.regione.campania.it/Elezioni/Normativa/dossiersenatoelezregionali.pdf>

<sup>184</sup> Accessed 25.08.2018: <https://www.osservatoriosullefonti.it/mobile-saggi/fascicoli/fasc-3-2009/325-davide-fiumicelli/file>

	<p>Art 11 (continued): Each list has to be followed by a declaration from each candidate, declaring that they accept the candidacy.</p> <p><b>Le Marche:</b> Had a new law (LR 27/2005), but it did not apply to the 2005 elections, so the national law applied.</p> <p><b>Calabria:</b> (LR 1/2005): Art. 1: Electoral lists that are expressions of parties represented in the Italian parliament are exempted from the signature requirements (see the signature requirement in the national law).</p> <p>Art. 1 (continued): The electoral lists have to comprise both male and female candidates.</p> <p><b>Puglia:</b> (LR 2/2005): Art. 8: Electoral lists that are expressions of parties constituted in a parliamentary party group (in either the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies) or a council group in the outgoing regional council are exempted from the signature requirement (see the signature requirement in the national law).</p> <p><b>Lazio:</b> (LR 2/2005): Art. 8: Electoral lists that are expressions of parties or movements that are represented in a regional council group or in parliamentary party groups (in either one of the national chambers), are exempted from the national signature requirements. Also, parties whose electoral lists are marked with the same logo as a party exempted from the signature requirement, are exempted. No signature requirement exists for the presentation of candidacies for President of the Region.</p> <p>Art. 8 (continued): Each constituency list is composed of a number of candidates depending on the specific constituency (in the metropolitan constituency of Rome the lists were for example to be composed of between 22 and 32 candidates).</p> <p><b>Abruzzo</b> (LR 9/2005): In each provincial and regional list, neither of the genders could be represented with more than 70 percent of the candidates.</p>	
2010	<p>The rules outlined before, still applied. But, as more regions had adopted their own regional laws, the ballot access criteria changed in some regions:</p> <p><b>Calabria:</b> (In addition to LR 1/2005, which still applied, LR 4/2010 was introduced): Art. 1: In addition to the exemptions from the signature requirements in LR 1/2005, also provincial electoral lists that are expressions of at least one regional council group, or one of the components according to art. 27 of the region's statutes, are exempted. In any case, regional lists that are linked to provincial lists are exempted from the signature requirement.</p> <p>Art. 3: The provincial lists must comprise a minimum of 2/3 up to a maximum of the number of seats that the constituency is entitled to.</p>	<p>Camera dei deputati: "Documentazione e ricerche. Le elezioni regionali del 28 e 29 marzo 2010".<sup>185</sup></p> <p>LR 4/2010 (Calabria)</p> <p>LR 4/2009 (Campania)</p>

<sup>185</sup> [http://documenti.camera.it/leg16/dossier/Testi/Re0127.htm#\\_ftn38](http://documenti.camera.it/leg16/dossier/Testi/Re0127.htm#_ftn38) Accessed 16.08.2018.

	<p><b>Campania</b> (LR 4/2009): Art. 3: The presentation of provincial lists must be accompanied by a declaration stating the lists' alignment with a candidate for the candidacy of President of the regional government. The provincial lists, as long as they also comply with other regulations, and are presented under the same symbol in at least 3 constituencies, are accepted.</p> <p>Art. 3 (continued): Those lists that are expressions of parties represented in the Italian parliament or in groups in the regional council are not subject to signature requirements.</p> <p>Art. 10: Each provincial list cannot have more than 2/3 of candidates of one gender.</p> <p><b>Lazio:</b> No change after 2005.</p> <p><b>Le Marche:</b> (LR 27/2004, for the first time applied in this election): Art. 9: Each provincial list is formed by a number of candidates that does not exceed the number of regional councillors that are to be elected from that constituency, and no less than 1/3 of this number. Each provincial list is aligned with a candidate for the presidency of the regional government. No provincial list can have a representation of one gender amounting to more than 2/3 of all the candidacies on the list.</p> <p>Art. 10: The lists of candidates (provincial lists) must be presented between 8 am on the 30<sup>th</sup> day before the election and noon on the 29<sup>th</sup> day before the election. The signature requirements are: For provincial lists in constituencies with up to 250,000 inhabitants, a list must be signed by at least 350 and no more than 700 voters, and in constituencies with more than 250,000 inhabitants, the number is between 500 and 1,000 signatures. The signatures have to be authenticated. No voter can sign more than one electoral list. A candidacy can only be presented in one constituency (province).</p> <p>Art. 10 (continued): To the list of candidates, a certificate from mayors regarding the signatories must be attached (stating that those who signed the list are really eligible to vote), and a declaration from each candidate on the list accepting the candidacy. A declaration stating that the candidate is an eligible voter must also follow. The declaration of the presentation of the list has to include a statement outlining to which candidate for the president of the regional government the list is attached.</p> <p><b>Piemonte</b> (LR 21/2009): Art. 1: Those lists that are expressions of parties that had at least one candidate elected in the last elections to either the national parliament, the European parliament, or the regional council, are exempted from the signature requirement. The same goes for lists that are expressions of parties/movements present in council groups in the outgoing regional council when the election campaign starts, and for lists that are linked to council groups when the electoral campaign starts.</p> <p><b>Puglia:</b> No change after 2005.</p>	<p>LR 27/2005 (Le Marche)</p> <p>LR 21/2009 (Piemonte)</p> <p>LR 74/2004 and LR 50/2009 (Toscana)</p> <p>LR 2/2010 (Umbria)</p> <p>LR 3/2010, and LR 19/2010 (Basilicata)</p>
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	<p><b>Toscana</b> (LR 74/2004 and LR 50/2009): The 2005 act was still valid, for instance concerning signature requirement (see above), but some additions:</p> <p><i>LR 74/2004:</i>  Art. 3: The electoral lists (provincial) are to be presented between 8 am on the 30<sup>th</sup> day prior to the election and noon on the 29<sup>th</sup> day before the election.</p> <p>Art. 3 (continued): The following documents are necessary to present a list: Certificate from mayors stating that the signatories are indeed eligible to vote in the relevant province, declaration from each candidate that she/he accepts the candidacy, and a certificate attesting that the candidate is eligible to vote in one (any) municipality in Italy. Each list has a logo and is linked to a candidate to the presidency of the regional government. Each list is composed of one or more regional candidates, having a maximum of 5 regional candidates (both genders must be represented), and constituency candidates. The total number of the latter type of candidates is determined proportionally based on the population (according to the last census). The number of candidates cannot be less than 1/3 of this. No provincial list can have more than 2/3 of its candidates of the same gender.</p> <p><i>LR 50/2009:</i>  Art. 2: The provincial lists are formed of one or two regional candidates (same as LR 25/2004 stated), but no more than five (new in 2009).</p> <p><b>Umbria</b> (LR 2/2010): Art. 6: For provincial lists, the signature requirement is as follows: Between 750 and 1,100 in provinces with up to 100,000 inhabitants, between 1,200 and 1,500 in provinces having between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants, between 2,000 and 2,500 in provinces with between 500,000 and 1,000,000 inhabitants, and between 2,400 and 3,000 in provinces with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants.</p> <p>Art. 6 (continued): Lists that are expressions of parties or movements constituted in a regional council group (except for the mixed group) or in the national parliament (either one of the chambers), are exempted from signature collection. The same is the case for parties, movements and political groups that are represented in the regional council and that are linked with at least one party or political group that is present in both the chambers of the national parliament</p> <p><b>Abruzzo:</b> No change.</p> <p><b>Basilicata</b> (LR 3/2010, and LR 19/2010): No change to ballot access requirements (national law applied).</p>	
2015	<p><b>Veneto</b> (LR 5/2012): Art. 13: Each provincial list is linked to a logo and to a candidate for the president of the regional government. The provincial lists are composed of a number of candidates that is not superior to the number of regional councillors to elect from the constituency, and no less than a third of this. Provincial lists that have an even number of candidates, has to have complete gender parity among its candidacies. If the number of candidates is an odd number, one gender cannot have more than one representative more than the other gender.</p>	Ministero dell'Interno: "Elezioni regionali e

	<p>Art. 14: The lists of candidates have to be presented between 8am on the 30<sup>th</sup> day prior to the election and noon on the 29<sup>th</sup> day prior to the election. The lists are presented by at least 750 and not more than 1,100 voters in constituencies with up to 100,000 inhabitants, by at least 1,000 and no more than 1,500 voters in constituencies with more than 100,000 inhabitants and up to 500,000 inhabitants, by at least 1,750 and no more than 2,500 voters in constituencies with more than 500,000 inhabitants and up to 1,000,000 inhabitants, and finally by at least 2,000 and no more than 3,000 voters in constituencies with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants.</p> <p>Art. 14 (continued): Electoral lists that are expressions of regional council groups or of components that are represented in the mixed group (in the regional council) are exempted from the signature requirement. The same is the case for lists of candidates that have a declaration of alignment to regional groups or political components in the mixed group, and that were present in the regional council at least one year prior to the electoral campaign. No voter can sign more than one electoral list. A candidate can present his/her candidacy in all constituencies, as long as it is under the same logo.</p> <p>Art. 14 (continued): The following documents must follow the electoral list: Declarations from mayors stating that those who have signed the electoral list are indeed voters in a municipality in the constituency. The declaration of acceptance of the candidacy from each candidate. The confirmation that each candidate is an eligible voter in any municipality in Italy. The list also has to have a declaration stating to which candidate for the president of the regional government the list is attached.</p> <p><b>Puglia</b> (LR 7/2015): Art. 6 (replaces Art. 8 from the 2005-act): The presentation of lists has to be accompanied by a declaration of alignment to one of the candidates for the president to the regional government. If the electoral lists comply with the law and are presented in at least three constituencies, they are approved. Electoral lists must be presented between 8am on the 30<sup>th</sup> day before the election and noon on the 29<sup>th</sup> day before the election.</p> <p>Art. 6 (continued): Signature requirement: Between 750 and 1,100 voters in constituencies with up to 100,000 inhabitants. Between 1,000 and 1,500 voters in constituencies with between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants. Between 1,750 and 2,500 voters in constituencies with between 500,000 and 1,000,000 inhabitants. Between 2,000 and no more than 3,000 voters in constituencies with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants. Those lists that are expressions of parties and movements that are represented in council groups in the outgoing regional council, or that are constituted in parliamentary party groups in the national legislature (in one or both of the chambers), or that are initiated by a regional councillor that is in office in the outgoing regional legislature, are exempted from the signature requirement.</p> <p>Art. 6 (continued): No voter can sign more than one electoral list. Each electoral list has to comprise a number of candidates that counts no less than the number of seats assigned to that constituency, and no</p>	<p>amministrative, 31. maggio 2015».<sup>186</sup></p> <p>LR 5/2012 (Veneto)</p> <p>LR 7/2015 (Puglia)</p> <p>LR 41/2014 (Liguria)</p> <p>LR 51/2014 (Toscana)</p> <p>LR 4/2015 (Umbria)</p> <p>LR 5/2015 (Le Marche)</p>
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<sup>186</sup> [http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/dossier\\_2015\\_portale.pdf](http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/dossier_2015_portale.pdf) Accessed 25.08.2018

	<p>more than the number that one gets by dividing the number of inhabitants by 50. Neither one of the genders can be represented with more than 60 percent of the candidates in an electoral list.</p> <p>Art. 6 (continued): With the electoral list, the following documents must be attached: Declarations from mayors stating that those voters who have signed the electoral lists are indeed registered voters in one of the municipalities in the relevant constituency. A declaration of acceptance of the candidacy from each candidate. Certificate that the candidates are registered voters in any municipality in Italy.</p> <p><b>Campania:</b> No change (see above).</p> <p><b>Liguria</b> (LR 41/2014): Art. 13: Provincial lists are to be supported by signatures. The signature requirement is: Between 500 and no more than 1,000 signatures from voters in constituencies with up to 300,000 inhabitants, and at least 1,000 and no more than 1,500 voters in constituencies with more than 300,000 inhabitants. Between 1,500 and 2,500 signatures are required for regional lists. The signature requirement is halved in the case of early elections of the regional council. Those lists that are expressions of parties or movements that are already represented in the regional council or in the Italian parliament are exempted from the signature requirement.</p> <p><b>Toscana</b> (LR 51/2014 – replaced LR 25/2004): Art. 8: Each list has a symbol and has to be aligned with a candidate for the president of the regional government. On the provincial lists, no more than three <i>regional</i> candidates can appear. The number of candidacies is determined based on the number of inhabitants. Electoral (constituency) lists under a specific logo are accepted only if they are presented (under the same symbol) in at least nine constituencies.</p> <p>Art. 10: A candidacy can maximum be presented in three constituencies. Regional candidates can only present themselves in a total of two constituencies.</p> <p>Art. 11: Each list has to present a symbol and a declaration stating to which candidate to the regional government the list is aligned. The signature requirements are as follows: Between 525 and 500 voters in constituencies with up to 200,000 inhabitants. Between 700 and no more than 1,050 voters in constituencies with more than 200,000 inhabitants and up to 500,000 inhabitants. Between 1,225 and no more than 1,750 voters in constituencies with more than 500,000 inhabitants. For constituency lists that are expressions of regional council groups, provided that they were constituted at least six months prior to the election campaign, (even if the list is with another symbol or name than that of the group) only have to collect 10 signatures from eligible voters. Those regional council groups constituted six months or less prior to the election, only have to collect half the required signatures. The signatures have to be authenticated. No voter can sign more than one electoral list. The presentation of each list is followed by a declaration of acceptance by the candidates, and (if present) the regional candidates (these declarations must be authenticated).</p> <p><b>Umbria</b> (LR 4/2015): Art. 9 (replaces art. 6 in LR 2/2010): The lists of candidates are presented between 8 am on the 30<sup>th</sup> day prior to the election and noon on the 29<sup>th</sup> day prior to the election. No gender can be</p>	
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	<p>represented with more than 60 percent of the candidates on a list. The lists are signed by a minimum of 500 and a maximum of 1,000 voters in the region. If the regional assembly is terminated early (with more than 120 days), the number of minimum and maximum signatures that must be collected are halved. No voter can sign more than one electoral list. Each list has to comprise a number of candidates not superior to the seats assigned to the constituency, and no less than 1/5 of this number.</p> <p>Art. 9 (continued): The electoral list has to be followed by a declaration stating that the voters who have signed the electoral lists are indeed voters in the specific region (the declaration has to stem from mayors). Additionally, a declaration from each of the candidates stating that they have accepted the candidacies, and a declaration that each candidate is an eligible voter in any municipality in Italy, must follow the list. Furthermore, the declaration of alignment of each list to a candidate for the presidency of the regional government (the candidate for president has to release the same declaration) must also be attached.</p> <p><b>Le Marche</b> (LR 5/2015) (changes to the law in 2010):</p> <p>Art. 6: No gender can be represented with less than 1/3 of the candidates on a provincial list.</p> <p>Art. 7: Changes to the signature requirement. The new signature requirements were: For provincial lists in constituencies with up to 250,000 inhabitants, a list must be signed by at least 245 and no more than 490 voters, and in constituencies with more than 250,000 inhabitants, the number is between 350 and 700 signatures. The signatures have to be authenticated. No voter can sign more than one electoral list. A candidacy can only be presented in one constituency (province).</p>	
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**Notes:** LR stands for 'legge regionale' (regional law).

**Table 4:** Ballot access requirements. European elections. Italy.

Introduction year (of legislation)	Description of ballot access criteria	Source
1979	<p>Art. 11: The logo has to be presented not before 8am on the 49th day prior to the election and no later than 4pm on the 48th day prior to the election.</p> <p>Art. 12: The lists of candidates have to be presented, for each constituency, from 8am on the 40th day prior to the election to 8pm on the 39th day prior to the election. The lists have to be signed by no less than 30,000 voters and no more than 35,000 voters. At least 10 percent of the signatures must come from voters in each and every region in the constituency. Those parties or groups of parties that are represented in parliament (in the sitting legislature), in either one of the two chambers when the electoral campaign starts, or that in the last election presented candidacies under an own logo and won at least one seat in one of the two chambers, are exempted from the signature requirement. The exemption finally applies to parties or group of parties that in the last election presented candidacies under its own logo and won at least one seat in the European parliament.</p> <p>Art. 12 (continued): A candidate cannot be part of two competing lists. Each candidate has to declare that he/she has accepted the candidacy, and has to declare if he/she is running in other constituencies. Each electoral list has to comprise a number of candidates no less than three, and not more than the number of members to elect from that constituency.</p>	L18/1979 (with updates in L61/1984)
1990	<p>Addition to the existing law:</p> <p>Art. 12 (further exemption from the signature requirement): If a party presents a joint list with a party that is exempted from the signature requirement, the other party is also exempted.</p> <p>Art. 14: The signatures for the electoral lists have to be approved by a notary (or similar official). Signatures can only be collected in the 180 days prior to the final date set for the presentation of candidacies.</p>	L53/1990
2004	<p>Addition to the existing law:</p> <p>Art. 4 (further exemption from the signature requirement): No signature is required for parties or political groups that in the previous election to the Chamber of Deputies presented a list (in the proportional part of the election), and that were aligned to a candidate that was elected in a uninominal electoral college.</p>	L90/2004
2014	<p>Addition to the existing law (Art. 12).</p> <p>Art. 1: On the electoral list, candidates of the same gender cannot exceed half of the candidacies. The two first candidates have to be of different genders.</p>	L65/2014  See also: Camera dei deputati. "Manuale elettorale. Le norme per le elezioni dei membri

		del Parlamento Europe spettanti all'Italia». <sup>187</sup>
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<sup>187</sup> [http://www.camera.it/temiap/temi17/Manuale%20elezioni%20europee%202014\\_29%20aprile%202014.pdf](http://www.camera.it/temiap/temi17/Manuale%20elezioni%20europee%202014_29%20aprile%202014.pdf) Accessed 19.06.2018.

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